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Foreword
Despite decades of research and advances in data and methodologies, meas-
uring poverty and reconciling this with patterns of economic growth is a
disputatious issue. This contentiousness and the fact that poverty remains
widespread in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) charged UNU-WIDER to launch in
2011 a major research project—the Growth and Poverty Project (GAPP)—to
re-examine SSA’s growth, poverty, and inequality trends with three main
goals in mind. First, develop new tools to measure monetary poverty in
consistent and comparable ways, and make these tools accessible to scholars
and analysts in Africa, other developing regions, and beyond. Second, under-
take detailed case studies of sixteen of the twenty-four most populous coun-
tries in SSA (covering no less than 73.8 per cent of the population in SSA) to
measure poverty trends, and ‘triangulate’ these with other development indi-
cators. Third, develop a macro–micro analytical framework to conduct
detailed research in countries where poverty and economic growth trends
appear to be inconsistent.
This book holds the essential country-level harvest of this large, multi-
country, multi-discipline research project brought to the reader in a con-
densed form together with a comprehensive synthesis to explore the depths
of the unfolding story of the growth–poverty nexus in SSA and to absorb the
policy implications. The project team consisted of leading international
experts and UNU-WIDER researchers along with some of the African contin-
ent’s best researchers and data analysts. I hereby sincerely express my appre-
ciation and admiration of the academic and analytical skills of this team and
the detailed knowledge of the case countries brought out so clearly in this
volume. Our profession does indeed have something sensible to contribute—
both in recognizing that growth is in many cases translated into poverty
reduction in African countries and in helping to understand why this link is
sometimes not as robust as desirable.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the Special Programme Contribution
(SPC) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland for this project and the
regular core financial contributions made to its research programme from the





UNU-WIDER’s Growth and Poverty Project (GAPP) was implemented between
2012 and 2014 and brought together a highly qualified team of more than
forty researchers from Africa and beyond. Without their dedication and pro-
fessional competence, this book would not have been possible. We wish to
express our sincere appreciation to these country teams who produced the
case studies in this book. Putting together a volume such as this one is no easy
undertaking; and we wish to express our appreciation for all of the high-level
academic input, together with the copious goodwill and patience—which
were much needed when doing the original groundwork followed by numer-
ous revisions and updates of the individual chapters.
A series of intensive planning meetings, involving many of the authors,
helped shape the project; and results were presented at several UNU-WIDER
development conferences and many other occasions across African countries.
We are grateful to all of those who offered critique and most helpful com-
ments. They include Oxford University Press’s Economics Commissioning
Editor Adam Swallow and his team, as well as three anonymous referees.
Your efforts were essential in helping to sharpen our research questions and
approach to addressing one of the most intricate challenges facing the devel-
opment profession, the African growth renaissance and its impact on poverty
reduction.
UNU-WIDER and its dedicated staff provided steady support, including
research assistance, which goes far beyond the normal call of duty. Particular
thanks go to Dominik Etienne for excellent programming; Anne Ruohonen
for consistent project assistance; Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen for all of the careful
publication support, including themany contacts with OUP; and LisaWinkler
and the group of copy-editors for helping to put out the many UNU-WIDER
working papers produced during the course of the project.
The research project—Reconciling Africa’s Growth, Poverty, and Inequality
Trends—was generously supported by the governments of Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, with a special project contribution add-
itionally provided by the Finnish government. UNU-WIDER gratefully
acknowledges this vital research funding. It is our hope that the volume will
be of relevance to all of those struggling to end poverty in Africa.
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1.1 Introduction
The recovery and acceleration of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
since about 1995 has been widely recognized. Much less is known about the
extent to which this growth has been associated with improvements in wel-
fare for the population in general and with poverty reduction in particular.
A recent Afrobarometer survey suggests that ‘despite high reported growth
rates, lived poverty at the grassroots remains little changed’ (Dulani et al.
2013). At the same time, these negative sentiments contrast with a number
of notably optimistic (and disputed) assessments that have been published
based on internationally available datasets (Young 2012; Pinkovskiy and Sala-
i-Martin 2014).
In addition, concerns have been raised about the quality of available
national accounts and other statistics for Africa, even raising a question
about the actual scope and extent of the African growth revival. In terms of
poverty, serious concerns with respect to the comparability and reliability of
bellwether consumption poverty statistics pre-date the more recent broader-
based doubts concerning the African statistical base. This is particularly true of
the US$1.25 per day statistics compiled by the World Bank, but extends to
national line poverty statistics reported in the World Development Indicators
(see World Bank 2015), and is a serious concern at country levels.
Amidst these disparate signals, pressing questions related to growth’s impli-
cations for poverty reduction hang in the balance. This book is dedicated to
answering these questions. To do so, we chart an intermediate course between
the extremes of the debate with respect to the reliability of African statistics.
On the one hand, we (the editors) believe that simply downloading statistics
from international databases and then subjecting those to analytical scrutiny
opens excessive scope for error and misinterpretation. On the other hand, we
do not believe that the mass of African statistics are as uninformative as the
harsher critics assert. We believe that a proper understanding of the extent to
which this growth recovery has or has not translated into poverty reduction
can come from (perhaps can only come from) careful country studies con-
ducted by analysts with expert knowledge of the context, based on their best
first-hand analysis of the available data and, crucially, knowledge of its relative
strengths and weaknesses.
To this end, this volume contains a series of in-depth country studies
conducted as part of UNU-WIDER’s Growth and Poverty Project (GAPP) in
SSA, a project conducted over the period 2012–14. The project undertook case
studies of sixteen of the twenty-four most populous countries in Africa (cover-
ing 73.8 per cent of the population of the region) and nine of the top ten. The
time period considered varied from case to case; generally it covered the last
ten to twenty years and so, in most cases, covered the period of the 2008 food,
fuel, and financial crisis.
This broad coverage notwithstanding, this book’s focus is not on aggrega-
tions of figures across countries. Rather, the aim has been to provide a careful
understanding of each country case. The chapters focus on presenting
observed trends in different welfare measures (monetary and non-monetary
poverty as well as inequality) and on seeking to understand linkages to eco-
nomic growth. In each case, the country authors returned to the primary
datasets, applying best techniques in analysis with a strong focus on assuring
comparability over time and on recognition of data limitations. The country
studies then sought to provide explanations for the observed outcomes. We
believe that, with this combination of careful documentation of the evidence
alongside rigorous effort to explain the outcomes, this is the most compre-
hensive and careful assessment of growth and poverty on the subcontinent
currently available.
Chapter 2 synthesizes findings from the country studies and presents les-
sons for the future. The case country studies, grouped broadly in terms of
growth and poverty reduction experience, follow. In this introductory chap-
ter, we revert to internationally available data to broadly set the scene. The
World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2015) compile data across
the different countries in the world and its major regions, including SSA, and
cover a significant period of time. The sources of the data; how comparable it
really is between countries; and the extent of and methods used for any
interpolation or extrapolation are not always clear. Nonetheless, these data
form a useful starting point in trying to summarize the situation for SSA as a
whole, and, in that spirit, we make use of these data first to briefly review the
growth recovery in SSA and then to consider the evolution of living condi-
tions using both non-monetary and monetary indicators.
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1.2 The Growth Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa
After registering a dismal performance during themid-1970s to about themid-
1990s, the reported constant dollar value of GDP per capita for SSA as a whole
has experienced a consistent upward trajectory since 1994, with only a minor
and temporary interruption at the time of the financial crisis in 2007–8. This
growth has also been widespread across SSA; thirty-nine out of forty-three
countries with available data had higher per capita GDP levels in 2013 than in
2000. Coming on the back of the declines registered over the roughly two
decades between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, the past twenty years mark a
dramatic change in fortune in the region. The decadal average growth rates for
the sixteen focus countries in this book, as reported in the WDI, are presented
in Table 1.1. In many of these countries, growth was low or negative in the
1980s, and then higher in the 1990s and often especially in the 2000s, though
with some exceptions.
There has been wide discussion of the factors which have underlain this
growth recovery, and in policy circles, the beneficial effects of increased
commodity prices are often referred to as a key driver. As we discuss in
Chapter 2, this explanation is not consistent with case country experience.
While some countries experienced improvements in terms of trade, many
others have not. The case country experience does indicate that sharp
Table 1.1. Average GDP per capita growth of the sixteen selected sub-Saharan
African countries (annual percentage) in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Burkina Faso 1.73 1.35 1.16 2.28 2.25
Cameroon 0.28 4.39 0.92 2.33 0.76
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.96 2.46 0.94 8.31 0.48
Cote d’Ivoire 4.38 2.81 4.07 0.40 1.08
Ethiopia* 0.82 0.60 5.12
Ghana 0.31 0.84 1.01 1.63 2.78
Kenya 2.33 3.31 0.44 0.74 0.84
Madagascar 0.22 1.34 2.36 1.48 0.21
Malawi 2.73 2.93 2.34 2.16 1.16
Mozambique 0.58 2.59 4.24
Nigeria 0.66 4.20 3.98 0.08 6.14
Rwanda 0.17 2.04 0.56 0.85 4.89
South Africa 3.56 1.00 0.26 0.81 2.02
Tanzania** 0.61 0.27 3.63
Uganda*** 0.45 3.43 3.65
Zambia 0.68 1.70 1.57 1.21 4.02
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.04 1.29 1.10 0.85 2.35
Note: *1980s data from 1982 onwards. **1980s data includes only one year (1989). ***1980s data from
1983 onwards.
Source: World Development Indicators
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movements in terms of trade, such as those that occurred in 2008, can
strongly impact welfare levels. At the same time, the diversity of experience
in terms of trade and growth indicates essentially no support for the idea that
terms of trade effects underpin the growth revival as a whole.
Rather, more durable factors seem to be at work. Radelet (2010) explains
the growth recovery in terms of five main factors: more democratic and
accountable governments; better economic policies; reduction in debt
levels and better donor relations; new technologies; and the emergence of
a new generation of policymakers, activists, and business leaders. None of
these factors are particularly transitory, and some are the fruit of purposeful
and long-term efforts to bring them about. For example, the African
Economic Research Consortium (AERC), founded in 1988, has for nearly
thirty years explicitly sought to facilitate the emergence of a new gener-
ation of policymakers alongside a more capable technical apparatus—both
within and outside government—to support economic policymaking. With
many senior African policymakers being graduates of AERC programmes
alongside manifest improvements in technical economic analysis capacities
throughout the subcontinent, the AERC can very plausibly claim (and does
claim) that it has played an important role in the emergence of a new
generation of policymakers and a consequent improvement in economic
policies.
While there is much to celebrate, it is also important to maintain perspec-
tive. For sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the most recentWDI indicates that the
constant dollar value of GDP per capita in 1994 was only 78 per cent of what it
had been in 1974. The growth renaissance from 1994 only returned GDP per
capita to its level of 1974 in 2007. By 2013, GDP per capita in SSA was only 7.7
per cent higher than in 1974. Consistent with the aggregates, just over half of
the countries for which WDI data are available had higher per capita GDP in
2007 than they had had in 1974. Hence, a substantial part of the growth
recovery amounts to catching up lost ground. Furthermore, while impressive
relative to previous experience, the growth rate of per capita GDP in SSA over
the period from 1994 to date is still much lower than the average in WDI
data for all developing countries, particularly East Asia and the Pacific and
South Asia.
All this said, the growth recovery is a dramatic change for the better. Given
the low levels of income characterizing many countries in SSA, economic
growth is essentially a necessary condition for substantial reductions in mon-
etary poverty and is a facilitator of improvements in non-monetary poverty
through, for example, greater tax revenue. However, growth does not always
translate effectively into improved living conditions for the majority of the
population; hence the key question of this book: have people become better
off as a result of the growth recovery?
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1.3 Evidence on African Development
We first provide a set of observations about recent developments in SSA by
looking at the evolution of different measures of welfare taken from the
WDI. The multidimensional nature of human welfare means that a wide range
of measures of living conditions need to be taken into account, including both
monetary and non-monetary dimensions. We begin here by considering some
key non-monetary measures which may be more easily comparable across
countries. We then proceed to consider selected monetary measures.
1.3.1 Non-monetary Measures
Mortality rates are one of the most fundamental development indicators. The
under-five mortality rate for SSA as a whole (see Figure 1.1) shows an impres-
sive and consistent reduction of over 60 per cent over the full period between
1965 and 2013. The rate of reduction visibly slows between about 1975 and
1995, and SSA loses ground relative to other regions of the world during this
period. This rate of reduction then picks up again in the most recent period
basically converging to the path of reduction elsewhere. Similarly, estimated
maternal mortality rates almost halved between 1990 and 2013. While much
improved, both indicators remain high, with nearly one child in ten dying
before their fifth birthday andmore than 500maternal deaths per 100,000 live
births in 2013. These are easily the highest levels registered by any of the
major developing regions.
The period from 1990 to date has also seen improvements in drinking water
and sanitation facilities in rural areas in particular. The levels remain low, and,
0
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Figure 1.1. Under-five mortality by major world region, 1980–2013
Source: World Development Indicators
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unlikemortality already discussed, SSA is registering a noticeably slower rate of
improvement compared with other major regions of the world, even in recent
decades. It is not clear why this should be so. Similar to other regions of the
world, there are substantial differences in access to these services with provi-
sion generally much better in urban areas.
Despite the lagging performance relative to other regions of the world in
water and sanitation, SSA has registered a strong performance in reducing
childhood malnutrition over the past twenty years. This is an important
indicator as it relates to the increased capability of families to deliver the
confluence of factors necessary for physical growth and development in early
childhood. It thus signifies real improvements on the ground across an array of
factors. In addition, mounting evidence points to the importance of early
childhood health for welfare and productivity in adulthood (e.g. Hoddinott
et al. 2008). Hence, these improvements are a hopeful sign for the future.
Another area where impressive improvement is registered is education. The
last twenty years have seen a major focus on trying to extend primary educa-
tion to all, and some countries have been more successful than others in this.
Arguably, it may be that it is the secondary level that is more important in
order for education to be transformative. Secondary enrolment rates are still
quite low in sub-Saharan Africa, and lower for females than males, yet both
have improved consistently over the past twenty years.
One dramatic change in SSA, as elsewhere, over recent years has been the
expansion in mobile phones. Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people
increased from 2.5 in 2000 to 66.0 in 2013. As of 2013, the data indicate
that mobile phone penetration in SSA lags behind, for example, South
Asia, only slightly. This is a remarkable achievement given the rural and
dispersed nature of the African subcontinent. It is potentially a very important
development.
Finally, while population and population growth are not direct welfare
measures, they have a bearing on many other outcomes. As shown in
Figure 1.2, population growth in SSA is expected to remain rapid, particularly
in comparison with major population centres such as China and India. The
UN medium variant population projection indicates that, by 2050, the popu-
lation of SSA will be larger than that of China and India (individually, not
combined). By 2050, more than one in five persons on the globe will reside in
SSA, up from a population share of about 12 per cent in 2010. Rapid popula-
tion growth in SSA is a function of continued high fertility rates. In 2012, the
average fertility rate was around five, following a consistent decline over
the past thirty years from a figure of about 6.5 in 1980. While SSA has made
progress in terms of reducing fertility rates, it strongly lags behind most other
regions of the world and, on the whole, continues to leave the benefits of a
demographic transition on the table.
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Overall, these various non-monetary poverty indicators show significant
progress over the periods considered here—some pre-dating the phase of re-
established growth, and some improving more quickly over this period. SSA
generally lags behind other developing regions of the world, with the gap
often widening during the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. From
about 1995, the performance of SSA has been, for many non-monetary indi-
cators, roughly on par with other developing regions of the world in terms of
rate of improvement, despite slower per capita GDP growth.
The non-monetary indicators presented here are, we believe, both import-
ant and relatively robust. They strongly indicate that something is happening
on the subcontinent.
1.3.2 Monetary Measures
We turn now to monetary measures of welfare, a much trickier challenge. We
first consider the evolution of real household consumption per capita in SSA
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Figure 1.2. Projected population growth for China, India, and sub-Saharan Africa,
2010–50
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/
index.htm>. For definition of variables, check the link Glossary of Demographic Terms, accessed 29
January 2012
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long period of decline/stagnation and then sustained recovery since around
2000. But the implications of this recovery for monetary poverty cannot be
judged without assessing the distribution of this consumption growth across
households.
Estimating a monetary poverty figure for SSA as a whole requires a common
unit of measure. The only available estimates are the global monetary poverty
figures produced by the World Bank. The latest available estimates indicate
that 51 per cent of the population of SSA was poor in 1981 and 58 per cent in
1999, relative to the US$1.25 poverty line. By 2010 this poverty rate had fallen
to 48 per cent. This shows progress in reducing poverty. Consistent with its
slower per capita GDP growth, the rate of decrease in the poverty headcount is
less than for East and South Asia, including the period since 2000.
As will be made abundantly clear in Chapter 2 and in the country case
chapters, these poverty headcounts are at best gross estimations. The regional
estimates are amalgamations of country-level estimates, where problems are
more evident. These country-level estimates of poverty relative to the US$1.25
poverty line have the advantage of comprehensiveness of country coverage, at
the cost of a number of challenges. For example, data may not be comparable
between countries because of differences in the surveys used, or because of
differences in the procedures used to adjust for price differences over time or
space. The many difficulties encountered in adequately measuring monetary
poverty in Nigeria alone (see Chapter 10) should cause any analyst to























































Figure 1.3. Household final consumption expenditure per capita for sub-Saharan
Africa, 1981–2013 (constant 2005 US$)
Source: World Development Indicators
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In addition, the methodology for these calculations is not adequately docu-
mented in international datasets, making the numbers difficult to interpret.
The exchange rate conversions needed to make comparable estimates across
all countries are also problematic. Such conversions are made at purchasing
power parity (PPP) exchange rates. While significant resources have been put
into the computation of PPP exchange rates through the International Com-
parisons Project, there is widespread disagreement about the adequacy of
these adjustments (see e.g. Ackland et al. 2013; Deaton and Aten 2014).
In this volume, the focus is not on cross-country comparison, meaning that
national poverty lines, held fixed in real terms, can be used and the conversion
problems just noted can be circumvented. Poverty relative to a national line is
likely to be the more relevant concern at the country level, and this approach
avoids the need for any exchange rate conversion. As noted, the authors of the
country studies presented in this volume all have a detailed knowledge of the
specific data being used and its strengths and weaknesses.
1.4 Summing Up
The aggregate data for SSA as a whole reviewed here suggest that living
conditions, measured by both monetary and non-monetary indicators, have
improved over the period of re-established growth, with some improvements
in non-monetary indicators pre-dating this. It remains the case that the
absolute levels of deprivation in SSA continue to be high relative to most
other regions of the world. Beyond this, not a lot can be said. These aggregate
figures do provide a starting point, but they hide a great deal of country
diversity. Chapter 2, to which we now turn, takes on the challenge of synthe-
sizing this diversity and presenting a series of lessons learned.
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Two Cheers for the African Growth Renaissance
(but not Three)
Channing Arndt, Andy McKay, and Finn Tarp
2.1 Introduction
This chapter draws from sixteen detailed country case studies, which collect-
ively represent nearly three-quarters of the sub-Saharan African (SSA) popula-
tion. Attempts at synthesis of something as massive as the African continent
south of the Sahara customarily begin with emphasis on the diversity encoun-
tered and the consequent perils confronting the generalizer. We will follow
suit. Consider four populous countries in focus in the chapters that follow:
Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and South Africa. These
countries contain 41 per cent of the population of the subcontinent, and, as
the chapters focused on these countries illustrate, the experiences and devel-
opment challenges facing them differ enormously. To take only one example,
the recent drop in world oil prices by about 50 per cent represents a serious
threat to macroeconomic stability to major oil exporters such as Nigeria. At
the same time, it is likely to be a boon for large and dispersed structural fuel
importers such as Ethiopia. From a development policy perspective, the issues
in the fronts of the minds of decision-makers in Nigeria and Ethiopia are, at
this moment in time, very different.
Nevertheless, stepping back to amuch broader perspective, there is a lot that
is shared. Foremost, the peoples of the subcontinent share with each other,
and with the people in the rest of the world, a desire for better lives for
themselves and for their children. Much has been written about what consti-
tutes a ‘better life’ and associated issues of measuring whether such a better life
is being achieved or not. This volume takes a broad view of what constitutes a
better life in line with the capabilities approach developed by Sen (1993).
Whenever a broad perspective is taken on assessing a better life, the operatio-
nalization of this perspective will inevitably encounter limits to its applica-
tion; and these limits will vary from country to country.
The country chapters in this volume focus principally on the issue of
whether the peoples of the sixteen countries in focus are experiencing a better
life or not. In light of the diversity of experiences, priorities, and country-level
limitations in our capacity to assess trends in well-being, a unified method-
ology across all countries was not deemed to be the best way to proceed. But
the authors of the case chapters were invited to employ approaches that were
structurally similar, while allowing for heterogeneity. In particular, authors
were encouraged to examine trends in well-being from multiple angles, to
compare and contrast across multiple data sources, and to draw upon their in-
depth experience of the country in question. The aim throughout has been to
develop, to the greatest extent possible, a coherent narrative that explains
what has been happening with emphasis on the last fifteen to twenty years. In
addition, the case countries employ, either implicitly or explicitly, the optic of
the poverty, growth, and inequality triangle of Bourguignon (2004) in devel-
oping their narratives (see also Bourguignon 2003).
The task of this synthesis chapter is to draw together what can be said from
these narratives. A very broad-brush picture already emerges from the aggre-
gate data presented in our Introduction in Chapter 1. Compared with the
experience from about 1975 to about 1995, the performance of the subcon-
tinent has, in general, been vastly improved. Unfortunately, this observation
does not take us very far for at least three reasons. First, outperforming the
period 1975–95 is a remarkably low bar to clear. As emphasized in Chapter 1,
development outcomes were dismal. Second, a number of countries, such as
Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, fail to clear even that. Finally, the vast space
above the bar set by the 1975–95 period remains unexplored.
To investigate this space, section 2.2 categorizes each country into one of
four groups and discusses these allocations. Section 2.3 presents a series of
lessons drawn from the case studies, while section 2.4 revisits the risks of a
cross-country analysis which does not take account of local knowledge and
context. The final section looks forward.
2.2 Country Typologies
2.2.1 The Poverty, Growth, and Inequality Triangle
Before describing the groups into which we have placed countries for
the purpose of this synthesis, some discussion of the poverty, growth, and
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inequality triangle, on which the typologies are motivated, is merited.When a
significant share of a population is defined as poor because they live below
some given absolute consumption threshold, the poverty rate for that popu-
lation is a macroeconomic variable. Changes in the poverty rate are linked to
other macroeconomic phenomena, not least economic growth. For most
African countries, economic growth is a necessary condition for sustained
improvement in the welfare of the poor. This assertion falls out of the
Bourguignon (2004) poverty, growth, and inequality triangle. In environ-
ments characterized by very low GDP, consumption levels are generally low,
even if consumption is characterized by perfect equality. To the extent that
onemoves away from perfect equality of consumption, poverty rates will tend
to worsen. By similar logic, if GDP grows, this increment to production must
go somewhere. If it accrues as consumption for lower-income populations,
then some measure of poverty will improve. If the fruits of the production
increment accrue only to upper-income households, then an increase in
inequality (by at least some metrics) is to be expected. These relationships
comprise the fundamental logic of the triangle.
There are several mechanisms which could ‘break’ the poverty, growth, and
inequality triangle. First, when the poverty metric is the share of the popula-
tion living below some material welfare threshold (i.e. the poverty head-
count), one can easily generate situations where growth occurs, inequality
declines, and the poverty headcount remains essentially constant by postu-
lating bizarrely shaped distributions of consumption. For example, if very
few households live ‘near’ the poverty line, then GDP growth could
accrue exclusively to households below the poverty line, causing those house-
holds to approach the poverty line while not crossing it. In this case, there
is GDP growth, a decline in inequality of consumption, and no reduction in
the poverty headcount rate. While easy to postulate, these situations are, in
our experience, rare.
Two additional mechanisms that can break the poverty, growth, and
inequality triangle can be considered using two basic macroeconomic
accounting identities. These cases were not considered by Bourguignon
(2004) as he uses a household income per adult equivalent as an income
metric:
Cþ I þ GþXM ¼ GDP ð2:1Þ
Abs ¼ Cþ I þG ¼ GDP þM X ð2:2Þ
The standard GDP identity using an expenditure optic shown in equation
(2.1) can be reformulated to illustrate the definition of absorption (2.2). This is
the broadest-based standard measure of economic welfare in the economy.
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Thinking in real terms, the identity in (2.2) states that the real use of goods
and services (Abs = absorption) divides itself into three components: con-
sumption (C), investment (I), and government spending (G). The sum repre-
sents total usage of goods and services in the economy, which must equal the
amount available. Goods and services are produced domestically (GDP) and
imported (M). Exports (X) are subtracted from this total.1
From equation (2.2), one can straightforwardly identify two additional
reasons why the triangle of Bourguignon (2004) might not hold, even in the
absence of measurement issues:
1. GDP growth is not proportional across the components of absorption.
For example, GDP growth might be translating into growth in invest-
ment and government combined with stagnation in per capita
consumption.
2. The real trade balance (M-X) shifts such that, for example, the volume of
imports declines relative to the volume of exports. One expects this to
happen following, for example, a decline in the terms of trade, a reduc-
tion in the volume of foreign assistance, or the initiation of debt service
payments.
These two factors are serious considerations, particularly given recent
experience. In many of the case countries, interest in improving social out-
comes has led to substantial growth in state expenditures driven by areas such
as education, health, water, and sanitation. This then often translates into
improved non-monetary outcomes, and so reduction of some dimensions of
poverty, even if monetary poverty improves less. While donor funding has
been important in these areas, there have also been concerted efforts to raise
tax revenue to support government expenditure in these and other areas. In
addition, improved growth performance and prospects combined with better
macroeconomic management should also enhance interest in investment. In
sum, for a given real trade balance (M-X), the components of absorption are
generally shifting, sometimes substantially.
Perhaps more importantly, the period since about 2003 has been character-
ized by large shifts in global relative prices, with strong implications for the
real trade balance. Food and fuel prices, which are major traded items for
essentially all African countries, rose dramatically relative to the prices of
manufactures and services. For those low-income African countries which
are predominantly large net importers of fuels and often food, they were
forced to import less or export more of other goods, or borrow, in order to
procure the same volume of fuels and food (in the absence of the appearance
1 See Tarp (1993) for a more elaborate overview.
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of some new source of foreign exchange). In other words, for these countries,
at least part of the increment to production in GDP growthmust effectively be
shipped overseas in order to purchase even the same volume of imports.
Finally, the triangle may break due to mismeasurement of any one of the
components. While much has been made about the weaknesses of African
GDP estimates (e.g. Jerven 2014) and fierce debates persist on the proper
estimation of monetary poverty (as discussed in Chapter 1 and many of the
case studies that follow), the estimation of inequality is almost surely the
weakest link in the triangle. As discussed in Box 2.1, with the possible excep-
tion of South Africa, none of the case countries has even attempted to imple-
ment a statistical system that responds to the specialized requirements for
tracking inequality.
In sum, the poverty, growth, and inequality triangle is not an iron rule even
in the absence of measurement issues. We also acknowledge a range of com-
plex intertemporal choices and potential trade-offs discussed in detail by
Bourguignon (2004). Nevertheless, the simple arithmetic of the triangle pro-
vides a useful analytical framework for considering relationships acrossmacro-
economic variables, including measures of monetary poverty. The triangle is
also relevant for non-monetary measures of poverty. As noted above, growth
in absorption, whether driven by GDP growth or an increase in net imports,
permits more consumption, investment, and/or government expenditure.
One reasonably expects an expanded government expenditure envelope to
result in improvements in the social outcomes targeted by government
expenditure even if there may be a lag due to long gestation periods. We
apply this optic in the typologies that follow.
2.2.2 Country Categorization
We classify countries into one of four groups. These are:
1. Relatively rapid economic growth and corresponding poverty reduction.
2. Relatively rapid economic growth but limited poverty reduction.
3. Uninspiring or negative economic growth and corresponding stagnation
or increases in poverty.
4. Low-information countries.
As already noted, it is not difficult to criticize almost any categorization
scheme. The difficulties inherent in categorizing economies based on publicly
available data, such as the World Development Indicators, are illustrated in
Box 2.2. The discussion below provides brief comments on each country case
with emphasis on those cases where categorization is, in our view, less clear.
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Countries categorized within the first group, relatively rapid growth and
corresponding poverty reduction, are: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, and
Uganda. Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, and Uganda all fall comfortably within
this group based on experience over the past ten to fifteen years or more.
Ghana, with its large rebasing of GDP accounts, is one of the examples of the
Box 2.1. MEASURING INEQUALITY
To begin, it merits mentioning that a specialized system, the system of national accounts
(SNA), exists for the measurement of GDP. Similarly, for the measurement of poverty
and well-being, specialized surveys, such as Living Standards Measurement (LSMS) and
Demographic and Health (DHS) surveys, have been designed and broadly administered.
For the measurement of inequality, there are hardly any corresponding systems, tailored
to the particular challenges of these measures, in African countries.
This absence is not due to any lack of specialized challenges. In nearly all African
countries, it is eminently possible, indeed expected, for a very small share of the
population to command a relatively large share of consumption, income, and wealth,
with strong implications for many inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. And
the wealthy in developing countries (as elsewhere) are a heterogeneous group with
some members earning or consuming considerably more than others. Both of these
factors point to a strong need to oversample wealthy households. Yet, the widespread
sense is that wealthy households are under-represented in most household surveys, in
part reflecting the frequent unwillingness of such households to respond to surveys. This
can explain in significant part the tendency for household surveys to often underesti-
mate aggregate consumption relative to national accounts (Ravallion 2003). This under-
sampling would bias downward inequality measures, perhaps significantly. It also likely
contributes to the enhanced volatility of inequality estimates as the number of very
wealthy households that are actually included in the sample might vary a lot with strong
implications for measured inequality.
A second problematic feature of household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa is that the
questionnaire frequently does not vary with circumstance. The same questionnaires
designed to capture consumption/income of absolutely poor households are used for
wealthier households even though their consumption patterns are very different. As
such, the questionnaires administered to wealthy households very often focus on items
reflecting trivial expenditure shares while only broadly treating important classes of
expenditure, with implications for non-sampling error.
These factors are, in all likelihood, on display in Nigeria where theWorld Bank’sNigeria
Economic Report (2014) lists an implausibly low national Gini coefficient for Nigeria of
about 0.33 based on a 5,000 household panel conducted in 2010/11 and 2012/13. This
estimate is much lower than any other publicly available national-level estimate and puts
Nigeria in the same ballpark as the Republic of Korea. More generally, the variations in
alternative inequality measures are vividly on display in the World Income Inequality
Database (WIID) at UNU-WIDER.
The profound challenges to adequate inequality measurement, particularly in SSA,
would appear to be deeply problematic for the approach of Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovskiy
(2010), which makes uncritical use of the available inequality data, not stopping to
assess their reliability, to say nothing of the scale of imputations they make for the very
large numbers of missing values. This could substantially affect their results.
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Jerven and Johnston (2015) African Statistical Tragedy; but there is no doubt
that it has experienced more than two decades of respectable economic
growth, and nearly all welfare indicators, consumption poverty included,
point to improvements, often substantial ones. Malawi is perhaps the
most controversial placement within this first group. Contrary to the official
poverty statistics, the case study presented in this volume finds monetary
poverty reductions that are consistent with rapid agricultural growth. Non-
monetary measures also point strongly towards improvement, particularly in
relatively recent periods. Nevertheless, even if one accepts that growth has
occurred and led to poverty reduction in recent years, the durability of this
positive trend remains open to question. The growth and poverty reduction
spell in Malawi has been relatively short and has been driven by agricultural
Box 2.2. DIFFICULTIES IN CATEGORIZATION
Country categorization based on growth and poverty trends is an endeavour likely to
generate disagreement. It may seem that a systematic evaluation of available indicators,
such as those assembled in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI),
should yield reasonably stable categorizations. However, our attempts at classification
based on these criteria were strongly sensitive to the choice of poverty measures, time
frame, and even the version of the WDI employed.
Consider the case of Tanzania. Based on US$1.25 a day poverty headcount figures,
Tanzania appears to have achieved significant progress, with poverty falling from 84 per
cent in 2000 to 68 and 43 per cent in 2007 and 2012. Further investigation, as discussed
in the Tanzania chapter, shows these numbers are not plausible. Looking at national
poverty lines suggests a very different scenario, with poverty only declining from 36 to
34 per cent between 2000 and 2007. Further compounding difficulties, these national
line figures of 36 and 34 per cent are not comparable to the 2012 poverty estimate of 28
per cent. Hence, they have been withdrawn from the most recent release of the WDI.
In countries such as Cameroon, the choice of time frame can significantly impact the
poverty story. Based on national poverty lines, poverty fell from 53 to 40 per cent
between 1996 and 2007. However, this gain occurred entirely between 1996 and
2001 and if instead the period 2001–7 were considered, Cameroon would appear to
have achieved absolutely no improvements (see Box 2.3).
Finally, methods of computing poverty rates are frequently scrutinized and then
revised. For example, the most recent South African poverty estimates, based on
national poverty lines, appearing in the WDI indicate a substantial increase in poverty
from 38 per cent in 2000 to 57 and 46 per cent in 2006 and 2011 respectively. The WDI
is reflecting an official revision from previous estimates, which suggested the opposite,
with poverty declining by 15 percentage points to 23 per cent between 2000 and 2006.
The South Africa chapter relies on neither figure, preferring income rather than
consumption-related measures due to greater reliability and robustness.
These observations strongly underline the rationale for this book as discussed in the
Introduction. Simply plucking figures from the WDI can provide a deeply misleading
picture, or at least one that is easily contradicted through alternative choices of indica-
tors (or via release of a revised WDI). They also highlight the difficulties inherent in
classification in the volatile contexts that characterize Africa south of the Sahara.
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production, at least partly as a consequence of an input subsidy programme. It
remains to be seen whether a more sustainable process has been ignited.
Countries categorized within the second group, relatively rapid growth but
limited poverty reduction, are: Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania,
and Zambia. While Burkina Faso fits fairly comfortably within this category,
the other countries are somewhat less clear. The case study for Mozambique
points to a strong role for temporary factors influencing the most recent
poverty assessment; and the authors expect poverty reduction to resume
when the next set of data is analysed.
Nigeria could be classified as a low-information economy, given the desul-
tory state of statistics in relation to monetary poverty. For example, the
recently released Nigeria Economic Report (World Bank 2014) estimates poverty
rates in 2010 and 2012 at much lower levels than the official estimates.
However, the report shrinks from making formal comparisons with earlier
monetary poverty estimates due to severe comparability issues. Were it pos-
sible, application of the same approach to earlier years may yield similarly
lower estimates, leaving the conclusion of stagnation or even increase in
measured monetary poverty intact. In addition, the analyses undertaken for
2010 and 2012 show only a small decline in poverty over that short period that
is clearly statistically insignificant. Finally, the report publishes an implausibly
low Gini coefficient of about 0.33 (see Box 2.1). Non-monetary measures
appear to be much more reliable, and the Nigeria case chapter conducts con-
siderable original analysis using those data. Viewed broadly, the available
evidence summarized in the Nigeria study points reasonably consistently
towards broad stagnation in living standards based both on monetary and
non-monetary measures, despite fairly rapid GDP growth and a substantial
terms of trade boost due to rising oil prices over this specific time period.
For Tanzania, economic growth has probably been overstated. However, the
extent of overstatement is likely not so large as to reclassify it to the third
group. Tanzania’s tepid performance in reducing monetary poverty can be
explained by the slow growth of household consumption, reflecting in part
slow growth in agriculture, relatively high population growth, and food and
fuel price increases. Zambia is a curious case. Official monetarymeasures point
to stagnation in living standards in rural zones and mild improvements in
urban zones. The analysis of non-monetary measures conducted in the case
study provides exactly the opposite signal with notable improvements in rural
zones and stagnation in urban zones. This puzzle remains to be resolved. The
constraint appears to be principally the analytical effort required to resolve the
puzzle rather than an underlying data constraint (though better data would
certainly make the task easier).
Countries categorized within the third group, uninspiring or negative
growth and corresponding relative stagnation or increases in poverty, are:
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Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa. Côte d’Ivoire
and Madagascar fit comfortably within this group, both plagued by political
instability over much of the period and Cote d’Ivoire by extended episodes of
conflict. In both cases this was associated with economic decline and often
worsening monetary and sometimes non-monetary poverty outcomes. Cam-
eroon and Kenya have had relatively volatile growth records, with some
periods of growth but others of stagnation or even recession, and correspond-
ingly limited long-run gains in many welfare indicators.
Growth in South Africa has been tepid relative to many countries on the
continent both before and after the end of apartheid. While growth picked up
in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, growth essentially collapsed
following the financial crisis of 2008. It has yet to resume at anywhere near the
rates required to deliver substantial employment and welfare gains, reinfor-
cing the categorization decided upon here. Essentially stagnant monetary
measures of poverty and zero or negative progress in reducing inequality
accompany the uninspiring growth performance. With respect to non-
monetary measures, the ample scope for redistribution made available by
the fall of apartheid has permitted impressive progress in many measures of
non-monetary poverty, representing substantial government investment in
sectors such as education and housing over this period. These investments
have explicitly sought to target previously disadvantaged groups.
Finally, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is securely categorized
as a relatively low-information economy, even by the standards of SSA and
despite ongoing efforts to improve the information base.
Overall, the recent growth record in these sixteen countries is not one of
consistent fast growth across the board. There is a wide range of experience. In
terms of the extent to which countries have been able to improve the living
conditions of their citizens, there is an even broader range of experience with
some relatively fast-growing countries registering disconcertingly few
improvements in the welfare of the general population.
2.3 Lessons
2.3.1 Peace and Stability
During the 1990s, the term ‘lost decade’ (or ‘lost decades’ as the aggregate
growth hiatus persisted) became increasingly employed to describe the eco-
nomic experience of SSA since about 1980. The terminology employed evoked
a sense of stagnation. Easterly (2001: 135), for example, points out that
‘median per capita income growth in developing countries was 0.0 per cent’
from 1980 to 1993. The countries of SSA, by and large, sat on the left-hand side
of this distribution with negative per capita growth. However, when reading
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the actual case studies, the period in question is almost invariably character-
ized by massive upheavals as opposed to stagnation. Tanzania ‘only’ had to
transition from a socialist to a market orientation. There are, unfortunately,
many at the other end of the spectrum. The Rwandan genocide is well known.
Mozambique suffered a devastating decade-long war that killed 1 million,
displaced 4 million, literally decimated rural infrastructure, and left it the
consensus ‘poorest country in the world’ by 1992. In general, some period of
massive upheaval, almost always punctuated with violence, often severe vio-
lence, was the rule almost everywhere.
The importance of political stability and avoidance of conflict for economic
and social development is well recognized and clearly evidenced by the more
recent experiences of Côte d’Ivoire andMadagascar. In the remaining fourteen
of the sixteen case countries, stability as a basic precondition to growth and
broad-based poverty reduction is much improved relative to the tumult that
characterized the experience of nearly all of the case countries at some point
during the 1980s and into the 1990s. An assertion of improvement does not
imply that all is well. For example, the 2007–8 electoral crisis in Kenya clearly
had a substantial adverse impact on living conditions at the time, as well as
illustrating that democratization does not guarantee stability. This is true even
in countries where democracy is relatively well embedded, as in the case of
Ghana, which has peacefully managed two changes of government since
1992. Nevertheless, even in Ghana, closely contested elections risk creating
tensions; and the context of recent oil discoveries may increase this risk. In
Ethiopia and Rwanda, political risk reduces the lustre of notably strong object-
ive performances in growth and poverty reduction. Finally, one can recall
that, while Côte d’Ivoire was seen as very stable and peaceful in the 1970s
and early 1980s, it later descended into large-scale conflict.
It should, in addition, be recognized that our ‘sample’ of sixteen countries
suffers from selection bias. Mali, Sudan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe are not among
the cases considered in this volume in largemeasure because conflict or political
instability precludes in-depth analysis of living conditions. Even among our
selected sixteen, there is, arguably, not a single case where threats to political
stability could be termed very mild or highly unlikely. In cases such as Nigeria
with Boko Haram, open conflict is ongoing.With all of this said, the cases often
vividly illustrate that governments in SSA in general have been doing a much
better job of fulfilling their fundamental role of ensuring peace and security,
providing the fundamental stage for the growth acceleration since 1995.
2.3.2 Data Issues
Without question, the data situation in SSA has substantially and reasonably
consistently improved over the past twenty-five years. In 1990, only a handful
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of countries had data allowingmeasurement of consumption poverty, and the
DHS surveys were only beginning. Since then, the large majority of countries
have had multiple DHS surveys, and the majority of countries have now had
multiple income and expenditure surveys.
Having said this, all is clearly not well. Massive deficiencies plague almost
every case country. The shortcomings of GDP and growth statistics are well
known and briefly discussed in Chapter 1. The desultory state of agricultural
statistics is reviewed in Box 2.5; price data are often surprisingly weak (see
Box 2.6); and emerging interest in inequality on the subcontinent confronts
the functional absence of a system designed specifically to track it in an
effective way as discussed in Box 2.1. The weaknesses and confusion that
characterize data systems at the country level are at best held constant and
more likely magnified when transferred to international datasets as discussed
in Box 2.2 (see also the discussion of FAO maize production data in the
Mozambique case study).
Doing better is a clear priority. Pluralistic political systems require informa-
tion in order to function properly. Given the evident very large appetite of
global investors for information and given the need for information if there is
any hope of developing a well-informed polity, it seems to us deeply unwise to
dismiss appropriate data collection and analysis for a later phase of develop-
ment. Appropriate information is better viewed as a key public good that, in
many instances, only government can supply. In short, we agree with the UN
Secretary General’s High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015
Development Agenda,2 which called for nothing less than a data revolution.
Some thoughts on appropriate data collection programmes are included in
Box 2.3.
2.3.3 Volatility of Monetary Poverty
While the frequency and severity of descent into conflict or macroeconomic
collapse has clearly declined on the subcontinent, other sorts of volatility
prominently remain. With the accumulation of experience in the estimation
of monetary poverty, not least from the cases in this volume, it is becoming
increasingly apparent that consumption poverty estimates are volatile. This is
true for three reasons, discussed in Box 2.4. Among these reasons is actual
variation in levels of consumption (the other two are sampling and non-
sampling error). An extensive literature argues that households seek to smooth
their consumption and use different predominantly informal ways of doing so—
see Case (1995) for a brief overview of an influential symposium. The literature
2 See <http://www.un.org/sg/management/hlppost2015.shtml>.
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also confirms that while households generally try to smooth their consump-
tion they are unable to do so perfectly. Households frequently face major
interrelated shocks, such as unusually good or bad harvests, changes in prices
of items they purchase or sell, and variations in general economic conditions
with implications for income-earning opportunities.
The Burkina Faso case finds that monetary poverty increased by about six
percentage points from 1994 to 1998 and then declined by nearly fifteen
percentage points from 1998 to 2003. A large drought in 1998 temporarily
Box 2.3. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
The broad issue of data collection and analysis is a lot to take on in one box. The points
made in other boxes, related to agricultural statistics, price statistics, and inequality,
obviously pertain. Here, we simply make four general points based on our experience in
pulling together this volume and beyond.
First, the central role of national accounts in data collection and analysis has been
substantially neglected in most cases. The national accounts department is obliged to
create a macroeconomically coherent whole from a dispersed set of available data
sources. Hence, national accounts are a natural location for cross-checking and verifica-
tion of alternative sources of information. For example, if import plus production
information on fertilizer availability does not remotely accord with farm-level data on
fertilizer use, then something is wrong in at least one place. National accounts could and
should be used more to identify anomalies and then correct them. This implies a more
central role for national accounts in country statistical systems.
Second, administrative data, particularly tax data, are frequently underused. In many
cases, there is no connection at all between the revenue authorities and statistical
authorities. This stands in direct contrast to basic logic and global best practice. These
links should be fomented throughout the continent. Use of tax data should put less
pressure on the enterprise monitoring programme while simultaneously allowing for
cross-checking between administrative and survey-based data sources.
Third, the periodicity of household consumption surveys is very often too infrequent.
This follows directly from the observations on volatility made in Box 2.4. It also follows
from a capacity development perspective. If the period between surveys is five years or
more (as is often the case), the personnel that worked on the previous survey (across the
domains of data collection, cleaning/processing, and analysis) have very oftenmoved on
by the time the next survey rolls around. One option could be a three-year rolling
programme involving a DHS survey (or similar) in year 1, a household-consumption-
oriented survey in year 2, and a survey focused on household income sources in year 3.
The last survey would focus more on labour force and informal enterprises in urban areas
and agricultural income and off-farm enterprises in rural areas. A three-year rolling
programme is convenient in that it easily makes room for a census every tenth year.
Finally, while the many benefits of panel data are clear, and do provide information on
volatility, pursuing large-scale, national-level panel surveys does not make sense when
very basic items, such as timely and reliable agricultural production statistics, are absent.
Given the capacity constraints evident in many statistical services, smaller-scale panel
surveys, perhaps pursued within a university context (as in Ethiopia), may be a more
productive approach.
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constrained consumption possibilities nationwide. In Mozambique, the stag-
nation in observed national poverty rates between 2002/3 and 2008/9 was
driven by the combined effect of rising/high fuel and food prices, very slow
growth in agricultural productivity, and weather shocks in major growing
regions, which drove up poverty rates substantially in populous provinces.
Box 2.4. SOURCES OF VARIATION IN MONETARY POVERTY MEASURES
In general terms, there are three main sources of variation that need to be distinguished.
These are: (i) true variation in the poverty rates, which in turn can be divided into long-
term trends and ephemeral shocks; (ii) variation due to sampling error; and (iii) variation
due to non-sampling error. Each source of variation is considered in turn.
True variation. It is highly likely that true poverty rates vary substantially through time,
particularly for limited geographic areas. For poor African households, food shares
represent up to three-quarters of total consumption. Furthermore, in many poor, rural
households, home consumption of own production accounts for more than half of food
consumption. Given that poor households have relatively few options for stabilizing
consumption over time, household consumption becomes highly dependent on agri-
cultural production, food prices, and dependability/availability of income-earning
opportunities outside of agriculture. The available evidence indicates strongly that
none of these is stable even at relatively high levels of aggregation. Shocks to agricultural
production and crucial prices can be expected to influence poverty rates strongly.
A negative shock can easily outweigh long-run trend improvement, particularly over
short time frames.
Sampling error. When calculated, the confidence intervals on poverty rates can be
wide, particularly for subnational regions. For example, in Mozambique, confidence
intervals are in the order of plus/minus ten percentage points in many provinces (e.g. a
standard error of around five). Sampling error stems from the use of samples; and the
likelihood of divergence from the characteristics of the true population declines as the
sample sizes increase. Because lower levels of geographical aggregation are associated
with smaller samples, sampling error tends to be higher at the provincial level and lower
at the national level.
Non-sampling error. Non-sampling error reflects mistakes anywhere along the long
chain of events in producing the poverty rates. Enumerators may not pose questions
correctly. Respondents may not respond completely or correctly. The declarations of
respondents may be improperly noted on the questionnaire. There may be errors in data
processing or analysis. These are only a few examples. Non-sampling error is present in
all surveys.
In summary, if we could perfectly observe every household in every country through
time, we would, in all likelihood, observe that monetary poverty rates vary through time,
with favourable conditions pushing poverty rates down and unfavourable conditions
pushing poverty rates up. However, as a practical matter, we cannot observe every
household, so we are forced to rely on samples and statistical methods to inform our
understanding of reality. As a result, sampling error is added to the inherent variation in
poverty rates. And error inevitably creeps into our observations of households in the
sample. As a result, non-sampling error influences the estimates, adding a third source of
variation.
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In Ethiopia, results from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) con-
firm the power of combined drought and food price shocks. The poverty rate
among the nearly 1,500 households followed over successive waves declined
from a high mark of 55 per cent in 1995 to 35 per cent in 2004, but increased
again to 52 per cent in 2009 following a bad harvest combined with a sub-
stantial increase in global food prices (Dercon et al. 2012). A subsequent
observation from the ERHS is not yet available; however, a separate nationally
representative household survey suggests that national-level poverty reduc-
tion resumed in 2010 and 2011.
As these results from Mozambique and the ERHS indicate, volatility of
consumption (manifesting itself as volatility in poverty rates) is likely to be
more pronounced at regional levels where shocks might be concentrated and
in rural areas where consumption smoothing options are more circumscribed.
The presence of additional shocks, such as the illness or death of a key
household member, ensures that true variations in consumption at the house-
hold level are even more pronounced than the already substantial variations
suggested by repeated data cross-sections. Finally, from a measurement per-
spective, the role of sampling and non-sampling error is also more pronounced
at lower levels of aggregation, complicating the task of assessing volatility.
Household-level insecurity has long been recognized as a key feature of
poverty, as stressed in many qualitative poverty studies and in World Bank
(2001). However, the frequently high levels of variability observed in esti-
mated poverty rates even at fairly high levels of aggregation have not yet
been adequately internalized. Monetary poverty measures may fail to decline
or even rise between two points in time for a host of reasons, including: (i) an
ephemeral positive shock in the earlier period; (ii) an ephemeral negative
shock in the later period; (iii) a relatively well-off sample in the early period;
(iv) a relatively poor sample in the later period; (v) underestimation of poverty
in the early period due to non-sampling error; (vi) overestimation of poverty
in the late period due to non-sampling error; and finally (vii) actual stagnation
or deterioration in underlying living conditions. These observations are
particularly pertinent at subnational levels but also apply to national-level
monetary poverty estimates.
For these reasons alone, one could conclude that excessive weight is fre-
quently placed on the (normally relatively few) monetary poverty measures
available in SSA countries. Non-monetary measures are often more easily
measured and more stable, supporting the need for considering a multiplicity
of indicators each relating to a different facet of well-being.
These indicators are the subject of section 2.3.4; however, before proceed-
ing, the importance of serious monetary poverty measurement merits high-
lighting. While the weight accorded to monetary poverty measures is
frequently excessive in evaluating country performance, the appropriate
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response is not to allocate fewer resources to the evaluation of monetary
poverty. Inadequate consumption or income is a key aspect of poverty, and
more frequent observation (i.e. more frequent surveys) is the best way to
counteract intrinsic variability.
2.3.4 Importance of Multidimensional Assessments
Consistent with the MDGs and with the approach in this volume, it is essen-
tial to conceive of and monitor poverty in its different dimensions. Education
and health are fundamental human outcomes in their own right (and for
many other factors), and premature mortality is clearly the most fundamental
form of deprivation. Access to adequate drinking water, sanitation, and infor-
mation, among other items, are also very important for the realization of
human capabilities.
In terms of tracking multiple indicators, the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) have been a major achievement. The data are, by and large, of
good quality and broadly comparable (over time and between countries),
providing solid insights on non-monetary measures of living conditions.
They underlie some of the non-poverty measures discussed in the introduc-
tory chapter. They are also now being exploited for a number of purposes, one
of which is the computation ofmultidimensional poverty indices as presented
in the DRC, Nigeria, and Zambia case studies. Two or more DHS surveys (or
DHS-type surveys such as the Mixed Indicators Cluster Survey) are available
for every one of the sixteen case countries, including relatively weak data
environments such as the DRC, allowing for a perspective on evolution
through time.
Helpfully, many key non-monetary indicators are relatively easy to observe
(at least compared with estimating per capita consumption for a household).
These indicators include child height and weight, possession of assets, access
to water, access to sanitation, enrolment in school, distance to public services,
use of public services, and child and maternal survival. In addition, with some
potential exceptions such as shorter-run malnutrition indicators, non-
monetary indicators tend strongly to evolve in a more stable manner through
time compared with consumption per capita. These characteristics ameliorate
issues associated with non-sampling error, due to the relative ease of observa-
tion; and they ameliorate issues with sampling error, due to the lower variance
of the targeted indicators (the width of a confidence interval is proportional to
the standard deviation of the variable observed). As such, non-monetary
measures are useful in identifying long-run trends.
Finally, many non-monetary outcomes reflect the availability and quality of
publicly provided services, in particular for the poor. As such, non-monetary
indicators provide important insight into the quality of governance. This
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observation reflects well on most case countries. Consistent with the aggre-
gates presented in Chapter 1 and the observations of Young (2012), non-
monetary indicators exhibit reasonably broad-based improvement in most
case countries.
2.3.5 The Role of Agriculture
Solid conclusions emerge with respect to the fundamental role of agriculture.
Five country cases are classified as exhibiting rapid growth and poverty reduc-
tion. These are Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, and Uganda. In these cases,
an extended period (a decade or more) of broad-based (and sometimes rapid)
agricultural growth has been a substantial initial driver of both growth and
poverty reduction.3 In this context, Ethiopia is a particularly interesting case
as it explicitly pursued a strategy of Agricultural Development-Led Industrial-
ization (ADLI). The Ethiopia case study documents very strong efforts by the
government of Ethiopia to stimulate agriculture alongside a wide array of
indicators pointing to considerable success in fomenting agricultural devel-
opment. The degree of seriousness of the Ethiopian government is well illus-
trated by the number of agricultural extension agents hired—some 45,000.
Ethiopia now has one of the highest ratios of extension agents to farmers in
the world (Davis et al. 2010). Malawi provides a second and somewhat more
controversial example. The authors of the Malawi case credit Malawi’s Farm
Input Subsidy Program as contributing, perhaps substantially, to recent meas-
ured poverty reductions despite a series of negative shocks over recent periods.
Historical experience strongly indicates that it is eminently possible to
waste substantial resources on poorly designed agricultural interventions.
And in an environment with multi-pronged initiatives, such as Ethiopia, it is
difficult to know with precision which intervention has contributed the most
to their so far successful drive to foment agricultural development. Finally,
policies that work in one location may not yield the same results in a different
location. For instance, the specificities of the Malawian case may limit the
lessons that might be drawn from this experience by other countries. Never-
theless, the message from the experiences of these five countries is that there
3 How long this agricultural growth episode must persist to fuel sustained national-level poverty
reduction is an open question whose response likely varies from country to country. For example,
Ugandan national accounts do not point to strong growth in agricultural value added during the
first decade of the twenty-first century, in contrast to the 1990s (Government of Uganda 2012).
Benin et al. (2012) attribute the observed slowdown in reductions in the national poverty rate in
the 2000s compared to the 1990s to this more tepid performance in agriculture. In addition, the
positive conclusion of national-level growth and poverty reduction is tempered by lagging regions
and other equity considerations.
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are potentially high returns to effective policies that take agriculture seriously
at scale with particular emphasis on upgrading the productive capabilities of
small-scale farmers.
The cases of countries with relatively rapid growth and limited poverty
reduction—Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia—
provide an interesting counterpoint. In none of these cases does solid
evidence of sustained and substantial growth in agriculture, particularly
smallholder agriculture, present itself.4 In these cases, substantial agricultural
production potential is broadly recognized and is often accompanied by
considerable policy rhetoric. In the cases of Burkina Faso, Mozambique,
Nigeria, and Tanzania, country authors highlight weak agricultural product-
ivity growth as an underlying factor in the relative stagnation of monetary
poverty rates.
The importance of agricultural growth in general and productivity growth
within smallholder agriculture in particular is often made but bears repeating
here. For countries with large shares of the population mired in low-
productivity subsistence agriculture, agricultural productivity growth among
this group remains a powerful lever for achieving poverty reduction and holds
out potential from priming sustained growth and poverty reduction over the
long run as has been experienced in Asia and elsewhere.
Exhortation to improve agricultural performance is not new. But some
countries, notably Ethiopia and Malawi, have clearly moved beyond rhetoric
and enacted highly ambitious programmes. And the rhetoric from African
policymakers as well as donors has become explicit. Recently, at a Senior
Policy Seminar held in March 2015, hosted by the African Economic Research
Consortium (AERC) in Maputo, African policymakers reaffirmed the ‘critical
role of smallholder agriculture in Africa’s economic and social transformation’
(AERC 2015). Their declaration recognized the Comprehensive African Agri-
cultural Development Programme (CAADP) as well as subsequent commit-
ments such as the Malabo declaration. While commending governments
for increasing government budget shares allocated to agriculture, the AERC
Maputo declaration also highlighted that ‘important gaps remain’. One
important gap, the dismal state of agricultural statistics, is highlighted in
Box 2.5.
The cases studied in this volume provide further evidence for converting
this rhetoric into well-designed programmes to stimulate agriculture, particu-
larly smallholder agriculture, operating at scale.
4 The Burkina Faso study finds consistent and sustained growth in agriculture but at a low rate
per capita basis. Land expansion, rather than productivity growth, is pointed to as a driving force.
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2.3.6 Relative Prices
In many of the case country studies, substantial attention is accorded to
the role of shifting relative prices and their implications for poverty and
Box 2.5. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS
Better agricultural statistics are clearly not a sufficient condition for fomenting agricul-
tural development. They might not even be necessary. After all, the case authors for
Ethiopia argue that substantial agricultural growth is occurring in spite of rather broad-
based mistrust in Ethiopian official statistics. Nevertheless, the ability of governments to
design policies informed by evidence is surely strongly compromised by the stark
weaknesses in agricultural statistics that persist in most countries. For example, a great
deal of effort has gone into evaluating Malawi’s fertilizer input subsidy programme,
which has been widely perceived as a potential model across the continent (Jayne and
Rashid 2013). The lack of faith in national production and area statistics for major crops
in Malawi substantially complicates the task (see Arndt, Pauw, and Thurlow 2015).
Importantly, quality agricultural statistics are not only useful for the purposes of policy
formulation and evaluation. Throughout Africa, market prices are meant to provide the
appropriate signals to market participants across the value chain from producers to
consumers. It is difficult to see how markets can properly price commodities when the
quantities existing within a given country or region are so poorly known. When properly
gathered and issued in a timely manner, government statistics are known to move
agricultural markets. For example, Baur and Orazem (1994: 681) examined the price
effects of government orange production forecasts in the United States and found that
‘significant price movements occur in response to announced production’. Hence, even
in a developed country setting, market participants are not omnisciently capable of
efficiently pricing in the information content of official data prior to its announcement,
implying that the information provided has significant value. The value of information is
very likely to be relatively higher in developing countries given its general paucity.
The success of the Demographic and Health Surveys illustrates that massive improve-
ments within particular data domains are possible. We see no fundamental reason why
agricultural statistics could not achieve similar success and a plethora of reasons for
striving to achieve that objective. It is impossible to prove definitively that the nearly
simultaneous rise of the DHS survey and the gains registered in non-monetary poverty
indicators in the large majority of case countries (as discussed in the previous section and
in Chapter 1) are related, but it would be unwise to ignore the correlation.
Agriculture is a very different domain from demography and health; hence, applicable
‘on-the-ground lessons’ from the DHS are limited. Household surveys may not be
the best approach to collecting basic agricultural statistics, particularly the timely pro-
duction information required by market participants. This is especially true of multi-
purpose household surveys which seek to measure consumption or income and in
tandem collect data on agriculture. In our view, approaches based on area, such as
area frames, as practised by, for example, the United States and Morocco, merit more
serious consideration on the subcontinent (see Davies 2009). Technological advances in
location and imaging technologies expand the possibilities set for developing transpar-
ent, reliable, and cost-effective approaches that are appropriately tailored to specific
country circumstances. One way or another, having better data on agriculture, the most
important source of employment in many SSA countries, is a priority.
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inequality measures. These price variations must be taken carefully into
account in comparing estimates of consumption poverty; and much future
work is required to collect relevant price data (Box 2.6). In line with the high
levels of volatility discussed in section 2.3.3, relative prices can be very differ-
ent across space (particularly in large countries) and may shift dramatically
through time for the same location. Consistent with standard economic
theory, the case countries tend to find that changing relative prices influence
consumer behaviour, with households tending to shift consumption towards
relatively lower-priced products.
These observations relate to long-running debates about the relative merits
of consistency versus specificity in the construction of poverty lines based on
consumption bundles (Tarp et al. 2002). In a nutshell, it is desirable that the
consumption baskets that underlie poverty lines reflect the consumption
patterns of the poor. To take an extreme example, it is undesirable to include
the price of airline tickets in African poverty line baskets because low-income
Africans almost never consume airline tickets. The price of an airline ticket is,
as a result, largely irrelevant to the welfare of poor Africans, at least in any
direct sense. This is quite straightforward. Other decisions may be less so. As
Box 2.6. PRICE DATA
In a number of case countries, household budget surveys allocated inadequate attention
to the collection of price data, substantially complicating the task of computing meas-
ures of real consumption or income. For example, price data associated with the
household consumption survey are either weak or non-existent in the cases of Ghana,
Cameroon, and Zambia. In each of these three countries, considerable efforts were
made to analyse the household survey data. However, due to difficulties in accessing
adequate price information, it was deemed difficult to improve upon or corroborate
existing monetary poverty estimates. Hence, the available estimates were employed.
In some cases the price data may be available as part of collection of data for
consumer price indices, if these are conducted sufficiently widely across the country,
as was the case in Rwanda. In other cases, CPI data have weak geographic coverage, and
in at least two case countries (Malawi and Tanzania), published CPI data were inad-
equate to even capture basic inflation trends. In yet other cases, such as Mozambique,
CPI data largely corroborate data from the household surveys. Use of price data from
agricultural market information systems also provides a useful coherence check.
One approach is for countries to collect expenditure and quantity information for
relatively homogeneous products such as food within the context of the household
budget survey such that reliable unit value estimates can be calculated. Challenges occur
if respondents are unable to report quantities accurately in standard units. Alternatively,
prices may be better collected separately from the survey, but still capturing the spatial
variation. In whatever case, this information should be corroborated with contempor-
aneous village-level pricing surveys, and then further cross-checked using CPI and
market information system data.
The African Growth Renaissance
29
emphasized in a number of case countries, staple food consumption can vary
quite substantially across regions, even within a relatively small country by
area (e.g. Uganda). Simply put, the price of a product is a lot less relevant to
populations that consume very little of that product.
However, increasing specificity may come at a cost in terms of consistency.
In principle, absolute poverty lines should be linked to some underlying
fundamental level of welfare. If poverty analysts are employing multiple
consumption bundles to account for consumption specificity across space
or through time, how can the analyst be sure that these bundles all reflect a
reasonably similar level of welfare? A number of case studies (Ethiopia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, and Uganda) employ the approach of
Arndt and Simler (2010), which is designed to enhance specificity while
preserving consistency. The approach applies revealed preference conditions
in order to constrain multiple bundles to correspond to reasonably similar
welfare levels. The Burkina Faso case also emphasizes relative price move-
ments though an alternative method is employed for coping with the
implications.
A few of the case studies address the specific implications of the global food
and fuel price crisis of 2007/9. During that period, oil prices spiked to about
US$150 per barrel, compared to about US$35 per barrel in 2003, and real food
prices attained levels not seen since the early 1970s. In largemeasure because a
major national household budget survey was conducted in Mozambique in
precisely 2008/9, theMozambique study devotes considerable attention to the
food and fuel price crisis as well as global commodity price trends from 2002/
3, when the prior household consumption survey was conducted. The litera-
ture on the food and fuel price crisis emphasizes country-specific factors in
enhancing or reducing vulnerability (Headey 2013; Swinnen and Squicciarini
2012). Mozambique was particularly vulnerable to the price shocks, and
measured poverty rates responded accordingly. As noted in section 2.3.3,
strong effects were also observed in the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey,
which also was in the field during the 2008/9 period.
Both the South African andMozambican case studies highlight, in addition,
the observation that international price trends from about 2003 have tended
to shift the relative prices of basic products (foods and fuels) upwards relative
to prices of manufactures and services. Because lower-income people tend to
allocate proportionately more consumption expenditures towards basic
goods, these movements have potential implications for measured inequality.
Indeed, in both countries, the case authors find that ignoring relative price
shifts across the income distribution tends to materially underestimate
inequality. As these global pricing trends affected all developing countries, it
may be that the implications for inequality are more general and extend
beyond these two cases.
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2.3.7 Aid Flows
While issues of aid and aid effectiveness were not an explicit focus of the case
studies, most of the sixteen countries considered received substantial volumes
of aid for at least part of the period in reference. It is, as a consequence, much
easier to list the countries with notably low aid volumes relative to GDP:
Nigeria and South Africa. Aid has been an important consideration in the
remaining fourteen case countries. And the contraction of aid volumes in
newly declared middle-income countries, such as Ghana and Zambia, is a
much-discussed policy issue.
By and large, the outcomes of the case studies in this volume are consistent
with a positive developmental impact associated with foreign assistance.5 The
broad-based improvements in non-monetary indicators are often clearest in
relation to education and health. These are services predominantly provided
by the public sector, and are therefore a consequence of increased public
spending in these areas, more effective and widespread service delivery, or
both. Without question, in many case countries, aid has targeted improve-
ments in exactly these areas and has provided often substantial funding and
other resources to achieving these objectives.
In sum, it is, in our view, difficult to see how the gains registered in the case
countries, particularly the non-monetary gains, could have been achieved
with zero or greatly reduced assistance, an observation that is consistent
with up-to-date macroeconomic studies of aid impact (see, for example,
Arndt, Jones, and Tarp 2015).
2.4 The Perils of Existing Cross-Country Studies
Before concluding, we revert to the rationale for undertaking a case study
approach in the African context. As a counterpoint, we consider two promin-
ent studies on growth and poverty in SSA: Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2014)
and Young (2012). These papers, published in leading journals, use inter-
nationally available data to suggest that recent changes in living conditions
in SSA may be much better than is conventionally understood. Pinkovskiy
and Sala-i-Martin (2014) draw on GDP data in purchasing power parity (PPP)
values along with available inequality data to claim that monetary poverty
reduction has been substantially greater in sub-Saharan Africa than theWorld
Bank and other estimates have reported. Young (2012) uses DHS data from
across many African countries to argue that the scale of improvements in non-
5 In a previous case study, Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2007) examined aid effectiveness for
Mozambique and found that aid represented a crucial ingredient to the positive trends observed
in development indicators up to that point in time.
The African Growth Renaissance
31
monetary measures of well-being suggests that consumption and living stand-
ards have been growing much faster than official data suggest.
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin use inequality data from Chen and Ravallion
(2010) containing Gini coefficients and quintile shares, supplemented by data
from the UNU-WIDER WIID database, to estimate income distributions, pov-
erty rates, and inequality measures for African countries over the period
1990–2011. They use PPP-adjusted GDP data from the World Bank to anchor
the survey mean for this income distribution data, and fit income distribution
functions, experimenting with different variants. The functional form is
assumed to be the same across all countries and in all years, and is character-
ized by a scale parameter (reflecting GDP) and a distribution parameter
(reflecting inequality). Changes over time manifest themselves in changes in
the parameters. The function is fitted to the data, but not before they impute
for the substantial number of missing values of inequality-by-year values,
using methods explained in the paper. Some countries have no inequality
data at all, but imputations are nonetheless made based on neighbouring
countries.
The authors then use this as a basis to estimate poverty for each country and
for SSA as a whole. The core to their argument that poverty has reduced very
rapidly is that the growth in the per capita PPP GDP data is substantially
greater than the survey means. It is, however, far from clear that the national
accounts data are more accurate than the household survey means, or that
price adjustments have been adequately made. As frequently emphasized, the
quality of national accounts data has beenwidely criticized in SSA, and there is
plenty of literature to suggest that the household survey estimates may be at
least as accurate. Concerns about price adjustments within national surveys
(see section 2.3.5) and the quality of PPP adjustments (see Chapter 1) have
already been discussed. Second, the appropriate standard used to establish the
mean would have been private household consumption per capita, not
GDP. Third, the massive scale of imputation of the inequality data suggests
that a limited amount of real data in fact underlies these poverty calculations.
Turning to the very carefully conducted study by Young (2012), he uses
country-level DHS data on ownership of durables, housing quality, child
health and nutrition, household demographics and time use as a basis for
estimating real consumption. The basic argument is that these indicators,
normalized by the cross-country distribution of per capita consumption
from Penn World Tables, have improved at a rapid rate in SSA over the period
considered. For SSA, these growth rates are relatively fast compared with the
growth in per capita consumption in the national accounts. In other world
regions, growth in these indicators aligns more closely with consumption
growth, raising a question about the African case. Young then uses educa-
tional attainment as a proxy for income, and looks at the relationship between
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education and assets. He argues that the source of the discrepancy in the
African case is that there has been faster growth in incomes not picked up in
the consumption data. Earlier work by Sahn and Stifel (2000, 2003) also
pointed out that there had been significantly faster growth in assets than in
income poverty, though they did not use this to make such strong claims.
However, even if assets and related measures may function as reasonable
proxies for consumption at a point in time, they can be deeply problematic in
assessing change over time (Harttgen et al. 2013). Assets are stock measures
while consumption is a flow variable. Some variables measured as household
assets such as drinking water source may be publicly provided and so are not
clearly related to private consumption. Preferences for assets may change over
time as they become a more accepted part of normal life; and the relative price
and/or quality of assets can change sharply over time. Mobile phones are a
clear example of these phenomena. Increased availability of assets over time
then is highly likely to overestimate growth in consumption. Thus, this does
not appear to be a convincing approach to estimating changes in consump-
tion over time.
In both cases, there appear to be significant problems which raise questions
about how much confidence can be placed in these results. Furthermore, the
case studies in this volume provide little support for these views. In cases
where country authors make adjustments or caveats with respect to GDP
growth, it is mainly to adjust them downwards rather than upwards.6 For
most cases, after careful examination of the full range of available informa-
tion, authors are able to provide a narrative that reconciles observed trends
(both monetary and non-monetary). As discussed in section 2.2.2, one set of
countries is doing very well. Others are experiencing either short-term or
structural difficulties in translating growth into broad-based welfare gains.
Others are simply not growing rapidly enough or are mired in conflict/polit-
ical turmoil. Taken as a group, these narratives generate amuchmore nuanced
picture and do not support the view that there has been a broad-scale and
systematic underestimation of the rate of economic growth and welfare
improvement on the subcontinent.
In sum, whatever the contribution of these cross-country approaches, they
do not obviate the need for the careful case-by-case country analysis which is
the approach taken here. The case study approach enables a much more
careful and critical assessment of the available data. It enables expert country
knowledge which helps judge the credibility of the findings reported by the
6 A possible exception is South Africa where very recent growth performance has been so poor
that some well-informed observers speculate that perhaps national accounts give lower weight to
some relatively new and relatively well-performing sectors. However, the assertion that growth is
perhaps not quite as dismal as the official numbers suggest is a long way from a growth miracle.
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data. And importantly it helps to provide explanations, making the findings
more convincing, which is critical from a policy point of view.
2.5 Summing Up and Looking Forward
Looking across the sixteen African case countries considered, the develop-
ment process has been, essentially without exception, highly non-linear.
The non-linear nature of the process opens the risk that variability, particu-
larly if one pays greater attention to those countries that are making progress
compared to those that are regressing, is mistaken for progress. With this risk
accounted for, progress in SSA has been markedly better than almost anyone
expected ten or fifteen years ago. Relative to previous periods, macroeconomic
management has improved significantly, and important gains have been
registered in four key areas: (i) overall political stability; (ii) rates of economic
growth; (iii) a large array of non-monetary poverty indicators; and (iv) mon-
etary poverty as measured by household consumption.
This listing is purposefully ordered. At one end of the spectrum, Côte
d’Ivoire andMadagascar have failed to achieve political stability and concomi-
tantly failed to achieve appreciable gains in any of the other three areas. At the
other end of the spectrum, the five countries that have achieved significant
monetary poverty reduction (Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, and Uganda)
have also enjoyed a sufficient degree of political stability, GDP growth, and
gains in non-monetary poverty indicators. In the middle of the spectrum, the
tendencies are somewhat less clear. Nevertheless, we classify five examples of
reasonable political stability, economic growth, and varying non-monetary
poverty reduction, combined with limitedmonetary poverty reduction. Other
permutations are much less frequent.7
Looking forward, realistic expectations are required. A development process
is in place in SSA; however, it is likely to remain difficult and halting. Even
the most basic item of the four, political stability, is not guaranteed in any of
the sixteen case countries. While political setbacks are to be expected, these
should not completely overshadow the gains. Within just the past twelve
months, reasonably peaceful transfers of power have occurred in Malawi,
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zambia.
Overall, gradually improving political stability combined with greatly
improved macroeconomic management has created a much firmer platform
for growth and broad-based improvements in well-being. Taken as a whole,
7 And the exceptions tend to reinforce the rules. For example, South Africa achieved progress in
many non-monetary indicators despite uninspiring GDP growth due to the broad scope for
redistribution in the post-apartheid period.
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the case studies do not point to ephemeral factors, such as firm commodity
prices, as supporting the African growth renaissance across the board. Chan-
ging commodity prices have created economic opportunities for some coun-
tries and economic challenges for others. The recent large drop in oil prices
and general reductions in food and other commodity prices move countries
between the categories of those with opportunities and those with
challenges—however, the varied picture remains.
The fairly broad-based success in improving non-monetary indicators also
provides some cause for optimism. Higher school attendance, reduced child
mortality, better access to health services, improved access to water and
sanitation, and reduced rates of childhood malnutrition are desirable in
and of themselves. Improvements in these areas provide hopeful signals in
two additional ways. First, and as noted, the frequently substantial state role
in delivering these improvements implies that these areas act as a rough
indicator of governance. Some state capability is required and is in evidence
in most cases. Second, these areas, taken as a whole, also amount to invest-
ments in a more productive workforce over the long run. With a decade or
more of improvement registered in these areas in many countries, these gains
should begin manifesting themselves, helping to firm the basic growth plat-
form. In sum, the basic elements of a self-sustaining development process are
starting to come into place.
Nevertheless, the African growth renaissance earns two cheers, not three.
The fragility of the gains in stability was highlighted in the previous para-
graphs. As discussed in Chapter 1, GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa is much
better than it was, but still lags behind other developing regions of the world
on a per capita basis. Population growth rates remain stubbornly high inmany
countries, forcing these societies to run just to stay in place and forsaking the
opportunities that a demographic transition might offer. At the same time,
many case countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Ghana, and Rwanda) have begun their
demographic transition.
Importantly, key countries on the subcontinent are not among the better
performers. Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa are key economies in Eastern,
Central/Western, and Southern Africa respectively. They also account for
29 per cent of the population of the subcontinent. In Kenya, monetary
poverty measures as of 2005/6 are not much different from those observed
in 1994 and 1997 (above the former and below the latter), and, consistent
with the presence of some growth and the absence of poverty reduction,
inequality appears to have worsened fairly substantially. Gains have been
registered in many though not all non-monetary measures. Overall, Kenya
has progressed only slowly, or sometimes stagnated, from the relatively
favourable position that it occupied among African nations in the first decades
after its independence.
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In Nigeria, growth has been present; however, as noted, evidence of poverty
reduction, both monetary and non-monetary, is disconcertingly scarce.
Living standards in the Northeast, where Boko Haram has created havoc, are
particularly low. The stagnation or even deterioration in important non-
monetary welfare indicators occurred despite a fiscal bonanza due to rising/
high oil prices from 2003 to 2014. Having failed to improve living standards
under positive fiscal circumstances, Nigeria confronts serious development
and security issues with substantially reduced resources due to recent oil
price declines. In short, the new government confronts enormous challenges.
South Africa is both failing to grow and encountering limits to redistribu-
tion. The growth hiatus, which began in 2008, is now entering its eighth year,
while South Africa’s long-standing employment problems continue to fester.
Rekindling growth is a policy imperative.
While the fortunes of every country on the continent may not be inextric-
ably tied to the fortunes of their respective regional powerhouse, a broad-
based African renaissance surely requires better performance from these three.
The international community might usefully ponder their role in helping to
bring about this highly desirable outcome. The (so far) peaceful transfer of
power following elections in Nigeria in March 2015 is a very positive signal
both for Nigeria and the subcontinent as a whole. The gradual institutional-
ization of mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power is a positive harbin-
ger. The continuation of this trend is also a key policy priority for the
continent as a whole for the foreseeable future.
Two other clear policy priorities emerge from case studies on a continent-
wide basis. Agriculture is the first. We hope that the rhetoric surrounding
agriculture in general and smallholder agriculture in particular is followed by
action at scale in a growing number of countries. The second area is informa-
tion. Information should be seen as a vital publicly provided input into an
informed polity in general, into policy formation, and into investment deci-
sions by both public and private actors. Doing better on information systems
is crucial to achieving broad-based development goals, not just looking back
and tallying the score card.8
Finally, we reiterate that the development process is, almost always, a
long hard slog involving a challenging process of structural transformation.
In this regard, much concern centres around the small and stagnant or even
8 For example, the preceding paragraph calls for aggressive and broad-scale efforts to stimulate
agriculture, particularly smallholder productivity. As discussed in section 2.3.4, there are risks
associated with these policies. Monitoring and evaluation systems are required to identify poorly
functioning initiatives and then make adjustments.
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shrinking share of manufactures in GDP on the subcontinent.9 Substantial
growth in manufacturing value-added and employment creation as a conse-
quence of links by African countries to global value chains would be a very
positive outcome. Employment creation goes further than this to other sectors
as well. Whether in manufacturing or elsewhere, positive outcomes are
more likely if the education system generates the necessary human capital;
the agricultural sector is sufficiently productive to simultaneously provide
relatively inexpensive food and release labour to rapidly growing, high-
productivity sectors; infrastructure underpins development in both agricul-
tural and non-agricultural sectors; information systems are decent; and so on.
These issues come on top of the more direct policy concerns within manufac-
turing, such as reliable and reasonably low-cost power delivery, regulatory
burdens, tax burdens, and speed of customs clearance.
In sum, to succeed, African governments must be prepared to accomplish
multiple tasks simultaneously. Yes, there are capacity constraints within gov-
ernments, and state capabilities should be carefully directed with these limi-
tations inmind. At the same time, sustainable development processes demand
improvements across multiple dimensions essentially contemporaneously.
The subcontinent as a whole has done a much better job of confronting
these multi-faceted challenges over the past fifteen to twenty years. While
the potential pitfalls are many, there is every reason to aim to achieve three
cheers and not just two over the next fifteen to twenty years.
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Poverty in Ethiopia, 2000–11
Welfare Improvements in a Changing Economic
Landscape
David Stifel and Tassew Woldehanna
3.1 Introduction
Since the turn of the century, the Ethiopian economy has experienced strong
economic growth and structural improvements. Rapid infrastructure growth,
increased agricultural production and commercialization, better-functioning
food markets, and a strong social safety net programme are all part of the
changing economic landscape (Dorosh and Schmidt 2010) that is paying
dividends in terms of poverty reduction. Yet measuring these dividends in
Ethiopia is complicated by conceptual and practical data-related issues. This is
not surprising given the complexity of measuring poverty in a manner that is
consistent over time and space, yet is also sensitive to local conditions.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse poverty in Ethiopia between 2000
and 2011, using nationally representative household consumption and
expenditure surveys, and applying to those surveys Arndt and Simler’s
(2010) utility-consistent approach to calculating cost of basic needs (CBN)
poverty lines. This method involves calculating region-specific poverty lines
based on consumption patterns of the poor in each of the regions to reflect
local perceptions of poverty (i.e. specificity). But to ensure that each of the
consumption bundles in the region-specific CBN poverty lines also represents
the same level of utility (i.e. consistency), a maximum entropy approach is
then employed to reconcile cases where revealed preference conditions are
violated. These consistent yet specific poverty lines, along with consumption
aggregates calculated from the household surveys, form the basis of the pov-
erty analysis in this chapter.
To disentangle the long-term poverty trends from the short-term shocks
that may affect poverty estimates based on nationally representative house-
hold surveys in particular years, we place the monetary poverty measures in
context by comparing them to other macro- and microeconomic indicators,
some of which are collected with more frequency. These indicators suggest
that survey-based poverty estimates for Ethiopia are largely a reflection of
long-term trends characterized by broad-based growth and improved welfare.
While comparability issues related to the main data sources used in this
analysis warrant care in interpreting the degree to which poverty fell, the
overall body of evidence paints a picture of substantive improvements in
living standards over the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century
in Ethiopia.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the
primary data sources and discuss the poverty lines estimated from these data.
Section 3.3 provides a description of the economic context during which the
surveys took place to better understand the long-term trends. In section 3.4,
we present the estimates of poverty and inequality based on the utility-
consistent approach to calculating poverty lines, and triangulate these results
with other monetary and non-monetary indicators. Section 3.5 provides con-
cluding remarks.
3.2 Data and Poverty Lines
In this section, we briefly describe the primary data sources and the regional
poverty lines that are consistent over time and space, and which are specific to
local consumption patterns and norms.
3.2.1 Data
The primary data sources used in this analysis are the 1999/2000 (hereafter
2000), 2004/2005 (hereafter 2005), and 2010/2011 (hereafter 2011) Ethiopia
Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Surveys (HICES) andWel-
fare Monitoring Surveys (WMS). The WMS and HICES, conducted by the
Central Statistical Agency (CSA), are nationally representative stratified and
clustered surveys that contain information on household characteristics,
expenditure, activities, and infrastructure. The WMS were conducted mainly
to assess non-income dimensions of poverty, whereas the main objective of
the HICES was to provide data on levels, distributions, and patterns of house-
hold income, consumption, and expenditure. In each of the three years, the
HICES interviewed a representative subset of the households that were inter-
viewed in the WMS.
Rapid Growth and Rapid Poverty Reduction
44
The HICES are used to construct the household consumption aggregates for
the analysis of monetary poverty. As such, it is important to be aware of com-
parability issues related to them. Coverage of the three surveys is similar (major
urban areas, rural regions, and other urban areas), and although the sample sizes
grew from 17,332 to 21,274 to 27,830, for the 2000, 2005, and 2011 surveys,
respectively, this is unlikely to affect the comparability of the welfare measures
over time. There are, however, other differences in the data collection method
thatmay be problematic. First, although the questionnaires are nearly identical,
the item codes used for the expenditure/consumption recall differed for each of
the three years. For example, the numbers of food codes used in the data
collection process were 252, 872, and 653 in the 2000, 2005, and 2011 surveys,
respectively. Evidence thatmoredetailed lists of commodity items are associated
with higher levels of reported consumption from household surveys (Pradhan
2000)warrants care in interpreting changes in poverty given that the household
consumption aggregates may not be entirely comparable.
Second, the change in the data collection period complicates comparability
due to issues of seasonality and inflation. The 2000 and 2005 surveys were
conducted in two relatively short and similarly timed rounds (July–August and
January–February) during low inflation periods, whereas the 2011 survey was
conducted over the course of a year (8 July 2010 to 7 July 2011) that was
characterized by inflation of over 30 per cent.1 Although we do temporally
deflate the food consumption aggregate quarterly for the 2011 data using price
indices calculated from unit prices in the data to address inflation,2 even
within-quarter inflation may be problematic due to the high rate at which
prices rose. Further, it is difficult to gauge the consequences that seasonal
variation in consumption patterns may have on the comparability of the
2011 consumption aggregate relative to the aggregates from the earlier sur-
veys. As a form of sensitivity analysis, we estimated poverty lines on the subset
of the sample of households in the 2011 survey who were interviewed in the
same quarters as those in the 2000 and 2005 surveys. Although the poverty
estimates from this subsample do not differ substantively from those of the
full sample, we remain cautious about interpreting the magnitudes of the
changes in poverty between these surveys.
3.2.2 Regional Cost of Basic Needs Poverty Lines
The utility-consistent regional poverty lines estimated from the HICES
(Table 3.1) show that between 2000 and 2011, the costs of basic needs rose
1 Headey et al. (2012) document a rapid rise in urban food prices for the poor during the 2011
survey period that outpaced the growth of urban nominal wages.
2 See Arndt and Simler (2010) for more details.
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by over 130 per cent (an average of 9.0 per cent per year). Most of this increase,
however, occurred between 2005 and 2011 as costs actually fell between 2000
and 2005 in many regions (most markedly in Addis Ababa where basic needs
costs were 30 per cent lower in 2005 than in 2000). In some regions, such as
Oromiya and rural Tigray, the cost of living for the poor rose even further over
the decade (230 per cent). Throughout the survey periods, the changes in
prices for both food and non-food items contributed to overall changes in costs
of basic needs, though non-food costs rose slightly faster than food costs
between 2005 and 2011. The poverty lines in Table 3.1 also illustrated substan-
tial variation in costs of basic needs. For example, in 2000 the rural Oromiya
poverty line was 30 per cent below the Addis Ababa poverty line, while the rural
Dire Dawa poverty line was 11 per cent higher than in Addis Ababa. These
different poverty lines and the differential changes in these poverty lines lend
credence to the need for specificity in constructing poverty lines.
3.3 Context
During the 2000–11 period, Ethiopia witnessed persistent weather shocks,
high rates of inflation in the latter half of the decade, and a post-election crisis
in 2005. Nonetheless, this period is predominantly characterized by what
Dorosh and Schmidt (2010) refer to as ‘Ethiopia’s changing economic land-
scape’. In short, fundamental structural changes took place in the economy
led by the Ethiopian government’s deliberate strategy of Agricultural
Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI). In an effort to facilitate ‘rapid
agricultural growth as a means of accelerating economic transformation and
Table 3.1. Regional poverty lines, Ethiopia 2000–11
Birr per person per day
Urban Rural
2000 2005 2011 2000 2005 2011
Addis Ababa 3.22 2.27 8.86
Afar 3.27 2.68 8.00 3.07 3.09 8.89
Amhara 2.78 3.31 8.52 2.52 3.84 7.77
Benishangul 2.83 3.99 7.41 2.66 4.54 6.77
Dire Dawa 3.42 2.69 9.19 3.58 4.07 8.68
Gambella 2.80 7.22 2.79 7.76
Harari 3.48 2.87 9.10 3.48 2.87 9.10
Oromiya 2.43 3.20 8.00 2.26 3.94 7.52
SNNP 2.62 3.31 6.93 2.36 3.73 5.57
Somali 3.43 2.83 8.69 2.90 3.05 8.31
Tigray 3.10 2.94 8.86 2.84 3.44 9.17
Source: Authors’ calculations from HICES (2000, 2005, 2011)
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reducing poverty’ (MoFED 2008), the government invested substantial
resources towards increasing agricultural productivity through the use of
modern inputs, and towards developing growth linkages with the rest of the
economy through improved roads and other types of infrastructure.
Although increases in agricultural production over the last decade appear to
be driven largely by the expansion of cultivated land (Dercon and Hill 2009;
Seyoum Taffesse et al. 2013), and overall use of modern agricultural inputs
remains low, changes did take place that likely resulted in productivity gains.
For example, the Ethiopian government expanded the agricultural extension
system to such a degree that by 2010, some 45,000 extension agents were
placed in villages. With roughly three extension agents available per kebele
(ward), Ethiopia now has one of the highest extension agent per farmer ratios
in the world (Davis et al. 2010). Further, there is evidence that the use of
modern inputs that are distributed through government-established coopera-
tives increased over the course of the decade. The gains in modern cereal seed
use were largely confined to maize (Spielman et al. 2011), though more
improved teff (cereal) seeds were also being rapidly adopted by the end of
the decade (Minten et al. 2012). Finally, chemical fertilizer use grew to
about 650,000 tons in 2012, as the amount of fertilized land dedicated to
cereal production more than doubled over the course of the decade (Rashid
et al. 2013).
Improving the physical infrastructure has been a central component of the
Ethiopian government’s development strategy. In 1997, the government
embarked on a large road investment programme (the Road Sector Develop-
ment Program), with a resulting impressive increase in spatial connectivity. By
2011, all-weather surfaced roads connected most of the capitals of the regions,
as the length of these roads more than doubled in the fifteen years between
1993 and 2008, from an estimated 19,000 km to 44,300 km, respectively. As a
consequence, in 2007 only 12 per cent of the total population were more than
ten hours away from a city compared to 31 per cent in 1997, and 38 per cent
were over five hours away in 2007 compared to 82 per cent in 1997 (Schmidt
and Kedir 2009). Minten et al. (2012) find that this type of road development
had important effects on the spatial integration of agricultural markets in the
country, as travel times between different wholesale markets in the country
and the Addis wholesale market fell on average by 20 per cent over the
last decade, from ten hours to eight hours, and transportation costs fell by
50 per cent.
Infrastructure investments were not limited to roads, however. Public
resources that poured into the construction of hydroelectric dams prior to
2000 began to pay off in the latter half of the decade. The increase in total
generating capacity from 477megawatts (7 watts per person) at the turn of the
century to 1917 megawatts (21 watts per person) by the end of the decade
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(Dorosh and Schmidt 2010) laid the foundation for significant increases in
productivity and output (see, for example, Ayele et al. 2009). Further, com-
munication infrastructure reached a larger segment of the population as fixed
telephone lines more than doubled from 405,000 in 2003, and as mobile
subscriptions rose exponentially from 50,000 in 2003 to over 10 million in
2011 (Dorosh and Schmidt 2010; Telegraphy 2012). Minten et al. (2012) find
that the increased access to telecommunications played an important role in
reducing marketing margins in the improved food marketing system.
Finally, in 2005, the Ethiopian government and a consortium of donors
began implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in
response to chronic food insecurity in rural Ethiopia. With the objective of
providing ‘transfers to the food-insecure population in chronically food-
insecure woredas (districts) in a way that prevents asset depletion at the
household level and creates assets at the community level’ (Government of
Ethiopia 2004), the PSNP targets food-insecure rural households and provides
them compensation for their labour on labour-intensive projects designed to
build communityassets. For labour-scarcehouseholds,direct support isprovided
in the formof cashor food transfers, though this accounts for less than5per cent
of total transfers. The programme is well targeted (Coll-Black et al. 2011) and
participants with access to both the PSNP and packages of agricultural support
provided through the Other Food Security Program are more likely to be food-
secure (Gilligan et al. 2009), have shorter hungry seasons, and own more live-
stock (Berhane et al. 2014). Programmes such as the PSNP appear to have helped
reduce food insecurity, and hence poverty, in rural areas since 2005.
3.4 Poverty and Inequality in the 2000s
It is in this context of steady structural changes in the economic landscape of
Ethiopia that we analyse snapshots of poverty and inequality in Ethiopia from
2000 to 2011. The general story that emerges from the data is one of steady but
uneven progress, with urban areas witnessing the greatest gains in the first half
of the decade, and rural areas benefitting more in the latter half. Moreover,
while slightly more muted, other monetary and non-monetary measures of
well-being confirm the general pattern of persistent improvements.
3.4.1 Monetary Poverty and Inequality
Poverty rates in Ethiopia at the turn of the century were high, but fell sub-
stantially by 2011 (Table 3.2). In 2000, 46.8 per cent of the population was
poor, compared to 23.8 per cent in 2011. Most of the decline, however,
occurred between 2005 and 2011 as the poverty rate fell by just under one
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percentage point between 2000 and 2005. Poverty is largely a rural phenom-
enon, with 48.0 per cent of the rural population below the poverty line in 2000,
compared to39.0 per cent inurbanareas. Although the rural headcount ratio fell
by a remarkable 25.6 percentage points, urban areas as a whole saw even greater
declines in poverty, as the urban poverty rate fell to under 14 per cent by 2011.
Most of the decline in urban poverty took place in the first half of the decade,
falling by just over sixteen percentage points. Conversely, rural poverty rose
marginally during this period, with all of the gains occurring after 2005.
Themore distribution-sensitivemeasures of poverty (depth and severity) are
generally consistent with the trends in the headcount ratios, though the
magnitude of the declines in the severity of poverty are not as large. The
poverty incidence curves shown in Figure 3.1 illustrate this graphically, as
the poorest of the poor were no better off in 2011, or in 2005, than they
were in 2000. As for the other 95 percent of the population, although there
was virtually no difference in the distributions of real per capita household
consumption levels (temporally and spatially deflated by the poverty lines to
convert all values to 2011 Addis Ababa values) between 2000 and 2005 (the
thick solid line overlapping the thin solid line), they rose substantially
between 2005 and 2011 (the thick dashed line substantially below the other
lines). In short, while the well-being of most of the Ethiopian population
improved significantly, extremely poor households were not as fortunate.3
Table 3.2. Monetary poverty in Ethiopia, 2000–11
Levels Changes
2000 2005 2011 2000–5 2005–11 2000–11
National
Headcount ratio (P0) 46.8 46.0 23.8 −0.7 −22.3 −23.0
Depth of poverty (P1) 12.6 12.3 6.3 −0.3 −6.0 −6.3
Severity of poverty (P2) 4.8 4.5 2.4 −0.3 −2.0 −2.3
Urban
Headcount ratio (P0) 39.0 22.7 13.3 −16.3 −9.4 −25.6
Depth of poverty (P1) 10.8 4.7 3.2 −6.1 −1.5 −7.6
Severity of poverty (P2) 4.1 1.5 1.3 −2.6 −0.3 −2.9
Rural
Headcount ratio (P0) 48.0 50.0 25.9 2.0 −24.1 −22.2
Depth of poverty (P1) 12.9 13.5 6.9 0.7 −6.6 −5.9
Severity of poverty (P2) 4.9 5.0 2.7 0.1 −2.3 −2.2
Note: Poverty measures are multiplied by 100.
Source: Authors’ calculations from HICES (2000, 2005, 2011)
3 The overlapping of the 2005 and 2011 distributions indicates that tests of first-order
dominance are rejected. Further, because the overlap is at the lower end of the household
consumption distribution, this also results in rejection of tests of second- and third-order
dominance (see Appendix Figures 3.A1 and 3.A2).
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The dramatic fall in urban poverty between 2000 and 2005 is clearly illus-
trated in Figure 3.2a by the across-the-board increase in real household con-
sumption levels (the thick line below the thin line at all consumption levels).
The vertical gap between the poverty incidence curves for these two years
indicates that the sixteen percentage point decrease in the poverty rate shown
in Table 3.2 is not sensitive to the real poverty line. A whole host of possible
poverty lines, ranging from less than 2,000 Birr (2011 Addis Ababa prices) per
person per year to over 6,000 Birr, would result in estimates of similar magni-
tudes.4 This is not the case for the 2005–11 period, however. During this
period, most of the urban population also experienced increased real con-
sumption levels, but the gains were not as large (9.4 percentage point decrease
in poverty), nor were they distributed as uniformly. In fact, the poorest 10 per
cent of the urban population experienced no real change in their consump-
tion levels, despite nominal incomes rising.
Figure 3.2b shows that all of the improvements in rural well-being occurred
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Figure 3.1. Poverty incidence curves, Ethiopia 2000–11
Source: Authors’ calculations from HICES (2000, 2005, 2011)
4 2,000 Birr is equivalent to US$117.6 and 6,000 Birr is equivalent to US$352.9 at the 2011
average exchange rate (17 Birr/US$).
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between 2000 and 2005 (the thick line almost everywhere above the thin
line), the declines weremoderate, with atmost a five percentage point increase
in headcount ratios, depending on the value of the poverty line chosen. The
positive and large shift in the 2011 poverty incidence curve to the right for
the top 95 per cent of the rural population illustrates the twenty-two percent-
age point decrease in rural poverty along with the six point decrease in the
depth of poverty (Table 3.2). The smaller two point reduction in the severity of
poverty follows from the poorest 5 per cent of the rural population being no
better off in 2011 than in 2000 or 2005.
Further disaggregation of poverty by region reveals some interesting mes-
sages (Table 3.3). First, in 2000, urban poverty rates in all of the regions were
lower than the poverty rates in all of the rural areas, except for rural Oromiya
and Amhara. The headcount ratio in rural Oromiya (37.9 per cent) was in fact
lower than all urban areas other than Addis Ababa (34.6 per cent), Oromiya
(35.1 per cent), and Benishangul-Gumuz (36.6 per cent). That rural Amhara
hasmarginally less poverty (52.6 per cent) compared to urban Somali (52.7 per
cent) is more of a reflection of the high rate of poverty in the latter, than of the
low poverty in the former.
Table 3.3. Regional poverty in Ethiopia, 2000–11
Percent poor Changes
2000 2005 2011 2000–5 2005–11 2000–11
Addis Ababa 34.6 10.9 10.7 23.7 0.3 24.0
Afar (rural) 79.6 39.1 42.7 40.5 3.6 36.9
Afar (urban) 39.7 12.4 15.2 27.3 2.8 24.5
Amhara (rural) 52.6 51.2 33.2 1.4 18.0 19.5
Amhara (urban) 38.9 31.1 14.8 7.8 16.3 24.1
Benishangul (rural) 63.1 57.5 21.3 5.6 36.2 41.8
Benishangul (urban) 36.6 32.8 13.7 3.9 19.1 22.9
Dire Dawa (rural) 70.7 66.2 14.7 4.5 51.5 56.0
Dire Dawa (urban) 44.2 16.6 22.2 27.6 5.5 22.1
Gambella (rural) 63.7 19.7 44.0
Gambella (urban) 38.7 24.1 14.7
Harari 41.9 17.7 7.5 24.2 10.3 34.4
Oromiya (rural) 37.9 47.4 25.1 9.5 22.3 12.7
Oromiya (urban) 35.1 23.3 15.9 11.7 7.4 19.2
SNNP (rural) 53.4 52.2 15.1 1.2 37.1 38.3
SNNP (urban) 40.9 35.6 8.8 5.4 26.8 32.2
Somali (rural) 59.2 40.8 33.8 18.4 7.0 25.4
Somali (urban) 52.7 21.3 14.6 31.4 6.7 38.1
Tigray (rural) 63.0 53.6 39.3 9.4 14.3 23.7
Tigray (urban) 60.2 24.8 12.3 35.4 12.5 47.9
Urban 39.0 22.7 13.3 16.3 9.4 25.6
Rural 48.0 50.0 25.9 2.0 24.1 22.2
National 46.8 46.0 23.8 0.7 22.3 23.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from HICES (2000, 2005, 2011)
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Second, in 2000, the poverty rates were lowest in Addis Ababa,5 which is not
surprising given that it is the national capital as well as the commercial hub of
the country. The poorest regions, with more than twice as much poverty as
the least poor, are located in the rural areas of Dire Dawa and Afar. The former,
situated in drought-prone lowlands inhabited by pastoralist Somali tribes, and
the latter, situated in lowland pastoralist areas, are both repeatedly affected by
droughts and periodic tribal conflicts.
Third, although poverty fell in all of the regions between 2000 and 2011,
the changes in poverty were not uniform, nor were they necessarily consistent
with the observed changes at the more aggregated urban and rural levels. For
example, while urban areas generally exhibited greater declines in poverty
between 2000 and 2005 than did most rural areas, the rural areas in Afar
experienced the greatest decline in poverty among all of the regions as a result
of 2000 being a particularly bad year and 2005 being a good year there. Further
urban poverty in Benishangul-Gumuz declined only moderately during this
period, but fell substantially in the latter half of the decade. Finally, some
regions did remarkably better than others in terms of poverty reduction. For
example, poverty rates in rural Dire Dawa and urban Tigray fell by forty-eight
percentage points ormore over the course of the decade, while poverty rates in
urban Gambella and rural Oromiya fell by less than fifteen percentage
points—which is still quite good. As a consequence of these differential
experiences, rural Afar continues to have the highest level of poverty, while
Addis Ababa no longer has the lowest.
Clearly, the differing poverty rates indicate that not all regions in Ethiopia
are equal. We now turn to how the differing consumption levels for different
regions translate into overall inequality of household consumption in the
country as well as in urban and rural areas. The first thing to note is that the
degree of inequality in Ethiopia is in the low range for African countries
(World Bank 2011), as the Gini coefficient was 0.29 in 2000 (Table 3.4).
Second, inequality rose over the course of the decade as indicated by the
Gini coefficient increasing from 0.29 in 2000 to 0.32 in 2011, and the Theil
index rising from 0.16 to 0.21. This is not surprising, given the observation in
Figure 3.1 that the poorest 5 per cent of the population did not fare as well as
the rest.
The degree of inequality in urban areas was considerably higher than in
rural areas throughout the decade. Further urban inequality initially rose
between 2000 and 2005, and fell back to nearly the same level in 2011 as in
2000. While the Gini coefficients from 2000 and 2011 are both roughly 0.38,
5 Because all areas in Addis Ababa were categorized as urban in the 2011 survey, no distinction is
made between urban and rural areas for Addis Ababa for all three survey years.
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the Theil index for 2011 (0.32) is slightly larger than for 2000 (0.28). Con-
versely, rural inequality fell slightly by 2005, before rising in 2011.
Despite urban consumption levels being roughly 50 per cent higher on
average than in rural areas in 2000, 95 per cent of total inequality in 2000
was due to within-group inequality (Table 3.4). This follows largely from the
rural population accounting for over 85 per cent of the national population.
As with poverty, rural inequality largely drives national inequality. Nonethe-
less, the more rapid growth experiences in urban areas as a whole compared to
rural areas contributed to the overall rise in national inequality. This is illus-
trated by the contribution of between-group inequality to overall inequality
rising from 4.9 per cent in 2000 to 11.1 per cent in 2011.
3.4.2 Poverty, GDP, and Inflation
National poverty rates in 2000, 2005, and 2011 are consistent with trends in
real per capita GDP over the decade, suggesting that at the more aggregated
levels, the declines in poverty capture long-term growth trends in Ethiopia
rather than short-term shocks. As illustrated in Table 3.5, growth of real GDP
per capita in the first half of the decade was punctuated by periods of drought-
induced negative growth in 2002 and 2003. As such, despite otherwise
respectable growth rates in other years, per capita GDP was only 18 per cent
higher in 2005 than in 2000. By the end of the decade, however, overall
growth remained high, as per capita income increased by 50 per cent over
the 2005 level. This shadows the poverty rates that fell by 7.5 percentage
points between 2000 and 2005, and even further by 14.5 percentage points
between 2005 and 2011.
A sectoral breakdown in GDP is instructive vis-à-vis the differential impact
of the sources of growth. First, with the exceptions of 2001 and 2002, the real
Table 3.4. Inequality in Ethiopia, 2000–11
2000 2005 2011
Gini coefficient
National 0.289 0.326 0.321
Urban 0.384 0.438 0.387
Rural 0.263 0.254 0.282
Theil Index
National 0.158 0.259 0.208
Urban 0.279 0.460 0.317
Rural 0.122 0.117 0.141
Percentage due to . . .
Within-group inequality 95.1 80.2 88.9
Between-group inequality 4.9 18.8 11.1
Source: Authors’ calculations from HICES (2000, 2005, 2011)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































value of agricultural production in Ethiopia grew by roughly 9 per cent per
year on average. Given the dominance of agriculture in the livelihoods of rural
dwellers, the doubling of real agricultural GDP between 2000 and 2011
(Table 3.5) was an important driver of rural poverty reduction. Much of this
growth was driven by increases in the production of cereals, which account for
three-quarters of the cultivated area (Dorosh and Schmidt 2010). As illustrated
in Figure 3.3, production of all major cereal crops grew steadily over the course
of the decade. In the 1990s, despite stagnating yields, increases in areas
cultivated drove increases in cereal production. In the 2000s, however, yields
grew by 3.5 per cent per year and contributed to the 7 per cent annual growth
in cereal production during this time period (Dorosh and Schmidt 2010). This
type of growth was a key objective of the government’s ADLI strategy.
Although the population remains largely rural, with some 80 per cent
employed in agriculture, the service sector grew so much over the decade (12
per cent per year on average) that by 2011 it accounted for a greater share of
GDP than agriculture. With financial services, real estate, and wholesale and
retail trade leading the way, especially between 2005 and 2011 (MoFED 2012),
urban dwellers are the most likely beneficiaries. Further, given that much of
the growth in the service sector occurred in the latter half of the decade



























Figure 3.3. Cereal production, Ethiopia 2000–11
Source: MoFED (2008, 2012)
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half), the performance of this sector is consistent with the greater decrease in
urban poverty observed during this period. Finally, industrial production
more than doubled over the decade, but it started from such a low base that
it accounted for only 10 per cent of GDP by 2011.
Inflation and price volatility are problems that faced Ethiopian households
during this period, and created challenges for accurately measuring poverty.
While non-food inflation was low between 2000 and 2005, it rose steadily
over the latter half of the decade, reaching as high as 25 per cent in 2011.
However, the major source of uncertainty for poor households, who spend
more than half of their incomes on food, was related to food prices. During the
period between 2000 and 2011, food prices were volatile6 and at times rose
substantially. Following annual average declines in the beginning of the
decade, food prices swung upward and food price inflation reached peaks of
28 per cent in 2003, 60 per cent in 2008, and 38 per cent in 2011. As such, it is
surprising that poverty fell to the degree shown in Table 3.2. This is especially
the case for urban areas where poor households are primarily net buyers of
food. In rural areas as well, inflation may have negatively affected the poor, as
the detrimental effect of food price inflation tends to dominate the effect of
rising producer prices given that the poor are generally net food buyers (Ticci
2011).
In terms of accurately measuring poverty, the high rate of inflation (33 per
cent for general inflation and 38 per cent for food inflation) during the year-
long data collection for the 2011 HICES may have contributed to overly
inflated consumption aggregates for households surveyed later in the year
compared to those surveyed earlier. Although we did deflate the food con-
sumption component of the household consumption aggregate by a quarter
during the data collection period, we warn that the poverty estimates for this
year may be too low due to intra-quarter inflation and non-food inflation, and
that the magnitude of the fall in poverty may be smaller than that reported in
Table 3.2.
3.4.3 HICES Poverty and Other Data Sources on Monetary Poverty
Although the HICES are the only nationally representative surveys for which
monetary poverty in Ethiopia can be assessed, there are other smaller surveys
that can be used to describe poverty in specific localities. One example is the
Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) conducted by the Department of
6 Bellemare et al. (2013) also document the seasonal volatility of food prices and find that
households in select rural communities are willing to pay 6–32 per cent of their income to
eliminate price volatility, though the welfare gains from price stability accrue disproportionately
to the non-poor.
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Economics of Addis Ababa University in collaboration with the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Oxford University. This survey
followed 1,450 households from fifteen rural villages for seven rounds
(1989, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004, and 2009) and focuses largely on Ethi-
opian highland farming systems that are often drought-stricken. It does not
include the pastoral areas.
The observed trends in poverty among the ERHS households are not exactly
the same as those from the HICES (Table 3.6), but are not entirely inconsistent
either. Dercon et al. (2012) find that although poverty in the ERHS villages did
fall significantly between 1994 and 2004 (for example, the headcount poverty
fell from 48 per cent to 35 per cent, respectively), it rose again sharply between
2004 and 2009 (to 52 per cent poor), contrary to the patterns found in the
HICES. Two factors contributed to the very high levels of poverty measured in
2009, and hence the rise in poverty in these villages—year-specific short-term
weather and food price shocks that were not experienced at the time of the
HICES. First, more than half of the villages are located in drought-prone areas
and were negatively affected by droughts in the year leading up to the survey.
Second, most households in the ERHS villages are net food buyers and were hit
hard by the food price hikes in 2008 (Dercon et al. 2012). It is thus important
to be cautious when comparing the poverty estimates from the ERHS with
those of the HICES because (a) the latter are nationally representative and the
former are not, and (b) surveys taken in a particular year may reflect time-
specific shocks, rather than overall long-term trends.
3.4.4 Poverty and Non-monetary Measures of Well-being
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for Ethiopia provide a nationally
representative set of non-monetary indicators that complement the poverty
estimates from the HICES. The collection of these data coincides with the
HICES and provides a sense of consistency between the patterns of the
changes in monetary poverty measured in the HICES and long-term trends









1994 51.9 0.48 0.21 0.12
1995 45.3 0.55 0.24 0.14
1997 70.1 0.33 0.12 0.06
1999 64.3 0.36 0.13 0.06
2004 65.7 0.35 0.13 0.06
2009 48.6 0.52 0.20 0.11
Source: Dercon et al.’s (2012) calculations from the ERHS
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in overall welfare. Consider, for example, child under-five stunting rates over
the three survey years (Table 3.7). The high level of malnutrition in 2000, with
over half of all young children stunted, is consistent with the high poverty
rates in the country at the time, when over half of all individuals were poor.
Further, the declines in stunting were substantial (12.6 percentage points
between 2000 and 2011), though they were not as large as the fall in poverty
(21.9 percentage points). As with poverty, stunting rates are lower in urban
areas, and they fell by more there than in rural areas. Moreover, urban stunt-
ing rates fell by more in the first half of the decade than in the latter half,
whereas they fell by more in the latter half of the decade in rural areas. These
patterns are remarkably similar to the patterns of change in poverty.
Birth history data collected in the DHS enable us to construct retrospective
estimates of infant (under age one) mortality rates (IMR) for each of the eight
years prior to, but not including, the survey year (Figure 3.4). The plot of these
IMRs shows two things. First, mortality rates are high, which is not surprising
given high monetary poverty in Ethiopia. For example, in 2000, roughly 100
children per 1,000 live births died before they reached their first birthday.
Second, there is evidence of a long-term trend of improvements consistent
with the stunting and poverty data. But unlike the stunting data, because we
estimate IMR for each year, not just the survey years, the longer-term trend is
more obvious. In this case, IMR declined on average by four deaths per
thousand live births each year, such that by 2011, the IMR was 60.
As with the other non-monetary measures of well-being, net primary school-
ing enrolment rates calculated from the WMS data showed persistent improve-
ments between 2000 and 2011 (Table 3.8) that are consistent with the decreases
in monetary poverty. For example, the net primary enrolment rate rose from
33.8per cent in 2000 to62.4per cent in2011.Althoughprimary enrolment rates
rose faster in rural areas than in urban areas, the levels are much lower in rural
areas (59.2 per cent) than in urban areas (84.8 per cent) in 2011. In line with the
Table 3.7. Stunting rates in Ethiopia, 2000–11
Levels Changes
2000 2005 2011 2000–5 2005–11 2000–11
National 51.3 46.4 38.6 −4.8 −7.8 −12.6
Gender
Male 52.0 47.2 39.3 −4.7 −8.0 −12.7
Female 50.6 45.6 38.0 −5.0 −7.6 −12.6
Residence
Urban 41.7 31.8 25.8 −9.8 −6.0 −15.9
Rural 52.4 47.6 40.4 −4.8 −7.2 −11.9
Note: Sample of children under age five
Source: Authors’ calculations from DHS (2000, 2005, 2011)
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Millennium Development Goal of equal access to education for girls, primary
enrolment rates for girls rose faster than for boys over the decade. In fact, by
2011, girls’primary enrolment rateswere higher than for boys in rural areas, and
girls nearly made up the 6 percentage point difference in primary enrolment
rates that existed at the beginning of the decade in urban areas.
These comparisons are complicated by the fact that the structure of primary
education changed after the 2005 survey. Primary school now includes grades
Table 3.8. Net school enrolment rates in Ethiopia, 2000–11
Primary Secondary
2000 2005 2011 2000 2005 2011
National 33.8 37.8 62.4 11.6 14.5 10.8
Male 35.8 38.9 60.7 12.2 16.6 11.4
Female 31.6 36.8 64.3 10.9 12.4 11.1
Rural 28.0 32.8 59.2 3.9 8.3 4.9
Male 30.7 34.2 57.3 5.0 10.6 5.6
Female 25.2 31.2 61.2 2.6 5.9 4.2
Urban 72.9 77.2 84.8 48.4 44.5 35.7
Male 76.0 78.8 85.4 52.2 50.1 39.4
Female 70.2 75.8 84.1 45.3 40.1 32.9
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Figure 3.4. Annual infant mortality rates, Ethiopia 1996–2010
Source: Authors’ calculations from DHS data
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1–8 rather than grades 1–6. This is likely to result in estimates of bothprimary and
secondary enrolment rates that are lower, or at least no higher, than would have
been the case had the change not occurred. This follows from dropout rates
increasing as children get older, which is illustrated by the degree to which enrol-
ment rates dropped between primary and secondary school in the 2000 and 2005
data (33.8 per cent to 11.6 per cent, respectively in 2000, and 27.8 per cent to 14.5
per cent, respectively in 2005). As such, the measured increase in primary school
enrolment rates between 2005 and 2011 likely represent lower bounds.
Secondary school net enrolment rates, which are much lower than primary
school enrolment rates (10.8 per cent compared to 62.4 per cent in 2011,
respectively), exhibited ambiguous changes. Although they rose from 11.6 per
cent in 2000 to 14.5 per cent in 2005, they appear to have fallen below the
2000 level to 10.8 per cent in 2011. Part of this is likely a consequence of the
official restructuring of primary and secondary schooling. As such, we do not
read toomuch into the apparent drop in enrolments. Nonetheless, the restruc-
turing does not explain the decline in secondary enrolment rates in urban
areas between 2000 and 2005. Finally, although urban secondary enrolment
rates (35.7 per cent in 2011) are higher than in rural areas (4.9 per cent in
2011), they remain very low and girls have yet to catch up to boys.
A broad-based measure of basic educational attainment that is not sensitive
to the change in the schooling structure—the literacy rate—shows consider-
able improvements over the decade (Table 3.9). While less than 30 per cent of
the over-ten population could read in 2000, this number rose to 46.7 per cent
by 2011. This increase is particularly noteworthy because general literacy rates
change more slowly than enrolment rates, given that literacy rates are a
measure of the stock educational attainment of the population, while changes
Table 3.9. Literacy rates in Ethiopia, 1998–2011
National Urban Rural
Total
2000 29.2 69.9 21.7
2005 37.9 74.2 30.9
2011 46.7 77.9 39.7
Male
2000 39.7 81.8 32.8
2005 49.9 86.2 43.4
2011 56.2 87.6 49.7
Female
2000 19.4 60.6 11.0
2005 26.6 64.4 18.7
2011 37.6 69.6 30.0
Note: For all persons ten years of age and older.
Source: CSA (2013)
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in these rates take place mostly at the margin among children in school, not
among adults who are out of school.
Literacy increased over time in both rural and urban areas, and for both
males and females. Most of the increase in literacy took place in rural areas
(eighteen percentage point increase, compared to eight percentage points in
urban areas) where rates were very low to begin with (21.7 per cent in 2000).
Although there remains a roughly 20 percentage point difference in literacy
rates between men and women, the gap did close by about two percentage
points over the decade as a consequence of more girls enrolling in schools
(Table 3.7).
3.4.5 Poverty and Access to Public Goods
A final set of indicators that can be used to triangulate the monetary poverty
estimates are measures of access to public goods, such as electricity, drinking
water, and sanitation (Table 3.10). Access to each of these types of public
goods increased over the decade in a manner consistent with improved well-
being. As with the non-monetary measures, however, the improvements are
generally more muted than those of poverty.
As noted in section 3.3, Ethiopia’s electricity-generating capacity improved
substantially since 2000, with most of the gains taking place after 2005. This
is clearly evident in Table 3.10, where the very low initial level of access into
the home of less than 5 per cent in 2000, increased to over 9 per cent in
Table 3.10. Access to public goods in Ethiopia, 2000–11
National Urban Rural
2000 2005 2011 2000 2005 2011 2000 2005 2011
Electricity access 4.9 5.7 9.1 31.6 34.3 44.9 0.6 0.4 2.1
Drinking water
Piped 7.1 8.7 40.4 48.6 0.8 0.7
Communal tap 14.3 20.3 47.4 40.6 8.1 16.4
Protected well 11.3 19.3 4.4 5.0 12.6 22.1
Low-quality* 67.3 51.7 5.2 5.8 78.4 60.8
Toilet facilities
Flush 1.7 2.4 1.8 6.9 8.7 10.2 0.8 1.1 0.2
Pit latrine 15.7 27.1 65.7 64.4 71.6 76.8 7.7 18.9 63.5
No facility 82.5 70.5 32.5 28.6 19.7 13.0 90.7 79.9 36.3
Note: *Low-quality drinking water is unprotected well, river, lake, pond, or rainwater.
Source: Authors’ calculations from WMS (2000, 2005, and 2011)
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2011, with the bulk of the increase being realized between 2005 and
2011. Most access to electricity is in urban areas, rather than in rural areas
(45 per cent compared to 2 per cent in 2011). As such, most of the gains
were realized there as well (10 percentage point increase between 2005
and 2011).
Access to clean sources of drinking water also improved. Since information
on sources of drinking water was not collected in the 2000 WMS, our analysis
is limited to the 2005–11 period. Nonetheless, the improvements over this
period are substantial. Although more than half of the population had access
to only low-quality sources of drinking water (unprotected wells, rivers, lakes,
ponds, or rainwater) in 2011, this is a vast improvement from the more than
two thirds of the population in the same situation in 2005. Patterns of
improved access to clean sources of drinking water were markedly different
in urban and rural areas. For example, in urban areas, where nearly 90 per cent
of the population had access to communal taps or direct piped water, the gains
weremade in the form of eight percentage points more households with piped
water. These households were generally those who previously relied on com-
munal taps in 2005, but had since gained access to piped water. In rural areas,
where the percentage of households with access to only low-quality sources of
water fell from 78 per cent to 61 per cent, the gains were in the form of newly
built protected wells and communal taps. Piped water in rural areas is effect-
ively non-existent.
Finally, access to sanitation facilities improved substantially, and along
with greater access to clean sources of drinking water, is likely to have
contributed to the lower stunting and mortality rates discussed previously.
Whereas 82.5 per cent of the population had no toilet facilities in 2000, by
2011, only 32.5 per cent were in a similar situation. Almost all of these gains
follow from the construction of pit latrines (15.7 per cent in 2000 to 65.7 per
cent in 2011) as a result of the implementation of the health extension
system, which allocates two health extension workers per kebele (ward),
especially in rural areas where more than half of the population benefitted.
Flush toilets effectively only exist in urban areas with one in ten individuals
having access in 2011.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we analyse poverty in Ethiopia in 2000, 2005, and 2011
using Arndt and Simler’s (2010) utility-consistent approach to calculating
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CBN poverty lines. This method involves calculating region-specific poverty
lines based on consumption patterns of the poor in each of the urban and
rural areas in the nine provinces (regional states) and two city administra-
tions to reflect local perceptions of poverty (i.e. specificity). To ensure that
each of the consumption bundles used to construct the region-specific CBN
poverty lines also represents the same level of utility (i.e. consistency), a
maximum entropy approach is employed to reconcile cases where revealed
preference conditions are violated. These consistent yet specific poverty lines,
along with consumption aggregates calculated from nationally representative
household surveys, form the basis of the monetary poverty analysis in this
chapter.
The general story that emerges from the data is one of steady but uneven
progress, with urban areas witnessing the greatest gains in the first half of the
decade, and rural areas benefitting more in the latter half. According to our
estimates, national poverty fell remarkably from 51.9 per cent in 2000, to 44.5
per cent in 2005, and finally to 30.0 per cent in 2011. Poverty is considerably
higher in rural areas (53.7 per cent) where more than 80 per cent of the
population lives, compared to urban areas (40.8 per cent). Although the
rural headcount ratio fell by a remarkable 20.5 percentage points, urban
areas as a whole saw even greater declines in poverty, as the urban poverty
rate fell to just under 14 per cent by 2011.
These patterns of declining poverty took place in the context of what
Dorosh and Schmidt (2010) describe as ‘Ethiopia’s changing economic land-
scape’, in which fundamental structural changes took place in the economy.
Improvements in the country’s physical infrastructure, better access to
improved agricultural inputs, and widespread social safety nets have created
an environment that is conducive to poverty reduction. Moreover, other
monetary and non-monetary measures of well-being confirm the general
pattern of persistent welfare improvements. These indicators suggest that
the poverty estimates for Ethiopia are largely a reflection of long-term trends
characterized by broad-based growth and improved welfare. Although data
comparability issues warrant care in determining the degree to which monet-
ary poverty fell, the broader body of evidence paints a picture of substantive
welfare improvements over the decade.
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Figure 3.A2. Test of third-order dominance, Ethiopia 2000–11
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Poverty Reduction over Thirty Years
Andy McKay, Jukka Pirttilä, and Finn Tarp
4.1 Introduction
Ghana has by now experienced solid growth for almost thirty years. In the late
1980s and early 1990s when much of sub-Saharan Africa saw economic
decline, Ghana stood out as one of a small number of exceptions with positive
growth. It undertook major economic reforms from 1984 onwards, and is
regularly held up as an example of successful implementation of adjustment
policies. They came with substantial aid inflows; and in recent years growth
has accelerated even further, in part with the discovery of oil and the start of
its production.
While the rate of growth has varied over time, growth in per capita GDP was
positive in every single year between 1985 and 2013. Per capita GDP grew at
1.7 per cent from 1985 to 1994; by 2.0 per cent from 1995 to 2004; and it
reached 5.3 per cent over 2005–13, in part due to 12 per cent growth experienced
in 2012. This period also saw Ghana joining the group of lower-middle coun-
tries. Accordingly, Ghana has widely been seen as an African growth success
story, and growth is projected to remain strong over the medium-term future.
Turning to the poverty impacts of this growth, Ghana has over the years
benefitted from having a variety of sources of data. Not only have there been
six different rounds of the national household living conditions survey (the
last four at least being comparable), there have also been five waves of the
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). A number of insightful studies of
poverty in Ghana therefore exist, starting with an analysis based on one of
the very first household surveys conducted in Africa, the first round of the
Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), conducted in 1987/8 (Boateng et al.
1992), with many other more in-depth studies following. A consistent mes-
sage of these studies is that growth has been accompanied by progress in
reducing monetary poverty.
At the official level, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) has also published
important studies of poverty in Ghana. Its 2007 study (GSS 2007) describes
poverty developments between 1991 and 2006 in detail, and a recently pub-
lished poverty report compares the situation in 2005/6 with that revealed by
the latest survey in 2012/13 (GSS 2014). Both reviews show impressive pro-
gress over these periods in terms of reducing consumption poverty, but also
that inequality has been on the rise.
Among academic studies, Aryeetey and McKay (2007) look at the relation-
ship between economic growth and poverty reduction in Ghana as a study
done as part of a multi-country project analysing pro-poor growth. Coulombe
andWodon (2007) provide a thorough study of poverty, its relation to growth,
and the determinants of poverty between 1991 and 2006. They note that the
GDP deflator increased more than the CPI, which implies that poverty reduc-
tion has been further underpinned with relatively strong real consumption
growth. They also decompose changes in the mean level of consumption per
adult equivalent of households over time into changes due to differences in
household characteristics and changes due to differences in the returns to
these characteristics. The results from this exercise suggest that the reductions
in poverty due to declines in household size, which occurred both in rural and
urban areas, are important, and also that the impact was much larger in urban
areas. They also calculate that, if inequality had not increased between 1991
and 2006, poverty would have fallen by four percentage points more than it
actually did during this period.
Duclos et al. (2006) examine multidimensional poverty in three African
countries, including Ghana. Their chosen indicators are consumption and
children’s height for age scores (a good measure of nutrition). For the country
as a whole, suchmeasuredmultidimensional poverty is greater in rural than in
urban areas. It also appears that in some geographical regions this pattern
unexpectedly does not hold. Annim et al. (2012) study district-level inequality
using GLSS3-5, and find that the contribution of within-district inequality to
national inequality is higher than inequality between districts.
Two papers specifically focus on the linkages between inflation, an import-
ant challenge in Ghana, and poverty. Cudjoe et al. (2010) examine food price
transmission between regionalmarkets, using the 2007–8 food price crisis as an
example. They combine econometric analysis of food price correlations with
consumer demand system-based simulations. While they find that domestic
grain prices are highly correlated with world market prices, the food crisis had
only amodest impact on consumerwelfare on average because of the relatively
diverse consumption patterns within the country. They also argue that some
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subgroups of the population, namely the poorest households in urban areas,
suffered considerably due to food price increases. Coleman (2012), in turn,
investigates the persistence properties of inflation across regions and sectors in
Ghana. He finds some regions (Ashanti, Central, and Eastern) demonstrate
inflation persistence, implying that a nationwide policy shock will have
longer-lasting effects in these three compared to the other regions.
This chapter revisits and updates all of this evidence on growth and poverty
in Ghana, taking into account the results of the most recently conducted
household survey in 2012/13. Insights are also provided using different non-
monetary indicators from the Demographic and Health Surveys for the four
latest available rounds. While Ghana is undoubtedly an African success in
many respects, we also raise a number of issues, in particular in relation to the
more recent record and in terms of the inclusiveness of the growth pattern.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 sets out the historical back-
ground to Ghana’s period of three decades of sustained growth and outlines
some of the policies and reforms related to growth and poverty reduction.
Then in section 4.3 we review the macroeconomic picture in terms of growth
and other outcomes, looking in more detail at the composition of growth and
its likely implications for changes in poverty. The record in terms of monetary
poverty and inequality, and the responsiveness of these to growth, is reviewed
in section 4.4, after which section 4.5 discusses the record in terms of non-
monetary dimensions of poverty. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Economic Developments and Policies Implemented to
Reduce Poverty
At Independence in 1957 Ghana had a per capita income level comparable to
countries like South Korea and Malaysia, and much higher than Thailand,
India, and most other African countries. The government of the time (with
Kwame Nkumah as prime minister during 1957–60 and president from 1960
to 1966) pursued several policies and programmes to enhance economic
growth and to reduce poverty, focusing on removing constraints to industri-
alization. This included, among other things, policies to construct a modern
road network, to modernize and enlarge the main ports (Takoradi and Tema),
to diversify agricultural production and to achieve significant progress in
education and health.
In reality though, the history of Ghana’s first twenty-five years of independ-
ence is a case of largely self-inflicted decline (Huq 1989). The period between
the toppling of the Nkrumah government in 1966 and December 1983 when
Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings took power for the second time saw substan-
tial political instability (with eight different regimes in this period, some
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military andmany short-lived) andmajor inconsistencies in policy implemen-
tation. In addition, the economy was hit by several shocks, including the
sharp oil price rises in the 1970s, severe droughts during 1975–7 and
1981–3, and the repatriation of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 (Gockel and
Amu 2003). The government ended up in 1983 having no other alternative
than to seek assistance from the IMF and the World Bank through the Eco-
nomic Recovery Programme (ERP) (Aryeetey et al. 2000).
The ERP is described by Aryeetey and Tarp (2000). They detail the many
different market-oriented policy reform measures, which were involved, and
assess the initial performance. The programme helped relaunch growth and
was associated with improved fiscal performance; although the fact already
noted that the ERP was accompanied by substantial aid inflows makes it
challenging to disentangle the relative importance of the different factors in
accounting for re-establishing growth. Furthermore, in some respects eco-
nomic performance remained poor, in particular in relation to private invest-
ment and control of inflation. Political liberalization followed economic
liberalization with a transition to democracy in 1992; and this process has
been both popular in Ghana and successful as demonstrated by two peaceful
changes of political regime in elections in 2000 and 2008. Democracy though
also creates challenges, with rising fiscal deficits associated with election
periods. Effective fiscal management remains a major issue, alongside high
inflation, which has been a continued problem.
Concern about the poverty consequences of the reform measures being
undertaken led the government to adopt its Programme of Actions to Mitigate
the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1989 as a kind of buffer for the
vulnerable groups in the country (Leite et al. 2000). More effective focus on
alleviating poverty was introduced through a set of later initiatives, including
Vision 2020, which sought to propel the economy to middle-income status
within twenty-five years. Its replacement, the first Ghana Poverty Reduction
Strategy (GPRS I), the first phase of which accompanied Ghana’s application
for the Enhanced HIPC facility in 2001, followed. Concerns were nonetheless
expressed that the poor did not participate actively in the growth process (Osei
and Domfe 2008). Hence the second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
(GPRS II) was launched in 2006 to continue the poverty reduction efforts. One
key poverty reduction project under GPRS II, borne out of the evaluation of
the GPRS I, was the cash transfer programme called the Livelihood Empower-
ment Against Poverty (LEAP). GPRS II ended in 2009 and was replaced by the
Ghana Shared Growth Development Agenda (GSGDA), which has now
entered a second phase.
An important recent economic development in Ghana is the discovery of
significant quantities of oil in 2007 with production starting on a modest scale
towards the end of 2010. This has now become a significant source of export
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revenue for Ghana, adding to its traditional important exports of gold and
cocoa.Oil production is intended toprovide a sourceof revenue for government;
however, it is still too early to judge the impact of oil productionon the economy
and certainly on poverty. Recent macroeconomic difficulties caused by expend-
iture overshooting, which caused Ghana to approach the IMF once again,
underline the importance of prudent management of natural resource income.
4.3 The Macroeconomic Environment
Three phases can be discerned from the economic growth trends from 1960 to
2013. The first, spanning the period 1960–83, saw growth averaging close to
zero with very large variability (Figure 4.1). The dismal growth performance
for this period has been attributed to many factors, including economic
mismanagement, political instability, the severe droughts referred to in sec-
tion 4.2, adverse shifts in the country’s terms of trade, and the oil shocks of the
1970s (Killick 2010; Lloyd, Morrissey, and Osei 2001). The second phase spans
the economic recovery period until the early 2000s. These years of restoration
recorded positive growth on average with relatively low variability, reflecting
greater economic and political stability in combination with a much stronger
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Figure 4.1. Trends in economic growth, 1960–2012
Source: World Development Indicators 2014
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foreign aid). The last phase covers the period from the mid-2000s to date,
where the beginnings of accelerated growth could be witnessed. Economic
growth between 2002 and 2008 averaged about 6.1 per cent per annum. In the
year 2011, the economy grew at an unprecedented rate of 14.4 per cent. This
growth, though, was principally driven by oil production, which started
during the last quarter of 2010.
According to the more detailed information available from Table 4.1 (see
also Table 4.2), private consumption (and investment) grew faster than the
GDP during the period 1991–9, made possible through increasing deficits in
the external balance. In the latest period shown, 2007–13, after the rebasing of
the GDP, consumption growth has lagged behind GDP growth, while invest-
ment growth has remained high.
The sectoral decomposition of growth shows how the agricultural sector
lagged behind overall growth in the 1990s, then experienced a faster growth
rate until the rebasing of GDP in 2006. After that, the share of agriculture in
total GDP remained fairly small, and agricultural growthhas beenmodest. This
stands in comparison with the much faster growth of the service sector and
especially non-manufacturing industries in the period from 2007 onwards.
The sluggish development of the manufacturing sector stands out. Jedwab
and Osei (2012) note that income changes in Ghana during 1960–2010 were
mainly driven by changes in the productivity of specific sectors rather than by
a shift of resources from low- to high-productivity areas. This was particularly
the case before 1992. Nevertheless, the authors argue that Ghana has slowly
transitioned into a more efficient economy, with structural change becoming
a more significant factor of productivity growth. Indeed, Osei (2012) cautions
Table 4.1. Growth rates of different national accounts aggregates
Mean growth rates per annum
1991–9 1998–2005 2007–13
Real GDP growth, % 4.4 4.8 8.3
GDP per capita growth, annual % 1.8 2.2 5.8
Final consumption expenditure, etc., annual % growth 4.8 4.9 6.3
General government final consumption expenditure, annual %
growth
7.0 8.4 18.1
Household final consumption expenditure, annual % growth 4.6 4.4 5.5
Gross capital formation, annual % growth 11.7 8.1 11.4
External balance on goods and services, annual % growth 23.6 12.0 1.0
Exports of goods and services, annual % growth 12.8 7.7 18.5
Imports of goods and services, annual % growth 13.3 7.7 11.1
Agriculture, real growth rate, % 3.0 5.1 3.4
Industry, real growth rate, % 12.0 4.2 14.5
Manufacturing, real growth rate, % 4.8 3.9 0.1
Services, etc., real growth rate, % 2.5 4.9 8.6
Source: World Development Indicators 2014
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that the growth-enhancing type of structural change needs to be sustained
particularly if the country is to avoid the oil curse. Other potential concerns
that could mitigate the growth-enhancing potential of structural change in
Ghana are the increasingly fragile nature of the government’s fiscal situation
and the challenges in the country’s energy sector. In terms of the fiscal policy,
the country has recently again needed a fiscal rescue package from the IMF (see
IMF 2015). On the energy sector the frequent disruptions to power means that
firms rely increasingly on their own power generation (mainly by use of diesel
generators), which invariably makes them less competitive, limiting the scope
to develop an industrial sector.
A key factor lurking behind poverty estimates is inflation, especially food
price inflation. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the large fluctuations in the inflation
rate over the entire time period discussed here. In Figure 4.3, food price
inflation is compared with overall consumer price inflation for the period for
which comparable information is available. While food prices increased rap-
idly during the food price crisis around 2008, the overall inflation rate was also
high and remained above food price inflation. In any case, the rates shown
underline the need for great care when deflating nominal figures to arrive at
real consumption estimates.
4.4 The Record on Consumption Poverty
The analysis of consumption poverty in Ghana is enabled by the four rounds
of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS, rounds 3 to 6), concurred in
Table 4.2. Real GDP growth, by expenditure category and sector, 1991, 1999, 2006, and
2013
Shares
1991 1999 2006 2013
Final consumption expenditure, etc., % of GDP 92.7 96.5 93.9 81.0
General government final consumption expenditure, % of GDP 9.5 10.8 11.2 16.6
Household final consumption expenditure, etc., % of GDP 83.2 85.7 82.7 64.4
Gross capital formation, % of GDP 15.9 21.0 21.6 24.1
External balance on goods and services, % of GDP 8.6 17.5 15.5 5.1
Exports of goods and services, % of GDP 17.0 32.1 25.2 42.2
Imports of goods and services, % of GDP 25.5 49.6 40.7 47.2
Total 100 100 100 100
Agriculture, value added, % of GDP 45.6 39.9 30.4 21.9
Industry, value added, % of GDP 17.0 28.4 20.8 28.5
Manufacturing, value added, % of GDP 9.3 10.1 10.2 5.8
Services, etc., value added, % of GDP 37.5 31.7 48.8 49.6
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: The World Bank
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Figure 4.3. Comparison of food price inflation and overall price inflation
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ghana Statistical Service data
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1991–2, 1998–9, 2005–6, and 2012–13. These are comparable surveys which
enable total real household consumption expenditure per adult equivalent to
be computed, using price data which can take account of differences across
space and over time between one round and another. A national poverty line
is used. The Ghana Statistical Service has published a poverty report based on
the first three of these rounds (GSS 2008), and more recently a poverty study
based on the latest two rounds, the latter using a revised consumption meas-
ure and poverty line (GSS 2014).1
The mean values of household consumption from the last four household
surveys, expressed in the constant prices of January 2013, are summarized in
Table 4.3. It demonstrates rising average consumption at quite fast rates over
this period. Over the full period from 1991/2 to 2012/13, consumption per
adult equivalent grew at a very respectable annual average rate of 3.1 per cent.
While growth was faster in the periods between the GLSS3 and 4 and GLSS4
and 5 surveys than over the GLSS5 to 6 years, even in this last period con-
sumption still grew at an average rate of 2.5 per cent per year.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the distributional pattern of this growth by plot-
ting growth incidence curves for the GLSS3 to 5 and GLSS5 to 6 periods
respectively. These figures show the higher average rate of growth in the first
period compared to the second. They also show that in the first period growth
in consumption was significantly higher at the top end of the distribution
than at the bottom, indicating that inequality rose over this period. Growth
between the GLSS5 and 6 periods was less uneven, though still slightly higher
at the top end of the distribution.
What these growth incidence curves also indicate is a consistent history of
reduction in monetary poverty over this period. Poverty headcount data from
the four most recent GLSS surveys at the national level are presented in
Table 4.3, drawing on official, published data. The data for the GLSS3 to
GLSS5 surveys are directly comparable. Small revisions were made to the
computation of the poverty line (and consumption aggregate) in the analysis
of the GLSS6 survey, resulting in revised estimates for GLSS5, which are also
presented in this table. While the revised poverty line, which took into
account more recent consumption patterns, gives higher poverty numbers
for the 2005/6 period, the patterns are not fundamentally different from the
previous figures. The headline story remains one of a large reduction in the
poverty headcount between 1991/2 and 1998/9, and again between 1998/9
1 An earlier study by Coulombe and McKay (1995) compared poverty over the first three rounds
of the Ghana Living Standards Survey from 1987/8 to 1991/2, a comparison which was made
difficult by a significant change in the way of collecting consumption data between the second and
third rounds of the survey. Nonetheless, attempting to correct for the effects of this change,
Coulombe and McKay estimated that poverty had fallen over this period.
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and 2005/6. Poverty continued to fall between 2005/6 and 2012/13 (based on
the comparable data), even if the percentage point reduction was smaller.
The rest of the table examines the responsiveness of poverty to growth by
computing the growth elasticity of poverty reduction, based on different
definitions of growth. The first calculations are done relative to per capita
GDP, the growth rate of which increased over time. The figures suggest that
Table 4.3. Changes in national poverty headcount for Ghana, and elasticity calculations
1991–2 1998–9 2005–6 2012–13
Poverty headcount 51.7 39.5 28.5
Proportionate change in poverty 0.236 0.278 0.241
Real GDP per capita (2006 values) 634.8 714 837.2 1,228.2
Real consumption per capita (2006 values) 539.3 590.1 685.5 711.9
Real survey consumption per capita (est. 2006
values)
294.8 382.8 479.2
Real survey consumption per capita (2013 values) 2,511 3,002
Proportionate change in per capita GDP 0.125 0.173 0.467
Proportionate change in per capita consumption
(national accounts)
0.094 0.162 0.039
Proportionate change in per adult household
consumption (survey)
0.216 0.272 0.192
Growth elasticity of poverty (GDP) 1.89 1.61 0.52
Growth elasticity of poverty (national accounts
consumption)
2.51 1.72 6.26
Growth elasticity of poverty (survey consumption) 1.09 1.02 1.26
Note: The levels of consumption from the third household survey in 2006 values cannot be compared with those in 2013
values because of significant revisions in the CPI data used for these calculations. But comparisons along the row to
compute growth rates are valid.
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Figure 4.4. Growth incidence curve for Ghana, 1991/2–2005/6
Source: Authors’ computations based on Ghana Living Standards Survey data
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the growth elasticity with respect to GDP falls from 1.9 between 1992 and
1998/9 (a respectable figure) to a much less respectable 0.5 between 2005/6
and 2012/13. In other words, the recent faster growth in GDP would not
appear to have been associated with significant poverty reduction. Monetary
poverty is, however, more directly linked to private consumption; and the
elasticity with respect to the national accounts estimate of private consump-
tion is2.5 in the first period,1.7 in the second period, and6.3 in the third
period. The last figure would seem to be an anomaly and raises questions
about the reliability of the associated private consumption estimate in the
national accounts. Its growth rate may well have been underestimated. We
now finally turn to the estimated growth elasticities of poverty computed
using the household-based consumption measure, which shows significantly
faster growth between 2005/6 and 2012/13 than does the national accounts
aggregate. Here the growth elasticities of poverty are both more stable and
more modest; 0.8 between 1991/2 and 1998/9, 1.1 between 1998/9 and
2005/6, and 1.2 between 2005/6 and 2012/13. This is perhaps the best
measure of the responsiveness of poverty to growth and shows disappointing
progress in poverty reduction, given the consumption growth rate achieved.
As will be seen, rising inequality over much of this period will be part of the
explanation.
While the above review concerns national-level poverty, a disaggregated
analysis of the poverty headcount is presented in Table 4.4. Significant diver-
sity is evident in both levels and trends. Poverty levels aremuch higher in rural
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Figure 4.5. Growth incidence curve for Ghana, 2005/6–12/13
Source: Authors’ computations based on Ghana Living Standards Survey data
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rural areas, poverty reduction was less over the 1991/2 to 2005/6 period in the
savannah ecological zone compared to the forest and coastal zones. The
savannah is also the zone with the highest poverty levels by far in both
urban and rural areas.
There are some differences though in the patterns of change between 2005/6
and 2012/13 compared to the earlier period. In this period the poverty
reductions in percentage point terms are higher in the savannah zone than
elsewhere, and poverty in fact increases in the coastal zones outside of Accra
(as well as in the urban forest zone). What is clear is that over this latest period
the urban poverty reduction is completely accounted for by Accra, while
poverty in other urban areas in fact rises. It is also the case that measured
poverty in Accra has been exceptionally volatile over time, falling sharply
between 1991/2 and 1998/9 before rising to a significant extent between
then and 2005/6 and then falling again from then to 2012/13. Whether this
volatility reflects something about the data collection or is a real phenomenon
is difficult to confirm from the available data.
In rural areas poverty in the savannah zone fell slowly between 1991/2 and
1998/9, and then more quickly between 1998/9 and 2005/6 and again
between 2005/6 and 2012/13. Savannah remains the zone where poverty
Table 4.4. Disaggregated poverty headcount data for Ghana
1991–2 1998–9 2005–6 2005–6 2012–13
All Ghana 51.7 39.5 28.5 31.9 24.2
Urban 27.7 19.4 10.7 12.4 10.6
Rural 63.6 49.5 39.3 43.7 37.9
Accra (GAMA) 23.1 3.8 10.6 12 3.5
Urban Coastal 28.3 24.2 5.5 6.4 10.1
Urban Forest 25.8 18.2 7.0 8.7 9.9
Urban Savannah 37.8 43.0 26.9 30.1 26.4
Rural Coastal 52.5 45.2 23.9 27.2 30.3
Rural Forest 61.6 38.0 27.9 33.1 27.9
Rural Savannah 73.0 70.0 60.3 64.2 55
Western 59.6 27.3 18.6 22.9 20.9
Central 44.3 48.4 19.9 23.4 18.8
Greater Accra 25.8 5.2 11.8 13.5 5.6
Eastern 48.0 43.7 31.7 37.3 33.8
Volta 57.0 37.7 14.7 17.8 21.7
Ashanti 41.2 27.7 20.5 24 14.7
Brong Ahafo 65.0 35.8 29.7 34 27.9
Northern 63.4 69.2 52.2 55.7 50.4
Upper West 88.4 83.9 70.5 72.9 44.4
Upper East 66.9 88.2 87.9 89.1 70.7
North 68.8 76.6 62.7 65.6 52.4
South 47.9 31.3 19.8 23.3 18.5
Male 54.9 41.0 31.5 34.9 25.9
Female 43.1 35.2 19.0 22.1 19.1
Source: Authors’ computations based on Ghana Living Standards Survey data
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levels are by far the highest in Ghana. This zone only accounted for 20.5 per
cent of the population in 2012/13 but 40.8 per cent of national poverty
according to the headcount measure. Poverty in the rural forest zone fell
very quickly between 1991/2 and 2005/6 and it continued to fall between
2005/6 and 2012/13. As noted above, poverty rose in the rural coastal zone
between 2005/6 and 2012/13, in contrast to the sharp falls seen in the years
leading up to this. This increased poverty in the coastal zone is the most
striking finding of the analysis of the latest round of the GLSS surveys, a
point acknowledged though not explained in the government’s official pov-
erty report.
An analysis by the ten main regions of Ghana covering the 1991/2 to 2005/
6 period shows a pattern of generally significantly better progress in the seven
southern or transition regions compared to the three northern regions; these
are grouped together as ‘south’ and ‘north’ in Table 4.4. The poverty head-
count for the three northern regions increased between 1991/2 and 1998/9,
and by 2005/6 poverty here was only 6.1 percentage points less than it had
been in 1991/2. By contrast, the seven regions in the south had reduced their
collective poverty headcount by 28.1 percentage points. In 2005/6 the poverty
headcount for the three northern regions was more than three times that for
the seven southern regions. Between 2005/6 and 2012/13 poverty fell faster in
the north than in the south, narrowing this gap, but it remains very large. The
north–south gap in Ghana, a characteristic shared by other West African
countries including Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, stands out as an important
policy challenge in Ghana and a continually sensitive political issue.
Looking at the specific regions shows some diversity. In the north, sharp
reductions in poverty between 2005/6 and 2012/13 happened predominantly
in the Upper West and especially the Upper East region, with poverty reduc-
tion being less in the Northern region. While the poverty headcount was
much higher in the Upper West compared to the other regions in the north,
in terms of accounting for the numbers in poverty, it was the Northern region
which contributed much more, reflecting its higher population. Nearly 18 per
cent of the poor in Ghana in 2012/13 were located in the Northern region.
Similar diversity exists regarding poverty reduction in the south. The Ashanti
and Brong Ahafo regions have shown consistent progress in poverty reduction
over all the periods considered here. In other regions there has been a bit more
variability. The Western and Volta regions showed impressive poverty reduc-
tion between 1991/2 and 2005/6, but much slower progress or slight regress
respectively between 2005/6 and 2012/13. Poverty decreased much more
slowly in the Eastern region, which from 2005/6 onwards was the poorest
among the seven regions outside the north.
Computation of the P2 Foster–Greer–Thorbecke poverty index (not pre-
sented here), which places much more emphasis on the depth of poverty,
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highlights evenmore sharply the north–south differential in Ghana. In 2005/6
the P2 value for the three regions in the north collectively was 0.176 compared
to 0.020 in the south. While the ratio of these two figures had narrowed by
2012/13 there was still a difference of a factor of 5.6. The P2 indices for the
Upper West region were 0.328 in 2005/6 and 0.188 in 2012/13. These values
highlight that the relatively remote Upper West region is by far the poorest in
Ghana.
Looking at poverty by the economic activity status of the household
(Table 4.5) shows that the highest levels of poverty by far are among those
reliant on agriculture for their primary economic activity. In all years this is
consistently the group among which poverty levels are the highest. At the
same time, the level of poverty in this group (as in most others) fell signifi-
cantly over each of the sub-periods. Poverty levels are much lower among
those self-employed in non-farm activities, and they too experience signifi-
cant reductions in poverty over these periods. The group among which pov-
erty seems to be falling less or even increasing in recent years is some of the
households in which no one works. This group can be disaggregated in more
detail for the last two rounds. This shows that the non-active and unemployed
are the second poorest groups in 2005/6 and 2012/13, and poverty among the
unemployed group increases quite sharply over this period.
Summary inequality indices are presented for Ghana for the same period in
Table 4.6. The Gini coefficient at national level was 0.397 in 1991/2, and this
rose in each following year to 0.407 in 1998/9, 0.411 in 2005/6, and 0.418 in
2012/13. This pattern is as expected from the growth incidence curves seen in
Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The two members of the generalized entropy inequality
indices presented here, the relative mean deviation and the Theil Index, show
Table 4.5. Poverty headcounts by main economic activity
1991–2 1998–9 2005–6 2005–6 2012–13
Public employees 34.7 22.7 7.8
Private formal employees 30.3 11.3 10.2
Private informal employees 38.6 25.2 17.1
Export farmers 64.0 38.7 24.1
Food crop farmers 68.1 59.4 45.7
Non-farm self-employed 38.4 28.6 16.7
Non-working 18.8 20.4 13.0
Public employee 9.0 7.1
Private employee 14.3 10.8
Self-employed (non-agric.) 17.0 12.8
Self-employed (agriculture) 45.1 39.2
Unemployed 20.0 28.1
Retired 9.1 4.7
Other non-active 38.6 23.6
Source: Authors’ computations based on Ghana Living Standards Survey data
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the same pattern of change over time. Given the apparent importance of the
north–south differential seen in Table 4.4, Table 4.6 presents values of the
inequality indices for the north and the south of the country separately.
What is clear from this is that the north of Ghana is not only much poorer,
it is also more unequal, except perhaps in 1998/9. These decomposable gen-
eralized entropy indices can be used to identify the relative share of between-
and within-locational inequality. It is clear that in 1998/9 and 2005/6, more
than 10 per cent of national inequality was accounted for by the difference in
average consumption between the south and north of the country. This share
had fallen by 2012/13, but the contribution of the north–south differential to
national inequality remains substantial. At the same time, substantial inequal-
ity within each of these groups continues, and that inequality is especially
high within the north.
4.5 Progress in Non-monetary Indicators
Table 4.7 reports various non-monetary indicators for the country as a whole,
from 1993 (1988 for some indicators) to 2008. The indices reveal a similar
pattern: infant and under-five mortality rates have declined remarkably well
(although the level for a country with Ghana’s GDP per capita is still on the
high side); and secondary school attendance rates increased at the same time
when income poverty went down. Access to services has also improved.
Table 4.6. Measures of inequality in Ghana, with a focus on south–
north differences
Gini GE0 GE1
1991–2 0.373 0.231 0.249
North 0.382 0.243 0.255
South 0.363 0.216 0.237
Share of between-group inequality .. 0.045 0.038
1998–9 0.388 0.255 0.259
North 0.375 0.230 0.269
South 0.362 0.219 0.226
Share of between-group inequality .. 0.135 0.111
2005–6 0.406 0.286 0.301
North 0.424 0.303 0.312
South 0.378 0.237 0.265
Share of between-group inequality .. 0.126 0.102
2012–13 0.409 0.288 0.296
North 0.423 0.306 0.330
South 0.391 0.257 0.270
Share of between-group inequality .. 0.079 0.066
Source: Authors’ computations based on Ghana Living Standards Survey data
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The only indicator where progress is not so clear is the weight-for-height
indicator for children. This measure captures short-term deficiencies in nutri-
tion, and its development may have been influenced by improvements in
child survival.
Heterogeneity in child mortality developments is examined in Table 4.8.
The drop in both infant and under-five mortality has been especially pro-
nounced in the rural areas, although the levels remain higher in the rural areas
and in the poorer administrative regions. Regions where child mortality rates
are high include Upper West and Northern regions, and also the Central
region, despite it being located not too far from Accra.
A similar picture emerges from the differences between child mortality
when classified based on mothers’ education. Children with more educated
mothers face a lower risk of death, but the situation has also improved for
children of uneducated mothers.
Educational attainment has increased across all regions (Table 4.9), and if
one looks at, for example, the age group 16–18, where there wasmore variance
in the first period, some more backward areas have done exceptionally well:
attendance increased by seventy-seven percentage points in the Upper East
region. While gender gaps have declined, they still persist, for example in the
Northern region, but also in Accra. One needs to remember, however, that
improvements in the male–female ratio among older students take some time
to materialize.
All in all, themonetary poverty developments and non-monetary indicators
convey a similar story: while poverty has decreased and well-being increased,
the differences across the country continue to be large. The same regions,
predominantly in the north, where monetary poverty is persistent, also fare
worse in terms of the non-monetary indicators.
Table 4.7. Trends in some headline non-monetary indicators in Ghana
1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Infant mortality rate 77 66 57 64 50
Under-five mortality rate 155 119 108 111 80
% with HFA < -2sd 33.6 32.3 30.3 35.0 26.8
% with WFH < -2sd 8.9 13.7 9.9 8.4 8.7
% with WFA < -2sd 22.6 23.3 19.5 17.7 13.5
Education level: Completed secondary or higher Male 10.8 45.7 40.6 47.7
Female 5.7 33.4 32.5 38.1
Has electricity: Yes 30.6 42.6 48.3 60.5
% with adequate drinking water source 67.0 73.7 79.7 80.0
% within 15 minutes of water source 60.9 56.6 61.8 67.4
% with flush or pit toilet 69.4 79.4 78.2 80.5
% having received all vaccinations 54.8 62.0 69.4 79.0
Source: DHS, various years
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4.6 Conclusions
In many ways Ghana stands out as one of the most notable success stories in
sub-Saharan Africa. It has had consistent growth in per capita GDP for thirty
years; it has managed a successful, popular, and peaceful democratic transi-
tion; it has maintained political stability; and it has achieved impressive
progress in monetary and non-monetary poverty reduction over the past
twenty-five years. In many ways it is an impressive model.
While all this remains true, there are a number of important concerns in
both the past record and perhaps especially in terms of risks for the future.
Ghana has continually struggled with effective macroeconomic and fiscal
policy management, the recent IMF loan being testament to this. Ghana has
always struggled in managing inflation; it has not had a particularly strong
record in private investment. Its manufacturing sector performance has been
poor and it has made slow progress in transforming the economy. Oil has
contributed to faster recent growth but may carry significant risks for the
future performance of the Ghanaian economy.
And while Ghana has consistently reduced monetary and non-monetary
poverty, the rate of responsiveness of the former to growth has not been very
Table 4.8. Child mortality by regions and education
Infant mortality Under-five mortality
1993 1998 2003 2008 1993 1998 2003 2008
Residence
Urban 54.9 42.6 55 49 89.9 76.8 93 75
Rural 82.2 67.5 70 56 149.2 122 118 90
Region
Western 76.3 68.0 66.0 51 131.8 109.7 109.0 65*
Central 71.6 83.8 50* 73* 128 142.1 90* 108*
Greater Accra 58.4 41.4 45 36* 100.2 62 75 50*
Volta 77.8 53.8 75 37* 116.4 98 113 50*
Eastern 55.9 50.2 64 53* 93.2 89.1 95 81*
Ashanti 65.2 41.9 80 54 97.6 78.2 116 80
Brong Ahafo 48.7 77.3* 58 37* 94.6 128.7* 91 76*
Northern 113.7 70.1 69 70 237 171.3 154 137
Upper West 84.5* 70.6 33 97 187.7* 155.6 208 142*
Upper East 105 81.6 105 46* 180.1 155.3 79 78*
Mother’s education
No education 87.1 69.3 66 61 165.7 130.8 125 102
Primary 85.8 45.4 76 55 141.2 112.5 120 88
Middle/JSS 55.4 39.9 60 46 89 91.3 92 68
Secondary/Higher 28.2* 36.8* 29* 49* 40.7* 59.8* 34* 64*
Total 74.7 61.2 64 50 132.8 110.4 111 80
Note: *Figures are based on 250–499 births.
Source: DHS data, various years
Ghana: Poverty Reduction over Thirty Years
85
fast and inequality has consistently risen over the past twenty years. Poverty
levels are much higher among those working in agriculture; the agricultural
sector has also shown significantly slower growth. It has not been seen as a
sufficient policy priority.
One aspect of this inequality has been the significant spatial diversity in the
achievements in both monetary and non-monetary poverty. One dimension
of this has been the significant disadvantage of the north of the country
compared to the transition zone and the south, despite different policy meas-
ures to try to address this. There is a tension between this and the need
to develop an effective manufacturing sector (McKay and Perge 2015),
which is more likely to be located in the south to take advantage of transport
links and agglomeration benefits. But a stronger policy focus on agriculture
and enabling freer trade should benefit the north. However, there is also quite
Table 4.9. School attendance by regions
Age range 12–15 years
Survey 1991/2 1998/9 2005/6 2012/13
Sex Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Western 83.2 75.5 93 84.3 98.9 94.5 98.6 96.9
Central 83.3 71.4 89.1 81.6 99.6 97.7 96.9 96.6
Greater Accra 93.2 77.7 87.3 85.4 98.1 97.4 99.7 98.3
Eastern 90.4 81.1 87.1 77.4 98.6 96.8 98.8 98
Volta 82.7 81.5 84.6 82 97.6 85.5 94.9 96.9
Ashanti 94 76 85.4 78.3 98 94.1 98 96.9
Brong Ahafo 83.3 82.5 88.7 82.3 95.3 91.8 96.2 95.8
Northern 63.3 31.5 71.9 46.1 63.7 57.9 74.6 73.1
Upper West 30.8 35.5 62.6 71.6 68.9 69.3 88.9 93.2
Upper East 44.8 34.1 60.2 47.2 58.3 67.7 93.1 90.4
All 81.5 70.8 83.8 76.8 90.4 88.5 95.1 94.7
Age range 16–18 years
Survey 1991/2 1998/9 2005/6 2012/13
Sex Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Western 60.3 47.3 50.1 41.1 95.5 92.2 98.2 94.7
Central 61 51.7 49.2 32.5 100 96.5 93.9 97.8
Greater Accra 65.9 52.5 68.4 43.4 97.7 93.7 99.2 92.1
Eastern 57.1 36.5 46.1 42.8 94.8 95.5 99.1 98
Volta 63.5 31.8 57.9 50.1 93.7 89.3 92.9 89.6
Ashanti 55 36.3 40.1 43.4 97.4 94.4 97 97.8
Brong Ahafo 65.9 53.6 55.6 37.9 87.3 92.8 94.3 91.5
Northern 40.9 22.6 38.6 32.1 52.7 54.8 78 65.4
Upper West 42.1 33.3 62.9 68.7 65.5 66.7 90.3 93.1
Upper East 14.3 15 59.9 18.5 64.9 56.4 91.9 92.3
All 56.9 41.1 51.9 41.8 87.6 87.3 94.2 92.1
Source: GLSS
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a high level of inequality within the north, and the spatial diversity has other
aspects than just the north–south difference. Recent years show increasing
poverty in the coastal zone and increasing urban poverty, some of which is
linked to those without work. The limited employment creation in Ghana has
been another important deficiency.
Thus, while there is much to applaud, Ghana will face increasing challenge
in sustaining its poverty reduction record over the coming years.
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5
Did Rapid Smallholder-Led Agricultural
Growth Fail to Reduce Rural Poverty? Making
Sense of Malawi’s Poverty Puzzle
Karl Pauw, Ulrik Beck, and Richard Mussa
5.1 Introduction
Poverty reduction is a primary development goal inMalawi. While a variety of
policy interventions and strategies have sought to reduce poverty, the most
significant policy intervention in recent years has been the Farm Input Sub-
sidy Programme (FISP). FISP provides heavily subsidized fertilizer and other
farm inputs to between 1.5 and 2million poor smallholders at a cost of around
3 per cent or more of annual GDP. Although the programme is primarily
designed to address food security through increasing maize yields, its signifi-
cant burden on public resources has meant that the programme’s wider
impact on growth and poverty reduction has also been closely scrutinized as
it is believed to crowd out other government interventions.
Malawi’s recent growth performance has been remarkable. Official national
accounts data reveal strong growth across all Malawi’s economic sectors dur-
ing 2005–11, with per capita GDP growth averaging 3.5 per cent per annum
(NSO 2012b). Growth was particularly robust in the agricultural sector, which
government attributes to FISP (GoM 2012). Since a large majority of the poor
are rural smallholder farmers, and since about half of these farmers were
explicitly targeted by the subsidy programme, the expectation was always
that Malawi’s growth trajectory during this period would be highly pro-
poor, even if poverty reduction was not necessarily a primary goal of the
subsidy programme.
Prior to the release of official poverty estimates in 2012, a heated debate had
already developed over the desirability, sustainability, and overall impact of
input subsidy programmes in Malawi and elsewhere in the continent (see, for
example, Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Jayne et al. 2013; Lunduka et al. 2013;
Arndt et al. 2015). Although initially praised globally as a bold and resound-
ingly successful initiative, emerging survey evidence was beginning to cast
doubt on the ability of FISP to raise maize yields enough for direct benefits to
outweigh programme costs, while official crop production estimates which
underlie GDP estimates were also being questioned (see Pauw and Thurlow
2014).
The FISP ‘success story’ unravelled further when official poverty estimates
suggested that purported economic growth had in fact not been accompanied
by rapid poverty reduction as expected: using the latest two rounds of Inte-
grated Household Surveys (IHSs), the National Statistical Office (NSO 2012a)
reported that the poverty headcount rate declined only marginally from 52.4
per cent in 2004/5 (IHS2) to 50.7 per cent in 2010/11 (IHS3). Even more
disconcerting was the fact that rural poverty had apparently increased mar-
ginally over the period despite the introduction and scaling up of FISP during
this time.
This growth–poverty puzzle justifies further investigation. One possibility is
that economic growth, and particularly agricultural growth, is overstated in
national accounts; another is that the structure of growth was such that it did
not benefit those close enough to the poverty line to be lifted out of poverty.
However, it is equally possible that poverty estimates understate the reduction
in poverty. We focus on the latter and undertake our own consumption-based
poverty analysis using the same datasets as in the official poverty analysis
conducted by Malawi’s National Statistical Office (NSO).
Several methodological advances distinguish our approach from that of
the NSO. First, we allow the consumption bundles from which poverty
lines are derived to change over time as consumers near the poverty line adjust
their spending patterns in response to relative price changes. Second, rather
than relying on a national poverty line only, we construct regional poverty
lines that account for variations in consumption preferences, prices, and
non-food consumption shares. In doing so we return to the tradition of
using regional poverty lines in Malawi in the late 1990s (see Mukherjee and
Benson 2003).
Third, we adopt a slightly revised version of Ravallion’s (1998) iterative
procedure to devise consumption bundles and poverty lines that more closely
represent actual consumption preferences of the poor, as well as an entropy-
based method by Arndt and Simler (2010) that ensures that poverty bundles
are utility-consistent. Finally, we use a revised set of conversion factors
(Verduzco-Gallo et al. 2014) for converting non-standard food consumption
into standard units. This may influence unit costs of foods and hence the
estimate of household consumption spending or the poverty line.
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In contrast to the official poverty estimate, our analysis reveals large
declines in regional and national poverty in Malawi between 2004/5 and
2010/11. Poverty declined by 7.5 and 10.3 percentage points in rural and
urban areas respectively, which is more consistent with the economic growth
trajectory reported in the national accounts as well as reported improvements
in several non-monetary dimensions of welfare. Although weaknesses in
Malawi’s economic statistics compel us to remain cautious in our conclusions,
and while we do not explicitly test causality, our results ultimately corroborate
a much more positive narrative about FISP and its impact on growth and
poverty reduction compared to the more pessimistic view held by many.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 further explores the official
evidence on economic growth and poverty trends in Malawi. Section 5.3
describes, in simplistic terms, the method for constructing utility-consistent
regional poverty lines for Malawi and contrasts this with the method used by
the NSO. Section 5.4 presents our consumption-based poverty results as well
as trends in non-monetary poverty; and finally, section 5.5 concludes and
highlights areas for further research.
5.2 Recent Evidence of Growth and Poverty Trends in Malawi
Rain-fed smallholder maize production accounts for around one quarter of
agricultural GDP in Malawi. The agricultural sector, in turn, accounts for 30
per cent of the economy (Benin et al. 2012). This high dependence on a single,
large agricultural subsector is a major reason for Malawi’s highly erratic eco-
nomic growth path. Since around 2006, however, favourable weather com-
bined with the introduction of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) has
contributed to robust and more stable agricultural growth led by rapidly rising
maize yields (see Figure 5.1). The initial success of Malawi’s FISP created
renewed interest globally in fertilizer subsidies as a tool for promoting growth
while at the same time ensuring food security and reducing poverty.
Increased yields achieved under FISP led to a significant increase in maize
production. Although FISP was also associated with relative declines in maize
prices, these were found to be fairly small (Ricker-Gilbert 2014), and as a result
agricultural GDP still grew strongly. The first three columns of Table 5.1 report
average sector-level and national GDP growth rates for different sub-periods
(i.e. 2005–7, 2005–11, and 2007–11). Agricultural growth was particularly
rapid during the first years of FISP (2005–7) but then slowed down as the
potential for further yield gains through input subsidies was exhausted. The
years 2010 and 2011 were exceptionally troublesome years for the important
tobacco sector, which faced large declines in international prices and domestic
sales volumes. However, despite these setbacks, the average agricultural
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growth rate over the whole FISP period remained above 10 per cent per
annum. Malawi’s growth path can be described ‘broad-based’, with strong
growth also in non-agricultural sectors. The final columns show sector-level
value added shares and average contributions to national GDP. As expected,
given its size and high rate of growth, agriculture remained a major driver of
growth during the FISP period, with a contribution of 34.2 per cent to overall
GDP expansion.
These results paint a very positive story about Malawi’s recent economic
performance and the role of agriculture. Growth far outstripped population
growth of around 3.3 per cent per annum. Moreover, growth was driven to a
large extent by smallholder maize production increases, a crop cultivated by








































































Figure 5.1. Maize yields by region: Smallholder summer harvest, 2000/1–11/12
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from MoAFS (2013)
Table 5.1. Sectoral GDP growth rates and contributions to change in GDP, 2005–11
Average growth rates (%) Value added
share
2005–11 (%)
Contribution to change (%)
2005–7 2007–11 2005–11 2005–7 2007–11 2005–11
Agriculture 15.9 7.3 10.1 30.0 54.7 26.4 34.2
Mining, industry, and
construction
3.0 11.4 8.5 16.7 6.3 22.7 18.2
Trade and transport 5.5 6.1 5.9 21.2 15.3 15.2 15.2
Private services 7.6 11.7 10.3 18.8 16.6 25.8 23.3
Government services 4.1 6.4 5.6 13.3 7.2 9.9 9.2
National GDP 6.2 7.5 7.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from NSO (2012b)
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predominantly poor, rural farm households (Benin et al. 2012), one would
very legitimately expect that the level and structure of growth would have had
a significant impact on rural poverty.
The most recently released poverty trends in Malawi are based on the
comparison of per capita consumption welfare aggregates from two rounds
of household surveys (i.e. the IHS2 in 2004/5 and the IHS3 in 2010/11).
During the inter-survey period, the NSO also published a series of poverty
estimates based on imputed consumption from several rounds of Welfare
Monitoring Surveys (WMSs). The imputations, which were necessary because
the WMSs did not include a detailed expenditure module, were done on
the basis of an econometric model fitted to the IHS2 data, with right-hand
side variables including household demographics, health, education, employ-
ment, housing conditions, and amenities that are included in both the IHS2
and WMSs. The poverty trend from these WMSs showed a sharp decline in
poverty to around 39 per cent in 2009 (NSO 2010) (see Figure 5.2), which at
the time created the expectation that the imminent poverty rates from the
IHS3 would be of a similar magnitude.
The WMS poverty trend also seemed entirely consistent with national
accounts data available at the time. For example, using a general equilibrium
model for Malawi, Pauw et al. (2011) replicate the reported agricultural pro-
duction and economic growth trends for 2005–10. The model yields a poverty
rate of about 40 per cent by 2010, which is remarkably close to the estimate in
theWMS 2009. However, contrary to expectations, the official poverty figures
for 2010/11, which were finally released in 2012 after much delay, were a



























































Figure 5.2. Official poverty headcount rates, 1997/8–2010/11
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NSO (2005, 2010, 2012a)
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17.3 per cent, the biggest concern was the increase in rural poverty from 55.9
to 56.6 per cent. National poverty declined only marginally from 52.4 to 50.7
per cent over the period.
One possible explanation for this unexpected result is that the production
effect of FISP and hence estimates of economic growth may have been vastly
overstated (see Jayne et al. 2008; Chirwa and Dorward 2013). Another is that
growth did not trickle down to the rural poor, which is unlikely given over-
whelming evidence that growth is generally associated with declines in pov-
erty (Dollar et al. 2013), and that agricultural growth in particular is strongly
pro-poor (Diao et al. 2010). However, the rising rural–urban income divide
and an overall increase in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient
(i.e. from 0.39 to 0.45) (NSO 2012a) does seem to suggest that growth may
have disproportionately benefitted wealthier sections of the population. Yet
another possibility is that the decline in poverty has been understated in
the official estimates. The remainder of this chapter focuses on this third
possible explanation for the growth–poverty puzzle in Malawi; particularly,
we explore how the NSO estimated their poverty rates and provide alternative
estimates of our own that are based on a method that introduces some
advances over the one used by the NSO.
5.3 Constructing Regional Poverty Lines for Malawi
In this section we briefly, and in largely non-technical terms, explain the
method adopted to estimate regional poverty lines for Malawi. As far as
possible, we compare this against the NSO method to provide a simplistic
explanation of possible sources of difference between our estimates and those
of the NSO. For a more comprehensive and technical discussion please refer to
Pauw et al. (2014).
5.3.1 Poverty and Prices
In its official assessment of poverty in 2004/5 the NSO followed a cost of basic
needs approach to estimate national food and non-food poverty lines. How-
ever, in coming up with a new set of poverty lines for 2010/11, they opted not
to follow this approach, arguing that the standard of living implied by any
newly estimated consumption bundle would not necessarily be utility-
consistent with the IHS2 bundle (NSO 2012a). This may be true, but as we
explain in this section there are approaches in the literature that allow us to
overcome this problem.
NSO’s approach was to estimate an inflation rate they believed to be repre-
sentative of price changes faced by the poor. The 2004/5 poverty line(s) were
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then multiplied by the inflation rate to arrive at the new lines for 2010/11.
Rather than using the implicit prices contained in the two household surveys
to estimate inflation, the NSO opted to derive an inflation estimate on the
basis of a revised consumer price index (CPI). The official CPI traditionally
used to monitor rural and urban inflation was thought to understate the true
extent of price increases over the analysis period, and hence this revision was
carried out with technical assistance from South Africa’s statistics agency and
the World Bank. The original and revised CPI series are shown in Table 5.2.
One particular oddity about the NSO’s approach is that although the revised
CPI suggests significantly higher inflation for food products compared to non-
food products, both the food poverty line (representing ‘ultra-poverty’) and
the overall poverty line (food plus non-food) were adjusted by the same
‘poverty line inflation rate’ (i.e. by 128.9 per cent). Their own data also show
large differences in rural and urban food and non-food inflation rates, but in
the interest of maintaining a single national poverty line this difference was
disregarded.
The last section of Table 5.2 shows a ‘true’ estimate of inflation based on the
revised price indexes for urban and rural food and non-food items. Essentially,
in doing this exercise, we assume that the food and non-food indexes as
reported, and hence their reported inflation rates, are correct; but we then
use actual food/non-food consumption shares of relatively poor households—
defined for simplicity as those below the median per capita consumption















CPI 2004/5 178.0 161.1 201.3 192.1 183.9 196.6 171.8 155.9 205.4
CPI 2010/11 315.6 276.3 370.0 379.7 425.9 354.7 287.8 242.7 383.5
Inflation (%) 77.3 71.5 83.8 97.6 131.6 80.4 67.5 55.6 86.7
(b) Revised estimates
CPI 2004/5 212.7 220.5 201.9 199.5 202.5 197.9 218.4 224.5 205.3
CPI 2010/11 488.1 543.8 411.0 457.9 549.6 408.1 501.4 542.5 413.7
Inflation (%) 128.9 146.7 103.6 128.9 171.4 106.2 128.9 141.7 101.5
(c) ‘True’ inflation
CPI 2004/5 213.4 220.5 201.9 200.7 202.5 197.9 217.2 224.5 205.3
CPI 2010/11 499.0 543.8 411.0 494.8 549.6 408.1 499.5 542.5 413.7
Inflation (%) 133.8 146.7 103.6 146.5 171.4 106.2 130.0 141.7 101.5
Note: CPI 2004/5 represents the average index value for the periodMarch 2004–March 2005, which is the period during
which the IHS2 was conducted. Similarly, CPI 2010/11 represents the average index value for March 2010–March 2011.
The ‘true’ inflation rates are obtained by averaging food and non-food inflation rates using actual consumption shares of
relatively poor households.
Source: Official CPI estimates from NSO website (<http://www.nsomalawi.mw/>); revised CPI estimates obtained from
NSO as supplementary material to IHS3 report (NSO 2012a)
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level—to construct new weighted average indexes for ‘all items’. This is done
separately for rural and urban as well as at national level. As can be seen, these
index values, and hence their associated inflation estimates, are quite different
from the 128.9 per cent estimate of NSO. We are only able to (roughly)
replicate the NSO’s national ‘all item’ index values of 212.7 in 2004/5 and
488.1 in 2010/11 and hence their national inflation rate of 128.9 per cent
using the 2004/05 consumption weights for all households (i.e. poor and
non-poor) in both years 2004/05 and 2010/11. Our contention is that the
NSO’s inflation rate is not necessarily representative of the inflation faced by
the poor and fails to account for differences in food and non-food inflation in
urban and rural areas.
5.3.2 Regions, Preferences, and Utility Consistency
Although official poverty estimates have always been reported at a regional
level in Malawi, region-specific poverty lines were last constructed using the
first Integrated Household Survey (IHS1) of 1997/8 (Mukherjee and Benson
2003; NSO 2010). Following the IHS1 approach we include four regions of
Malawi: rural areas are divided along the three administrative regions, namely
‘south rural’, ‘centre rural’, ‘north rural’, while a fourth region comprises all
major urban centres, including Mzuzu in the north, Lilongwe in the centre,
and Blantyre and Zomba in the south. The rationale for having a regional
disaggregation is to capture regional differences in consumption preferences,
relative prices of commodities or their changes over time (i.e. regional infla-
tion rates), and demographic composition which affects calorie needs. Taking
account of regional and temporal differences in prices and preferences tends
to have a significant impact on estimated poverty lines (Tarp et al. 2002).
As is common in the literature we use consumption expenditure rather than
income in our poverty estimation, mainly because consumption expenditure
provides a smoother, less lumpy measure of welfare through time. The con-
sumption aggregate used in the official poverty assessment is publicly avail-
able and consists of food and non-food components, with the latter consisting
of expenditure on non-durable goods, estimated use value of durable con-
sumer goods, and the rental value of housing. Whereas we adopt the NSO
non-food consumption measure for our own analysis, we construct a new
food consumption component.
Total quantity of food consumed in a household is the sum of purchased
food, own production, and gifts. Food consumption is based on a seven-day
recall period. In order to carry out meaningful analysis, quantity units of
measurement—these include standard (metric) and non-standard units (e.g.
plates, cups, bags, or pails)—need to be converted into grams using conversion
factors typically supplied with household expenditure survey data. Conversion
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factors take into account the volume of the measurement unit but also the
weight density of the particular food product. The quality of conversion
factors is crucial for determining unit costs of food consumption baskets.
We use versions of the official conversion factors for IHS2 and IHS3 that
were systematically checked for errors and cleaned by Verduzco-Gallo et al.
(2014) to construct both our consumption aggregate and estimated poverty
lines. This explains at least some of the differences between our consumption
aggregate and the one used in the official poverty assessment. The differences
in conversion factors also affect poverty lines through the composition and
cost of the poverty line food bundle, although since we use regional poverty
lines as opposed to a national one, regional differences in prices and con-
sumption patterns also influence the final results.
Since respondents provide estimates of both the cost and quantity of pur-
chased food, this data can be used to estimate unit values for different food
items. The valuation is carried out in the same way as the NSO describe their
valuation. If a household reports to have consumed a food item not purchased
in the last week (e.g. gifts, own production, or food purchased earlier), the
median unit value from its cluster is used to value that consumption. If no
other household in that cluster consumed the same item, or if there were not
enough observations to obtain a reliable unit value, the median unit value
from the next geographical level within which the household resides was used
to estimate the value of that consumption. Total food expenditure for each
household is calculated by multiplying the unit values by the quantity con-
sumed. In principle, the use of revised conversion factors should be the only
factor thatmay cause our food consumption estimate to differ from the official
one.
Once a consumption aggregate has been estimated, it is necessary to con-
struct a poverty line, or in our case, several regional poverty lines. The total
poverty line for each region is the sum of the food and non-food poverty lines.
The poverty line and its subcomponents reflect value judgements about basic
food and non-food needs, and are set in terms of a level of per capita con-
sumption expenditure that is deemed consistent with meeting those basic
needs at prevailing prices. The level at which the food poverty line is set is
crucial to our understanding of poverty since poor households allocate such a
significant proportion of their spending to food. The non-food poverty line,
on the other hand, recognizes that the poor also allocate a non-trivial propor-
tion of their total consumption to non-food items.
For each of the four regions a food poverty line is constructed by determin-
ing the food energy (caloric) availability for the reference population (i.e. the
poor), the caloric content of the typical diet of the poor in that region, and
the average cost (at local prices) of calories when consuming that diet. Thus,
the food poverty line, expressed in this instance inMalawi Kwacha (MWK) per
Making Sense of Malawi’s Poverty Puzzle
97
person per day, is the area-specific cost of meeting the minimum caloric
requirements when consuming a food bundle comprised of goods that the
poor in a particular area typically consume. Essentially, the caloric require-
ment is a way of anchoring the estimated poverty line at a specific welfare
level. We therefore opt to use the same caloric requirement as the NSO,
namely 2,400 kilocalories per person per day (NSO 2005, 2012a).
The first step in our poverty line estimation is to establish reasonable cost
estimates of commonly consumed food commodities. Following Arndt and
Simler (2010), we assume themost common food items consumed by the poor
to be those that account for 90 per cent of their food expenditure. On average,
we find that these bundles represent about 95 per cent of caloric availability.
The values of these area-specific food bundles are then scaled to equal 100 per
cent of calorie requirements. Each household’s food consumption bundle
therefore essentially excludes less common (and often more expensive)
sources of calories. A set of household-specific prices is then calculated (i.e.
amount spent divided by quantity in grams). The median unit values of these
price distributions will eventually be used in valuing regional bundles.
In order to ensure that our poverty lines reflect preferences and prices faced
by poor people, we adopt and modify an iterative process described by
Ravallion (1998). In the original procedure, households are first ranked by
consumption per capita, and then the bottom x1 = 60 per cent of households is
at first arbitrarily identified as the relatively poor. This means x1 may be
regarded as a preliminary estimate of the poverty headcount rate. These
‘poor’ households’ food quantities and prices are then evaluated to estimate
the cost of the calories they obtain. Preliminary poverty line calculations are
made using the minimum caloric requirement as the basis, and the nominal
consumption values are converted into real terms by taking into account
region-specific differences in the cost of acquiring the basic needs bundle.
This gives a preliminary poverty headcount ratio x2. Households are then
re-ranked using this first approximation of consumption per capita in real
terms, and the bottom x2 per cent of this ranking identified as the relatively
poor. Observed consumption patterns and prices in this subsample are calcu-
lated, producing a second estimate of poverty lines. This gives another pre-
liminary poverty headcount ratio x3. Again households are ranked by their real
expenditure, and the iterative process continues until the poverty line con-
verges, meaning that the same, or nearly the same, subsample of households
are identified as the poor.
Applying this procedure to Malawi yielded a very low poverty line and
hence a very low poverty rate. Therefore, we adopt a slightly modified version
of the iterative procedure in that the poorest 60 per cent of the population was
used in each iteration. Between each iteration the consumption aggregate
was deflated by the estimated poverty lines only. Since poverty lines were
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estimated at the regional level, this procedure allowed the final consumption
baskets to be calculated based on the consumption of the 60 per cent poorest
in terms of real consumption. This is, however, still a deviation from the
approach taken by the NSO where the poverty line was based on the fifth
and sixth consumption deciles.
The above procedure should reduce poverty rate bias; however, there is no
guarantee that the estimated poverty lines are consistent across time and
space. Arndt and Simler (2010) found that in both Mozambique and Egypt
poverty lines based on such traditional iterative methods produced biased
poverty estimates. This study therefore adopts the methodological advance-
ment first proposed by Arndt and Simler (2010) to ensure that poverty
lines are utility-consistent. The method is not described in detail here, but
essentially entails use of an entropy-based approach that makes small adjust-
ments to budget shares until imposed constraints—in this instance, utility
consistency—are satisfied. The method ensures that the information content
in the original budget shares is preserved to the greatest degree possible. Spatial
utility consistency is ensured if the regional bundles satisfy revealed preference
conditions. Thismeans that the 2010/11 bundle of domain A is notmanifestly of
higher quality than the 2010/11 bundle of domain B (and vice versa); similarly,
the 2004/5 bundle of domainA is notmanifestly of higher quality than the 2010/
11 bundle of domain A (and vice versa).
The next step is to estimate a non-food poverty line. Similar to the approach
adopted by the NSO, this is taken as a weighted average of non-food expend-
iture for people with food expenditure at between 80 and 120 per cent of the
food poverty line. A triangular weighting scheme is used where the closer a
household’s food expenditure is to the poverty line, the higher the weights.
The sum of the non-food and food poverty lines is the total poverty line,
which is the basis for calculating initial poverty rates.
Having derived the poverty lines, the next step is to estimate poverty rates.
Since expenditure data are collected at the household level, we assume a
uniform intra-household distribution such that each household member has
the same per capita expenditure level. In keeping with the popular poverty
literature, we use poverty measures proposed by Foster et al. (1984):








In equation (5.1), yi is per capita consumption expenditure of person i drawn
from a sample of size N, z is a poverty line, α is a measure of poverty aversion,
and I(.) is an indicator function equal to one if the condition yi < z holds, and
zero otherwise. The parameter α takes on values of 0, 1, or 2 to measure the
poverty headcount rate, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap respectively.
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Specifically, when α = 0, we have the poverty headcount index. This gives the
percentage of the population who are, based on consumption, poor. The
headcount is easy to interpret; however, it has some limitations. It neither
takes into account how close or far the consumption levels of the poor are to
the poverty line, nor the distribution among the poor. When α = 1, we have
the poverty gap index. It measures the extent of the difference between the
poverty line and the average consumption of poor households. This measure
captures changes in poverty that the poverty headcount index does not
detect. For instance, if the consumption of the poor increases without neces-
sarily crossing the poverty line, the headcount will not detect this change,
while the poverty gap will. For α = 2, we have the squared poverty gap index. It
measures the severity of poverty, and also takes into account inequality
changes among the poor. A transfer from a poor person to somebody less
poor may leave unaffected the headcount or the poverty gap but will increase
this measure. Our analysis focuses on the poverty headcount rate (α = 0).
5.4 Results and Analysis
5.4.1 Monetary Poverty Analysis
In this sectionwe present our estimates of changes inmonetary (or consumption-
based) poverty in Malawi between 2004/5 and 2010/11. Throughout we com-
pare our estimates with the official poverty estimates of the NSO. Differences
between our poverty results and those of the NSO reflect differences in poverty
lines as well as differences in the distribution of the consumption aggregates
used in the respective poverty analyses.
Our estimated poverty lines are reported in Table 5.3 and compared with the
official food, non-food, and national poverty lines used by the NSO. All
poverty lines are converted to Malawi Kwacha (MWK) per person per day. In
order to facilitate the comparison, we present, in addition to our regional
poverty lines, population-weighted national average poverty lines, which
can be compared against the NSO’s national poverty lines. We also estimate
an average rural poverty line in the same manner. Given the approach
adopted here, our poverty lines may vary by region, while, more importantly,
the implied inflation rate faced by the poor—we refer to it here as the ‘poverty
line inflation rate’—may also vary by region and for food or non-food items.
While both food and non-food poverty lines of the urban and rural north-
ern regions as well as the non-food poverty line for the central rural region are
above the official estimates, the food poverty lines of rural south and rural
central as well as the non-food poverty line of rural south are below the official
estimates. We estimate a national poverty line of MWK 43.2 per person per
day, which is about 2.4 per cent below the official estimate of MWK 44.3. In
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2010/11 all food and non-food poverty lines of the rural regions are lower
than the official lines, except the food poverty line in the rural north, which is
slightly higher. As in 2004/5 the urban food poverty line and in particular the
non-food poverty line are above the official lines. The overall poverty line of
MWK 92.5 per person per day is about 8.8 per cent lower than the official
poverty line of MWK 101.4. Our estimated national poverty line inflation rate
is 114.0 per cent, which is somewhat lower than the 128.9 per cent estimated
by the NSO.We therefore concur that the official inflation estimate of 77.3 per
cent (see Table 5.2) understates actual inflation faced by the poor, but at the
same time inflation faced by the poor may not have been as high as 128.9
per cent.
Importantly, there is some regional variation in our inflation estimates.
Consistent with the ‘true’ inflation estimates shown in Table 5.2, our urban
poverty line inflation rate (123.8 per cent) is significantly above the rural
poverty line inflation rate (108.0 per cent). While there is some variation
among rural areas, there is a much more pronounced difference between the
urban and rural inflation rates, particularly as far as non-food inflation rates
are concerned: whereas urban non-food inflation was 132.5 per cent, the rural
inflation rate is only 74.8 per cent. This may reflect significant welfare effects
associated with the subsidy programme: the commercial value of the full
subsidy package of two bags of fertilizer, distributed to half of rural farm
households, is equivalent to over 20 per cent of our estimated non-food
rural poverty line (see Arndt et al. 2015). Another likely factor is a sharp
reduction in clothing and footwear prices linked to a dramatic rise in sub-
Saharan Africa’s importation of inexpensive used clothing from developed
countries (see Baden and Barber 2005). The NSO’s revised CPI data shows that
Table 5.3. Food, non-food, and overall poverty lines for 2004/5 and 2010/11
Poverty lines (Malawi Kwacha/person/day) Poverty line inflation rates








National 26.0 17.2 43.2 59.4 33.1 92.5 128.2 92.5 114.0
Urban 30.3 26.7 57.0 65.4 62.1 127.5 116.1 132.5 123.8
Rural 25.5 16.0 41.5 58.3 28.0 86.2 128.8 74.8 108.0
North rural 29.7 16.3 46.1 64.7 31.0 95.4 117.5 89.5 108.0
Centre rural 26.1 17.6 43.8 59.8 28.7 88.4 128.8 62.6 102.1
South rural 23.8 14.4 38.2 55.0 26.4 81.3 131.0 83.5 113.1
NSO poverty line
(national)
27.5 16.8 44.3 62.9 38.5 101.4 128.9 128.9 128.9
Note: Poverty lines are estimated for each of the four regions. Estimates for ‘national’ and ‘rural’ poverty lines are
population-weighted averages of the region-specific poverty lines.
Source: NSO (2012a) and authors’ estimates based on IHS2 and IHS3
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clothing and footwear prices increased only about half as much as the overall
consumption basket, allowing households to drastically reduce spending—
the CPI weight for clothing and footwear items have recently been adjusted
downwards from 20.3 to 6.4 per cent of non-food expenditure—yet there is an
equally sharp rise in the proportion of households that feel their clothing is
‘adequate’ (see Table 5.5 and related discussion in section 5.4.2).
Perhaps the most important methodological difference between our
approach and that of the NSO is that our inflation rate is based on flexible
consumption bundles. This means that we account for observed changes in
the non-food share of expenditure, whereas the NSO fix the non-food expend-
iture share in both survey years at 38 per cent. Since the non-food poverty line
is estimated on the basis of non-food expenditures of households close to the
food poverty line, different choices of food poverty lines will mean that non-
food poverty lines are estimated on the basis of the observed expenditures of
different subsets of the population; hence, the level and share of non-food
expenditures may be sensitive to the choice of poverty line.
We find several interesting results in this regard. Firstly, if Engel’s Law holds,
the estimates of non-food expenditure shares would rise as we move to higher
poverty lines, simply because given the estimation procedure we would then
be evaluating non-food expenditures of slightly wealthier households. It
appears this only holds for urban households in 2004/5. In all other instances
the non-food share declines or is constant as we evaluate non-food expend-
iture at higher notional food poverty lines, which suggests extra income
earned by the poor is initially spent on more (or better-quality) food rather
than non-food expenditures. We can reasonably assume that many house-
holds with food expenditure at or below the food poverty line are not satisfy-
ing their caloric needs; for example Verduzco-Gallo et al. (2014) estimate a
calorie deficiency rate of 40 per cent in 2004/5. Hence, it is quite plausible to
think that additional income will be spent on food until they reach a desired
level and quality of food intake. Non-food shares therefore only start to rise at
relatively high food poverty lines. The relatively low rural non-food inflation
rate also means that poor households are able to divert household income
normally reserved for essential non-food items to food spending because of
significant savings on non-food items.
Secondly, while NSO assumed a constant non-food expenditure share of 38
per cent, we find this rate to be reasonably close to our own non-food shares in
2004/5 only in central and southern rural areas. The rural north has a lower
non-food share, while in urban areas the share is well above 38 per cent. This is
consistent with the literature where urban households are often found to
consume fewer and more expensive calories (Tarp et al. 2002). This finding
should therefore also be reflected in the estimated poverty line for the urban
areas. In summation, the regional and time-specific approach to poverty line
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estimation appears to be important in the present setting: consumption pat-
terns, even those represented by crude non-food shares, differ substantially
across regions.
Table 5.4 reports our estimated poverty headcounts and compares them
with official numbers. We calculate and report 95 per cent confidence inter-
vals to accompany the percentage point changes in poverty rates between
2004/5 and 2010/11. If the confidence interval value exceeds the absolute
value of the percentage point change in poverty, the change is considered
statistically insignificant.
Whereas we estimate a slightly lower rural poverty rate in 2004/5 (48.2 per
cent) to that of the NSO (55.9 per cent), our urban poverty rate (37.6 per cent)
is substantially higher than the official rate (25.4 per cent). Since our estimates
of rural poverty are at a somewhat lower level than those of the NSO for both
surveys and our estimates of urban poverty are somewhat higher, we will focus
our discussion on the changes in poverty over time rather than their absolute
levels. By 2010/11 our rural poverty rate (40.6 per cent) is substantially lower
than in 2004/5 (48.2 per cent), i.e. we estimated a significant 7.5 percentage
point decline in rural poverty compared to the NSO’s estimate of a small 0.7
percentage point increase. We also report substantial declines across all rural
Table 5.4. Poverty headcount rates and changes in poverty between 2004/5 and 2010/11
Poverty headcount rate (%) Percentage point change

























National 47.0 52.4 38.6 50.7 −8.4 ± 2.8 −1.7 ± 2.4 −4.1
Urban 37.6 25.4 27.3 17.3 −10.3 ± 9.4 −8.1 ± 6.8 −11.6
Rural 48.2 55.9 40.6 56.6 −7.5 ± 2.9 0.7 ± 1.4 −2.3
North rural 59.4 56.3 48.0 59.9 −11.4 ± 6.8 3.6 ± 6.5 8.8
Centre rural 40.0 46.7 33.7 48.7 −6.3 ± 4.4 2.0 ± 4.2 0.6
South rural 53.1 64.4 45.1 63.3 −8.0 ± 4.5 −1.1 ± 3.7 −3.5
Extreme poverty
National 17.1 22.3 17.9 24.5 0.8 ± 2.0 2.1 ± 2.2 −
Urban 9.0 7.5 4.7 4.3 −4.2 ± 3.6 −3.2 ± 3.4 −
Rural 18.1 24.2 20.2 28.1 2.1 ± 2.2 3.9 ± 2.4 −
North rural 30.1 25.9 25.6 29.0 −4.5 ± 6.7 3.0 ± 6.4 −
Centre rural 11.8 16.1 16.1 21.5 4.3 ± 2.8 5.4 ± 3.2 −
South rural 21.1 31.5 22.6 34.2 1.6 ± 3.8 2.7 ± 4.0 −
Note: The confidence interval is used to determine the statistical significance of the difference in the poverty rate between
2004/5 and 2010/11. Since the distribution of the poverty rate is unknown we follow Simler and Arndt (2007) in
defining the confidence interval as plus or minus twice the standard error. The change in the poverty headcount rate is
considered statistically insignificant if zero is within the confidence interval around the estimate.
Source: NSO (2012a) and authors’ estimates based on IHS2 and IHS3
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regions, which stands in contrast to the NSO’s estimates of increases in
poverty in the rural north and centre. On the other hand, consistent with
NSO’s estimate, we find a substantial decrease in urban poverty, i.e. by 10.3
percentage points compared to the 7.4 percentage points estimated by the
NSO. Overall, we estimate a statistically significant 8.4 percentage point
decline in national poverty, which stands in sharp contrast to the NSO’s
statistically insignificant decline of 1.7 percentage points.
Table 5.4 also presents results for changes in extreme poverty. Households
are deemed extremely poor or ‘ultra-poor’ when their total per capita con-
sumption falls below the food poverty line. Consistent in direction with the
NSO estimates, we find that urban extreme poverty declines by 4.2 percentage
points, while rural extreme poverty increases by 2.1 percentage points. At the
national level we estimate a small and insignificant increase in extreme pov-
erty (0.8 percentage points) compared to the NSO’s increase of 2.1 percentage
points, which is also statistically insignificant. It appears Malawi’s economic
policies, while benefitting those close to the poverty line, may have failed to
benefit the rural ultra-poor.
At least one important methodological question raised earlier is whether an
assumption of fixed non-food consumption shares is reasonable. To investi-
gate how such an assumption would affect our poverty estimates, we estimate
regional food poverty lines as before, but then assume that essential non-food
spending in 2010/11 is a fixed share of food spending, with the share deter-
mined by the 2004/5 non-food shares. The final column of Table 5.4 reports
the resulting change in poverty. The results now show a slightly higher
reduction in urban poverty (i.e. by 11.6 percentage points), but a much
smaller decline in rural poverty (i.e. by 2.3 percentage points). Poverty esti-
mates are therefore sensitive to the choice of flexible or fixed non-food shares,
and our estimates are closer to that of the NSO when we fix the non-food
budget share.
Figure 5.3 provides a visual picture of how the cumulative distribution
functions of our consumption aggregates compare with the official welfare
aggregates. The solid lines represent our newly calculated consumption aggre-
gates, while the dashed line represents that of the NSO. Poverty lines (loga-
rithmic values) are indicated by vertical lines, which are also dashed or solid to
match the cumulative distribution function. The point at which a poverty line
intersects the relevant cumulative distribution function indicates the associ-
ated poverty level (vertical axis). These values are comparable with those
shown in Table 5.4.
While our consumption aggregates for urban households are similar to
those of the NSO in both 2004/5 and 2010/11, our urban poverty lines are
much higher, and hence our estimated poverty rates in urban areas are higher.
The 2004/5 panel for rural areas shows that our cumulative distribution
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function lies slightly to the right of the NSO’s function, which implies that our
consumption estimate is higher over most of the distribution; however, our
poverty line is slightly lower, which explains why we get a lower estimate of
rural poverty compared to that of the NSO. In 2010/11, our rural poverty line
is again lower than that of the NSO, but our consumption estimate is once
again to the right of that of the NSO, thus yielding a much lower poverty
estimate than the NSO. These visual inspections lead us to conclude, with
some circumspection, that differences in our poverty line estimates are the
most important factor in explaining differences in poverty rates and their
changes over time between the respective studies.
5.4.2 Non-monetary Poverty Analysis
The preceding discussion has focused on estimates of monetary poverty
whereby consumption expenditure is used as an indicator of welfare. The
rationale for a consumption-based approach to identifying the poor is that
there is a strong correlation between ‘means’ (i.e. income or consumption
levels) and ‘ends’ such as adequate levels of health, education, or freedom. An
individual above the monetary poverty line is thought to possess sufficient
purchasing power to acquire the bundle of attributes yielding a level of
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Figure 5.3. Consumption distribution functions and poverty estimates
Source: Authors’ estimates based on IHS2 and IHS3
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well-being sufficient to function in society, thus providing a rationale for a
consumption-based approach to poverty analysis.
However, given the often weak relationship between income and
welfare—this may be due to incomplete markets, presence of externalities,
or provision of public goods—money-metric measures are not always good
indicators of welfare. Besides, there is no guarantee that households with
incomes at or above a poverty threshold would use their incomes to purchase
those ‘basic needs’ considered necessary for achieving an acceptable level of
well-being. Decision-makers in the household may, for example, instead
choose to satisfy wants for, say, alcohol and tobacco at the expense of
satisfying the minimum caloric requirements of their children. In the
money-metric approach such households would be classified as non-poor
when in reality at least some of their members are deprived of some basic
needs (Thorbecke 2005).
Consequently, Sen (1985) argues that the measurement of poverty
should, where possible, go beyond income or consumption and look at
other dimensions of well-being such as health, education, empowerment,
and freedom of association, among others. Income and consumption
expenditure are instrumentally important as a means of achieving the
other dimensions of well-being, but the other dimensions of well-being
are in and of themselves intrinsically significant. Thus, these dimensions
are equally important and deserve recognition and measurement in
their own right. Moreover, trends in non-monetary dimensions of well-
being can be used to validate or challenge observed trends in monetary
poverty.
This section looks at levels and trends of non-monetary dimensions of well-
being inMalawi between 2004/5 and 2010/11. Although we omit some results
due to space considerations—a full set of results can be found in Pauw et al.
(2014)—we find overwhelming evidence of improvements in non-monetary
welfare measures. Specifically, we note significant improvements in housing
quality, access to clean water, and ownership of consumer durables, which are
consistent with the finding of rising incomes and declining poverty. School
enrolment has increased, while Malawians appear to have become better
educated over time in terms of academic qualifications achieved. Nutritional
outcomes reveal a somewhat mixed picture, with declines in stunting and
underweight children, but an increase in wasting (see Verduzco-Gallo et al.
2014 for a more in-depth discussion with regards to food and nutrition
security outcomes).
The IHS2 and IHS3 also include several questions related to subjective well-
being vis-à-vis adequacy of food consumption, housing, clothing, and health
care. We treat households that report access to be ‘less than adequate’ as being
deprived, while those that report ‘just adequate’ or ‘more than adequate’ are
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considered not deprived. The corresponding prevalence rates of deprived
households are reported in Table 5.5. We note substantial reductions in
the percentage of households reporting to be deprived in terms of access
to food (–18.9 per cent), housing (–12.5 per cent), clothing (–15.5 per cent),
and health care (–27.5 per cent), which is largely consistent with our
corresponding finding of a large decline in national poverty. Equally sig-
nificant declines in deprivation rates are observed in most regions of
Malawi.
5.5 Conclusion
Malawi experienced rapid economic growth during the period 2005–11.
Although growth was broad-based and originated from several sectors, the
most important contribution came from the large and rapidly growing agri-
cultural sector, which enjoyed significant support in the form of fertilizer
input subsidies during the period. On average, and somewhat remarkably,
this sector purportedly grew at an average annual rate of 10.1 per cent per year,
while overall GDP expanded at a rate of 7.1 per cent per year, far exceeding
Table 5.5. Changes in subjective well-being, 2004/5–10/11

















Urban 48.1 26.7 21.5 44.2 31.5 12.6
Rural 58.5 40.4 18.1 56.8 44.5 12.3
North 35.3 29.8 5.5 36.4 39.0 2.6
Centre 59.1 33.8 25.3 60.3 40.4 19.9
South 63.8 49.2 14.6 58.7 49.9 8.8
Total 57.3 38.5 18.9 55.4 42.8 12.5

















Urban 54.5 49.3 5.2 51.8 28.1 23.7
Rural 74.9 58.5 16.4 62.0 34.5 27.5
North 52.3 55.3 3.0 43.1 27.8 15.3
Centre 84.2 54.7 29.5 65.4 39.3 26.1
South 71.8 62.1 9.7 63.6 31.1 32.5
Total 72.6 57.0 15.5 60.9 33.4 27.5
Source: Authors’ computation using IHS2 and IHS3
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population growth, and thus allowing per capita GDP to grow at roughly 3.5
per cent per year on average during the period.
A reasonable expectation was that rapid smallholder-led agricultural growth
would have a significant impact on poverty. However, the official poverty
estimates based on the IHS3, which were released in 2012, suggested national
poverty had declined onlymarginally by 1.7 percentage points between 2004/5
and 2010/11, while rural poverty increased by 0.7 percentage points. This
raised several questions, including whether reported maize production and
agricultural GDP growth estimates were in fact accurate. Others speculated
about whether or not the poor were excluded from the benefits of rapid
growth. The sharp rise in inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (0.39
to 0.45) supported the ‘no trickle-down effect’ hypothesis to some extent, but
the puzzling question remained: how could Malawi have had no reduction in
rural poverty after investing so heavily in poor smallholder agriculture and
seemingly reaping rewards from the subsidy programme in terms of economic
growth?
While recognizing that poverty measurement is challenging and poverty
results are extremely sensitive to the assumptions made, this study notes two
major concerns about the official poverty analysis conducted by the National
Statistical Office (NSO). The first relates to the revision of the official consumer
price index (CPI). Our analysis concurs that the official 2004–11 inflation rate
(77.3 per cent) is indeed an underestimation, and that revision was justified.
However, our estimate of the national average poverty line inflation rate
(114.0 per cent) is somewhat lower than that of the NSO (128.9 per cent).
The NSO approach of applying the same inflation rate to the food and overall
poverty lines in both urban and rural areas is another source of significant bias
in their estimated poverty rates. Our analysis suggests that urban poverty line
inflation was higher (123.8 per cent) and rural poverty line inflation some-
what lower (108.0 per cent) than the national average. This, coupled with
significant shifts in consumption patterns, makes an approach that adopts
regional poverty lines and flexible but utility-consistent consumption bundles
more appropriate.
Second, as pointed out by Verduzco-Gallo et al. (2014), there are several
inconsistencies contained in the official sets of consumption conversion fac-
tors. Even minor adjustments to conversion factors, especially for important
food commodities, may significantly alter estimates of poverty. There is need
for a consultative process to agree on a final set of conversion factors that can
be used in all ongoing and future poverty or nutrition analyses.
In contrast to the official poverty estimate, our own analysis reveals large
and statistically significant declines in poverty between 2004/5 and 2010/11.
The poverty rate declines by 7.5 percentage points in rural areas, with a
particularly large decline in the rural north. Urban poverty also declines by
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10.3 percentage points, which is slightly higher than the official estimate of
8.1 percentage points. At national level, we find that poverty dropped by
8.4 percentage points. These results are consistent with the purported
economic growth trajectory of Malawi, as well as evidence of significant
improvements across a range of non-monetary dimensions of welfare in
recent years.
While these results corroborate a much more positive narrative about FISP
and its impact on growth and poverty reduction, it still appears as if FISP, and
possibly other economic policies in Malawi, continue to neglect the ultra-
poor. We find a borderline statistically significant increase in rural extreme
poverty (2.1 percentage points), and amore sizable and statistically significant
decline in urban areas (i.e. by 4.3 percentage points). The direction of these
changes is consistent with the findings of the NSO. Many among the ultra-
poor are landless or labour-constrained households, and would make ideal
candidates for other forms of social support such as cash transfers, which are
currently being scaled up in Malawi.
There are some areas that require further analysis. We concur that the
official CPI series understates inflation in Malawi. The implication is that the
GDP deflator currently used to estimate real GDP levels may also be under-
stated, leading to economic growth estimates that are too optimistic. At
present, GDP estimates are available up until 2012, but all estimates beyond
2007 are subject to revision. In order to truly understand the growth–poverty
puzzle, more up-to-date national accounts data is needed, while supporting
data for estimation of agricultural GDP, such as crop estimates, need to be
strengthened. A more likely growth–poverty narrative for Malawi is probably
that growth was lower but that the poverty outcome was significantly more
optimistic than what official estimates suggest, particularly in rural areas.
Extreme poverty, however, may have increased slightly, suggesting that the
most vulnerable in Malawi’s society have been excluded from the benefits of
economic policy and growth.
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6
Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Inequality
in Rwanda
Andy McKay and Marijke Verpoorten
6.1 Country Context and Economic Performance
Rwanda has many features whichmake it unique and of interest to analysts. It
has the highest population density in Africa. Even more than many sub-
Saharan African countries, it is very highly dependent on agriculture, but its
originally fertile soils face a continued risk of environmental degradation, and
average farm size is rapidly falling (the average farm size is now only 0.7 ha,
with much of this land not being easy to cultivate). Without doubt, the
country needs to diversify out of agriculture, but finding these alternative
activities has been and remains a major challenge.
Rwanda has also attracted international attention because of its disastrous
period of violent conflict in the early tomid-1990s.1 Also well known, though,
is the impressive economic growth it has experienced since. Per capita GDP in
local currency values since 1970 is presented in Figure 6.1. What this shows is
consistent sustained growth from 1995 onwards, in sharp contrast to the
stagnation of GDP in the 1980s and early 1990s. By 2006, GDP per capita
had reached its highest level to date, and by 2012, it was about 50 per cent
larger than GDP per capita prior to the armed conflicts of the 1990s.
Growth seems to be even faster in recent years. All productive sectors have
grown consistently over this period, agriculture and industry included, but
according to national accounts data the fastest growth has been in the services
sector, especially in wholesale and retail trade and transport, storage, and
1 Poverty and land scarcity added to the intensity of the conflict (Verpoorten 2012), but the root
causes lay elsewhere (Ingelaere and Verpoorten 2014).
communications. In addition, there is evidence of significant improvements
in living conditions over recent years.
Population growthwas historically high in Rwanda, doubling between 1970
and 1990 (growing at an average of 3.3 per cent a year). Population growth has
been slower in the post-war period at around 2.6 per cent per annum, but the
momentum of past growthmeans that the population continues to increase at
a fast rate, and in an increasingly land-scarce environment.
There are different views among analysts about the factors underlying
Rwanda’s recent economic success story. Important elements often discussed
include post-war catch-up; massive aid inflows; increased budget shares for
health, education, and agriculture; the fertility transition; and the rise in
international commodity prices. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012: 387)
stress the aspect of governance, arguing that Rwanda is a developmental
authoritarian state that actively promotes private-sector development and
keeps the most detrimental forms of rent-seeking in check with ‘a set of
arrangements for managing economic rents in a centralized way and deploy-
ing them with a view to the long term’.
Even if aid and post-war catch-upmay be important, it is impossible to deny
the role of government policy in Rwanda. Numerous policy changes have
been made, including among others the 1999 new inheritance law that grants
equal rights to male and female children; the new constitution of 2003 that
introduces gender quotas at all levels of decision-making; free and mandatory
primary education; major changes in agricultural and land policy; the intro-
duction of performance-based financing for health care centres in 2006 as well






























































Figure 6.1. Evolution of real per capita GDP in Rwanda, constant local currency units
Source: World Development Indicators (2014)
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(imihigo); an intense family planning campaign in 2007; and mandatory
health insurance in 2008.
Many studies have looked at these policy changes to determine how they
have contributed to the Rwandan success story. Guariso et al. (2012) discuss
the transformation of the Rwandan coffee sector; Ayalew et al. (2011) study
the impact of land tenure regularization on investment, maintenance of soil
conservation measures, and women’s land access; Basinga et al. (2010), Kalk
(2008), and Kalk et al. (2010) study the impact of the introduction of
performance-based financing in the health care sector; Nkurunziza et al.
(2012) analyse the introduction of free primary education; Saksena et al.
(2011) study the introduction of mutual health insurance; and Westoff
(2012), Kabano et al. (2013), and Muhoza et al. (2013) look at the fertility
transition.
Identifying causality remains, however, a challenge in these studies; and
many policies still need to be properly evaluated. At the same time, some
policies, for instance in relation to agricultural and land policy, have been
criticized by many researchers, using mainly qualitative methods (Ansoms
2011; Huggins 2009; Newbury 2011).
The data, though, continues to indicate impressive growth performance.
The focus of this chapter is to consider the distributional pattern of this
growth and its impact on poverty. In section 6.2 we consider evidence on
the evolution of many non-monetary indicators from the Demographic and
Health Surveys for which several rounds have been conducted between 1992
and 2010. Section 6.3 focuses on consumption poverty and inequality, pri-
marily based on surveys which have been conducted since 2000, though with
a brief discussion of evidence dating back to 1990 as well as a brief first review
of available qualitative evidence. Then in section 6.4 we draw on a small-scale
panel dataset which enables an examination of mobility and consideration of
other issues, while section 6.5 presents an extended discussion and synthesis
while also discussing unresolved issues.
6.2 The Evolution of Non-monetary Measures of Well-being
As noted above, we first focus on trends in non-monetary indicators as
revealed by the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), of which there
were five rounds in 1992, 2000, 2005, 2007, and 2010. The first two surveys
bracket a period of armed conflicts, namely the 1991–4 civil war, the 1994
genocide, and the 1994–8 refugee crisis and (counter-)insurgency operations.
The more recent surveys were implemented in a period in which various
government interventions took place in the health and education sector.
The questionnaire design is broadly similar across the survey rounds, though
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the 2007 round was smaller and collected data on a more limited number of
indicators. The first four surveys were designed to be representative at the level
of the twelve provinces (in place before the 2006 administrative reform), while
the latest survey is representative at the level of the thirty districts created
during later administrative reform. The analysis here and in section 6.3 uses
population weights, and focuses throughout on indicators which are compar-
able across the different survey rounds. Table 6.1 summarizes time trends in
the average outcomes for a range of health, fertility, education, and housing
indicators.
The infant mortality rate, as calculated from the five-year period preceding
the survey, dropped dramatically from 109 in 2000 to 83 in 2005 to 50 in
2010. In contrast, in the period of armed conflict the same indicator had
increased from 85 in 1992 to 109 in 2000. Under-fivemortality shows a similar
trend and similar dramatic reduction from 2000. This falling mortality went
hand in hand with improvements in child nutritional indicators, with stunt-
ing and wasting decreasing over the period 2005–10, and with reduced preva-
lence of diarrhoea and especially fever for under-fives in the two weeks
preceding the survey. These improvements may in part reflect a better out-
reach of basic preventive health care measures. Vaccination coverage was
always high but bed net ownership increased sharply and consistently from
only 6.6 per cent of households in 2000 to 82.7 per cent in 2010.2
Another big change over this period is the fall in the fertility rate between
2005 and 2010 from 6.1 to 4.6 respectively. From 1992 to 2005, the rate had
not fallen and this is potentially a very important change. In line with this, the
same 2005–10 period saw a marked increase in the use of contraceptives, and
the unmet need for contraceptives declined considerably, from 37.9 per cent
in 2005 to 20.8 per cent in 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, there were also
sharp increases in delivery at a health facility (instead of at home), from below
30 per cent in and prior to 2005 to almost 80 per cent in 2010; and in the
number of births assisted by trained medical staff. The maternal mortality
ratio remains high in Rwanda, but shows a steady decline over the period
2000–10. It stood at 476 deaths per 100,000 live births in the 2010 DHS, down
from 1,071 in 2000, again demonstrating impressive progress.
Education has been a major policy and donor focus, and both attendance
and attainment have improved substantially over time. The share of men
(aged 6 years or more) with no formal education fell from 29.4 per cent in
1992 to 24.9 per cent in 2000 to 19.4 per cent in 2005 and 13.0 per cent
in 2010. The corresponding figures for women are 40.4 per cent, 32.6 per cent,
27.7 per cent, and 20.2 per cent. The mean years of education of the active
2 The ownership of bed nets was not recorded in 1992.
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population (aged 15–65) increased from 3.9 in 1992 to 4.6 in 2010 for men,
and from 3.0 in 1992 to 4.0 in 2010 for women.
The net attendance ratio (NAR) for primary school increased over the period
1991–2000 from 61.5 to 72.0, despite the violent conflicts, then increased
Table 6.1. Selected non-monetary indicators for Rwanda
DHS survey round 1992 2000 2005 2007–8 2010
Mortality rate
infant mortality 85 109 83 64 50
under-five mortality 151 196 152 103 76
Nutritional status
height-for-age (% below 2 sd) 56.8 48.3 51.1 n.a. 44.2
weight-for-height (% below 2 sd) 5.0 8.3 4.7 n.a. 2.8
weight-for-age (% below 2 sd) 24.3 19.5 17.5 n.a. 11.4
Health condition past two weeks (age 0–5)
diarrhoea (%) 22.0 17.2 14.4 13.9 13.3
fever (%) 42.1 31.0 26.6 21.9 15.9
All vaccinations (% children 12–23 months) 86.3 76.0 75.2 80.4 90.1
Households owns mosquito net (any type,
%)
n.a. 6.6 18.2 59.2 82.7
Total fertility ratea 6.2 5.8 6.1 5.5 4.6
Use of contraceptionb
any modern method (%) 12.9 5.7 10.3 27.4 45.1
unmet need for family planning (%) 38.9 35.6 37.9 100.0 20.8
Delivery at health care facility (%)c 26.3 25.7 29.7 53.7 78.3
Assistance of trained personnel (%) 28.3 31.3 38.6 52.1 69.0
Maternal mortality rated n.a. 1071 750 n.a. 476
Educational level
no education, men (%, >6 year) 29.4 24.9 19.4 n.a. 13.0
no education, women (%, >6 year) 40.4 32.6 27.7 n.a. 20.2
mean years of education, men 15–65 3.9 4.1 4.1 n.a. 4.6
mean years of education, women 15–65 3.0 3.3 3.4 n.a. 4.0
Net attendance ratioe
primary school, total 61.5 72.0 80.6 n.a. 87.5
secondary school, total 5.7 4.9 4.0 n.a. 14.4
Gross attendance ratiof
primary school, total 84.6 104.5 134.2 n.a. 142.4
secondary school, total 16.6 7.9 8.2 n.a. 26.
Housing characteristics
has electricity (%) 2.3 6.2 4.8 6.0 9.7
finished floor (%) 11.0 13.1 13.0 14.6 16.9
Household durable goods
radio (%) 32.3 35.2 45.8 58.2 62.6
television (%) n.a. 2.4 2.3 3.4 5.3
bicycle (%) 6.4 7.6 11.0 12.2 15.2
motorcycle (%) 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.1
Notes and source: Authors’ calculations from DHS data, except for the fertility and mortality rates, under-five mortality
rate, nutritional status, and health insurance which are taken from the DHS reports and gross attendance ratio which is
taken from the DHS reports for 2000, 2005, and 2010, and from the WDI for 1992. aFor the three years preceding the
survey and the percentage of women 15–49 currently pregnant. bAmongmarried women. cOf live births in the last three
years preceding the survey. dPer 100,000 live births, for the period of 0–4 years prior to the survey. eThe NAR for primary
school is the percentage of the primary-school-age (7–12 years) population that is attending primary school. The NAR for
secondary school is the percentage of the secondary-school-age (13–18 years) population that is attending secondary
school. fThe GAR for primary (secondary) school is the total number of primary- (secondary-)school students, expressed
as a percentage of the official primary- (secondary-)school-age population. If there are significant numbers of over-age
and under-age students at a given level of schooling, the GAR can exceed 100 per cent.
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further to 80.1 in 2005 and 87.5 in 2010. The NAR for secondary school is
much lower and fell in the period of conflict (Guariso and Verpoorten 2013),
but it then increased by more than ten percentage points during 2005–10.
Gross attendance ratios (GAR) though are much higher, a result of slow grade
progression during armed conflict (and so many over-age children). Gross
attendance ratios for primary school increased greatly from 84.6 in 1992 to
around 100 in 2000, close to 130 in 2005, and to approximately 140 in 2010.
The GAR for secondary school decreased from 16.6 in 1992 to 7.9 in 2000, but
then recovered to 8.2 in 2005 and further to 26.1 in 2010.
Finally the DHS surveys also collect data on housing characteristics and
household assets. There were improvements over time in the two comparable
housing indicators: electricity in the home and the construction material of
the floor. This is especially apparent across the latest three rounds (2005, 2007,
2010). Household ownership of durable goods also increased over time, with
62.6 per cent of households owning a radio in 2010, compared to 32.3 per cent
in 1992. Likewise, bicycle ownership almost doubled over the period
1992–2010, from 6.4 per cent to 15.2 per cent, though ownership of a televi-
sion or motorcycle remained low in 2010 despite small increases.
This analysis, though, focuses on average outcomes across the entire sam-
ple, where almost all indicators show improvements, often substantial
improvements, over the period. But it is also important to look at heterogen-
eity: to what extent do poorer households share in these improvements? In
the absence of income data, poverty is proxied on the basis of an asset index
constructed using principal component analysis (Filmer and Pritchett 2001).3
Table 6.2 then looks at eight indicators across rich and poor, showing the ratio
of the indicator for the top asset quintile to that of the lowest asset quintile.
The disparity is smallest and most stable over time for primary school enrol-
ment and vaccination coverage. For the other indicators, the general pattern is
one of sharply increasing disparities during the period of armed conflict
(1992–2000), followed in most cases by sharp reductions in disparities since
2000. The absolute levels of disparities are still large in some cases, notably for
the secondary NAR, but in six out of the eight cases inequality in these
outcomes fell, often sharply between 2000 and 2010; in the other two cases
the disparity scarcely changed. The evidence suggests that poorer households
shared in the improvements in these non-monetary indicators. A similar
analysis comparing rural and urban areas shows the same pattern of disparity
increasing during 1992–2000 and falling during 2000–10 (not reported).
3 The resulting indices are given by Measure DHS for each round, and are constructed on the
basis of a set of variables that vary across survey rounds. For instance, the 2005 and 2010 indices
include information on mobile phone ownership, a variable that was only introduced in 2005. In
addition, for some variables the answer categories varied between rounds, e.g. source of drinking
water and type of toilet facilities.
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In sum, the overall pattern revealed by almost all of the DHS indicators is of
big improvements in health, education, assets, and housing conditions
between 2000 and 2010, and of improvements in which rural areas and the
poor appear to share equally. In most cases this is in sharp contrast to the
pattern in Rwanda over the years of conflict in the 1990s.
This raises the question of the causes of these improvements in non-
monetary outcomes. The period from 2000 onwards saw major policy initia-
tives and changes in relation to education and especially health. Compulsory
and free primary education was introduced; large numbers of schools were
constructed or refurnished in this period, andmany who hadmissed school in
the years of conflict attended later. As seen above, a very high rate of attend-
ance was achieved. There were many initiatives in the health sector, including
the introduction of performance-based financing and of compulsory health
insurance; and all sectors were affected by the imihigo performance contracts
described above. The intense family planning campaign and a big increase in
contraceptive availability are likely to have contributed to the falling fertility
rates. To decisively attribute the improved outcomes to these policies, more
rigorous evaluations are needed.
6.3 Trends in Consumption Poverty and Inequality
The available data to assess consumption poverty primarily concern the post-
conflict period. Three comparable household surveys are available since 2000
and these are the main focus of this section; an earlier rural survey collecting
Table 6.2. The ratio of indicators between the richest 20 per cent and the poorest 20 per
cent of the sample population
DHS survey round 1992 2000 2005 2007–8 2010
Use of contraceptiona Ratio of indicator between top and bottom wealth
quintile
any method (%) 1.45 3.26 2.88 1.79 1.32
any modern method (%) 1.53 6.19 3.72 1.78 1.29
Delivery at health care facility (%)b 2.11 3.97 3.36 1.62 1.28
Assistance of trained personnel (%) 1.95 3.08 2.44 1.65 1.40
All vaccinations (% children 12–23 months) 1.05 1.08 1.00 1.02 1.10
Households owns mosquito net (any type, %) n.a. 26.01 7.35 1.71 1.20
Net attendance ratioc
primary school, total 1.39 1.18 1.10 n.a. 1.19
secondary school, total 4.86 12.88 24.24 n.a. 4.74
Notes and source: Authors’ calculation from the DHS data. aAmong married women. bOf live births in the last three years
preceding the survey. cThe NAR for primary school is the percentage of the primary-school-age (7–12 years) population
that is attending primary school. The NAR for secondary school is the percentage of the secondary-school-age (13–18
years) population that is attending secondary school.
Rapid Growth and Rapid Poverty Reduction
118
data on income from 1990 will be briefly reviewed at the end of this section,
despite concerns about comparability.
The three household surveys used here are the Household Living Condi-
tions Survey—Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages (EICV), in
French—of 2000/1, 2005/6, and 2010/11. These were multi-purpose house-
hold surveys collecting among other things detailed data to enable the esti-
mation of household consumption and income, based on short-period recall
data for consumption. The first survey used the 1991 census as a sampling
frame, but substantially complemented by a socioeconomic survey conducted
in 1996/7 because of the substantial population changes since 1991; the
second and third rounds used the 2002 population census for the sample
frame, which was also used ex post to revise the weights from the first survey.
Sample sizes were 6,420 in 2000/1, 6,900 in 2005/6, and 14,298 in 2010/11.
The larger sample frame in the last case was designed to give data which would
be representative at the new district level, following a reform in the structure
of local government in 2006.
The three surveys were identical in terms of how they collected consumption
data, andwere used to estimate household consumption for each of the rounds.
The measure of household consumption encompasses annualized estimates of
purchases of food andnon-food aswell as consumption of home-produced food
and non-food. In addition, consumption aggregates include spending on edu-
cation, frequent health expenses, expenses on housing and utilities (electricity,
water), the value of wages received in kind, the estimated value of services
derived from durable goods, and the value of transfers received in kind from
other households. An adult equivalence scale commonly used in Rwanda was
used to express household consumption on a per equivalent adult basis, so
taking account of differences in the size and composition of households. The
detailed methodology is described in the appendix to the National Institute of
Statistics of Rwanda’s poverty report (GoR 2012a).
In analysing consumption poverty it is also important to take account of
price differences between geographic locations, between months of the year,
and between the periods of the different surveys. Very good price data was
available in this case. The agriculture ministry had since 1999 been collecting
frequent and consistent food price data on a large number of commodities
across a large number of markets in Rwanda. This was used to estimate a food
price index capturing all the spatial and temporal differences, using commod-
ity weights from the survey data. A similar non-food index was constructed
using the raw price data collected for the consumer price index in more
urbanized areas and the two were combined into an overall cost-of-living
index, which was used to deflate the consumption data computed from the
survey. The index shows important differences by month, location, and
between the survey rounds (GoR 2012a).
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An absolute local currency poverty line was used in the analysis, of
RwF118,000 per adult equivalent per year in 2010/11 prices (RwF64,000
January 2001 prices). This line had been set with reference to a minimum
food consumption basket identified in 2000/1, judged to offer the number of
calories required for a Rwandan who was likely to be involved in physically
demanding work, along with an allowance for non-food consumption. An
extreme poverty line was also set as the cost of buying the food consumption
basket if nothing was spent on non-food at all, corresponding to RwF83,000
(RwF45,000 January 2001 prices). The consumption basket was an austere
one, reflecting widespread levels of poverty at the time of the EICV1 survey.
The average level of consumption and estimates of poverty headcount and
poverty depth (the average shortfall of the poor below the poverty line) are
presented in Table 6.3, disaggregated across the five provinces of Rwanda.
Average real household consumption per adult equivalent increased from
RwF90,601 in 2000/1 to RwF99,749 in 2005/6, an annualized rate of increase
of 1.9 per cent; between 2005/6 and 2010/11 it increased at an annualized rate
of 4.5 per cent to reach RwF 123,891 in 2010/11. The data show a very sharp
differential in the levels of consumption between Kigali and the other prov-
inces. The four remaining provinces have much more similar average con-
sumption levels. The provinces mostly show similar trends over time.
The poverty incidence figures show at the national level a modest reduction
in poverty of 2.2 percentage points, between 2001/1 and 2005/6. But there is
then a sharp reduction of 11.8 percentage points between 2005/6 and 2010/
11. A broadly similar pattern of change over time in poverty is seen in each
province, except that in the Southern province poverty actually increased
slightly between 2000/1 and 2005/6. There is a particularly sharp reduction
in poverty in the Northern province between 2005/6 and 2010/11. All the
province-level reductions in poverty between 2005/6 and 2010/11 are statis-
tically significant at the 1 per cent level, though the changes between 2000/1
and 2005/6 are often not significant. Comparing levels of poverty between
Table 6.3. Consumption and consumption poverty by province
average consumption per
adult
poverty incidence poverty depth
2000/1 2005/6 2010/11 2000/1 2005/6 2010/11 2000/1 2005/6 2010/11
Kigali City 253.2 289.5 324.8 0.227 0.208 0.168 0.366 0.346 0.284
Southern Province 68.5 71.6 106.8 0.655 0.667 0.565 0.422 0.416 0.340
Western Province 76.6 87.4 92.9 0.623 0.604 0.484 0.396 0.395 0.340
Northern Province 73.4 76.1 110.0 0.642 0.605 0.428 0.431 0.400 0.340
Eastern Province 71.4 89.9 104.5 0.593 0.521 0.426 0.415 0.357 0.302
RWANDA 90.6 99.7 123.9 0.589 0.567 0.449 0.414 0.393 0.329
Source: Government of Rwanda (2012a)
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provinces it is very clear always that the levels of poverty are much lower in
Kigali compared to the other four provinces. To a large extent this reflects
urban–rural differences as the provinces outside Kigali are predominantly
rural while Kigali province is predominantly urban. The depth of poverty
shows similar patterns. It falls modestly between 2000/1 and 2005/6 and
more between 2005/6 and 2010/11. The difference in the depth of poverty
in Kigali and other provinces is much less than was the case for the incidence
of poverty. In other words, those who are poor in Kigali are almost as poor on
average as are the poor in other provinces.
It is equally important to look at inequality. At the national level, the Gini
coefficient for Rwanda is high compared to neighbouring countries and inter-
nationally. It was 0.51 in 2000/1 and increased modestly to 0.52 in 2005/6,
but then fell to 0.49 in 2010/11. Other inequality indices such as the ratio of
the 90th to the 10th percentile show the same pattern of change. But the
nature of the change of inequality is also highlighted visually through growth
incidence curves for the 2000/1–2005/6 and 2005/6–2010/11 periods
(Figures 6.2a and 6.2b). These show the growth in household consumption
by percentile. What is clear is that for the first sub-period, consumption
growthwas higher at the top of the distribution than at the bottom, consistent
with the increase in inequality. In the second sub-period though, growth was
faster at the bottom of the distribution than at the top, again consistent with
inequality falling. Thus in the first period, poverty reduction was modest
because the growth in consumption was slower and it was associated with
increasing inequality. In the second period, poverty fell much more, both
because growth was faster and because inequality fell. It still remains the case
in 2010/11 though that the level of inequality is high in Rwanda.
In summary, the pattern revealed by the survey data shows two very distinct
periods. In the first period, over which GDP growth was also moremodest (per
capita GDP actually fell in 2001–2), consumption growth was also modest,
inequality rose, and the incidence and depth of poverty only fell slightly, to an
extent which was not statistically significant. In the second period, GDP
growth was higher and consumption growth was much higher. Inequality
also fell and there was a significant growth at the bottom of the distribution.
Reflecting all this, both the incidence and depth of poverty fell significantly,
indeed by a large magnitude.
As noted, the 2010/11 sample was large enough to permit indicators to be
estimated at the district level. Figure 6.3 shows a map of Rwanda indicating
district-level poverty estimates with darker colours representing higher pov-
erty levels. It is very clear from this that poverty is lowest in Kigali (the light-
shaded districts in the centre of themap) and inMusanze district in the north;
it is also clear that it is in the districts in the south and west that poverty levels
are highest. These are historically poorer areas of Rwanda, and they are often
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also less urbanized and more remote. Figure 6.4 then shows changes in pov-
erty between 2005/6 and 2010/11. Not all these changes are statistically
significant but all in the lightest colour category are; what this map seems to
suggest is much greater poverty reduction in districts located closer to borders
with neighbouring countries (even some very poor ones in the south) and
much less reduction or even increases in locations further from borders and
often more remote. Cross-border trade may have been a factor contributing to
this poverty reduction, but this needs further investigation.
An analysis looking at poverty in relation to a household’s economic activ-
ities shows that those undertaking non-farm activity, either as wage work or
self-employment, are much less poor than average; and that those reliant on
farming activity are much poorer than average. The period between 2005/6
and 2010/11 showed an increase in the proportion of households in the
survey reliant on non-farm activities, consistent with the overall poverty
reduction over this period. In both years, among households reliant on farm-
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Figure 6.2. Growth incidence curves for Rwanda
Source: Government of Rwanda (2012a: 22)
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of all. In 2005/6 and 2010/11 around 4 per cent of households get more than
half their income from farm wage work, and 7 per cent and 8 per cent get at
least 30 per cent of their household income from this source. This work is very
badly paid and these households are among the poorest of all.
The consumption poverty results suggest that there has been substantial
poverty reduction between 2005/6 and 2010/11; this is also the sub-period
where the DHS indicators showed the fastest improvement. But these results
need to be explained; and they need to be considered against local-level
qualitative field research which gives a very different picture (Ansoms et al.
2010; Sommers 2012) as well as highly critical evaluations or assessments of a
number of policy measures put in place by the government (e.g. villagization:
Newbury 2011; land consolidation and crop intensification policies: Ansoms


































Figure 6.3. Pattern of poverty in Rwanda by district, 2010–11
Source: Government of Rwanda (2012a: 17)
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In seeking to explain the results, it is important first to bear in mind that
poverty results reflect the economic conditions of the time period over which
the data was collected, and can reflect exceptional circumstances in these
years. To some extent, the relatively disappointing harvest in 2005/6 could
partly explain both the lack of progress between 2000/1 and 2005/6 and the
faster progress between 2005/6 and 2010/11 as well as the attendant changes
in inequality. The period covered by the second and third surveys was one
over which agricultural production is reported to have increased substantially.
The production of cereals, pulses, and roots was reported to have increased
between 2005/6 and 2010/11 by 135 per cent, 21 per cent, and 95 per cent,
respectively (World Bank 2013). The survey data also show that agricultural
commercialization was higher in 2010/11 than 2005/6. Reyntjens (2012: 115)



































Figure 6.4. Changes in poverty in Rwanda between 2005/6 and 2010/11, by district
Source: Authors’ computation from the Rwanda EICV survey database
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might be determined by the output, strongly influenced by climate of the
agricultural season preceding the survey’. Further potential support to this is
given by the fact that total annual rainfall in 2010 was 50 per cent higher than
in 2005 (1,200 mm compared to 800 mm) (SSEE 2011).
Other factors though undoubtedly contributed to poverty reduction. One is
the increased number of households able to undertake non-agricultural activ-
ities (though this may to some extent also be affected by the good agricultural
performance), including an increase in available wage work opportunities
(GoR 2012b). Smaller family size is another factor which will have had a
positive impact on poverty reduction. Improved education and health out-
comes, as evidenced in section 6.2, are also likely to have contributed to
improved economic outcomes for households.
But in terms of whether and which policies contributed to poverty reduc-
tion, the same point made above in relation to social sectors applies evenmore
emphatically here. Given the lack of proper impact evaluations, nothing
contained in this consumption poverty analysis can be decisively attributed
to the different policies which have been put in place (e.g. agricultural and
land policies; social protection; the Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction Strategy itself).
Besides the absence of rigorous assessments, another issue is how to inter-
pret ‘improvements’. Some argue that they reflect the ‘cosmetic upgrading of
rural life’ which ‘hides the true extent of poverty and inequality’ (Ansoms
2011: 247). This criticism is based on the coercion that accompanies many of
the developmental measures, institutionalized in a system of fines—for not
sending children to school, for walking bare-footed, or for consulting a trad-
itional healer without authorization, among others.4 Ingelaere (2011: 73)
argues that these fines may make rural dwellers ‘look’ less poor, even though
they are likely to ‘be and feel’ as poor, or even poorer, than before. The issue of
people’s perceptions in relation to poverty will be revisited in section 6.4.
The comparisons on which this section focuses have been based on surveys
conducted since 1994, and these are not properly comparable with earlier
surveys. However, in terms of trying to make a pre-war comparison, a survey
in 1990 collected quite detailed data on incomes of rural households, and
McKay and Loveridge (2005) sought to compare this with income data
collected from rural households in the 2000/1 EICV survey. Differences in
methodology mean that considerable care is needed in making this compari-
son. The authors sought to define comparable concepts of income, and could
also compare child anthropometric outcomes between the two surveys.
Anthropometric outcomes for under-five children had improved slightly
4 Following criticism of the fines, among others by donors, their actual implementation may
have decreased in recent years (personal correspondence with Bert Ingelaere).
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between 1990 and 2000/1, despite a significant reduction in the average land
size cultivated over the period; and average household income in 2000/1 had
risen above its 1990 value (a result consistent with other data on agricultural
production for this period). But there also appeared to be increasing inequality
over this period (in line with the pattern observed in the DHS data); the richest
30 per cent of the sample in 2000/1 were significantly better off, but the
remaining 70 per cent were in fact worse off in income terms, though not in
terms of anthropometric outcomes. The latter paradox may be explained by
changes in cultivation patterns over the period (e.g. more cultivation of
cassava, less of cash crops) and reductions in sales of output over the period.
There may then have been progress also during 1990–2000. But the results
for the post-2000 period are clearly more robust.
6.4 Analysing Household Mobility Based on
a Small Panel Dataset
Panel data enables an analysis of economic mobility which cannot be done
with the repeated cross-sectional data analysed above. The analysis in this
section is based on a small panel data conducted in 2002 and 2008 in two
locations in Rwanda, the former provinces of Gikongoro and Gitarama (now
mainly in the Southern or Western provinces). It is interesting to note that
much of this area was seen to havemade less progress in consumption poverty
in section 6.3. This survey was a follow-up of the same 1990 survey discussed
in the previous section, but the analysis here focuses on the 2002 and 2008
rounds. The 2002 round was collected as part of a study for the Belgian
Department for Development Cooperation (DGOS), and collected data from
258 households on themes including subsistence production, crop sales, live-
stock production, non-farm income, beer brewing, transfers, land ownership,
household composition and schooling, war-related shocks, other adverse
income shocks, and household consumption shortfalls. For a detailed descrip-
tion, see Verpoorten and Berlage (2007). The 2008 round used a similar design
and was collected on a grant from the Rwandan government and LICOS—
Center for Institutions and Economic Performance (University of Leuven). It
sought to interview and collect similar information from all 258 households,
but in the end interviewed 241 because the remaining households could not
be found or could not be considered to be the same. Analysing attrition across
the 2002 and 2008 rounds, we find little evidence that household character-
istics drive attrition.
The data can be used to estimate household income as a welfare measure,
and data are also available on land, livestock, and other assets. There is strong
growth in average income between 2002 and 2008, with real income per adult
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equivalent (in prices of 2008) increasing from RwF54,614 in 2002 to
RwF60,725 in 2008, a 11.2 per cent increase over the six-year period. This
happened despite a sharp drop in average farm sizes from 0.89 ha in 2002 to
0.54 ha in 2008. Livestock ownership, expressed in TLU (tropical livestock
units), was very similar in both years. There is a very small rise over the period
in the contribution of non-farmwage employment (7.2 per cent to 7.6 per cent)
andnon-farmself-employment (9.4per cent to10.1per cent).More important is
the fact that agricultural productivity would seem to have increased, whichmay
reflect the increased use of fertilizer as highlighted by theWorld Bank (2013), or
simply better agricultural weather conditions. The data again highlight substan-
tial inequalitywith theGini coefficient of net incomeper adult equivalent being
0.56 and 0.55 in 2002 and 2008 respectively.
Of particular interest in a panel dataset is to look at mobility. Figure 6.5
presents scatterplots of income and land in 2008 compared to their 2002
values. The land scatterplot shows reductions in the large majority of cases,
including some very large reductions. The income plot shows much greater
heterogeneity, with many increases but also a large number of reductions.
A regression analysis, based on a production function approach, of the level of
income found that there were large, positive, and significant returns to land
and labour. In addition, income in 2008 depends positively and significantly
on income in 2002 and on changes in labour and land between 2002 and 2008
(Verpoorten 2014).
The 2008 survey also classified households into six widely used social
categories that emerged from the 2001 nationwide participatory poverty
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Figure 6.5. Scatterplots of 2008 values of income and land against their 2002 values
Source: Computed from DGOS/Government of Rwanda/LICOS panel dataset; see text
5 The PPA was implemented nationwide in a sample of administrative sectors. In each sector,
facilitators consulted with a large number of community members (about 300), aiming to identify
different social categories as seen by Rwandans themselves. The characteristics of these groupings
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(umutindi nyakujya) to ‘the money rich’ (umukire). The intermediate categories
are ‘the very poor’, ‘the poor’, ‘the resourceful poor’, and ‘the food rich’
(umutindi, umukene, umukene wifashije, umukungu). These categories are
described in more detail in the Appendix to this chapter. The 2008 survey
also asked households to report their ubudehe status in 2002. The social
categories reported by respondents correlate quite strongly with the income,
land, and livestock data available from the survey.
This then gives an alternative, self-reported measure of mobility to the
income and land-based measures above, and a mobility matrix is reported in
Table 6.4. In this matrix, nearly 70 per cent of households remain in the same
category between these two years, but where there is mobility it is mostly
upward, especially people moving out of categories 2 and 3 to typically the
next highest group. Howe and McKay (2007) in an earlier analysis interpreted
the first three categories as being likely to include a substantially higher
number of chronically poor households, but even some of these appear to
have been able to move up into a higher group. In 2002, we find about 13 per
cent in the second category and 43 per cent in the third category, compared to
11 per cent and 37 per cent in 2008.While the lowest three categoriesmake up
almost 59 per cent of the sample in 2002, their share stands at 51 per cent in
2008, thus marking a decline in poverty.
The survey also asked respondents directly about the reasons for upward
and downward mobility in terms of these categories (Figure 6.6). Once again,
production factors figure large here, with a good harvest, better andmore land,









umutindi nyakujya 6 0 1 0 0 0
85.7 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
umutindi 0 19 8 4 0 0
0.0 61.3 25.8 12.9 0.0 0.0
umukene 1 4 70 27 0 0
1.0 3.9 68.6 26.5 0.0 0.0
umukene wifashije 0 4 8 66 2 0
0.0 5.0 10.0 82.5 2.5 0.0
umukungu 0 0 1 5 11 0
0.0 0.0 5.9 29.4 64.7 0.0
umukire 0 0 0 0 1 1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0
Source: Small DGOS/Government of Rwanda/LICOS panel dataset; see text
were defined as well as the reasons for moving up or down the social ladder and for being stuck in
poverty (<http://www.rgb.rw/governance-innovations/ubudehe/>).
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and more livestock being reported as the most important factors behind
upward mobility; and the opposite factors being the main reasons behind
downward mobility.
Finally and importantly the 2008 round of the panel data set also asked
household heads the twelfth question of the GHQ-12, the General Health
Questionnaire, developed by Goldberg and Blackwell (1970):6 ‘Have you
recently been feeling reasonably happy all things considered?’ (Goldberg
and Blackwell 1970), with the following response categories: ‘strongly agree’,
‘agree’, ‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’. About 10 per cent of household
heads strongly agree, 57 per cent agree, 21 per cent disagree, and 12 per cent
strongly disagree (see Table 6.5). These responses suggest that close to one out
of three household heads felt unhappy. Looking at the distribution of income,
assets, and mobility across the answer categories, happiness is weakly posi-
tively correlated with income, but strongly correlated with relative income
mobility (both measured and self-reported): those who moved more upward
feel more happy. Strikingly, however, even the unhappy experienced a posi-
tive absolute change in average income (+21,000 vs +85,000 for the happy),

















































































Figure 6.6. Self-reported reasons for social mobility between ubudehe categories
Source: Computed from DGOS/Government of Rwanda/LICOS panel dataset; see text
6 The GHQ has been translated into many languages. It was cross-culturally validated as part of a
World Health Organization project onmental illness conducted in both developing and developed
countries (Goldberg et al. 1997). During the preparation phase of the 2008 round of the panel data,
we let the GHQ-12 be translated from English to Kinyarwanda and then back from Kinyarwanda to
English by two different translators (double-blinded). We compared the retranslated English
version with the original one to spot problems, which were then discussed in detail with both
translators until a consensus on an accurate translation was reached. We acknowledge input from
Pieter Serneels in this process.
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relative changes. Happiness also strongly correlated with land ownership.
Those who report being happy have about 75 per cent more land than ‘the
unhappy’ (0.65 ha versus 0.38 ha). The average decline in landholdings was
also significantly larger among the unhappy than among the happy (0.53 ha
vs 0.25 ha, not reported).
The importance of relative wealth for subjective well-being has also been
underlined in many other studies including Luttmer (2005), Kingdon and
Knight (2007), and Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), among others. The import-
ance of relative landholdings aligns well with the findings of Van Landeghem
et al. (2011) who study the subjective well-being (SWB) of farm households in
the context of land reform in Moldova.
The fact that happiness is not strongly correlated with the level of material
well-being is an important finding, and may help explain something of the
difference between the indicators reported in the survey-based results and the
results of the qualitative fieldwork. Progress in terms of levels of monetary and
non-monetary indicators does not necessarily mean that people feel better off,
certainly when others are also making progress, at a faster rate.
6.5 Conclusions
In many respects Rwanda has made very impressive progress in the period
since 1994, showing sustained growth at fast rates, even accelerating in recent
years. This represents a substantial change from the pre-1994 situation of no,
or at best, low and unsustained growth. This chapter has examined the
changes in living conditions which have taken place alongside this growth.
It shows substantial progress in both non-monetary indicators of well-being
and consumption poverty, with faster progress since around 2005 in each
case. The 2002–8 panel survey also suggests that people have become better
off in income terms and in terms of their own self-assessment (in terms of the
Table 6.5. Happiness, and mean income, assets, and income change by happiness




















strongly disagree 29 11.6 11.6 77,897 33.33 0.93 0.59 15,146 0.21
disagree 52 20.8 32.4 47,820 40.45 0.86 0.51 26,078 0.24
agree 143 57.2 89.6 61,961 62.92 1.24 0.46 69,011 0.31
strongly agree 26 10.4 100 70,134 81.47 1.39 0.19 183,623 0.42
Source: Small DGOS/Government of Rwanda/LICOS panel dataset; see text
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ubudehe categories). There is therefore strong evidence of improving living
conditions alongside the economic growth.
In the case of consumption or income, given the typical fluctuations in such
variables over time, the results of the comparisons between two or more years
can be quite sensitive to the precise timing of the surveys. Hence the com-
parisons of these variables may or may not indicate longer-term trends. But
many non-monetarymeasures varymuch less over time, rather evolvingmore
gradually and consistently. The non-monetary measures considered here
mostly show improvement which is just as impressive as that in consumption
poverty. Mortality rates have fallen consistently since 2000, access to health
care has much improved, education levels have increased, asset holdings and
housing conditions have improved, and these improvements have happened
for the poor as much as for the non-poor. While complete explanations of
these changes are currently lacking, these changes are beyond mere post-war
catch-up.
Because of the various channels of multi-way causation between income,
health, education, and other outcomes, it is not surprising that the improve-
ments in human development outcomes as inferred from the DHS data are in
line with the poverty and inequality trends that emerge from data on con-
sumption expenditures. But how can this evidence of pro-poor growth be
reconciled with the much more pessimistic findings of mostly qualitative
fieldwork at the local level?
The analysis of dynamic and subjective measures of household well-being
based on the small panel dataset may provide some clues. Respondents’
happiness levels turned out to be very weakly related to income levels, but
correlated much more strongly with relative income changes and landhold-
ings. These findings suggest that subjective measures of well-being do not
necessarily align well with objective measures of well-being; and that the
mismatch may be considerable in Rwanda as a result of rapid and profound
economic and social transformations. This creates uncertainty; it leads to
winners and losers (in relative terms); and it affects traditional land- and
subsistence-based livelihoods. In particular, peasants have often had great
difficulty in responding to many of the policies introduced—for example, in
relation to land consolidation and monocropping—and the speed of the
implementation makes this more difficult.
It is very difficult also to say to what extent the improvements have been
due to the many different government policy interventions which have been
put in place over the period. Many of these interventions are quite recent; but
more importantly they mostly have not been properly evaluated. Thus, for
example, it is not yet possible to know whether changes in land and agricul-
tural policy can account for the significantly increased production levels in
the sector. The requirement for increased upward accountability from the
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local to the central government level via performance contracts or imihigo
(Ingelaere 2011) might have played a role in improvements in health and
education (or even economic growth), but this has not been evaluated. The
massive increase in health care spending (increasing by a factor of 2.5 between
2004 and 2010), coupled with the introduction of performance-based finan-
cing, is nonetheless likely to be an important factor behind the improved
health outcomes (Basinga et al. 2010). A similar comment applies in the
education sector. Aid would seem to have played an important role here, as
it probably has in stimulating growth more widely. But there is currently
insufficient information to assess the relative role of public policy measures,
greater effectiveness of policy implementation, aid, and other factors in
accounting for the observed outcomes in terms of living conditions.
Although the technically capable government is well underway to reach
several of the Millennium Development Goals, Rwanda’s path to develop-
ment remains controversial, because of the sharp contrast between the
impressive economic progress and the standstill in ‘voice and accountability’,
one of the six Kaufmann et al. (2010) governance indicators. These allegations
cast a shadow over the regime’s economic successes and leave the scholar and
donor community deeply divided on how to approach Rwanda, and what to
expect—can the lack of progress on ‘voice and accountability’ pose a risk to
the sustainability of the achievements to date? If anything, Rwanda’s history
should make observers especially attentive to evolutions in social, political,
and economic exclusion (Ingelaere and Verpoorten 2014).
Another point of concern highlighted in this analysis is the continued high
level of inequality in Rwanda, even if this has fallen recently and has become
an important government priority. Inequality in Rwanda is higher than in
most or all other countries in Eastern Africa and this must be a concern for
cohesion and sustainability, exacerbated by the above concerns about voice
and accountability. The extent of the gap between Kigali and the rest of the
country remains an important dimension of this, though there are also large
levels of inequality within provinces.
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Poverty and its Dynamics in Uganda
Explorations Using a New Set of Poverty Lines
Bjorn Van Campenhout, Haruna Sekabira, and Dede Houeto Aduayom
7.1 Introduction
During the past few decades, Uganda has experienced substantial economic
growth. Since 1986, when the National Resistance Movement took over gov-
ernment, real gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at an annual rate of 6.8
per cent, making its economy one of the fastest growing in Africa. This growth
has been attributed to the new government that has implemented a far-
reaching economic reforms agenda, transforming Uganda into one of the
most liberal economies in Africa south of the Sahara. Indeed, as argued in
World Bank (1993: 22), the government ‘liberalized the trade regime by abol-
ishing export and import licensing; dismantled all price controls, which were
few to begin with; repealed the Industrial Licensing Act, promulgated a new
investment code, returned properties expropriated by the Amin regime and
commenced privatizing public industrial enterprises; made important strides
in abolishing export and distribution monopolies; embarked upon a major
overhaul of the civil service; restructured the tax system and improved tax
administration; and has made an impressive start in restructuring public
expenditures towards critical economic and social services’. Such policy
changes were seen as essential preconditions for sustainable economic growth.
The growth has been accompanied by equally impressive declines in the
levels of poverty as reported by the government. While aggregate headcount
poverty stood at about 57 per cent in the early 1990s, the most recent official
estimate puts 19.5 per cent of the population below the official poverty line.1
1 For the most recent official estimate, we take the poverty estimate based on the 2012/13
Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). The data on which these estimates are based were
But despite these successes at the aggregate level, researchers warn that this
growth has not been shared equally. For instance, marked spatial heterogen-
eity in poverty reductions means that differences in the standard of living
between locations are often much higher now than they used to be.
Apart from the observed heterogeneity in terms of poverty and poverty
reduction, the figures themselves have been called into question as well.
Some argue that the lack of progress on assets accumulation and non-
monetary well-being proxies suggests much more modest poverty reductions,
raising suspicion about the poverty lines and the welfare indicator used by the
government of Uganda (Daniels and Minot 2015; Kakande 2010). Some
scholars have also been questioning the spatial pattern of poverty as reported
in official documents, arguing that a single national food poverty line is likely
to overstate poverty in some areas while underestimating poverty in others
(Appleton 2003; Jamal 1998).
In this chapter, we want to update existing knowledge about the state of
poverty and its dynamics in Uganda, while at the same time addressing some
of the problems with the official figures that have been identified in recent
studies. To account for differences in diets in different locations, we will
construct different poverty thresholds for different spatial domains using the
latest available nationally representative household survey. We will then use
these new poverty lines to look at the evolution of poverty, using the recently
released Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS), a yearly panel survey collected
by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) supported by the World Bank’s
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) project that tracks about 3,000
households.
Finally, we will use the panel nature of this survey to study how many
households are chronically poor and investigate how their characteristics
differ from other groups, such as households that successfully escaped pov-
erty. In other words, we will construct a detailed poverty profile that takes
dynamic aspects into account, defining groups based on poverty transitions
instead of a simple dichotomous poor/non-poor status (Boateng et al. 1992).
As for the characteristics we contrast within each group, we confine ourselves
to those that change only slowly over time, and we look at the ‘initial condi-
tions’ at the start of the panel. We hope that this can enlighten us on the
preconditions that need to be in place to be in a particular poverty dynamics
group.
obtained from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) in August 2014. As is mostly the case with
UNHS data obtained from UBOS, the dataset came with a compiled welfare aggregate based on
consumption expenditure and a set of official poverty lines. Using the same methods we used to
replicate official poverty figures in previous rounds of the UNHS, we estimate national headcount
poverty to be 19.5 per cent in the UNHS 2012/13. This is lower than official poverty estimates at the
time of the UNHS 2012/13 dissemination and reported in the press (22.1 per cent).
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We first give an
overview of poverty in the past few decades and look at the current official
poverty estimates in Uganda. We also review some studies that point out
shortcomings in official poverty measurement. In section 7.3, we briefly
explain the reasoning behind the use of spatially disaggregated poverty
lines, as well as the methodology we use to construct them. Section 7.4
presents poverty estimates using the new poverty lines and using household
consumption expenditure data from 2005 up to 2013. Section 7.5 then looks
at poverty dynamics and relates households with differing poverty dynamics
to a selection of characteristics. A final section concludes.
7.2 Poverty in Uganda: Trends and Controversies
During the 1990s, poverty in Uganda decreased substantially, falling by
almost 40 per cent at the national level (Appleton 2003). However, there
were significant spatial differences in both levels and changes in poverty.
The urban areas and central region reduced poverty the fastest. The northern
region, already starting from high levels of poverty, was relatively unsuccess-
ful in bringing down the number of people living below the poverty line. In
addition, studies that exploit the panel nature of the data find that in some
regions, poverty was particularly persistent (Deininger and Okidi 2003). Also
puzzling is a sudden drop between 1997/8 and 1999/2000. Although it took
five years for poverty to decrease by 20 per cent between 1992 and 1997, it
took only two years to decrease another 20 per cent at the turn of the century.
This may be due to inconsistent underlying welfare indicator data that were
obtained from different surveys.
One controversy we will also address in this chapter pertains to the fact that
the official poverty estimates are based on poverty lines that are rooted in a
single national food consumption bundle, derived from 1993/4 Monitoring
Survey data. In particular, a single food basket was identified at the national
level with twenty-eight of the most frequently consumed food items by
households with less than the median income. The items in this food basket
were then converted into caloric equivalents and scaled to generate 3,000
calories per adult equivalent per day using the World Health Organization
(WHO) estimates for an 18–30-year-old male as a reference. Next, a non-food
allowance was added. Non-food requirements were estimated as the average
non-food expenditure of those households whose total expenditure was
around the food poverty line. The non-food allowance does allow for spatial
heterogeneity, as separate averages were calculated for urban and rural loca-
tions interacted with the four regions (central, eastern, northern, and west-
ern), using the method described in Ravallion and Bidani (1994). These
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poverty lines have since been updated by the official inflation figures each
time a new household survey came out.
Appleton (2003) and Jamal (1998) argue that Uganda is unusual in its
dietary diversity. Indeed, Uganda has five different staples—matooke, maize,
sweet potatoes, cassava, and millet—that are more or less important within
the diet depending on the region. This may not matter very much if the diets
are equally cost-effective in obtaining the same level of basic needs as defined
in kilocalories. However, the staple food of choice for a large part of the
population, both in the western and the central regions, is matooke, a highly
localized staple.2 Appleton (2003) calculates that, at least in 1993–4, matooke
appeared to be a very expensive source of calories, compared to what people
in, for instance, the north consume. When Appleton (2003) and Jamal (1998)
account for this in their analysis, they come to the conclusion that poverty is
more pronounced in the western region than found in official statistics. Even
after correcting for income difference, as regions that consume more expen-
sive calories may do so simply because they have higher incomes, Appleton
(2003) comes to the conclusion that the western region, rather than the
northern region, emerges as the poorest.
Progress in fighting poverty reported by the government of Uganda and
UBOS in the first decade of the new millennium is equally impressive.
Table 7.1 shows that poverty at the national level kept falling during the first
decade, shaving another 50 per cent off of headcount poverty. At the same
Table 7.1. Official poverty headcounts, 2002–12
2002/3 2005/6 2009/10 2012/13
Uganda 38.80 31.10 24.50 19.50
Urban 14.40 13.70 9.10 9.60
Rural 42.70 34.20 27.20 22.40
Central 22.30 16.40 10.70 5.10
Eastern 46.00 35.90 24.30 24.10
Northern 63.00 60.70 46.20 43.70
Western 32.90 20.50 21.80 7.60
Kampala 4.70 4.40 3.90 0.80
Central 1 22.00 18.80 11.10 3.90
Central 2 30.00 19.70 13.60 7.90
East Central 42.60 32.70 21.40 24.10
Eastern 48.40 39.20 26.50 24.10
Mid-northern 57.40 61.10 40.40 35.60
Northeastern 82.80 79.30 75.80 74.50
West Nile 62.80 55.30 39.70 42.00
Mid-western 37.90 23.20 25.30 9.50
Southwestern 29.00 18.70 18.40 5.80
Source: Calculated from respective Uganda National Household Surveys
2 Matooke is a variety of starchy banana, commonly referred to as cooking bananas.
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time, differential progress in poverty reduction in different regions persists,
too. For instance, by 2012/13, poverty was more than eight times higher in
the northern region than in the central region. In 2002/3, the north was only
2.7 times poorer than the central region. The more disaggregated the num-
bers, the starker the contrasts become. In the northeast, a semi-arid area with
low rainfall inhabited by the Karamajong, an agro-pastoralist ethnic group,
poverty remains stubbornly high, while in the central and western regions of
the country, poverty has been almost eradicated.
The official poverty figures and their evolution over time have been ques-
tioned in recent years for being overly optimistic. Daniels and Minot (2015)
use Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data and methods related to
poverty mapping and small area estimation to look at poverty trends across
Uganda from 1995 to 2010. They use the 2005/6 UNHS survey to estimate
regressions that correlate poverty to a range of household characteristics that
also appear in the DHS (four such surveys have been carried out between 1995
and 2009/10). They then use the DHS surveys to predict poverty in each of the
DHS survey years. They find that poverty indeed reduced over time, but much
slower than official figures suggest. While their national estimate of head-
count poverty in 2006 is 33 per cent and thus very close to the official estimate
of 2005/6, the rate still stands at 30 per cent using the 2009 DHS, about six
percentage points higher than the 2009/10 UNHS estimate.
This view is shared among many researchers and opinion makers in
Uganda. Byekwaso (2010) calls officially reported poverty changes ‘a fiction’.
Kakande (2010) admits that qualitative findings on poverty trends suggest
there was a decrease in well-being despite the drop in poverty rates. Recently,
an unpublished manuscript has been circulating that compares Uganda to
other African countries on six non-monetary poverty indicators, such as
literacy rates and access to piped water. This admittedly partial analysis also
points to a much higher incidence of poverty than officially reported.
7.3 Utility-Consistent Poverty Lines Using Revealed Preferences
From section 7.2, we learn that one of the main weaknesses of the official
poverty measures is that they are based on a poverty line that is constructed
using a single food commodity bundle for the entire country. In addition, this
food basket was constructed in 1993 and has not been updated since, apart
from accounting for inflation using the consumer price index. However, it is
well known that in many instances—for example, if relative prices of basic
commodities vary by region (or through time) and preferences permit
substitution—the use of a single consumption bundle may yield inconsistent
poverty comparisons (Tarp et al. 2002). While differences in prices in different
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locations are usually incorporated in poverty measurement by adjusting the
welfare indicator to reflect prices used in the construction of the poverty lines
(or by adjusting the poverty lines to reflect prices used in the construction of
the welfare indicator), it is becoming more and more common to also account
for spatial heterogeneity in consumption bundles in an effort to increase the
specificity of poverty lines (e.g. Mukherjee and Benson 2003; Ravallion and
Lokshin 2006).
While differences in consumption baskets are interesting in their own right,
they become relevant only in the context of poverty measurement and ana-
lysis, as we relate a welfare indicator to the cost of these basic needs. Indeed,
different diets may provide the same basic needs (usually a given amount of
kilocalories per day) at significantly different costs, which complicates poverty
comparisons between units (regions, households, individuals, and so forth)
with different diets. It is especially in this regard that Uganda provides an
interesting case. Matooke, themain ingredient in the diet of households in the
west, may be more or less expensive per energy unit than, for example,
sorghum, the main staple in the north. As such, it would be misleading to
compare the west with the north on the basis of a single food poverty line,
even after allowing for spatial price heterogeneity.
But how can we be sure that two different consumption bundles provide the
same basic needs? Or, in the language of Ravallion and Bidani (1994), how do
we ensure consistency?3 The theory underlying absolute poverty lines is
grounded in welfare economics and constrained utility maximization. In
this context, the fixed standard of living represented by the poverty line is
viewed as a level of utility associated with the minimally acceptable standard
of living. In other words, two bundles of goods are consistent if they yield the
same utility.
We follow Ravallion and Lokshin (2006), who argue that the theory of
revealed preferences provides a suitable framework for answering these ques-
tions. The idea uses the rationality assumption that economic agents that
derive utility from consumption always prefer consuming more to less.
A representative consumer in a particular spatial domain will choose only
that bundle that minimizes expenditure. Thus, any other bundle that yields
the same level of utility should be equally expensive as or more expensive
than the chosen bundle. No bundle can cost less than the chosen one yet yield
that same utility, because then the rational consumer should have chosen that
one. Or, as in Gibson and Rozelle (2003), if the cost of a bundle from another
domain would be cheaper if bought in a specific domain, this means it must
have lower utility than the bundle in that specific domain, as otherwise the
3 A poverty measure is consistent if two individuals at the same welfare level are considered
equally poor.
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rational consumer would have picked the bundle from the other domain. We
use aminimum cross-entropy approach to adjust expenditure shares such that
they meet revealed preference conditions (Arndt and Simler 2010). More
information on the rationale behind utility-consistent poverty lines and the
estimation using minimum cross-entropy can be found in Van Campenhout
et al. (2014).
7.4 A Reassessment of Poverty and its Evolution in Uganda
For our reassessment of poverty in Uganda using spatially disaggregated pov-
erty lines, we will calculate welfare using the four waves of the Uganda
National Panel Survey (UNPS).4 The UNPS is a multi-topic panel household
survey started by UBOS in 2009/10. However, the 2009/10 sample was essen-
tially a subset of 3,123 households that were interviewed as part of the 2005/6
Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS 2005/6), a nationally representa-
tive survey that covered 6,775 households. As such, the first wave of the panel
comprises the UNHS 2005/6 data of this subsample of 3,123 households. After
the second wave of 2009/10, the survey was repeated annually. Currently data
are available for a third round covering the 2010/11 agricultural year and a
fourth round covering the 2011/12 agricultural year.5 The UNPS is conducted
in two visits to better capture agricultural outcomes associated with the two
cropping seasons of the country.
For the construction of the utility-consistent poverty thresholds elaborated
on in the previous section, we will use the 2012/13 Uganda National House-
hold Survey (UNHS 2012/13). Like the UNHS 2005/6, the UNHS 2012/13 is
nationally representative, covering 6,888 households. We choose this survey
because it is the most recent one available, and the construction of utility-
consistent poverty lines requires a sufficiently large sample, with sufficient
observations in each spatial domain. After some experimentation, we ended
up using six spatial domains (Kampala, Rural Central, Rural East, Rural North,
Rural West, and Other Urban). The results are presented in Table 7.2.
The poverty headcounts we obtain using six spatial domains are much
higher than the official ones. While part of the divergence may be explained
by various differences between approaches (e.g. official estimates scale house-
hold consumption expenditure by adult-equivalent units, while we use per
capita expenditures; we use a much more recent dataset underlying the pov-
erty line estimates, etc.), spatial disaggregation seems to make the largest
4 We use consumption expenditure per capita as a proxy for welfare, as is common in poverty
measurement and analysis.
5 No UNPS survey was done in 2012/13.
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difference. In Van Campenhout et al. (2014), we compare poverty lines and
poverty estimates based on the 2012/13 data, contrasting figures generated
using one and six spatial domains. We find that our method using one spatial
domain actually leads to a lower poverty estimate than the official one, while
allowing for spatial disaggregation leads to substantially higher estimates of pov-
erty.6 The reductions in poverty over time also seemmoremodest than the official
ones, with an overall reduction in poverty between 2005/6 and 2012/13 of about
one-quarter, echoing concerns raised byDaniels andMinot (2015), who argue that
the original 1993 poverty lines may have increased too little to keep pace with
inflation. We also see that the largest reduction of the number of people living
below the poverty line happened between 2011/12 and 2012/13.
If we disaggregate between rural and urban poverty, we see that most of the
poverty reduction has been happening in rural areas. Over the years, poverty
in rural areas has steadily fallen from almost 50 per cent to 36 per cent. This
is different from what has been happening in urban areas. While between
2005/6 and 2010/11 urban poverty was on the decline, it started rising again
afterwards. A marked acceleration in urban poverty between 2011/12 and
2012/13 together with a steady decline in rural poverty reduced the contribu-
tion of rural poverty to overall poverty from about 94 per cent to 88 per cent in
2012/13. The evolution of official figures is in line with our findings, except
that we find a much stronger rebound of urban poverty.
Finally, we disaggregate poverty by region. We find that in the northern
region, which is the poorest, poverty has decreased by 15 per cent over the
Table 7.2. Poverty headcounts, 2002–12, using six spatial domains
2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
P0 contr P0 contr P0 contr P0 contr P0 contr
Uganda 0.423 1.000 0.381 1.000 0.370 1.000 0.359 1.000 0.315 1.000
Rural 0.476 0.938 0.431 0.951 0.413 0.959 0.408 0.943 0.360 0.879
Urban 0.158 0.062 0.117 0.049 0.108 0.041 0.121 0.057 0.167 0.121
Central 0.291 0.213 0.231 0.187 0.143 0.098 0.146 0.089 0.149 0.123
Eastern 0.374 0.219 0.295 0.188 0.389 0.282 0.379 0.337 0.355 0.328
Northern 0.670 0.273 0.603 0.285 0.489 0.306 0.529 0.308 0.567 0.374
Western 0.463 0.295 0.485 0.340 0.473 0.314 0.379 0.266 0.231 0.175
Note: ‘P0’ means headcount poverty; ‘contr’ means contribution to national poverty.
Source: Calculated from the respective UNHS and UNPS waves
6 Technically, this can be explained by the fact that poverty lines are based on the consumption
patterns of the poorest households (e.g. the poorest 50 per cent). If poverty lines are constructed at
higher aggregate levels, such as the national level, all the poor are lumped together and the poverty
line is calculated on the basis of the poorest of the poor in society at large, leading to a single low
poverty line. If some degree of spatial disaggregation is allowed for, these poor are likely to be
distributed over spatial domains, generally leading to higher poverty lines.
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entire period. However, the evolution was far from linear. Especially between
2009/10 and 2010/11, there was a strong reduction in poverty. But since then,
poverty in the northern region has been rising again. Official poverty figures
report a reduction of 28 per cent between 2005/6 and 2012/13 in headcount
poverty. The western region is, just as in the official estimates, the second-
richest region. However, it is now 55 per cent poorer than the richest region.
This gap between the western and central regions is significantly larger than in
the official statistics, where poverty rates in the western region are 33 per cent
higher than in the eastern region. Thus, while we do not observe the reversal
in the rankings observed by Appleton (2003), our results are consistent with
the finding that the west is poorer than official figures suggest.
The central region, already the least poor region at the start of the panel,
reduced headcount poverty by half between 2005/6 and 2012/13 according to
our estimates using six spatial domains. Again, official estimates record higher
poverty reductions (almost 70 per cent). Inequality in poverty headcount
has also increased over time. While the northern region initially contributed
27 per cent to overall poverty, this has increased to 37 per cent in 2012/13.
The contribution of the eastern region also has increased substantially. If we
disaggregate the 2012/13 data further, we find that most poverty is found in
the northeast, where over 80 per cent of the individuals live in poverty. This is
followed by West Nile, a distant second with 60 per cent of the population
living in poverty.
To summarize, we feel that these poverty estimates are more credible, both
from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. The continued use of
outdated poverty lines based on a single food basket is likely to lead to
inconsistent poverty estimates, especially in a country where different regions
have widely varying diets. Indeed, most of the staples in these diets are
effectively non-tradables, deriving their price from local demand and supply
conditions. The result is that the cost of basic needs, even though anchored in
a single caloric requirement, may vary significantly.
7.5 A Profile Based on Poverty Dynamics
Now that we have developed a new set of poverty lines, in this section we will
use the Uganda National Panel to construct profiles for different categories of
households based on the evolution of their poverty status over time. We will
start by defining five different categories. The first category consists of house-
holds that are identified as being poor in all four waves of the UNPS. We will
refer to these households as the chronic poor. Second, we will identify the
households that were never poor in any of the waves. These households will
be grouped in the non-poor group. Next, we delineate a group of households
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that are escaping poverty. These are households that are poor in all past waves
but non-poor in all subsequent waves.7 A fourth group will then consist of
those households that are falling into poverty.8 These are households that are
non-poor in all past waves but poor in all subsequent waves. Finally, there is a
category for the rest. These households, repeatedly moving in and out of
poverty, are labelled as vulnerable in our analysis.
Looking at poverty transitions using the above typology, we find that only
about 257 of the 2,195 households that appear in all four waves are poor in
each wave. This amounts to only 11.7 per cent of the households being
chronic poor. However, if we weigh these households by population weights,
the number of chronic poor individuals increases to 12.3 per cent. This
suggests that the chronic poor tend to live in larger households. At the other
extreme, we find that 833 households, or 37.9 per cent of the households, are
never poor, corresponding to about 35.8 per cent when using weights. Next,
387 households have escaped poverty and 198 have fallen into poverty,
corresponding to 19.0 and 8.2 per cent of the population, respectively. Finally,
there is a sizable class of about 520 vulnerable households, or almost a quarter
of the population, that moves into or out of poverty, possibly multiple times,
over the four waves.
We will now relate these four categories of households to various household
characteristics to come up with a profile, similar to poverty profiles in a static
analysis of poverty. Since we are interested in the likely causes of poverty
transitions, we will look at characteristics of the household at the first wave of
the panel in 2005/6. In other words, the profile may help us understand
whether households have fared differently in terms of poverty status because
of a different past. As such, we will also concentrate on characteristics that
change only slowly over time, as opposed to those that may change signifi-
cantly from year to year, such as crops cultivated. In a way, we will try to
identify the preconditions at the household level associated with different
poverty transition trajectories.
7.5.1 Location
Location and well-being are often found to be correlated. In virtually all cases,
poverty is found to be higher in rural areas than in urban. More in general,
remote areas tend to be poorer for a myriad of reasons. For instance, one
7 This group comprises households that are poor in 2005/6 and non-poor in all subsequent
rounds, those that are poor in 2005/6 and 2009/10 and non-poor in 2010/11 and 2011/12, and
those that are poor in 2005/6, 2009/10, and 2010/11 and non-poor in 2011/12.
8 This group comprises household that are non-poor in 2005/6 and poor in all subsequent
rounds, those that are non-poor in 2005/6 and 2009/10 and poor in 2010/11 and 2011/12, and
those that are non-poor in 2005/6, 2009/10, and 2010/11 and poor in 2011/12.
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prominent economic reason is that in sparsely populated areas with a thin
road network that is often in bad shape, transaction costs are high, affecting
economic activity (Stifel and Minten 2008). Dercon et al. (2012) find that
chronic poverty in Ethiopia is significantly correlated to ‘remoteness’ in
terms of distance to town or poor roads. Bird et al. (2010) note that agro-
ecology; institutional, political, and governance failures; service delivery;
stigma and exclusion; crime and insecurity; and communication, media,
and information and communication technologies are all factors that are
mediated by remoteness and as such likely to contribute to spatial poverty
traps.
We first look at the location of households in the five classes in terms of
being in urban or rural areas. Of all the chronic poor, 97.7 per cent live in rural
areas. Of all the non-poor, this is only 71.9 per cent. For Uganda as a whole,
86.7 per cent report to be living in rural areas. Going one step further, we look
at the three groups by region. This is visualized in the mosaic plot in
Figure 7.1. The figure clearly shows that chronic poverty is concentrated in























Figure 7.1. Regional distribution of households in different poverty dynamics
categories
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
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On the other end, the households that have never experienced poverty are
disproportionately located in the central region—more than 44 per cent of the
people that are always above the poverty threshold live there. If one lives in
the eastern region, one has a relatively higher chance of falling into poverty.
People living in the western region seem to be moving in and out of poverty
more than people living in other regions. While the northern region has a
large group of chronic poor, the good news is that the relative share of people
escaping poverty is larger than the share that falls into poverty. This is differ-
ent in the eastern region, where the large share of individuals sliding into
poverty happens simultaneously with relatively few people escaping poverty.
Finally, it is worth noting that, despite the already high presence of non-poor
in the central region, many poor households have escaped poverty over time
and very few households have slipped back into poverty.
As mentioned, location also affects access to services, such as safe drinking
water. Figure 7.2 provides kernel density plots for time reported to fetch
drinking water, including waiting time. You can see that respondents cluster
their answers around two hours and four hours. We find that, in general, the
0.000
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Figure 7.2. Time to fetch water in 2005/6 and poverty dynamics
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
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non-poor need to spend less time fetching water, except maybe for some
non-poor that spend about two hours. The median for the non-poor is about
fifty minutes, as opposed to about sixty minutes for the chronic poor. The
respective means are sixty-three minutes for the non-poor and seventy-seven
for the poor. This is also illustrated by the fact that the chronic poor have
higher densities at the extreme right of the distribution—for instance, around
four hours or 240 minutes. The vulnerable have a high density around two
hours.
7.5.2 Household Demographics
The size and composition of the household are also variables that often feature
in poverty regressions. It is thought that increased competition for a given
food stock reduces consumption. However, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995)
argue that the negative correlation disappears as one takes economies of
scale in household food consumption into account. In terms of production,
a larger household may mean more and cheaper labour is available, but Van
Campenhout (2014) finds that especially mothers in larger households devote
a significant amount of time to non-productive activities. This last featuremay
be captured better when relating the different types of household in terms of
poverty dynamics to dependency ratios.
Female-headedness is also often found to be a good predictor of poverty.
The underlying reasons should be sought in differences between male-headed
and female-headed households in terms of access to secure land tenure,
labour, credit, technology, and extension services (e.g. Quisumbing and
Pandolfelli 2010). One of the consequences is that female-headed households
employ fewer inputs, such as improved seeds and fertilizer, which has been
shown to reduce productivity (e.g. Udry et al. 1995). We will also look at
marital status as an alternative way to look at gender-based agricultural gaps.
This will enable us to see if, for instance, widowhood is associated with
chronic poverty (van de Walle 2013).
We find that indeed, chronic poor households are more likely to be headed
by a female. In addition, households that were never poor in our panel, as well
as households that are escaping poverty over time, are more likely to be
headed by a male. For the other categories, we do not find big differences
between male- and female-headed households. We also looked at the age of
the household head.We find that average age of the household head is around
40 for households that are chronic poor or have been sliding into poverty.
Households that have never been poor or that have moved out of poverty are
on average about four years older.
Figure 7.3 gives an idea of the distribution household size and child depend-
ency ratios conditional on the poverty dynamics group of the household. In
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the left panel (1), we plot box plots for household size for each of the five
poverty dynamics classes. In the right panel (2) we do the same for child
dependency ratios. For each household we calculate the share of children
under the age of 15 within the total household and use this to plot box plots
by poverty dynamics category. We find that higher child dependency is
associated with chronic poverty, while the non-poor have the lowest median
child dependency ratio. Looking at both of the charts together, the chronic
poor have relatively large households and high dependency ratios. Those that
have never been poor have small households and low dependency ratios.
Households that slide below the poverty threshold and those that are vulner-
able have a surprisingly high dependency ratio given the relatively smaller
households. These may be households where one of the parents has died or
has left the household. Large households with a high dependency ratio also
escape poverty. These may be households that start to benefit from the add-
itional cheap labour provided by children.
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Figure 7.3. Household size and child dependency ratios in 2005/6
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
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For marital status of the household head, respondents could choose from
five mutually exclusive types of marriage: married monogamously, married
polygamously, divorced, widow or widower, and never married. The results
are presented as a table of proportions where the rows sum to 1 (Table 7.3).
This allows us to judge the fraction of the total in each type of marriage
accounted for by each of our poverty transition groups. Thus, although the
chronic poor account for only about 12.3 per cent of the population, they
account for almost 20 per cent of individuals living in households where
the head has never been married. However, at the same time, households
where the head has never married are clearly more likely to be non-poor, as
are households where the head has divorced. We also see that widowed
households are under-represented in the non-poor segment. In addition,
households headed by widows appear to have a hard time keeping consump-
tion smooth, as is evident by the large proportion classified as vulnerable.
Divorced household heads have been more successful in moving out of pov-
erty and are under-represented in the group of chronic poor households.
Polygamously married households have been less successful in escaping pov-
erty. Just like widowed household heads, they seem to have a hard time
keeping consumption smooth between the different years.
7.5.3 Activity
Table 7.4 looks at what households report to be their major source of earnings
at the beginning of the panel. While in general 35.8 per cent of Ugandans fall
into the non-poor category, only 25.7 per cent of the Ugandan subsistence
farmers are in the non-poor subgroup. It seems the group of vulnerable
households is disproportionately represented within the group of subsis-
tence farmers. Subsistence farming is indeed a very risky activity, and subsist-
ence farmers have few assets to insure against adverse shocks such as bad
weather outcomes or disease. Individuals that are living in households that
report to be engaged in commercial farming appear more likely to be non-
poor. Wage employment also seems to be an activity that is prevalent among
Table 7.3. Marital status in UNPS 2005/6 and subsequent poverty dynamics
Non-poor Escape Vulnerable Fall Chronic
Married monogamously 0.367 0.192 0.230 0.086 0.125
Married polygamously 0.348 0.152 0.299 0.081 0.119
Divorced 0.420 0.238 0.169 0.077 0.096
Widowed 0.272 0.246 0.293 0.071 0.118
Never married 0.517 0.125 0.139 0.029 0.190
All 0.358 0.190 0.247 0.082 0.123
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
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the non-poor. But among the wage-employed, there is also an over-
representation in the group of people that have fallen into poverty.
Ugandans engaged in non-agricultural enterprises are also likely to fall into
the non-poor category. The clearest results are for those who mention their
main source of income is property—virtually all are non-poor. People that
depend on transfers are also non-poor. Transfers are likely to correlate with
social capital, and hence the lower probability that such households fall into
the vulnerable group or in the group that falls into poverty. Finally, a signifi-
cant group of people reported to be depending on handouts. As expected,
these are especially the chronic poor or individuals that are vulnerable. It is,
however, also interesting to note that 17.2 per cent of the individuals that
report organizational support as their main source of income are never poor in
the four-wave panel.
7.5.4 Education
In traditional poverty profiles, the education level of the household head is
often significant. Indeed, skills are important for the self-employed, and
schooled labour is likely to be better rewarded. It is less obvious how schooling
affects poverty dynamics in the short run. Lack of education has been linked
to intergenerational poverty (Harper et al. 2003). Education is also among the
initial characteristics associated with chronic poverty in rural communities in
Ethiopia (Dercon et al. 2012).
Table 7.5 looks at the highest education level reported by the household
head. We see that 17.6 per cent of all Ugandan household heads have never
attended school. However, within the group of individuals in households that
have always been poor, the share of households that are headed by someone
without formal education is 37 per cent. On the other hand, the share of
households with heads without schooling in the subgroup of the non-poor is
only 7.8 per cent. In the second row, we see that the majority of household
Table 7.4. Most important source of earnings in UNPS 2005/6 and
subsequent poverty dynamics
Non-poor Escape Vulnerable Fall Chronic
Subsistence farming 0.257 0.211 0.293 0.089 0.150
Commercial farming 0.563 0.160 0.258 0.019 0.000
Wage employment 0.513 0.145 0.152 0.094 0.097
Non-agricultural enterprise 0.535 0.159 0.160 0.060 0.086
Property income 0.865 0.035 0.037 0.064 0.000
Transfers 0.555 0.207 0.168 0.048 0.021
Organizational support 0.172 0.132 0.290 0.057 0.349
All 0.358 0.190 0.247 0.082 0.123
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
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heads have finished primary education. Primary education also seems insuffi-
cient to keep the household permanently out of poverty. Everything above
primary education leads to a higher-than-average chance to be in the non-
poor class.
7.5.5 Health
Illness and health shocks have been reported to affect poverty dynamics. For
instance, Barrett et al. (2006) note that serious human health shocks causing
permanent injury or illness or death were among the most frequently cited
reasons for households falling into poverty in quantitative data from Mada-
gascar and Kenya. But the bidirectional nature of the poverty relationship
between poverty and health may trap households in persistent poverty, as ill
health can be a catalyst for poverty spirals and in turn poverty can create and
perpetuate poor health status (Grant 2005).
Health status is likely to be a function of the distance to the nearest health
facility. Figure 7.4 reports on distance to the nearest health facility. By health
facility we mean either a private clinic, a government or non-governmental
health unit, or hospital. There seems to be some pattern in the data. House-
holds that are never poor in any of the waves of the panel dataset reported
lowest median distance to health facilities. At the other extreme, we find that
households that live in chronic poverty reported highest median distance to
health facilities. Distance to health facilities likely reflects location, as we have
seen that the chronic poor tend to live in more remote areas.
Figure 7.5 looks at average days that household heads reported being
inactive due to illness in the last six months in the 2005/6 UNPS wave
conditional on subsequent poverty transitions. For most of the categories,
the number of days lost is on average about 8.5 days. We see that people
that have lost relatively few days due to illness are more likely to be in the
subgroup that subsequently escapes poverty. On the other hand, the house-
holds that report the highest number of days lost by the household head due
Table 7.5. Education of household head in UNPS 2005/6 and subsequent poverty
dynamics
Non-poor Escape Vulnerable Fall Chronic All
No schooling 0.078 0.190 0.227 0.142 0.366 0.176
Primary 0.425 0.648 0.627 0.642 0.583 0.554
Post-primary training/certificate 0.085 0.026 0.024 0.032 0.010 0.045
Secondary 0.297 0.119 0.114 0.175 0.041 0.177
Post-secondary training/certificate 0.086 0.016 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.036
Above 0.029 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.011
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
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Figure 7.4. Distance (in kilometres) to health infrastructure in 2005/6








Figure 7.5. Average number of days per year inactive due to illness reported in 2005/6
Note: Includes household heads that did not report illness with days inactive set to zero.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
Rapid Growth and Rapid Poverty Reduction
154
to illness are those that are in the subgroup of households that eventually fall
into poverty or are living in chronic poverty.
7.5.6 Shocks and Coping
The poor are known to be more vulnerable to shocks, due to their lower ability
to insure (Dercon 2004). Shocks can have lasting effects if they destroy pro-
ductive assets, such as when droughts reduce livestock or health shocks des-
troy human capital. If households are left with too few productive assets to
replenish the gap left by shocks, they are likely to fall into an asset-based
poverty trap (Carter and Barrett 2006). We also look at how the households
deal with shocks ex post, conditional on their wealth dynamics category.
Table 7.6 looks at shocks reported at the onset of the panel. More particu-
larly, respondents were asked if they experienced any of a series of shocks in
the previous five years. We again report column percentages. Hence, while 35
per cent of all shocks are drought-related, this increases to almost 40 per cent
in the group of the chronic poor. Still, drought also features prominently in
the group that subsequently escapes poverty. A substantial share of the non-
poor report to have been exposed to drought shocks, but this share is only
about five percentage points lower than the overall share that reports drought-
related shocks. Floods, hailstorms, and also pest reports do not seem to differ
too much between the different groups.
Bad seed quality is reported more among the non-poor than average,
although care needs to be taken as relatively few farmers report bad seed
quality as a shock. This may be because especially farmers that are always
above the poverty line are more commercially oriented and buy seed, instead
of recycling seeds. As such, they are also more prone to counterfeit seeds. But
Table 7.6. Shocks experience in the previous five years as reported in UNPS 2005/6 and
subsequent poverty dynamics
Non-poor Escape Vulnerable Fall Chronic All
Drought 0.302 0.383 0.369 0.350 0.388 0.350
Floods/hailstorm 0.125 0.135 0.136 0.114 0.129 0.129
Pest attacks 0.098 0.086 0.084 0.098 0.082 0.090
Bad seed quality 0.035 0.011 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.024
Livestock epidemic 0.065 0.067 0.042 0.047 0.061 0.057
Fire accident 0.018 0.021 0.036 0.024 0.038 0.027
Civil strife 0.037 0.059 0.074 0.051 0.123 0.064
Robbery/theft 0.102 0.055 0.075 0.098 0.063 0.081
Death of HH head 0.022 0.041 0.023 0.028 0.023 0.026
Death of other family member 0.139 0.097 0.107 0.123 0.038 0.108
Injury from accidents 0.033 0.011 0.010 0.024 0.010 0.019
Other 0.024 0.032 0.020 0.021 0.025 0.024
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS
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probably the most significant result in this table is the disproportionate
number of people within chronically poor households that report being
affected by civil strife. Poverty that is associated with civil war seems to be
very persistent (Goodhand 2003). The non-poor clearly faced different shocks.
They report more than average losses related to robbery and theft. This cat-
egory also shows up relatively more in the category of households that slide
into poverty. The death of a family member is also disproportionately men-
tioned among those that fall into poverty over the period covered by the
panel.
Finally, the dot chart in Figure 7.6 shows how the different categories of
households reportedly dealt with shocks. The top of the chart shows that the
use savings
help provided by relatives and friends
reduce consumption
work as self-employed
change crop choices to avoid bad weather or pest attack
sell assets
other
help provided from local government
more wage employment






send children to live elsewhere
withdraw children from school and send them for wage employment
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Figure 7.6. Coping with adverse shocks reported in 2005/6
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNPS. Points are proportions of households reporting item
as main way to cope with shocks
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non-poor most often used savings to cope with shocks. This is also reported as
a main source of ex post insurance for a substantial part that have slid into
poverty over the course of the panel. The chronic poor deal in a completely
different way with shocks. For instance, they cannot rely on savings to deal
with shocks. Instead, the poor seem to rely on employment and migration,
but most of all simply have no choice but to reduce consumption. The graph
also shows the importance of social capital to deal with shocks for vulnerable
households. There is also some indication that informal borrowing during the
first round of our panel is associated with an increase in the chance that
households descend into poverty.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we reassess the evolution of poverty over the past ten years in
Uganda. Official figures suggest substantial poverty reduction, but independ-
ent researchers note that the benefits of economic growth have been shared
unequally. In addition, casual observation does not correspond to the rosy
picture that official figures suggest. Other indicators that define well-being in
a broader way, such as adult literacy and maternal health, also put Uganda at
a much lower level than what would correspond to officially disseminated
well-being.
One possible explanation for this divergence lies in the poverty line. The
poverty line that is currently in use to estimate official poverty in Uganda was
constructed more than a decade ago, using data from a 1993/4 survey. In
addition, this poverty line relies on a single food consumption basket for
Uganda, despite the fact that Uganda consists of a diverse set of regions,
each with their own diets. These diets are also exceptional in their difference
in cost to obtain a certain level of kilocalories. Lumping all regions together
and assuming they require the same amounts of each commodity disregards
the cultural and agro-climatic diversity that typifies Uganda. We therefore
follow Arndt and Simler (2010), and construct poverty lines that better reflect
local diets, which results in poverty estimates and patterns that are more
realistic than the official ones. For instance, they are much more in line with
the levels and evolution of other non-monetary poverty indicators. A case in
point is the nutritional status of children in the west, a region highly
dependent on the cost-inefficient non-tradable food crop matooke. According
to the Uganda Demographic Household Survey 2011, height-for-age scores are
worst in the western region, except for the Karamoja district. Ssewanyana and
Kasirye (2010) also find that the highest rates of stunting are in the south-
western sub-region. This at least indicates that the situation in terms of
poverty is less rosy than official figures suggest.
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We then use panel data to look at changes in poverty over time. While our
analysis shows the situation has improved over time in the northern region, a
disturbingly large proportion of the chronic poor remain. In addition, a
substantial proportion of vulnerable households resides in the northern
region. In the western region, relatively few households are escaping poverty
and relatively more households are falling into poverty. This is in contrast to
the central region, where, despite the already high presence of non-poor,
many poor households have escaped poverty over time and very few house-
holds have slipped back into poverty.
We also investigate how poverty dynamics are correlated with household
demographics, We find that chronic poor households are more likely to be
headed by a female. Higher child dependency is also associated with chronic
poverty. Households headed by widows appear to have a hard time keeping
consumption smooth and households where the head has never married are
more likely to be better off. Divorced household heads have been more
successful in moving out of poverty.
If we look at the main source of income at the start of the panel, we find a
significant group of people that reported to be depending on handouts. As
expected, these are especially the chronic poor. It seems the group of vulner-
able households is disproportionately represented within the group of subsist-
ence farmers, underlining the riskiness of rain-fed agriculture. Ugandans
engaged in commercial agriculture or non-agricultural enterprises are likely
to be better off.
We then look at education and health. We find that households that live in
chronic poverty reported highest median distance to health facilities. Another
striking feature is that long periods of illness (in terms of days lost due to
illness) are correlated with sliding into poverty. Finally, we find some inter-
esting results with respect to shocks and how households subsequently deal
with these shocks. While the chronic poor seem to have no other option than
to reduce consumption, the non-poor draw on savings. Social networks also
seem important for vulnerable households.
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Shipping around the Malthusian Trap
Michael Grimm, Claude Wetta, and Aude Nikiema
8.1 Introduction
More and more people seem to think that the time has come for sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) to take off. This optimism is based on high rates of economic
growth indicated by national accounts data (see, for example, Pinkovskiy and
Sala-i-Martin 2014), and by a rather positive development in asset ownership
revealed by household surveys (Young 2012). Burkina Faso, a resource-poor,
landlocked country in West Africa with a very low level of human develop-
ment,1 is no exception in this regard. According to its national accounts, it has
experienced remarkable rates of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) over
the past twenty years. However, according to official poverty estimates and
people’s perceptions, the level of poverty has not changed much over this
period. Indeed, the growth elasticity of poverty—that is, the rate by which
poverty declines for each per cent of GDP per capita growth—is, at0.54, very
low, both in absolute terms and in comparison with countries that have
recently shifted large parts of their population out of poverty.2
We show that in Burkina Faso growth had basically two sources: first, a
massive migration of people from the rural agricultural sector to the urban
informal sector, and second, agricultural production of food crops and cotton,
both fuelled by a massive expansion of cultivable land. Both sources are
1 The country ranks 181st out of 187 countries in the United Nations Human Development
Index ranking; see <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends/>.
2 This elasticity can, for instance, be compared to growth elasticities of poverty reported in
Besley and Cord (2007) for a larger set of countries. The sample average is well beyond 1.
unsustainable. Structural changes that would allow urban workers to move
from low- to high-productivity jobs and increases in land productivity are
virtually absent. Given the stagnation of agricultural productivity, the limits
to further land expansion, and the massive population growth—population
size has doubled since 1985—the country is experiencing a steady rise in food
prices, which erodes the purchasing power of the population and hence
prevents significant reductions in poverty from materializing. Food price
inflation is so substantial that child malnutrition and mortality rates are still
very high and, temporarily, even on the rise. Taming these Malthusian forces
will be a major challenge for Burkina Faso in the decade to come. We believe
the findings from this case study are also relevant to many other parts of SSA.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 briefly
describes the relevant context. Section 8.3 provides a detailed assessment of
growth, inequality, and poverty dynamics since the early 1990s. Section 8.4
investigates the underlying forces with a focus on changes in population size,
migration, and productivity development. Section 8.5 concludes.
8.2 Country Context and Background
In Burkina Faso almost 80 per cent of the population live in rural areas. As a
mainly agricultural and cotton-exporting country, its economic performance
depends heavily on climatic conditions and the world market price for cotton;
even though more recently gold (the most important export product since
2009) and a few other metals have also became important export products. In
urban areas the majority of the workforce operate in the informal sector.
Public revenue is for a large part financed through external aid. In the late
1980s the country started to make reforms in accordance with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The first Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) was signed in 1991.3 Given that Burkina Faso,
due to its participation in the CFA franc zone,4 already showed relatively
modest public expenditure and monetary stability, the most important elem-
ent of the SAP was the liberalization and privatization of the economy.
However, despite the SAP (or because of it), real GDP per capita declined
between 1991–3 by approximately 3.8 per cent per year. Finally, the failure
of the internal adjustment strategy, not only in Burkina Faso but also in
3 The government had already undertaken ‘auto-adjustment programmes’ to stabilize the
economy at the end of the 1960s and in 1983.
4 Franc de la Communauté Financière d’Afrique is the name of the local currency. The currency
union is called the CFA franc zone.
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several other countries of the CFA franc zone and especially in Côte d’Ivoire,
led to a 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc parity in relation to the
French franc in January 1994. After the devaluation, real GDP per capita
growth began to rise and averaged at approximately 6.1 per cent per year
between 1994–8 (see Figure 8.1). This growth was furthermore encouraged
by a favourable development of the world market price for cotton and a
multiplication of the amount of land used for cotton production.
In the following years, Burkina Faso pursued its efforts for structural
reforms, in particular concerning price and trade liberalization. Burkina Faso
established its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in May 2000
(Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2000) and the country reached its
completion point in the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) II Initiative in
April 2002. In the 2000s, GDP per capita growth was rather moderate and
adversely affected by the Ivorian crisis and the resulting, albeit temporary,
return migration of many Burkinabè, adverse rainfall conditions, and a vola-
tile international price for cotton.
Between 2003 and 2010, real GDP per capita grew on average by 2.3 per cent
annually. The entire period was marked by a general rise in the prices of basic
food items, in particular domestically produced cereals and imported rice, and
a high volatility of these prices, with important peaks in 2005 and 2008.
During the 2008 food crisis, prices for the main food crops rose by 40–70 per
cent. Urban dwellers additionally suffered from high prices for cooking energy
and fuel. Wodon et al. (2008) estimate that the price increase for rice, bread,
oil, sugar, and milk alone increased poverty by about 1–2 percentage points.
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Figure 8.1. GDP per capita constant prices (1994 = 100)
Source: INSD (National Accounts various years; see <www.insd.bf>)
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price hikes for the most important food crops of millet, sorghum, and maize.5
In response to the food crisis, the government suspended taxes on a number of
consumer products between March and September 2008, with a view to
protecting the welfare of the most vulnerable groups. Energy prices were also
contained, and some petroleum products subsidized. However, an IMF report
that looked at these interventions more closely concluded that these measures
were not well targeted as 80 per cent of the benefits accrued to the top 60 per
cent in terms of income distribution (Arze del Granado and Adenauer 2011).
Regarding fuel subsidies alone, the authors show that less than 16 per cent of
the benefits reached the poorest 40 per cent of households. Not surprisingly,
these measures were phased out in late 2008. In 2008, but in particular in
spring 2011, people took to the streets of Ouagadougou to protest against the
soaring prices of basic foods. Other spontaneous and largely unexpected
civilian protests and military looting followed. President Blaise Compaoré
intensified the dialogue with representatives of student and military groups.
He replaced the prime minister, defence chief, and security service chiefs and
appointed new governors in all thirteen regions. However, a large part of the
population seems to share the view that their standard of living has not
changed much over the past two decades.6 Hence, in late 2014 when Com-
paoré made an attempt to change the constitution again and extend his
twenty-seven-year rule, violent protests followed and eventually forced him
to resign. A transitional government was formed to guide the country to
elections in 2015.
Official estimates do indeed suggest that poverty has not reduced much
since the implementation of structural reforms. The first survey that measures
poverty in a representative way dates back to the mid-1990s. It has been
repeated since then every four to six years. The fourth survey was undertaken
in 2009. According to the official poverty figures provided by National Insti-
tute of Statistics and Demography (INSD),7 the poverty rate has fluctuated
since 1994 at around 45 per cent: 44.5 per cent in 1994, 45.3 per cent in 1998,
46.4 per cent in 2003, and 43.9 per cent in 2009 (IMF 2012; INSD 1997, 2000a,
2003). These numbers have been challenged by several authors (Grimm and
Günther 2004, 2007a; World Bank 2004). Grimm and Günther (2004, 2007a)
show that if one accounts for differences in the survey design over time,
ensures a computation of a time-coherent expenditure aggregate, and allows
the poverty line to reflect changes in prices acceding to the consumption
5 The second-order effects of such price hikes on children’s school enrolment have been
analysed by Grimm (2011).
6 In the QUIBB surveys for instance, 86 per cent of all respondents in 2005 and 71 per cent in
2007, respectively, reported that they thought that the economic situation in their community had
not changed or had even worsened over the previous twelve months.
7 Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie.
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habits of poor people, then poverty actually increased between 1994 and
1998, in particular as a result of a severe drought in 1997, and declined
between 1998 and 2003 with a national poverty rate in 2003 even somewhat
lower than it had been in 1994. The 2009 poverty rate was published first in
2010, but then withdrawn as there was a fear that it would lead to social
unrest. It was only in 2012 that the (same) figure was issued again—in a report
published by the IMF (2012).
8.3 Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Dynamics
For Burkina Faso, representative cross-sectional household living standard
measurement surveys (so-called Enquêtes Prioritaires) are publicly available for
the years 1994, 1998, and 2003. These surveys were undertaken by the INSD
with financial support by the World Bank, among others. The sample size in
each is around 8,500 households. A fourth round of data was collected in
2009, but these data are not yet publicly available. Hence, we first analyse the
period 1994–2003 for which we have detailed data, and then the period
2003–9 for which the information is more scattered.
8.3.1 Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Dynamics over the Period
1994 to 2003
Given Burkina Faso’s macroeconomic performance, one would have expected
poverty to also have substantially declined. Indeed, as shown in Table 8.1,
over the entire period the growth rate of household expenditure per capita
(here deflated by the general consumer price index (CPI)) had a similar order
of magnitude than the growth rate of real GDP per capita.8 If the Gini
coefficient is computed for this expenditure aggregate, one finds an almost
constant coefficient; 0.47 in 1994 and 0.45 in 1998 and 2003. This in turn
implies that expenditures by the poor must have more or less followed the
average growth rate. However, as shown in Grimm and Günther (2007a), this
is not necessarily the case, if, for instance, the relevant price index of the poor
evolved differently than the general CPI and the deflator of GDP.
As can be seen in Table 8.1, the nominal poverty line9 increased between
1994 and 1998 much more than the CPI, suggesting that the poor lost in
8 There are, of course, differences in levels between GDP per capita and household expenditure
per capita (used as a proxy for income) due to conceptual differences between national accounts
(NA) and household surveys and there is also measurement error on both levels.
9 We deviate from the official poverty line used by INSD, since the official poverty line only
accounts for the price increase of the food component (based on the price of the 2,283 per
kilocalories (kcal) per day provided by millet, sorghum, maize, and rice, which are the main
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components of the nutritional intake of the poor) but not for the non-food component. In the
official poverty line, the non-food component is simply calculated as a share of the nominal food
component. Because this component has been altered over time—it slightly decreased from
1994–8 (from approximately 35 per cent to 30 per cent) and strongly increased from 1998–2003
(from approximately 30 per cent to 50 per cent)—the price index implicit in the official poverty
line does not correspond to a true Laspeyres index. Therefore, Grimm and Günther (2004, 2007a)
decided to calculate a new poverty line using constant real weights of food and non-food items over
the period 1994–2003. More precisely, they took the nominal value of the official poverty line for
2003 (to have a common reference point with the official statistics), and the cereal food, other-
food, and non-food budget shares as they were observed in the 2003 household survey in the first
two quintiles of the expenditure distribution. The cereal food component, which accounts for
roughly 37 per cent of per capita household expenditure, was then deflated to 1998 and to 1994
using the observed price changes for the corresponding cereals. The remaining food and non-food
components were deflated using the corresponding CPI components.
Table 8.1. Income, income inequality, and income poverty, 1994–2003
1994 1998 2003 1994–2003
(change
per annum, %)
Income and income inequality
Real GDP per capitaa (in 1,000 CFA
francs, 1994 prices)
120,821 135,434 148,195 2.30
Real household expenditure per
capita, survey-based (CPI deflated,
1994 prices)b
78,772 85,540 99,153 2.59
Inequality (Gini coefficient) 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.01
Poverty line (nominal)c (1994 = 100) 53,219 82,885 82,672
100 155.74 155.34 5.02
For comparison: CPI (1994 = 100) 100 123.57 133.07 3.23
Real household expenditure per
capita, survey-based (poverty line
deflated, 1994 prices)
78,772 67,871 84,938 0.84
Poverty national
FGT Poverty headcount index (P0)d 0.555 0.618 0.472 1.78
[0.54; 0.57] [0.61; 0.61] [0.46; 0.49]
FGT Poverty gap index (P1)d 0.209 0.229 0.160 2.92
[0.20; 0.22] [0.22; 0.24] [0.15; 0.17]
Poverty urban
FGT Poverty headcount index (P0)d 0.147 0.273 0.203
[0.13; 0.17] [0.26; 0.30] [0.18; 0.22] 3.65
FGT Poverty gap index (P1)d 0.039 0.083 0.057 4.31
[0.03; 0.05] [0.07; 0.09] [0.05; 0.06]
Poverty rural
FGT Poverty headcount index (P0)d 0.634 0.687 0.533 1.91
[0.61; 0.65] [0.67; 0.70] [0.52; 0.55]
FGT Poverty gap index (P1)d 0.241 0.258 0.183
[0.23; 0.25] [0.25; 0.27] [0.18; 0.19] 3.01
Inequality
Gini coefficient, price-adjustede 0.47 0.50 0.47
Notes: a Deflated by GDP deflator (INSD, National Accounts).b In prices of Ouagadougou.c The poverty lines are taken
from Grimm and Günther (2007a).d 95 per cent confidence intervals in brackets.e To adjust for the effect of change in
relative prices, the Gini coefficient is computed over expenditure distributions, where the deflation to 1994 is done using
urban/rural and decile-specific price deflators.
Source: Grimm and Günther (2007a), and own computations based on National Accounts and EP (1994, 1998, 2003)
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purchasing power relative to the representative household underlying the
CPI. Indeed, if deflated using the implicit price index of the poverty line,
household expenditure per capita declined between 1994 and 1998, but
increased between 1998 and 2003, in the end even to a level higher than in
1994. The increase in the poverty line was mainly driven by a drought-
induced rise in the prices of the three main cereals: sorghum, millet, and
maize. This drought reduced cereal production in 1998 by more than 20 per
cent in relation to 1996/7 levels.10 Applying the poverty line shown in
Table 8.1 thus implies the following development of poverty over time: the
national headcount index (P0) increased from 1994–8 from 55.5 per cent to
61.8 per cent and then decreased quite substantively from 1998–2003 to 47.2
per cent—that is, to a level lower than in 1994. It is safe to say that probably
any year would look better than 1998 if the comparison could be done—that
is, if household survey data were available.
In rural areas we find the same dynamic, but at a higher level (63.4 per cent
to 68.7 per cent to 53.3 per cent). In urban areas throughout all three survey
years poverty remained significantly lower than in rural areas: the respective
numbers are 14.7 per cent (1994), 27.3 per cent (1998), and 20.3 per cent
(2003). Hence, urban poverty also increased from 1994–8 and decreased from
1998–2003. However, and in contrast to rural areas, urban poverty in 2003
was still substantially higher than in 1994. The poverty gap—that is, the
average distance to the poverty line (where this distance is set to zero for the
non-poor)—relative to the poverty line broadly follows the movement of
the poverty rate.11
Two main messages emanate from this analysis. First, poverty in Burkina
Faso is highly responsive to food prices and therefore very volatile across time.
Second, over the entire period 1994–2003, poverty declined by about nine
percentage points—that is, one point per year. This decline was even more
pronounced in rural areas. Again, these estimates are different from the official
estimates, because of different assumptions about the poverty line and
because of a different concept used to construct the expenditure aggregate.12
These changes also affect the assessment of inequality. As can be seen at the
bottom of Table 8.1, accounting for differential inflation shows that inequal-
ity did in fact increase between 1994 and 1998 (by three percentage points)
and decline afterwards, but not below the 1994 level. This is quite different
from the assessment that is obtained by simply using nominal expenditures,
since scale invariance does not apply if inflation rates differ across the income
distribution.
10 Based on data of the Enquête Permanente Agricole (1995–2002).
11 Computation as in Foster et al. (1984).
12 For details, the interested reader can refer to Grimm and Günther (2004, 2007a).
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Since the change in relative prices, or in other words the phenomenon of
differential inflation—that is, loss of purchasing power that varies systemat-
ically across the income distribution—is so crucial to understanding Burkina
Faso’s growth, inequality, and poverty nexus, we illustrate this issue further by
decomposing the changes in poverty into a growth and distributional com-
ponent. We use Datt and Ravallion’s (1992) method, but extend it by a third
component as suggested by Günther and Grimm (2007) that will measure the
contribution of differential inflation.
Datt and Ravallion’s decomposition (Datt and Ravallion 1992) can be writ-
ten as follows:
ΔPt ¼ ½Pðμt ;Lt1; zÞ  Pðμt1;Lt1; zÞ þ ½Pðμt1;Lt ; zÞ  Pðμt1;Lt1; zÞ þ R;
ð8:1Þ
where P(μt,Lt,z) is the poverty measured with a mean income of µt, a Lorenz
curve Lt, and a poverty line z which is constant in real terms. The first
component corresponds to the change in poverty explained by the growth
effect. The second component corresponds to the change in poverty
explained by the distribution effect. R is the calculated residual, representing
the interaction effect of changes in the mean income and changes in inequal-
ity.13 To ensure that such a decomposition is consistent, the implicit price
deflator of the poverty line and the one applied to deflate household expend-
itures have to be the same: typically the CPI is used for that purpose. However,
in our case, as we have just shown, the development of the CPI and the
inflation experienced by the poor are very different, hence we use the implicit
price deflator of the poverty line. Moreover, to illustrate the poverty impact of
that ‘differential’ inflation, it is possible, as shown by Günther and Grimm
(2007), to add a ‘relative price shift’ or ‘poverty line’ component to Datt and
Ravallion’s (1992) decomposition and to derive the following ‘triple’ poverty
decomposition:
ΔPt ¼ ½PðμtLt1; zt1Þ  Pðμt1;Lt1; zt1Þ þ ½Pðμt1;Lt ; zt1Þ  Pðμt1;Lt1; zt1Þ
þ½Pðμt1;Lt1; ztÞ  Pðμt1;Lt1; zt1Þ þ R;
ð8:2Þ
where the third component corresponds to the change in poverty explained
by the inflation difference between the poverty line and the national CPI, in a
13 The magnitude of both components and the residual depend on the decomposition path—
that is, it depends on whether the initial or the final year is taken as the reference period. In our
case, the decomposition results are averaged over the two possible decomposition paths—first the
initial year is taken as the reference year for the computation of the components, and then the final
year is taken as the reference year, and in a last step for each component the average over the two
decomposition paths is calculated.
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growth- and distributional-neutral case. The poverty line zt+1 is calculated by
inflating zt with the inflation rate of the consumption basket underlying the
poverty line relative to the inflation rate of the CPI between t and t+1. In this
‘triple’ decomposition, the growth component has to be interpreted a bit
differently than in a ‘dual’ decomposition. It represents the change in poverty
that would have occurred with the observed growth rate given that the poor
had experienced the same increase in cost of living as the CPI. The ‘poverty
line’ component represents the change in poverty that can be explained by
relative price shifts between the goods consumed by the poor and the goods
consumed by the non-poor.
Table 8.2 shows the results of that decomposition. It can be noted that the
impact of the ‘poverty line’ component on changes in poverty can be
significantly negative (as from 1994–8 and 1994–2003) as well as positive
(as from 1998–2003) and might in some cases even outweigh the impact of
the growth as well as the redistribution component. This implies that rela-
tive price changes heavily contributed to the poverty increase that could be
observed between 1994 and 1998. Poverty would have decreased by almost
eighteen percentage points between 1994 and 2003 if the prices of the goods
of the poor had experienced the same inflation rates as the prices of the
goods of the non-poor. However, the high relative price shifts offset the
positive effects of general growth rates and redistribution by over nine
percentage points. Obviously, the ‘true’ relative price shift effect might in
reality have been somewhat lower if households had been able to substitute
the items that became relatively more expensive. Our data do not allow for
the examination of such a substitution in detail as the survey only reports
values and not unit prices and quantities. However, we have good reasons to
believe, as we will explain in more detail in section 8.4.3, that the relevant
substitution effects are very limited. The main reason is that the price
increase concerns not only the main food items of the poor but also the
items with by far the lowest price per kcal, even after accounting for the
price increase of these goods.
Table 8.2. Decomposition of the change in the national headcount
index, ΔP0, Burkina Faso, 1994–2003
Year 1994–98 1998–2003 1994–2003
ΔP0 0.063 0.146 0.083
Growth effect 0.044 0.091 0.131
Redistribution effect 0.023 0.013 0.048
Poverty line effect 0.129 0.045 0.091
Residual 0.001 0.002 0.005
Source: EP 1994, 1998, 2003; Günther and Grimm (2007)
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8.3.2 Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Dynamics over the Period
2003 to 2009
Given that the Enquête Prioritaire 2009 is not yet publicly accessible (and
probably never will be), it is not possible to simply extend the analysis
presented in the previous section up to 2009. We rely instead on the recently
published official poverty estimates based on that same survey and check the
credibility of these estimates against other evidence.
The official poverty line and the estimated poverty headcount index for
2009 are shown in Table 8.3. Recall we had used the official 2003 poverty line
as a reference point to recompute the poverty lines for 1994 and 1998,
therefore the 2003 poverty line in Table 8.3 is identical to the one in
Table 8.1. This poverty line was increased by the INSD by 31 per cent to
reach a nominal value of 108,374 CFA francs per person per year in 2009 or
about 454 $PPP (or 1.24 $PPP per day).14 Based on this poverty line and the
distribution of household per capita consumption expenditure drawn from
the 2009 survey, INSD estimates that the poverty headcount index declined to
43.9 per cent, which corresponds to a reduction of 2.4 percentage points or 0.4
points per year since 2003. If this estimate could be confirmed, it would mean
that the positive trend over the entire period 1994–2003 continued, but that
the pace of poverty reduction slowed down further. As will be seen, there is
indeed a lot of evidence supporting this conclusion. Before we discuss this
further, we will first take a closer look at the implied growth rate in household
consumption per capita and the implied inflation rate experienced by the
poor.
INSD increased the poverty line by 31 per cent over the six years between
2003 and 2009. The general CPI during that period increased by 23 per
cent, the GDP deflator by 18 per cent, and the deflator of private consump-
tion in the national accounts by 28 per cent (see Table 8.3). The prices of
the three main food staples consumed by the poor showed the following
price dynamics: sorghum +29 per cent, millet +15 per cent, and maize +40
per cent. The price of rice, which, because of its high cost per kcal, is not
consumed as much by the poor, increased by 68 per cent. If we extrapolate
the Grimm/Günther poverty line used above to 2009, we get 102,667 CFA
francs which implies an increase relative to 2003 of 24 per cent. This is
slightly less than the INSD estimate. But it is sufficiently close to conclude
that the increase inherent in the method used by INSD is in line with
the facts.
14 2009 Purchasing Power Parity from Penn World Tables 7.0, <http://www.rug.nl/research/
ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-7.0>.
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Based on this poverty line and assuming (for the moment) that the distri-
bution of relative incomes did not change between 2003 and 2009, we can
compute the implicit mean growth rate of household consumption expend-
itures per capita. It is simply the growth rate with which we have to multiply
all household consumption expenditures in the 2003 distribution to get a
poverty headcount index of 43.9 per cent given the new poverty line. This
procedure yields a rate of 6 per cent (Table 8.3). Depending on the true
distributional change, the true mean growth rate might be a bit higher or
lower than 6 per cent. Six per cent is about half of the growth rate in GDP per
capita, but significantly more than the per capita adjusted growth rate in real
private consumption in the national accounts. In section 8.4, we further
investigate the discrepancy between growth in GDP and growth in household
expenditure per capita.
To further check the robustness of the official poverty estimate, we recom-
puted the poverty headcount, applying the growth rate of real household
expenditure per capita implied by the INSD estimates to the 2003 distribution
for alternative poverty lines—again assuming the absence of any distribu-
tional shift between 2003 and 2009. The results are shown in Table 8.3. If we
Table 8.3. Income, income inequality, and income poverty, 2003–9
2003 2009
INSD official estimates
Poverty line (nominal) 82,672 108,374
Poverty headcount index (P0) 0.463 0.439
INSD (National Accounts)
Inflation rate CPI 0.23
Inflation rate GDP deflator 0.18
Inflation rate private consumption deflator 0.28
Inflation rate CPI sorghum 0.29
Inflation rate CPI millet 0.15
Inflation rate CPI maize 0.40
Inflation rate CPI rice 0.68
Growth rate of real GDP per capita 0.13
Growth rate of real private consumption per capita 0.002
Own computations
Implied inflation rate of INSD poverty line 0.31
Implied real household expend growth rate of the poora 0.06
CPI-inflated poverty line 101,773
P0 using CPI-inflated poverty line and INSD income levela 0.426
Poverty line extrapolating Grimm/Günther 2004 line 102,667
Implied inflation rate 0.24
P0 using Grimm/Günther line and INSD income levela 0.431
Poverty line inflated with inflation of private consumption 105,820
P0 using priv. consumption inflated pov. line and INSD income levela 0.453
Note: a Assuming no distributional change in nominal incomes between 2003 and 2009.
Source: EP (2003), INSD, National Accounts (various years); IMF (2012); own computations
Burkina Faso
173
use a CPI-inflated poverty line, we find a poverty headcount index of 42.6 per
cent; if we use the extrapolated Grimm/Günther line, we find 43.1 per cent;
and if we use the inflation rate implied by the private consumption deflator
(national accounts), we find 45.3 per cent.
We conclude that the official estimate is relatively robust to alternative
poverty lines and it seems safe to state that the relative number of poor people
decreased between 2003 and 2009, but very modestly and at a slower pace
than between 1994 and 2003.
8.4 An Analysis of the Underlying Driving Forces
In what follows we investigate in more detail the driving forces of the growth,
inequality, and poverty trends already discussed. We start by unpacking
aggregate growth into sectoral growth and analyse how it affected households’
disposable income and employment in urban and rural areas. We then focus
on the agricultural sector, which accommodates almost 90 per cent of the
poor, and link the supply and demand side of food. Throughout, special
attention is given to the role of population growth and the urban–rural divide
of that growth.
8.4.1 Sectoral Analysis
In this section we disaggregate growth of real GDP per capita by sector in order
to investigate the sources of aggregate growth. Figure 8.2 shows GDP growth
according to three broad sectors: agriculture (primary sector), industry (sec-
ondary sector), and trade and services (tertiary sector). It can be seen that the
level of total GDP is highest in the tertiary sector, followed by the primary
sector and then the secondary sector. In terms of growth, the figure suggests
that real growth in total GDP was also highest in the tertiary sector; it even
gained pace over the observation period. In the primary and secondary sec-
tors, growth of GDP was a bit less impressive, but still positive and relatively
steady over the entire period.
Yet, regarding the implied leverage on poverty, what matters is obviously
growth of GDP per capita. As has already been shown, given the continuing
high population growth in Burkina Faso, aggregate real growth rates differed
substantially from per capita growth rates. Regarding the sectoral analysis, it
would be a mistake to simply discount the aggregate population growth rate,
since the primary sector is mainly related to the rural population, whereas the
secondary and tertiary sectors are mainly related to the urban population and
population growth rates are very different in rural and urban areas. Although
natural population growth was higher in rural areas compared to urban
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areas,15 total growth in urban areas was in fact much higher than in rural areas
due to the intensive rural–urban migration. This can be seen in Table 8.4,
which shows population estimates for the census years and the implied
growth rates over the periods in between. For instance, over the period
1996–2006, the urban population grew at a rate of more than 7 per cent per
year, whereas the rural population ‘only’ grew at a rate of 2.2 per cent per year.
Some of the urban growth was due to villages that surpassed the threshold of
5,000 inhabitants and hence got the status of a city, but the bulk related to
population growth in already existing cities, including Ouagadougou and
Bobo-Dioulasso, the country’s two major cities.
Hence, Figure 8.3 shows sectoral GDP per capita, where GDP in the primary















































Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
Figure 8.2. Sectoral GDP (constant prices 1999, in million CFA francs)
Source: INSD (www.insd.bf); own computations
15 According to the last Demographic and Health Survey undertaken in 2010, the estimated total
fertility rate—that is, the number of children a woman would have over her fertile years if she was
exposed to the currently observed age-specific fertility rates—was 3.9 in urban areas and 6.7 in rural
areas (INSD 2012a). According to the same data, the crude birth rate—the number of births relative




Table 8.4. Rural and urban population growth
1985 1996 2006 2011 (proj.)
Rural (count) 6,912,367 8,711,441 10,835,295 12,084,150
Mean annual growth rate over period 0.021 0.022 0.022
Urban (count) 1,052,338 1,601,168 3,181,967 4,485,647
Mean annual growth rate over period 0.039 0.071 0.071
of which
Ouagadougou (count) 465,969 750,398 1,475,223 1,475,223
Mean annual growth rate over period 0.044 0.070 0.070
Bobo-Dioulasso (count) 228,668 309,771 489,967 489,967
Mean annual growth rate over period 0.028 0.047 0.047
Other cities (count) 357,701 540,999 1,216,777 1,216,777
Mean annual growth rate over period 0.038 0.084 0.084
Total (count) 7,964,705 10,312,609 14,017,262 16,571,808
Mean annual growth rate over period 0.024 0.031 0.034
















































Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
Figure 8.3. Sectoral GDP per capita (constant prices 1999)
Note: In 1,000 CFA francs
Source: INSD (www.insd.bf); own computations
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tertiary sectors to the urban population.16 The message that we get now is
completely different. The sectoral differences in GDP per capita widened.
Moreover, and more importantly, these figures show that aggregate growth
was, to a large extent, the result of urbanization or the migration of rural
dwellers from low-paid activities to better-paid activities in urban areas.
Whereas GDP per capita in the primary sector was between 50 and 100
thousand CFA francs (in 1999 prices), it was between 200,000 and 250,000
CFA francs in the secondary sector and 350,000 to 400,000 CFA francs in the
tertiary sector. Hence, at least on average, migrants increased their income
quite substantially. However, as Figure 8.3 clearly shows, in terms of growth,
the performance in the secondary and tertiary sector was, as a consequence of
that massive influx, very weak. The secondary sector only saw positive growth
rates in the second half of the 1990s, but thereafter growth was negative in
most years and real GDP per capita in 2011 was lower by about 30 per cent
than in 1999. The negative growth performance in the tertiary sector started
in the mid-1990s and was only interrupted by a short boom in the mid-2000s.
By 2011, GDP per capita was more or less at the same level as it had been in
1994. Thus the only sector that experienced growth in per capita terms over
the entire period was the agricultural sector. In the agricultural sector, real
GDP per capita in 2011 was about 50 per cent higher than in 1994. Cash crops,
in particular cotton, played an important role in that growth, but the bulk is
related to food crops (see also Table 8.6). So, relative to the other two sectors,
the primary sector showed the best performance in per capita terms. In this
sector themassive outflow of people prevented GDP per capita from declining.
However, even there growth was volatile and in the end was also relatively
weak: 50 per cent over 17 years is equivalent to a yearly growth rate of roughly
2.5 per cent. This dynamic also perfectly fits our own poverty estimates for the
period 1994 to 2003 (Table 8.1), which suggest that poverty declined in rural
areas but increased in urban areas.
A look at employment patterns in rural and urban areas confirms that the
massive urbanization was not accompanied by any significant structural
change within the urban economy. Table 8.5 shows the distribution of the
active population over five different socioeconomic groups. The data are
drawn from the same household surveys as above. In addition, for 2005 we
used the so-called QUIBB survey (Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Base du Bien-
être), which is an extremely shortened version of the Enquête Prioritaire. QUIBB
does not collect any information on household expenditure or household
16 Obviously, to the extent that households in urban areas still engage in agriculture, the
procedure applied here exaggerates demographic growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors
and underestimates it in the primary sector. However, the 2003 household survey shows that
only 8.3 per cent of the urban workforce (population aged 15–64 years) had agriculture as their
primary activity, hence the simplification we are making here seems acceptable.
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income, but has information about occupations. This survey is also available
for the year 2007, but the information on occupations is not reliable, hence for
that year we only use the information related to whether a household was
involved in cotton production. The data on occupational patterns from the
2009 survey are not yet available. Table 8.5 shows two striking results. There
was no substantial change in the employment structure with respect to the
allocation of workers between the private formal and informal sectors. Still, in
2005 in urban areas fewer than 10 per cent of the population aged 15–64 years
declared having a job in a private formal firm. There was also no increase in
public sector employment over time. Given that earnings in the informal
sector are significantly lower than in the private formal and public sectors
(Grimm and Günther 2004, 2007b), there is nothing that would suggest
substantial income gains in urban areas over the entire period. In rural areas,
employment in subsistence agriculture declined significantly over the period
1994–2005, while the share of the workforce involved in cotton farming
doubled. As mentioned above, the expansion of cotton farming and the—
over most of the period—favourable development of the international cotton
price was certainly one of the most important drivers of rural poverty reduc-
tion. However, the producer price paid to farmers declined between 2004 and
2008 and even in 2009 it did not reach its 2004 level, thus explaining why the
share of households involved in cotton production declined again after 2005.
This is then also consistent with the slower pace of poverty reduction between
2003 and 2009 compared to the period between 1994 and 2003. In the
following section we further unpack the sources of agricultural growth by
examining the development of land, production, and productivity.
Table 8.5. Employment patterns of population aged 15 to 64 (shares), 1994–2007
1994 1998 2003 2005 2007
Rural
Public sector worker 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005 .
Private (formal) sector worker 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 .
Informal sector (independent/dependent) 0.042 0.025 0.038 0.049 .
Subsistence agriculture 0.727 0.702 0.621 0.599 .
Cotton agriculture 0.114 0.195 0.208 0.252 .
Inactive 0.107 0.070 0.121 0.089 .
Urban
Public sector worker 0.068 0.072 0.076 0.068 .
Private (formal) sector worker 0.074 0.099 0.109 0.085 .
Informal sector (independent/dependent) 0.222 0.208 0.231 0.232 .
Subsistence agriculture 0.172 0.206 0.169 0.160 .
Cotton agriculture 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.010 .
Inactive 0.463 0.411 0.408 0.445 .
Households involved in cotton production 0.103 0.167 0.182 0.188 0.154
Source: EP (1994, 1998, 2003); QUIBB 2004 and 2007 in INSD (2007); own computations
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8.4.2 The Development of Land Use, Production, and Productivity in
Food and Cotton Production
The data used in this section have been drawn from the Enquête Agricole
Permanente (or ‘EAP’), an annual agricultural survey that has been undertaken
by the agriculture ministry since the mid-1990s. In principle, it interviews the
same sample of households every year and collects basic sociodemographic
information and information about agricultural production and income from
farming. However, the survey does not collect information about livestock
and non-farm income (see Wetta et al. 2011). We use these data to answer the
following question: to what extent was agricultural growth, albeit moderate,
in particular in per capita terms, the result of land expansion, a rise in land
productivity, and price movements? We undertake this analysis separately for
food crops and cotton, the main cash crop in Burkina Faso. Table 8.6 shows
that the land used for food crop production increased on average by 2.1 per
cent per year and the land used for cotton production by 7.6 per cent per year
(the growth rate for the period 1995 to 2002 was substantially higher, for both
food crops and cotton). However, comparing both, the absolute area used for
cotton is relatively small compared to that used for food crops. In 1995 only
5 per cent of agricultural land was used for cotton production. Due to the
favourable development of the cotton producer price, this share increased to
10 per cent in 2003. During that period, the producer price could be kept high
due to the favourable international price dynamic and the devaluation of the
CFA franc relative to the French franc in 1994, which temporarily increased
Table 8.6. Cereal and cotton production, 1995–2010
Food crops Cotton
ha ton kg/ha ha ton kg/ha
1995/6 2,694,493 2,296,382 852 145,418 150,451 1,035
1996/7 2,692,899 2,470,971 918 200,768 202,630 1,009
1997/8 2,838,530 2,002,800 706 276,911 343,106 1,239
1998/9 2,969,359 2,642,334 890 334,770 324,557 969
1999/2000 2,940,876 2,686,548 914 211,931 257,121 1,213
2000/1 2,645,351 2,268,474 858 209,113 212,545 1,016
2001/2 3,194,448 3,096,769 969 345,578 395,031 1,143
2002/3 3,296,616 3,110,176 943 412,138 439,247 1,066
2003/4 3,566,360 3,555,542 997 443,739 471,945 1,064
2004/5 3,073,117 2,892,905 941 521,466 535,367 1,027
2005/6 3,227,040 3,641,728 1,129 621,748 712,707 1,146
2006/7 3,043,932 3,671,174 1,206 569,858 759,858 1,333
2007/8 3,302,871 3,095,966 937 378,536 377,364 997
2008/9 4,167,474 4,338,972 1,041 535,325 720,675 1,346
2009/10 3,585,683 3,600,539 1,004 406,278 483,865 1,191
Mean annual growth rate 0.021 0.033 0.012 0.076 0.087 0.010
Source: Economic accounts for the agricultural sector, based on the EPA (1995–2010)
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the competitiveness of Burkinabè products on international markets—see, for
example, Kaminski (2011: 115, figure 6.5).
In terms of output, food crop production increased by about 3.3 per cent
annually, cotton production by about 8.7 per cent annually—more or less
one-to-one with the expansion of land—implying that land productivity did
not change much during the observation period. Indeed, over the entire
period, output per hectare increased annually by 1.2 per cent in the food
crop sector and 1.0 per cent in the cotton sector. Hence, the agricultural
growth documented in the previous subsection was to a very large extent
driven by land expansion and an increase in prices, and not by an increase
in land productivity. Agricultural growth was also overproportionally driven
by cotton production, in particular in terms of the value of output.
The data also shows that among food crop farmers the usage rate of
fertilizer was only 20 per cent of all households, at least in 1994 and 1998,
and therefore not very widespread (data not presented in Table 8.6). It is
only in 2003 that the usage rate increased to 57 per cent. Among cotton
farmers the usage rate was much higher, 80–90 per cent. This is due to the
fact that cotton farmers had access to credits and fertilizer through a cotton
marketing board.17 They typically also used their fertilizer for their food
crops. Less than 5 per cent of all food crop farmers made use of credits.
The absence of any systematic and large-scale support through seeds (at least
till 2000), fertilizer, and other extension services can explain why there was
more or less no increase in productivity in the food crop sector. The agri-
cultural sector still operates in a very traditional fashion. Although some
promising technologies exist, adoption and diffusion rates are low (see also
Kaminski 2011).
Due to the lack of space we do not discuss here in detail the development
of livestock production and forestry. Livestock production is relatively
important in terms of its share of GDP in the primary sector (about 30 per
cent), but is regionally more concentrated (mainly in the Sahelian north).
According to national accounts, this subsector grew more or less one-to-one
with the primary sector as a whole. The forestry sector in turn increased its
share in total primary output and is today responsible for almost 25 per cent
of total agricultural GDP. However, the forestry sector is dominated by a
few larger companies and is therefore less important in terms of poverty
reduction.
17 The institutional set-up of the cotton sector, and in particular the organization of the
marketing board, was subject to substantial reform in the 2000s. In particular the state-owned
marketing board SOFITEX was split into several parts and partly privatized. For details, see
Kaminski et al. (2010).
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8.4.3 Food Price Dynamics
As has been shown in section 8.4.2, in the period under consideration, prod-
uctivity growth in the food crop sector was very low, land expansion hit its
limits, and population growth was intense. Moreover, these dynamics have to
be seen in a context of a rather weakly integrated cereal market, both nation-
ally and regionally, and in a context of internationally rising food prices.
Hence, it is not surprising that the relative price of cereals—by far the most
important single consumption item for the Burkinabè population—increased
steadily; this is shown in Figure 8.4. Although the development was very
volatile, given the boosts and busts in agriculture induced by variations in
rainfall, the trend was clearly that prices were increasing. This steady inflation
of food had a sizeable impact on the purchasing power of the population, in
particular poor households who spent a very high share of their income on
food. Table 8.7 shows that in 1994 in rural areas in the lowest quintile of the
expenditure per capita distribution, almost a third of the budget was spent on
millet, sorghum, and maize. In line with the relative price movement of these
items, this share increased over time. It was particularly high in 1998, just after
the massive drought, when cereals were particularly expensive. Table 8.7
further shows that in the richest quintile, again in rural areas, the share of
income spent on these items was still at 20 per cent in 2003 and also signifi-










CPI Millet Sorghum Maize Rice Polynomic trend (millet)
Figure 8.4. Inflation of food crops compared to the CPI in the long run
Source: INSD (www.insd.bf); own computations
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only 10 per cent (Table 8.8). The total food component of the CPI stands at 34
per cent. However, on average, rural households spend 50–60 per cent of their
budget on food.
In urban areas the share of cereal and food components in total consump-
tion was obviously lower than in rural areas, but they were still substantial and
also rose over time. In urban areas in the lowest quintile the share spent on
cereals (sorghum, millet, maize) stands at 18 per cent, 35 per cent, and 25 per
cent, in 1994, 1998, and 2003 respectively. In these three years, the total food
component amounted to 45 per cent, 55 per cent, and 53 per cent of total
expenditure respectively. This shows again that the CPI is an inadequate price
Table 8.7. Budget shares and farmers’ market integration
Rural 1994 1998 2003
All Q1 Q5 All Q1 Q5 All Q1 Q5
Food crops 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.43 0.48 0.31 0.30 0.38 0.22
millet/sorghum 0.16 0.24 0.09 0.33 0.40 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.15
maize 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
rice 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Other food items 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.23
Rent and utilities 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Education 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06
Health 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.05
Transfers made 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.05
Other 0.29 0.22 0.35 0.24 0.17 0.32 0.30 0.20 0.39
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Households producing food crops (share) 0.90 0.94 0.90
Households selling food crops (share) 0.16 0.15 0.30
Share of purchased food crops 0.15 0.49 0.33
Urban 1994 1998 2003
All Q1 Q5 All Q1 Q5 All Q1 Q5
Food crops 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.35 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.06
millet/sorghum 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.01
maize 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02
rice 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03
Other food items 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.19
Rent and utilities 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Education 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07
Health 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.15
Transfers made 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.05
Other 0.38 0.27 0.44 0.36 0.22 0.44 0.37 0.27 0.44
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Households producing food crops (share) 0.26 0.25 0.24
Households selling food crops (share) 0.02 0.01 0.04
Share of purchased food crops 0.83 0.91 0.86
Source: EP (1994, 1998, 2003); own computations
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deflator for the poor population, also in urban areas. It is important to note
that the possibilities to substitute were very limited for these households,
since the relative price shift concerns all three cereals: sorghum, millet,
maize. Rice in turn was hardly an alternative for the rural population;
although the price of rice increased less, it remained substantially more
expensive per kcal than the other three cereals.18
From a theoretical point of view, one could argue that the rural population
should benefit from rising cereal prices as this improves their terms of trade.
However, as was shown to be the case in many poor countries during the 2008
world food crisis, the market integration of Burkinabè food crop farmers is
surprisingly low. Table 8.7 shows that although 90 per cent of all rural house-
holds produced cereals, only 15–30 per cent of these households sold cereals
on the market; the others just produced for their own consumption.19 But
more importantly, almost all households had to purchase additional cereals
from the market. The share of purchased cereals relative to the total value of
cereals consumedwas 15 per cent in 1993, 49 per cent in 1998, and 33 per cent
in 2003. This low market integration had to do with a lack of market access
due to bad infrastructure, lack of information, and a lack of adequate storage
facilities (see Gräb and Grimm 2011; Grimm and Günther 2004, 2007b;
Kaminski 2011). Even those farmers who sold some of their cereals were
often obliged to sell them right after the harvest when prices were low and
to purchase later during the lean season when prices were high. The need for
cash after a long, lean season is a further factor that often pushed households
to sell quite early.
Table 8.8. Budget shares of general CPI
Share
Food crops 0.10
Other food items 0.24







18 For instance in 2010, the price of a kilogram of rice was almost 400 CFA francs whereas the
price of millet, sorghum, and maize was between 150 and 200 CFA francs per kilo. This difference
does not make up the difference in kcal per kilo (rice: 3,680; maize: 3,680; sorghum: 2,990; and
millet: 2,650) (see Wetta et al. 2011).
19 It needs to be seen whether the rising trend of households selling cereals that was observed
between 1998 and 2003 is confirmed in 2009 data.
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To conclude, the absolute and relative increase of cereal prices substantially
eroded the purchasing power of the Burkinabè population and in particular of
the poor population. This again fits in with the Malthusian framework. Prod-
uctivity improvements and better market integration could in principle turn
the price dynamic into rising living standards in rural areas, but so far pro-
duction has not been able to keep up with the rising demand. Figure 8.5
provides another illustration of this phenomenon—food imports increase
almost one-to-one with the growth rate of the urban population.
Obviously, food price inflation will not only erode the purchasing power of
the population; it can potentially also have direct health effects as it may
increase malnutrition and mortality, in particular in children. This is what we
investigate next.
8.4.4 Undernutrition and Child Mortality
To investigate the dynamics of malnutrition and child mortality we make
use of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) which are available for










1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Food imports Population total Population rural Population urban
Figure 8.5. Food imports and population growth (1996 = 100)
Note: Food includes all vegetarian products, food oil and fat products, processed food (vegetarian
and animal-based) and all drinks. Unprocessed animal products are not included.
Source: INSD (www.insd.bf)
20 See <www.measuredhs.com>.
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representative and have also been collected by the INSD. The sample size in
each round is about 9,000 households. Regarding children’s malnutrition we
consider wasting and stunting. Wasting refers to a low weight-for-height ratio
and is a sign of short-term undernutrition. Stunting refers to a low height-for-
age ratio and is a sign of a continuous shortage of food; children end up
shorter when they are adults (WHO 2009). We use the standard WHO
(World Health Organization) concept—that is, compute the share of children
for whom weight-for-height and height-for-age respectively is inferior by two
standard deviations of the median in the reference population. We have
computed these indicators throughout all years using the newWHO standard
(WHO 2009).
Table 8.9 shows that between 1993 and 1998 wasting was almost stable in
both rural and urban areas and even increased after 1998, in particular in rural
areas. Only after 2003 did malnutrition decline a bit. In rural areas malnutri-
tion was in 2010 almost identical to the level observed in 1998; in urban areas
it was slightly higher.We findmore or less the same evolution if we use the old
WHO standard (results not shown in the table) instead of the new WHO
standard. Hence, in 2010 14 per cent of all Burkinabè children under five
were wasting. Stunting in urban areas is more or less constant throughout the
entire observation period with 25 per cent of all children under five con-
cerned. In rural areas the share increases between 1994 and 1998, followed
by a modest decline in 2003 and a more significant decline in 2010, reaching
in that year a level five percentage points below the 1993 level. To summarize,
despite the improvements in consumption and poverty over the entire period
1993–2009, there is almost no change in malnutrition rates—between 1993
and 2003 malnutrition even increased.
Infant and child mortality decreased also only modestly over the observa-
tion period 1993–2010. Child mortality even increased between 1994 and
1998. This is thus in line with the trends in child malnutrition.
To summarize, malnutrition and child mortality temporarily increased and
are still at a relatively high level. This suggests a direct link between the
performance in the food crop sector, food prices, and nutrition. Thus, recur-
rent droughts and the rising long-term trend in food prices seem to have direct
health effects through undernutrition and premature mortality.
8.5 Conclusion and Policy Perspectives
Although we find that over the past twenty years poverty has declined a bit
faster than official estimates suggest, the overall reduction has been relatively
modest and, due to the vulnerability of the country, also quite volatile. Over
the entire twenty-year period the country achieved a meagre growth elasticity
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of poverty of less than 0.6 per cent. This is very low by international
standards and means that Burkina Faso may still need a long time to eradicate
poverty. In fact, a doubling of the population since 1985, in conjunction with
rapid urbanization and the absence of any substantial structural change to the
economy, leaves the country today with about 6.5 million people below the
poverty line; this is about 1 million more than in 1994. Agricultural growth
was almost uniquely generated through land expansion andmore labour, and
not much through modernization and the adoption of new technologies,
such as irrigation, machinery, and improved seeds. In urban areas, per capita
growth was hindered by a massive population influx which, however, was not
accompanied by any form of industrialization or significant creation of jobs in
the formal sector. Although those who migrated improved their income
position relative to those who stayed in the countryside, overall there has
been hardly any increase in real earnings within the urban informal economy.
Due to the limited growth in agricultural productivity, in conjunction with
high population growth, food prices increased continuously. We show that
food price inflation not only eroded the purchasing power of the poor, but
seems to have temporarily also increased malnutrition and premature mortal-
ity. To some extent Burkina Faso fits what Galor andWeil (2000) call the post-
Malthusian equilibrium, which is characterized by high demographic and
Table 8.9. Indicators of children’s malnutrition and mortality,
1993–2010
1993 1998 2003 2010
Share of children under five, weight-for-height (wasting) <2StDev
all 0.130 0.140 0.194 0.139
urban 0.094 0.101 0.133 0.122
rural 0.148 0.147 0.207 0.144
Share of children under five, height-for-age (stunting) <2StDev
all 0.366 0.436 0.427 0.343
urban 0.253 0.259 0.257 0.242
rural 0.424 0.471 0.461 0.372
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births
all 108 109 n.a. n.a.
urban 76 67 70 61
rural 113 113 95 81
Under-five mortality per 1,000 live births
all 205 224 n.a. n.a.
urban 148 129 136 104
rural 214 235 202 156
Notes: Stunting and wasting have been computed using the raw data that can be
downloaded from the DHS webpage. The new 2006 standard has been used for all
years, such that the indicators are fully comparable over time. Mortality rates are taken
from the published survey reports.
Source: Own computations based on DHS (1993, 1998, 2003, 2010) and officially
published survey reports (INSD 1994, 2000b, 2004, 2012b)
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low economic growth. In Galor andWeil’s model this equilibrium is unstable.
If educational investments and technology adoption take off, a country can
switch to a modern growth regime. If not, it risks falling back into the
Malthusian low equilibrium. Since Burkina Faso can hardly expand the
amount of its cultivable land further (on the contrary, land is becoming
scarce and much land is becoming infertile due to the extensive use of fertil-
izers in cotton production), and given the decline of the cotton sector (partly
due to a less favourable international environment and also to a degradation
of soils) and the lack of any substantial industrialization, population growth
can fully unfold its adverse effects. Without substantial change, the country
will not be in a position to absorb the 0.3 to 0.5 million men and women that
enter the labour force each year. If change can be made, the country has a
chance to turn the demographic burden into a demographic gift.
More generally, this study hopes to contribute to the general debate on
poverty trends in SSA. We identified (endogenous) food price inflation as a
major driver of poverty. Obviously, its adverse effects on the poor would have
remained largely unnoticed if we had, as in Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin
(2014), used an approach that uniquely focuses on GDP, GDP deflators, and
nominal expenditure distributions. This is also true for all approaches that
focus on asset ownership, as for instance in Young (2012), since these
approaches ignore shifts in relative prices—the fact that in many regions
food becomes more and more expensive relative to durables. This makes it
unlikely that the income elasticity of asset demand stays constant over longer
periods of time.
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Off-track or Temporarily Sidelined?
Channing Arndt, Sam Jones, and Finn Tarp
9.1 Introduction
The past four decades in Mozambique have been tumultuous by almost any
standard. Unlike many African countries that gained independence during
the 1960s, the struggle in Mozambique for political independence from the
colonial Portuguese power lasted until 1974. The decade prior to independ-
ence was marked by increasing violence coexisting with a policy of settlement
on the part of the Portuguese. Independence occurred following the Carna-
tion Revolution in Portugal and the subsequent decision to withdraw support
to the colonies. Once in power in Mozambique, the ruling Frelimo party
initiated a Marxist economic and social regime. Simultaneously, a mass exo-
dus of nearly all of the approximately 200,000 Portuguese settlers removed the
vast bulk of skilled people.Whilemacroeconomic collapse was avoided during
the second half of the 1970s, the limitations of the collectivist economic
strategy became increasingly evident. Before alternative policies could be put
in place, armed struggle broke out with the National Resistance Movement of
Mozambique (Renamo) in the early 1980s, strongly abetted by the racist
regimes in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa.
The war that ensued was brutal and lasted for a decade. During the 1980s,
more than 1 million people were killed and about 5 million displaced.
The stresses of war, including the difficulties in enacting economic reforms
under a wartime footing, led inexorably to economic collapse, in spite of
the signing of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in 1984. In 1986,
Mozambique formally embarked on an Economic Rehabilitation Programme
controlled by the Bretton Woods institutions. However, without peace, few
reforms were actually possible. Coincident with the release of NelsonMandela
from prison in 1990, peace talks began in earnest and culminated with the
signing of a peace agreement in 1992. This was followed by general elections
in 1994, when the Frelimo party took firm control, and by the fairly rapid
implementation of an essentially standard structural adjustment programme.
In the more than two decades that have passed since democratic elections
ushered in a new era in Mozambique, a great deal has been accomplished
with nearly all development indicators registering improvements—often
substantial—relative to themiserable levels posted in themid-1990s. Headline
economic growth has been among the most rapid in the world; enormous
efforts have been made in improving access to education with complete
primary education now in sight; and infant mortality rates have declined
dramatically from about 175 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1975 to about 70
deaths per 1,000 live births in 2011. Moreover, the inherent potential for
Mozambique to continue to register rapid economic and social progress is
large. Recent major natural resource finds expand the possibilities set.
In this chapter, we assess whether Mozambique is on- or off-track.
Section 9.2 focuses on the record from the mid-1990s to about 2009. This
period saw three major efforts to take stock of living conditions and to relate
those to trends in the macro economy. Section 9.3 synthesizes the available
information and notes that a reasonably coherent picture emerges from the
record presented in section 9.2. Unfortunately, perspectives from 2009 to the
present are less clear due in particular to a lack of comprehensive data on how
the fruits of continued rapid economic growth are being distributed. Never-
theless, the final section 9.4 considers recent economic and social trends
drawing from the available information base and provides some perspectives
looking forward.
9.2 The Record from the mid-1990s to 2009
9.2.1 Growth and Monetary Measures of Poverty
As noted in the Introduction, economic growth has been rapid at approxi-
mately 7 per cent per annum since 1994. At this rate, the volume of goods and
services produced domestically at the end of 2014 would be about four times
greater than the (low) levels achieved in 1994. This expansion is spread across
a larger population. The 1997 and 2007 censuses estimated the population at
about 16.9 and 21.8 million respectively, implying a population growth rate
of about 2.5 per cent per annum. In addition, a share of the GDP growth has
been concentrated in highly capital-intensive activities (such as aluminium
production and gas extraction) with substantial foreign ownership and very
light tax burdens. These activities influenced the headline macroeconomic
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statistics during the 1996/2009 years, but had very limited implications for the
living standards of the population. If we accept that about one percentage
point of growth has been related directly to these island sectors, we end up
with a rough estimate of per capita growth in GNP of around 3.5 per cent per
annum. This implies, in turn, a rough doubling of goods and services pro-
duced whose incomes accrue to Mozambican nationals over the twenty-year
period from 1994 to 2014.
With increased production, one would expect increased consumption, and
this is indeed observed. Data on consumption patterns, growth, and distribu-
tion are derived principally from household budget surveys. Three major
surveys have been undertaken: 1996/7, 2002/3, and 2008/9. A fourth survey,
2014/15, is currently in the field (Ministry of Planning and Finance/DNPO
1998, 2004; Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP 2010). These
surveys are employed for a vast array of purposes including rebasing national
accounts and estimation of inequality. However, they are designed principally
for the estimation of absolute poverty rates. Table 9.1 presents the official
headcount results for consumption poverty at the national level and for
rural and urban zones.
The story from 1996/7 to 2002/3 is reasonably straightforward. Economic
growth was accompanied by a substantial reduction in consumption poverty.
About 15 per cent of the population passed from poor to non-poor status.
Gains occurred in both rural and urban zones and the gains in rural zones were
somewhat more pronounced. Consistent with the poverty, growth, and
inequality triangle of Bourguignon (2004), measured inequality remained
roughly constant.
Furthermore, as documented in the second national poverty assessment
(Ministry of Planning and Finance/DNPO 2004), this reasonably well-
distributed GDP and consumption growth occurred in tandem with improve-
ments across a large array of measures, including real agricultural incomes,
estimated production levels, anthropometrics, child mortality rates, and a
Table 9.1. Official consumption poverty headcounts
Difference (% points)
Levels (%) 1996/7 to 2002/3 to
1996/7 2002/3 2008/9 2002/3 2008/9
National 69.4 54.1 54.7 15.3 0.6
Urban 62.0 51.5 49.6 10.5 1.9
Rural 71.3 55.3 56.9 16 1.6
Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance/DNPO (1998, 2004); Ministry of Planning and Development/
DNEAP (2010)
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variety of social indicators. These improvements are all relative to the very low
levels observed in the mid-1990s. Hence, the progress realized reflects some
combination of a development process coming into place and a natural snap-
back from the deeply depressed conditions prevailing in the immediate post-
war period.
The next period, from 2002/3 to 2008/9, presents a different story. Even
though published GDP growth rates continued at roughly similar rates, no
progress was realized in reducing absolute consumption poverty rates. With
increasing population, this implies a growing number of absolutely poor
people. Stagnation occurred in both urban and rural zones though the point
estimate declines in the urban zone and increases in the rural. None of these
changes is statistically significant. Furthermore, inequality, measured in
exactly the same way as in 1996/7 and 2002/3, again remained essentially
constant. Hence, at face value, the growth, poverty, and inequality triangle
presents a conundrum. More is being produced and the measured distribution
of consumption remains constant; yet the poverty rate is not declining.1
Section 9.3 is dedicated principally to analysing this conundrum. Before
considering this, we present non-monetary measures of welfare with a focus
on the 2002/3 to 2008/9 period.
9.2.2 Non-monetary Poverty Measures
9.2.2.1 ASSETS
The quality of a household’s shelter or housing is a widely accepted indicator
of material wealth. Housing often represents the single largest category (by
value) of investments in durable assets made by individuals over the course of
their lifetime. Households will often need to save or access credit facilities in
order to make housing investments, meaning that such investments typically
reflect a temporal dimension of material well-being. Thus, they are a reason-
able proxy for longer-run income (typical/average individual income). Crude
differences in housing quality are also relatively easily observed, making them
less prone to measurement error.
Table 9.2 reports changes over time in four measures of housing quality.
Eachmeasure is represented as a dummy variable, which takes the value of one
if a household’s home has the characteristic indicated and zero otherwise.
Accordingly, the average of such a dummy variable for a population subgroup
gives the share of households in that group with that characteristic. The
results show that, on average, all characteristics of housing improved from
1 Poverty gapmeasures stagnate as well, indicating that themean distance to the poverty line for
those living below it has also remained roughly constant.
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2002/3 to 2008/9. The share of families that have roofs made of a durable
material (concrete, zinc, or fibrous cement) increased by 4.4 percentage
points, and the share using electricity, a generator, or solar energy for lighting
almost doubled from 6.9 per cent to 13.3 per cent of households.
It bears emphasizing that, while the trends in housing are positive, the
levels remain low. Nationally, 65 per cent of the population in 2008/9
reported living in housing with none of the four improvements in focus in
Table 9.2 (down from 71 per cent in 2002/3). It is also useful to look at patterns
of ownership of durable consumer goods. These typically represent lumpy
investments that require a minimum level of income to purchase and sustain
(for example, batteries to play a radio). Again, measures of this kind incorpor-
ate a temporal dimension tomaterial well-being thatmay not be fully reflected
in the consumption poverty measures.
Table 9.3 summarizes trends in ownership for eight different goods, differ-
entiated by urban and rural areas. Figure 9.1 then plots the average number of
these goods owned by each household (ranging from zero to eight), which
represents a simple composite non-monetary poverty indicator. Whichever
way one looks, the trends are unambiguously positive. Perhaps the only
exception is ownership of radios in urban areas; however, this is offset by
the large increase in ownership of TVs and phones (driven by cell phones),
which suggests some substitution between these goods.
Four more specific points can be made. First, as with housing, while the
trends are positive, the levels are low, particularly in rural areas. Rural house-
holds owned, on average, about 1.36 goods in 2008/9. Not surprisingly, the
use value of durable goods represents a small share of total consumption with
a median value of about 1.2 per cent in rural areas and 3.1 per cent in urban
areas in 2008/9. The small number of durables available, particularly to rural
households, and their relatively small value illustrate the limits of consumer
durable ownership as a reliable indicator of welfare as well as the limits of asset
sales as a means to smooth consumption.
Table 9.2. Indicators of housing quality, 2002/3 and 2008/9, percentage of
households
Durable roofing Durable walls Electric lighting Toilet/latrine
IAF02 IOF08 IAF02 IOF08 IAF02 IOF08 IAF02 IOF08
National 25.8 30.2 14.2 17.9 6.9 13.3 11.2 16.0
Urban 57.8 65.6 36.9 43.2 21.7 41.8 32.5 41.6
Rural 12.2 15.6 4.5 7.5 0.6 1.6 2.1 5.5
Note: IAF02 = 2002/3 Budget Survey; IOF08 = 2008/9 Budget Survey
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010) using data from the 2002/3 and 2008/9
budget surveys
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Table 9.3. Ownership of consumer durables, 2002/3 and 2008/9,
percentage of households
Urban Rural National
Bicycle 2002/3 19.4 31.8 28.1
2008/9 24.1 43.8 38.1
change 4.7 12.0 10.0
Car 2002/3 4.3 0.4 1.6
2008/9 5.0 0.6 1.8
change 0.7 0.2 0.3
Motorbike 2002/3 2.3 0.7 1.2
2008/9 5.2 2.9 3.6
change 2.9 2.2 2.4
Radio 2002/3 54.9 41.5 45.5
2008/9 47.7 44.9 45.8
change 7.1 3.5 0.3
TV 2002/3 19.5 0.7 6.3
2008/9 35.9 2.8 12.4
change 16.4 2.1 6.1
Telephone 2002/3 13.1 0.5 4.3
2008/9 53.7 11.4 23.7
change 40.7 10.8 19.4
Bed 2002/3 62.1 22.3 34.2
2008/9 64.1 28.8 39.0
change 2.0 6.5 4.9
Fridge 2002/3 12.2 0.3 3.9
2008/9 18.4 0.6 5.8
change 6.2 0.3 1.9
Average change 8.3 4.7 5.7
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010) using data from the 2002/
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Figure 9.1. Average number of consumer goods (out of a maximum of eight) owned by
households, 2002/3–8/9, by regions and rural/urban
Note: Included goods are those listed in Table 9.3.
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010) using data from the 2002/3 and
2008/9 budget surveys
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Second, as expected, one finds much greater levels of asset ownership in
urban compared to rural areas (excluding bicycles). Third, the change in the
share of households owning consumer durables has been moderately larger in
urban areas for many goods, contributing to a growing rural–urban divide in
asset ownership, at least in absolute terms. The average number of goods
owned by rural households increased from 0.98 to 1.36 (or by 0.38) goods
over the 2002/3 to 2008/9 period; in urban areas the increase was from 1.88 to
2.54 (or by 0.66) goods.2 Finally, we see from Figure 9.1 that the increase in
ownership of consumer durables has been stronger in the south, particularly
in comparison to rural parts of the central region of the country.
9.2.2.2 ACCESS TO EDUCATION
As indicated in the Introduction, Mozambique has achieved significant gains
in increasing citizens’ access to basic public services, especially education.
Trends in this domain can be assessed using the net enrolment rate (NER).
This is defined as the share of all children of official school age3 who are
enrolled in a school whose official age range corresponds to the child’s age.
The NER gives the share of children of a given official school age enrolled at
their ‘expected’ level.
The NER for primary schooling is shown in panel (a) of Figure 9.2, distin-
guished by regions and urban/rural. The NER for secondary schooling is given
in panel (b). The two panels show unambiguous increases for both ratios
across virtually every region. At the national level, in 2008/9 we find that
76.5 per cent of all children aged 6–13 attended primary school, up from 66.8
per cent in 2002/3. Similarly, the secondary school NER more than doubled
(from a relatively low base) to 22.0 per cent from 8.2 per cent. National-level
results mask even larger gains in specific areas. Access to primary schooling
increased most where it was lowest, thereby reducing regional educational
inequality. In the rural north, the primary NER rose to 67.5 per cent compared
to 52.2 per cent in 2002/3. Also, increases in the secondary NER were spec-
tacular in rural areas; previously net enrolment rates were below 1 per cent in
the rural north and centre and below 4 per cent in the south in 2002/3. In
2008/9 they stood at 6.4 per cent and 17.2 per cent, respectively. The conclu-
sion is that expansion of the school network and access to education has been
impressive.
9.2.2.3 ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES AND CLEAN WATER
Here, we consider indicators of public health. Two indicators are employed
here: (a) walking distance to the nearest primary health facility, measured in
2 In terms of rate of growth, the rural rate is slightly faster than the urban rate.
3 Primary school ages are 6–13 years; secondary school ages are 14–18 years.
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time taken; and (b) access to a safe water source, defined as potable water of
some form. Figures 9.3 and 9.4 provide summary results for these two meas-
ures, respectively.
With respect to distance to the nearest primary health facility, the most
important finding is a large improvement in rural areas. In 2008/9 in the rural
north, 69.7 per cent of households could access such a facility within a forty-
five-minute walk compared to only 31.5 per cent in 2002/3. Access in the rural
centre and south also improved, though not quite so quickly. Interestingly,
access in urban areas to primary health facilities appears to have worsened, as
a slightly smaller share of households report they were able to reach a facility
on foot within forty-five minutes. This may be due to a number of factors
such as urbanization, with higher population growth in the periphery of cities
where access to public facilities is lower; and a greater reliance on hospitals
and other medical facilities in urban areas, reducing demand for basic primary
facilities.
Evidence concerning access to safe water is probably the least impressive of
the non-monetary indicators. As Figure 9.4 shows, the only unambiguous
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Figure 9.2. Net enrolment rates, primary and secondary schooling by region, 2002/3
and 2008/9
Notes: NER is defined as the share of all children of official school age (primary: 6–13 years;
secondary: 14–18 years) who are enrolled in a school whose official age range corresponds to the
child’s age; secondary school includes technical schools.
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010) using data from the 2002/3 and
2008/9 budget surveys
Mozambique: Off-track or Temporarily Sidelined?
197
was already relatively good. In 2008/9, less than one-third of all households in
the rural centre and rural north of the country had access to a safe water
source.
9.2.2.4 ANTHROPOMETRIC MEASURES OF WELL-BEING
This subsection examines the well-being of the population from the
point of view of the nutritional status of children under five years old.
The risks and implications of poor nutrition are particularly critical for
young children, as nutritional deficiencies can exert a strong influence on
their subsequent growth and development. Assessing the nutritional status
of children is a first step in fighting against malnutrition and is an import-
ant broad indicator of well-being. In addition to the 2008/9 household
survey, a number of previous studies provide useful information about
the nutritional status of children. These include: (a) the 1996/7 household







































































Figure 9.3. Share of households with less than forty-five minutes’ walk to nearest
primary health facility, 2002/3 and 2008/9
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP using the 2008/9 and 2002/3 budget
surveys
Rapid Growth but Limited Poverty Reduction
198
(b) the 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS03); and (c) the 2008
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS08). In general, these studies indi-
cate that the prevalence of malnutrition in Mozambique decreased slowly
over time; yet remains high in absolute terms. These trends are illustrated in
Figure 9.5.
The jump in malnutrition between the MICS08 and the IOF08 is notable
even though portions of the two surveys were in the field contemporan-
eously. The increase might be indicative of a generally less well-off sample
selected in IOF2008/9, which might help explain the stagnation in con-
sumption poverty rates shown in Table 9.1. To test this, we consider only
households surveyed during the same period of 2008 (the MICS was con-
ducted between September and November 2008 while IOF ran from Septem-
ber 2008 to August 2009). The results are shown in Figure 9.6. It indicates
much smaller differences between the national averages for the three indi-
cators. While the full sample stunting rate for IOF08 is 46.4, the rate for the
comparable sample period is 44.7. If the September to November 2008
malnutrition indicators from IOF08 are lower than the full sample average,
this implies that the December 2008 to August 2009 malnutrition indicators







































































Figure 9.4. Share of households with access to a safe water source, 2002/3 and 2008/9
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP using the 2008/9 and 2002/3 budget
surveys




A principal concern is whether the story that emerges with respect to trends
in consumption poverty can be squared with other macroeconomic variables.
As discussed, the official statistics point to economic growth and a steady
distribution of consumption in combination with no poverty reduction.
The fundamental issues can be considered using two basic macroeconomic
accounting identities.
Cþ I þ Gþ XM ¼ GDP ð9:1Þ
Abs ¼ Cþ I þ G ¼ GDP þM  X ð9:2Þ
The standard GDP identity using an expenditure optic shown in equation
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Figure 9.5. Trends in malnutrition across surveys, percentage of infants, 1996/7–2008/9
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010) using data from the 1996/7 and
2008/9 budget surveys as well as 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (National Institute of
Statistics 2005) and the 2008 Mixed Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) (National Institute of
Statistics 2009)
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broadest-basedmeasure of economic welfare in the economy. Thinking in real
terms, the identity in equation (9.2) states that real use of goods and services
(Abs=absorption) divides itself into three components: consumption (C),
investment (I), and government (G). The sum represents total usage of goods
and services in the economy, which must equal the amounts available. Goods
and services are produced domestically (GDP) and imported (M). Exports (X)
are subtracted from this total.
From equation (9.2), one can identify a series of possible reasons why the
poverty, growth, and inequality triangle of Bourguignon (2004) might not
hold for Mozambique based on published data. They include:
(a) GDP growth is not as rapid as stated in national accounts. There are
actually fewer goods to distribute.
(b) GDP growth is not translating proportionally across the components of
absorption. So, consumption, government, and investment are growing
at different rates. Rapid GDP growth might be translating into even
more rapid growth in investment and government and consequently
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Figure 9.6. Comparison of malnutrition in IOF08 and MICS08 for survey overlap
period, percentage of infants
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010) using data from the 2008/9 budget
survey and the 2008 Mixed Indicators Cluster Survey (National Institute of Statistics 2009)
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(c) The real trade balance shifts such that the volume of imports declines
relative to the volume of exports. A decline in the terms of trade would
have this effect.
(d) The inequality estimates are incorrect. The distribution of consumption
is in fact worsening.
(e) The poverty estimates are incorrect. There should be more poverty
reduction than the estimates suggest.
9.3.2 Consumption Poverty Headcount Estimates
Let us begin with the last of the possible explanations—the consumption
poverty rate estimates should be lower in 2008/9 and/or higher in 2002/3.
A great deal of effort has been expended in examining the relevant consump-
tion data in order to corroborate (or not) the official estimates cited above. As
illustrated by Alfani et al. (2012), it is possible to employ a method for esti-
mating poverty that generates a decline in poverty over the 2002/3 to 2008/9
period. However, the fundamental result of a rapid decline in poverty rates
between 1996/7 and 2002/3 and then a substantial slowdown in the 2002/3 to
2008/9 period remain. In addition, the regional pattern of the slowdown,
particularly measured increases in poverty rates in rural provinces in the
centre of the country, are present in all analyses conducted to date. We now
turn to the remaining four possibilities listed in section 9.3.1 to consider
whether those factors alone can explain the observed stagnation in poverty
rates over the more recent 2002/3 to 2008/9 period.
9.3.3 GDP Growth
Issues with GDP growth calculations begin with agriculture. Before going to
growth, it is necessary to highlight the importance of agricultural production
for the well-being of the majority of Mozambican households. According to
the 2008/9 budget survey, 70 per cent of households are located in rural areas
and virtually all of these (96 per cent) are engaged in agriculture in some way,
with the vast majority of these pointing to agriculture as their principal
livelihood. As shown in Jones and Tarp (2013), agriculture represents the
principal occupation of a plurality of urban households. Additionally, con-
sumption of food accounts for two-thirds or more of total consumption of
poor households. These figures are essentially unchanged compared to 2002/3
and suggest a strong relationship between trends in agriculture and aggregate
trends in poverty reduction.
On this basis, the series of Agricultural Surveys (Trabalhos de Inquérito Agri-
cola, TIAs) provides an important complement to the household budget
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surveys (Ministry of Agriculture/DE 2010). Official estimates from the series of
TIAs have been published by the Ministry of Agriculture. The TIAs are based
on outcomes as reported by large, representative samples of households. As
such, they represent the most consistent and rigorous database of production
by agricultural households over time. Full TIAs were conducted in 1996, 2002,
2005, and 2008. They attempt to estimate total household income for the
production year. Limited TIAs, which focus on agricultural production, were
conducted focusing on the harvests of 2003, 2006, and 2007.
For the period 2002–8, four main findings from the TIAs can be highlighted.
First, the TIAs confirm the continued importance of agriculture for house-
holds’well-being. From 2002 to 2008 the number of small- and medium-sized
farms grew by 19 per cent, consistent with population growth, and the area
under cultivation grew by 34 per cent. Importantly, however, the vast major-
ity of farms are small—the average size is around 1.5 hectares, withmany farms
operating on one hectare or less. Second, all indicators concerning access to
and use of productivity-enhancing inputs, such as pesticides and fertilizers,
are at very low levels and show no unambiguously positive trends. From 2002
to 2008 the share of farming households receiving extension information
declined from 13.5 per cent to 8.3 per cent. Similarly, use of pesticides fell
from 6.8 per cent to 3.8 per cent. The point estimate for the share of farms
using chemical fertilizer rose slightly from 3.8 per cent in 2002 to 4.1 per cent
in 2008. Only about one in thirty-five farm households received credit of any
sort (Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP 2010) with no discern-
ible trend over the period. In short, all productivity indicators were at best
stuck at very low levels over the period with some showing negative trends.
Third, consistent with stagnation in technology trends, agricultural produc-
tion shows only weak growth on aggregate. Per capita production of all the
principal staple crops (for example, maize, sorghum, cassava, rice) was lower
in 2008 than in 2002 (Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP 2010).
Table 9.4 provides aggregated figures for staple food crop production, calcu-
lated using caloric values of the individual crops as weights.4 These caloric
values remain constant over time and can be used to derive a total production
index. When calculated on a per capita basis, the total calorie value of staple
crop production has been at best stagnant and possibly falling. For example,
total calorie availability per person per day was 2,000 calories in 2008 com-
pared to 2,135 in 2002 (based on national agricultural production alone).
These mild declines in per capita staple food production are highly consistent
with the national picture of stagnant rural poverty over the same period.
4 The caloric values are the same as those used in the household survey analysis and are based on
internationally recognized benchmarks.
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An additional point is one of production volatility. The last column of
Table 9.4 reports the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation
of the series of annual values divided by their mean. It indicates the expected
change per year as a percentage of the average value. Total calorie availability
(per person/day) can be expected to vary by 12 per cent from one year to the
next. Production volatility is much larger at the regional level given that
differential regional performances offset each other to some extent, leading
to smoother national trends. Large variability in agricultural production is an
indicator (amongmany) of the high level of vulnerability of rural populations.
Despite these repeated findings from the TIA surveys and despite the mas-
sive weight of the family sector and food in overall agricultural production,
national accounts estimated growth in agricultural value added (agricultural
GDP at factor cost) at 7.9 per cent per annum from 2003 to 2009. Outside
observers can be excused for falling into massive confusion over this statistical
disconnect. Table 9.5 provides some insights into the issues by illustrating
comparisons of maize production statistics between TIAs, which have recently
Table 9.4. Aggregate production trends for food crops
Aggregate measures
(using calories)






100.0 124.2 111.3 140.9 128.6 113.8 13.8 12.1
Productivity (kcal/ha) 2,307 2,643 1,935 2,424 2,189 1,961 15.0 12.2
Calories per person/
day
2,135 2,583 2,103 2,717 2,422 2,000 6.3 12.5
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010)
Table 9.5. Total maize production by data source (thousands of
tonnes)
TIA/AE FAOStat % Difference
2002 1,115 1,115 0.0%
2003 1,181 1,179 0.2%
2004 NA 1,060
2005 942 942 0.1%
2006 1,396 1,418 1.6%
2007 1,134 1,582 39.5%




2012 1,177 1,177 0.0%
2013 1,207 1,631 35.1%
Source: Ministry of Agriculture/DE (2010), National Institute of Statistics (2014, 2013,
and 2012), and Food and Agriculture Organization (2015)
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been the official source for agricultural production data as published in the
Statistical Yearbook and an international data site—in this case, FAOStat.
In a nutshell, up until about 2008, official agricultural statistics relied upon
data obtained from the food security unit located within the agriculture
ministry. This unit was set up in the immediate post-war period and essen-
tially employed rapid appraisal-type techniques to estimate agricultural pro-
duction. These data became the official source of data for agriculture by force
of the fact that there was no alternative. From 1996, these data coexisted with
data from the TIAs for the years when the TIAs went into the field. From about
2002, reasonably regular TIA surveys began to take place. In 2005, production
data from the TIA showed a wide-scale drought. This finding diverged mas-
sively from the estimations of the food security unit, which found a normal
year and continuation of rapid agricultural growth. A careful examination of
these competing data sources in general and the 2005 crop year in particular
by Kiregyera et al. (2008) shone a harsh light on the then official data source.
The food security unit had completely missed a massive drought, and the TIA
was highlighted as a far more reliable data source for production statistics.
Following the publication of the Kiregyera et al. (2008) report, the National
Institute of Statistics switched the official source of agricultural statistics to the
TIA. As shown in Table 9.5, FAOStat applies the TIA data from 2002 to 2006.
Curiously, FAOStat then reverts to another source (presumably the food secur-
ity unit data) in 2007 and 2008. It is then unencumbered by any TIA data in
2009, 2010, and 2011. In 2012, it reverts back to exactly the data published in
the Statistical Yearbook, the source for official data, before diverging from the
official source once again in 2013.
Two observations are pertinent here. First, many of the salient elements in
the FAOStat series derive from movement between data sources. The produc-
tion collapse from 2011 to 2012 is particularly striking. Second, and more
relevant to the point in focus here, national accounts have been almost
impossibly trapped with respect to estimating growth and value added in
agriculture. The survey-based data are, even in positive circumstances, deeply
inconvenient to use as they arrive well after the regular planning cycle for
government. The national accounts department is obliged to provide GDP
estimates for the cycle; hence, they are forced to use the more timely food
security unit estimates. Worse, survey-based estimations of agricultural pro-
duction do not happen every year. The 2012 Statistical Yearbook provides
maize production figures for 2008 (a number slightly greater than the one in
Table 9.5) and for 2012 (exactly the number in Table 9.5). The years in
between are pointedly blank (National Institute of Statistics 2013). So, just at
the time that the official data source for production of major crops switched to
a survey-based instrument, that instrument ceased to produce data for three
years running. Faced with this situation, national accounts have not yet
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moved from the old data series—which looks similar to FAOStat in trends—to
the new official agricultural production series, which is vastly more credible.
Note that, with FAOStat, maize production grows by 50 per cent from 2002 to
2008, or 7 per cent per year. With the more credible survey-based estimates,
production of maize—the most important staple food in the country—is
basically flat, which implies a mild decline on a per capita basis. As agriculture
represents around 20 per cent of GDP, significantly slower growth in agricul-
ture implies slower growth in overall GDP.
9.3.4 Components of Absorption
This brings us to point (b) in our list. A large reduction in the estimated growth
rate of agriculture has strong implications for exactly one component of
absorption, consumption (C). Increases in agricultural production are not
likely to be absorbed by the government or investment accounts. Hence,
reductions in the estimated rate of agricultural growth imply reductions in
consumption (assuming the trade statistics are left alone, which is sensible).
9.3.5 Terms of Trade
Point (c) is also relatively straightforward. Over the period 2002/3 to 2008/9, a
great deal was happening in international commodity markets, as shown in
Figure 9.7. World food prices spiked significantly in real terms, with the peak
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Figure 9.7. International real price indices
Source: International Monetary Fund (2011) and Council of Economic Advisers (2010)
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declined to levels significantly below their peaks of mid-2008, but still well
above levels registered in 2002 and 2003. In addition, fuel prices rose almost
continuously from 2002 to a peak in mid-2008 that was nearly five times the
average level observed in 2002/3. Like food, oil prices declined in the second
half of 2008 and remained at levels well above those observed in 2002/3.
Hence, the observed decline in per capita production of food crops in 2008
essentially coincided with a very strong spike in international food prices.
Increases in fuel prices raised the cost of delivering food to Mozambique (even
after the international food price had been paid), as well as the costs of
distributing imports within the country and distributing whatever surplus
domestic agricultural production might have existed.
All five of the items shown in Figure 9.7 are significant import items for
Mozambique, with fuel particularly prominent in the import basket. As
Mozambique did not enjoy similar price increases for its exports, its terms of
trade declined nearly continuously over the 2002/3 to 2008/9 period. For a
given level of foreign finance, Mozambique was forced to export more in order
to import the same volume of goods (particularly fuels and food).
9.3.6 Inequality
Finally, with respect to point (d), inequality, properly measured, appears to
have increased as well. In most poverty assessments (including those con-
ducted for Mozambique), inequality is calculated on the basis of nominal
consumption or consumption adjusted by a spatial price index in order to
take spatial variation in price levels into account. The spatial adjustment
typically reduces inequality as it is normally less expensive to attain a min-
imum standard of food consumption and housing in rural areas. Hence, the
typically more limited nominal consumption expenditures in rural areas have
more real purchasing power per currency unit compared with urban zones.
While accounting for spatial differences, the measures employed implicitly
assume constant relative prices across the income distribution. When this
constant relative price assumption does not hold, inequality can be affected.
As stated by Muellbauer (1974: 32), if ‘the prices of “luxuries” and “neces-
sities” move differently, then different groups are differently affected’. In
Mozambique, as in other poor countries, lower-income consumers dedicate
about half their overall budget to basic or core food products. Non-foods
account for about one-third of expenditure. The remaining budget share,
about 15 per cent, is allocated to a catch-all food category—non-core
foods—which include processed foods and other more expensive items that
would not be considered as core sources of calories or other nutrients.
At the upper end of the consumption scale, consumption patterns differ.
Upper-income consumers purchase a much lower share of basic foods, a much
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higher share of non-core foods, and a much higher share of non-foods (Arndt
et al. 2014). If the relative prices for goods in these categories shift, there are
potential implications for real consumption inequality.
Figure 9.8 illustrates the trajectory of subcomponents of the consumer price
index (CPI) for Mozambique divided between core foods, non-core foods, and
non-foods over the period 2004 to 2009. The figure shows that, coincident
with the world price spike of 2007 and 2008, the price of foods had risen
substantially relative to the price of non-foods. For Mozambique, the CPI data
are limited to three major urban zones. Arndt et al. (2014) extend the analysis
(to the extent possible) to rural zones and to the full time frame between 2002/3
and 2008/9, using the price data available for the household budget survey
combined with existing CPI data. They find even greater separation than
shown in Figure 9.8. Specifically, prices of core food, non-core foods, and
non-food rise 2.34, 1.92, and 1.51 times, respectively, from 2002/3 to 2008/9.
Arndt et al. (2014) use these three price indices combined with consumption
share information for the three categories of expenditure for each household
in the consumption surveys to construct a household-specific price index. The
resulting household-specific price indices, averaged per percentile of nominal
consumption, are shown in Figure 9.9. The figure shows that the cost of living
increased substantially more for lower-income consumers (who consume
more basic foods) than for upper-income consumers (who consume more
non-food). When this household-specific deflator is used to deflate nominal
consumption in 2008/9, measured inequality increases by about 2.5 Gini
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Figure 9.8. Components of the Mozambique CPI
Source: Authors’ calculations
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or not one deflates nominal consumption to account for spatial differences in
the cost of living.
9.3.7 Formal Assessment of Macroeconomic Factors
Hence, all the factors (a) to (d) listed at the end of section 9.3.1 are present, and
we note that all of them are likely to exert upward pressure on poverty in
Mozambique. Nevertheless, it is not clear which factors are the most import-
ant or whether they combine to result in stagnant poverty rates. To assess this,
Arndt et al. (2012) used a dynamic economy-wide model of the Mozambican
economy linked to a poverty module. They begin with a baseline scenario,
labelled 2003 Baseline, and present a projection of economic growth and
poverty rates in 2008/9, using assumptions that would have reasonably per-
tained had the projection been made in early 2004. Hence, they use standard
assumptions for growth in the labour force (near the population growth rate),
an optimistic projection of agricultural productivity growth, and constant
world prices for imports and exports.
They then present five successive scenarios labelled: Education, Agriculture,
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Figure 9.9. Percentile-specific price indexes by percentiles of nominal per capita
consumption
Note: Percentile-specific price indices were obtained computing the median of household-specific
price indices (HPIs) for each percentile of nominal per capita consumption. The 1st and 100th
percentiles are excluded from the figure. The HPI takes a value of 100 in 2002/3.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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adding a particular set of changes to the earlier one. The changes bring the
projection in line with what actually happened over the period. The Educa-
tion scenario relates to the increased tendency for children to remain in
school. As a result, the labour force as a whole grew at about 0.4 per cent per
annum. This is significantly less than the rate of population growth and the
assumed rate of growth of the labour force in the baseline scenario (both of
which are about 2.5 per cent per annum).5 Agricultural productivity growth
was in fact close to zero (Agriculture scenario). As noted in section 9.3.5, world
prices diverged dramatically. This is divided between two scenarios, Food and
Fuel, corresponding to their respective price increases. The final scenario,
Weather, incorporates shocks to agricultural production related to weather,
and represents the total cumulative effect of all changes from the 2003
Baseline.
We begin with macroeconomic outcomes from this final weather scenario.
Table 9.6 illustrates the growth in the components of GDP from both a
production and an expenditure perspective by sector between 2003 and
2009 as (i) published in national accounts and (ii) projected by the dynamic
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the final cumulative scen-
arioWeather. The table also illustrates the shares of each sector in value added
as well as expenditure shares in 2003. Sectors are divided between the broad
categories of agriculture, industry, and services.
We note that, for industry and services, actual growth in value added is
reasonably close to the growth in value added projected by the CGE model;
however, the projected rate of growth of agriculture is substantially lower than
Table 9.6. Growth in components of GDP 2003/9 for national
accounts and for model
National
2003 Share Accounts Model
GDP 100 7.6 6.5
Production optic
Agriculture 26 7.9 3.4
Industry 23 6.3 7.8
Services 51 8.3 7.4
Expenditure optic
Consumption 89 5.9 4.5
Investment 22 4.5 5.8
Government 13 7.7 8.5
Exports 26 11.0 10.2
Imports 50 4.7 5.2
Source: Arndt et al. (2012). Reproduced under Creative Commons license terms
5 The composition of the labour force does shift towards more skilled labour.
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the rate estimated by national accounts. Consequently, overall GDP growth
differs between the estimations of national accounts (7.6 per cent per annum)
and the projections of the model (6.5 per cent per annum). About 90 per cent
of the difference in the overall GDP growth rate is due to the difference in the
growth rate of agriculture, particularly food crops, which represented more
than two-thirds of agricultural value added in 2003. Even with this correction
to the estimated overall GDP growth rate, per capita GDP is still estimated to
have grown by about 4 per cent per annum (6.5 per cent GDP growth rate
minus about 2.5 per cent annual population growth rate) over the period 2003
to 2009. However, the rate of private consumption growth is lower than GDP
growth in both the model and in national accounts. Real consumption is
growing in the model at about 4.5 per cent per annum in total or about
2 per cent per annum per capita. Hence, returning to our list of factors at the
end of section 9.3.1 thatmight causemeasured poverty to stagnate despite real
GDP growth, we have accounted for the first two factors (a) and (b). Do these
two factors, combined with terms of trade effects (which relate to point (c)),
result in stagnant poverty?
The answer is ‘yes’. Table 9.7 compares poverty rates derived from the 2008/
9 survey with projected poverty rates using the economy-wide model. Before
comparing the rates, it is helpful to note that the CGE model is annual while
the household survey spans 2008 and 2009. To deal with this issue, we assume
that the first semester of the survey corresponds to the model year 2008 while
the second semester of the survey corresponds to the model year 2009. When
comparing the full 2008/9 survey with the model results, we take the simple
average of results for 2008 and 2009.
The model results are strikingly close to the estimates from the survey. At
the national level and for the full survey period, the 2008/9 budget survey
estimates 54.7 per cent of the population consumes below the poverty line.
The corresponding model estimate is 54.3 per cent of the population. The
model results are also very close to IOF estimated rates in rural zones both for
the full survey period and by semester. The only rates that do not lie very close
to one another between themodel projection (based on the 2002/3 survey and
Table 9.7. Actual and projected poverty rates
National Rural Urban
Actual Model Actual Model Actual Model
Aggregate 54.7 54.3 56.6 55.3 49.6 52.3
Semester 1 57.3 57.4 60.1 57.8 50.5 56.5
Semester 2 52.3 51.3 53.8 52.8 48.6 48.0
Source: Arndt et al. (2012). Reproduced under Creative Commons license terms
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the CGE model) and the 2008/9 survey are the first semester in urban zones.
The difference between these two rates is about six percentage points. Overall,
the 2008/9 survey results appear to be strongly consistent with the evolution
of macroeconomic variables.
A significant advantage of economy-wide models is that they allow the
analyst to decompose complex phenomena, such as the evolution of
poverty rates through time, in order to provide insights into the driving
forces behind results. So far, we have considered only results from the final
scenario, Weather, which includes all of the effects discussed in the preceding
subsection. Figure 9.10 shows the evolution of poverty rates through time
for each of the scenarios: 2003 Baseline, Education, Agriculture, Food, Fuel,
and Weather. Recall that the scenarios are cumulative. Hence, the scenario
Agriculture differs from the 2003 Baseline both in terms of rates of productiv-
ity growth in agriculture and the rate of growth of the labour force by skill
class.
A number of useful observations emerge. First, the goal, established in 2004,
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Figure 9.10. Evolution of poverty rates by scenario
Notes: Base is the Baseline 2003. Education applies observed labour force growth rates. Agriculture
applies low productivity growth rates. Food applies world price shifts in food products to exports
and imports. Fuel applies world price shifts in fuels and related products (plastics and fertilizers).
Weather applies shocks to agricultural production related to weather events.
Source: Arndt et al. (2012). Reproduced under Creative Commons license terms
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of this section, the 2003 Baseline scenario provides a projection of poverty
rates based on information available in 2004. In this scenario, the labour force
grows at plausible rates, agricultural productivity growth is relatively rapid,
world prices are held constant, and no weather events occur. Under this
scenario, a poverty rate of 45.7 per cent is attained in 2009.
The principal factors driving the observed stagnation in poverty are: (i) the
combination of low productivity growth in agriculture (particularly food
crops), substantial increases in world food prices, and a weather shock in
2008; and (ii) the nearly continuous increase in fuel prices over the 2003–9
period. In 2008, when fuel prices were at their peak, they contributed themost
to the increases in poverty above the 2003 Baseline scenario. In 2009, with the
decline in fuel prices but relative firmness of food prices, the combination of
low agricultural productivity growth and food price increases contributed the
most to the increase in poverty.
The strength of the fuel price effect merits further mention. This effect is
consistent with earlier analysis (Arndt et al. 2008). Net imports of fuel and
derived products represent a substantial share of total imports—about 18 per
cent in 2003. Because fuel use is difficult to economize on, particularly in the
short run, fuel price increases imply a need either to increase exports or reduce
imports for any given level of foreign exchange availability from external
sources. This terms of trade loss amounts to a reduction in the quantity of
goods available to the economy.
Changes in fuel prices then influence relative prices throughout the econ-
omy. Mozambique is a large dispersed country with relatively low population
density. Driven in part by this geography, the existence of large differences
between farm-gate agricultural prices and consumer prices is well established.
Transport costs, of which fuel is a substantial component, account for a large
share of this difference. Other things being equal, higher fuel prices simultan-
eously lower farm-gate prices and increase consumer prices because they
expand the marketing wedge between producers and consumers (Tarp et al.
2002). The costs of distributing imported products—especially food, which is
bulky and relatively low value—increases. Finally, direct transport costs such
as for buses or minibuses, which are often particularly important for urban
residents, also tend to rise.
The model can also be used to assess inequality. Because the model
contains household groups by income quintile, it will capture (some of ) the
differential impact of the observed shifts in relative prices across the income
distribution. In the model, the Gini coefficient, looking across results for 2008
and 2009, rises to about two points higher than the estimate from 2002/3.
This is in the same range as the 2.5 point increase estimated in Arndt et al.
(2014).
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In summary, a coherent story emerges. At the macroeconomic level, the
stagnation observed in absolute poverty rates is consistent with the best
available data on agricultural production, corrected GDP growth, and world
price shifts.6
9.4 Current Perspectives
Due to the current absence of sufficient data to conduct a detailed assessment
beyond 2009, the best approach is to extrapolate forward on the basis of the
trends observed up to 2008/9 and new factors entering the calculus. On this
basis, both optimists and pessimists have items to point to. On the positive
side, optimists can point to the following:
 While consumption poverty rates did not decline, a number of related
welfare measures registered improvement, including the quality of the
housing stock and ownership of durable goods. While still at very low
levels, some accumulation processes are in place in Mozambique.
 Education investments should begin to pay off. As discussed in section
9.3, the net effect of retaining children in school (reduction in the labour
force where labour force is defined as economically active individuals over
14 years old) outweighed the positive effect of increased levels of human
capital over the 2002/3 to 2008/9 period. Over time, the impacts of
education should tilt decisively towards benefits from a better-educated
population. This assumes that the education sector is actually conferring
skills of value; and available cross-section evidence indicates that, while
returns to education have declined somewhat, particularly for low levels
of education, they are still firmly positive (Ministry of Planning and
Development/DNEAP 2010).
 Other enhancements to human capital are being registered. Child mal-
nutrition remains alarmingly high and is declining at a slow rate; how-
ever, it has been declining over time. People should also benefit from
improved access to health posts and safe water.
 In contrast to the period leading up to 2008/9, there is a growing sense of
at least pockets of rapid growth in small-scale commercial agriculture.
Credible national-level statistics are scarce; however, Smart and Hanlon
6 Space constraints prevent a complete exposition of how changes in poverty observed by region
correlate with other observables; see Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010) for
such detail.
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(2014), for example, document the emergence of a viable poultry sector
value chain with links back to local feedstock producers.
 Importantly, the persistent terms of trade declines experienced over the
2002/3 to 2008/9 period have ceased. Some of these, notably oil prices,
have recently reversed themselves.
 As noted in the Introduction, recent major natural resource finds open
both new possibilities for growth as well as new risks. As with existing
large investments inMozambique, natural resource exploitation, which is
concentrated in coal, natural gas, and hydropower, is expected to be
highly capital-intensive in nature with very substantial foreign owner-
ship. Once in operation, a principal linkage to the domestic economy will
be government revenue. Substantial and reasonably regular revenues
from royalties and income taxes are only likely to kick in ten years or
more into the future. However, during the ongoing investment phase,
linkages to the domestic economy are clearly visible as natural resource
exploitation companies set up operations. This includes extensive invest-
ment in rail and port infrastructure.
On the negative side, pessimists can point to the following:
 The survey-based agricultural production data for major food crops
remains disconcerting, at least through 2013. And, use of improved tech-
nologies by the family sector remains very low.
 Job creation by the enterprise sector has also been disappointing. As a
consequence, job opportunities tend to be strongly concentrated in agri-
culture and services, where productivity is often very low.
 Social fissures remain. In the first half of 2014, the principal opposition
party Renamo, retreated into the bush and actively sought to split the
country in two by closing traffic on the main north/south road through
military means. Fortunately, an agreement was reached and Renamo
participated in the general elections held in November 2014. Neverthe-
less, these events can hardly be taken as a positive sign either from the
perspective of evaluating recent performance or looking forward.
Overall, and despite poor performance on some key welfare metrics during
the 2002–9 period, we conclude that while poverty reduction in Mozambique
was temporarily sidelined in the 2000s, development is not fundamentally
off-track. Rather, a series of shocks, especially the fuel and food price crisis of
2008, combined with poor underlying productivity growth in the family
agricultural sector and a weather shock in 2008 contributed substantially to
undermining progress in these key areas. As most of these shocks have ceased
or gone into reverse, we expect measured progress in consumption poverty
reduction to resume.
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At the same time, these shocks also exposed genuine weaknesses in devel-
opment strategies and programmes as implemented. These weaknesses persist,
and it is evident that the new Mozambican government that took office in
January of 2015 is faced with many complex challenges. Prominent policy
challenges include that poverty remains very high; and future prospects in
smallholder agriculture and the informal sector will be of fundamental
importance to achieving rapid and sustained poverty reduction.
Looking further ahead, the existing pattern of employment creation indi-
cates that the infrastructure and business environment remain weak and
skewed against labour-intensive manufacturing exports and household
firms. Meanwhile, Mozambique has to ‘run’ just to keep up due to the existing
demographic dynamics. Nearly half the population is under 15 years of age.
How they will be absorbed into the labour market in a productive manner will
be critical to the success or failure of the Mozambican socioeconomic trans-
formation process in the years to come. In sum, there is little doubt that
Mozambique has the potential to achieve rapid and broad-based economic
and social progress. With key reforms and success in maintaining peace and
stability, it will.
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Spatial and Temporal Multidimensional
Poverty in Nigeria
Olu Ajakaiye, Afeikhena T. Jerome, Olanrewaju Olaniyan, Kristi Mahrt,
and Olufunke A. Alaba
10.1 Introduction
Nigeria, no doubt, typifies a country that has had rapid economic growth but
worseningpoverty.Theeconomygrewstronglyatanaverageannual rate inexcess
of6percentover the lastdecade,evenduring theglobalfinancial crisis (IMF2013),
ranking Nigeria as one of the fastest growing economies globally. In spite of this
stronggrowthperformance, thepoverty incidencehas remainedhigh, rising from
42.7 per cent in 1992 to 65.6 per cent in 1996,with an all-timehighof 69per cent
in 2010, according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2012).
Furthermore, the benefit of growth has not been equitably shared as the Gini
coefficient, a standardmeasure of income inequality increased from0.42 per cent
in 2004 to 0.45 per cent in 2010. Therefore, the theoretical arguments and
empirical evidence from the literature that associate faster economic growth
with poverty reduction seem to be failing in the Nigerian context. Not surpris-
ingly, major issues in policy debates include how to proffer explanations and
reconcile this paradoxical trend, and the need to investigate the keymechanisms
throughwhich growth canbe translated into sustainable poverty reduction. This,
no doubt, would require adequate measurement of poverty, an issue to which
researchers and policymakers have givenmuch prominence in recent years.
This chapter seeks to contribute to the debate by estimating non-monetary
multidimensional poverty in Nigeria, across time and space within Nigeria’s
six geopolitical zones and the rural and urban sector. Using the first-order
dominance (FOD) method recently developed by Arndt et al. (2012), we are
able to compare these subpopulations using multiple-ordinal, discrete meas-
ures of poverty without imposing weighting schemes or making assumptions
about the preferences for each indicator. The FOD method allows multidi-
mensional welfare comparisons based on the simple criterion that it is better
to be non-deprived than deprived in any indicator. Furthermore, while the
welfare indicators are ordinal in nature, the application of bootstrap sampling
produces probabilities of one population performing better than another,
which enables population ranking across time and space.
This chapter makes a distinct contribution to the literature. This is the first
application of the FOD methodology to non-monetary multidimensional
poverty in Nigeria. Moreover, few studies exist on multidimensional poverty
in Nigeria. It complements earlier studies by Oyekale et al. (2009) which used
the fuzzy set approach to assess the poverty profile of rural households in
Nigeria based on the 2006 CoreWelfare Indicator Survey data and Adetola and
Olufemi (2012), which employed the Alkire and Foster (2007) counting
approach to examine child poverty in rural Nigeria using the 2008 Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS) data.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 reviews
the poverty and poverty situation in Nigeria, drawing on available data from
the DHS, while section 10.3 presents the methodology. The results are pre-
sented in section 10.4, and section 10.5 concludes.
10.2 Situation Analysis of Growth, Poverty, and Inequality
in Nigeria
10.2.1 Economic Growth
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a population of 168.8
million in 2012, distributed as 50.9 per cent urban and 49.1 per cent rural
(World Statistics Pocketbook 2014). The country comprises of thirty-six states
and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The thirty-six states have been clas-
sified into six geopolitical zones based on a number of criteria, including
location, cultures, ethnic composition, and common history.1
The depth and persistence of Nigeria’s economic failure is well recognized.
After a brief spurt of growth in the 1960s, the concurrence of political instabil-
ity, an inert economic structure, and chronic levels of poverty despite huge
hydrocarbon reserves have been a recurrent theme. Economic stagnation,
declining welfare, and social instability have undermined development
1 These zones are: South East = Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Imo, and Abia states; South South = Edo,
Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Cross-River, and Akwa-Ibom states; South West = Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun,
Ondo, and Ekiti states; North Central = Kwara, Kogi, Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue, Niger, and FCT;
North East = Taraba, Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and Gombe states; North West = Sokoto,
Zamfara, Kebbi, Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, and Jigawa states.
Multidimensional Poverty in Nigeria
219
for most of the post-independence period despite generating about US$500
billion as oil revenues in the past three decades (Ajakaiye and Jerome 2011).
Over the last ten years, Nigeria has attempted to turn the corner, implement-
ing an ambitious reform agenda. Sound macroeconomic policies combined
with structural reforms, aimed at increasing the supply responsiveness of the
economy, ushered in sustained high growth averaging 7.6 per cent over the last
decade and one of the highest in Africa (see Figure 10.1).2 The performance of
the economy continues to be underpinned by favourable improvements in the
non-oil sector, with recently rebased real GDP growth of 5.3 per cent, 4.2 per
cent, and 5.5 per cent in 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively.
The profile of the Nigerian economy must consider the differential roles of
the oil and non-oil sectors. The oil sector is the major export earner for the
country as well as the largest revenue-earning sector for government.
Figures 10.1 and 10.2 indicate that growth in the oil sector has been lagging

























Non-oil GDP Real GDP
Figure 10.1. Nigeria’s real GDP growth rate, 2004–12
Source: Underlying data based on Central Bank of Nigeria (2012)
2 The rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP in April 2014, to better reflect the structure of the economy, saw it
surge after South Africa to become Africa’s largest economy with a revised GDP estimate of US$454
billion in 2012 and US$510 billion in 2013 (compared with the US$259 billion and US$270 billion
that were previously reported), confirming Nigeria’s lead as the continent’s largest economy.
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production was a result of large-scale oil theft3 and other operational con-
straints experienced by some of the oil-producing companies. Within the
non-oil sector, agriculture and services, especially the communication sector,
are the main growth drivers. Agriculture has maintained its dominant role in
the Nigerian economy, though it is still essentially rain-fed, while farmers
have suffered tremendous crop failure as a result of climate variability.
While data on the geographic distribution of growth in Nigeria are still
scanty, it does seem that growth has a very high geographic concentration
and varies remarkably at the subnational level as the World Bank (2013)
rightly observes. Lagos state, for example, which accounts for about 35 per
cent of the national GDP, is experiencing exceptionally rapid growth, which
enabled it to reduce its poverty headcount from an estimated 44 per cent of
the population to 23 per cent between 2004 and 2010.
10.2.2 Poverty
Poverty is widespread in Nigeria no matter the method used in computing it,



























Agriculture Manufacturing Oil & Mining Services
Figure 10.2. Nigeria’s real sectoral GDP growth rates, 2004–11
Source: Underlying data based on Central Bank of Nigeria (2012) Statistical Bulletin
3 A recent study by Katsouris and Sayne (2013) estimated that an average of 100,000 barrels per
day was stolen in the first quarter of 2013.
4 The NBS periodically conducts the Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS),
which is used, among other things, to determine poverty and inequality trends in the country.
The HNLSS uses four different approaches in the computation of poverty indicators: relative poverty,
which is defined by reference to the living standards of themajority in a given society and separates
the poor from the non-poor; absolute poverty, which reflects the minimal requirements necessary to
affordminimal standards of food, clothing, health care, and shelter; the basic needs approach, which
measures the proportion of those living on the less than US$1 per day poverty line; and subjective
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energy intake to measure poverty, the 2010 Nigeria Poverty Profile Report
reveals that poverty incidence rose from 27.2 per cent in 1980 to 69.0 per
cent in 2010 (NBS 2012).5 Urban poverty has been consistently lower than
rural poverty; hence while 61.8 per cent of urban residents were considered
poor in 2010, more than 73 per cent of rural dwellers fell into the same
category (Table 10.1).
Poverty also appears to be more prevalent in the northern part of the
country with the highest rates hovering between the North East and North
West zones. The high poverty rate had even become more pronounced by
2010 as virtually all the zones of the country had over 60 per cent poverty
incidence (see Table 10.1).
A recent assessment by the World Bank using the NBS General Household
Surveys (GHS) for 2010/2011 and 2012/2013 estimated the national poverty
rate at 35.2 per cent and 33.1 per cent respectively, which are significantly
lower than earlier NBS estimates using the HNLSS. The new GHS analysis also
estimated rural poverty at 46.3 per cent and 44.9 per cent in 2010/2011 and
2012/2013 respectively compared to 69 per cent in the HNLSS 2009/2010 esti-
mates by the NBS. The new living standards estimates also imply an even
stronger divide between the North and South in Nigeria than do previous figures,
with the North experiencing significantly higher poverty. In addition, a large
number of Nigerians are clustered around the poverty line, implying a high
degree of vulnerability for a large part of the population (World Bank 2014a).
In addition to poverty incidence, income inequality has been consistently
high in the country although with some reduction in 1992 and 2004 (NBS
Table 10.1. Incidence of poverty by sector and zones, 1980–2010, per cent
Levels 1980 1985 1992 1996 2004 2010
National 27.2 46.3 42.7 65.6 54.4 69.0
Urban 17.2 37.8 37.5 58.2 43.2 61.8
Rural 28.3 51.4 46.0 69.3 63.3 73.2
Geopolitical zones
North Central 32.2 50.8 46.0 64.7 67.0 67.5
North East 35.6 54.9 54.0 70.1 72.2 76.3
North West 37.7 52.1 36.5 77.2 71.2 77.7
South East 12.9 30.4 41.0 53.5 26.7 67.0
South South 13.2 45.7 40.8 58.2 35.1 63.8
South West 13.4 38.6 43.1 60.9 43.0 59.1
Source: NBS (2009, 2012)
poverty, which is based on opinions from respondents on whether or not they consider themselves
poor.
5 Concerns have been expressed about the comparability of surveys through time. The figures
presented in Tables 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 should be interpreted with this in mind.
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2012). Using the Gini coefficient, income inequality in the country increased
between 1985 and 2010. Although national income inequality fell between 1985
and 1992, it rose in 1996, declined in 2004, and rose again in 2010 (Table 10.2).
With the exception of 1985 and 1996, inequality has been higher in the rural
areas relative to the urban areas, which is probably accounted for by the structure
of employment and income in the rural areas. The agricultural sector has con-
sistently been neglected until recently due to the dominance of the oil sector in
the economy. Faced with the inability to invest in skills acquisitions like those in
the urban areas, the predominantly rural population has become more vulner-
able to poverty. Considering zones, in 2010 income inequalities were highest in
the North East and lowest in the North West and South West.
Income inequality is further demonstrated in the share of income held by
the top richest and the bottom poorest in the country. As revealed in
Table 10.3, there is a very high disparity between the income of the richest
and poorest deciles of the population. The income share of the richest 10 and
20 per cent increased from 28 and 45 per cent respectively in 1986 to 37 and
52 per cent in 1996, declined to 32 and 49 per cent in 2004, and then jumped
to 38 and 54 per cent in 2010. This clearly defines Nigeria’s paradoxical status
Table 10.2. Inequality trend by area of residence and zones, 1980–2010
Levels 1985 1992 1996 2004 2010
National 0.43 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.45
Urban 0.49 0.38 0.52 0.41 0.43
Rural 0.36 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.44
Geopolitical zones
North Central 0.41 0.39 0.50 0.44 0.42
North East 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.45
North West 0.41 0.43 0.47 0.40 0.41
South East 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.44
South South 0.48 0.39 0.46 0.39 0.43
South West 0.43 0.40 0.47 0.41 0.41
Source: NBS (2009, 2012)
Table 10.3. Income shares distribution, 1986–2010
Year Income share held by the rich Income share held by the poor
10% 20% 10% 20%
1986 28.2 45.0 2.5 6.0
1992 31.5 49.4 1.4 4.0
1996 37.1 52.1 1.9 5.0
2004 29.9 46.1 2.2 5.6
2010 32.8 48.9 2.2 5.4
Source: WORLD Bank (2014b)
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as a rich country with poor people; a country whose richest 20 per cent
controlled 54.01 per cent of income in 2010 while most of the remaining 80
per cent were poor and struggled to live. A more equal distribution of Nigeria’s
income would assist greatly in curbing the increases in poverty rate.
10.3 Methodology
10.3.1 Approach
There is widespread agreement that poverty is a complex phenomenon with
multidimensional properties and effects (Sen 1973). Thus, there has been a
shift from the conventional one-dimensional approaches to measuring pov-
erty, inequality, and welfare, using monetary values such as household
income or expenditure per capita, to a multidimensional concept where
both monetary and non-monetary measures of deprivation are integrated or
applied independently.
More advanced approaches have evolved over time to assess living stand-
ards and make comparisons within a multidimensional framework since the
pioneering efforts of Tsui (2002) and Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003).
The challenge, however, has been to empirically define and aggregate
relevant attributes, as well as determine the minimum thresholds that can
capture differences in levels of deprivation rather than choices and tastes
(Layte et al. 2001).
Some approaches that have been adopted to handle the aggregation prob-
lem6 are axiomatic and extensions of unidimensional poverty indices (Tsui
2002; Atkinson 2003; Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003). Other non-
axiomatic approaches in the literature include the fuzzy set approach
(Cerioli and Zani 1990; Cheli and Lemmi 1994; Chiappero-Martinetti 2006),
the distance function method (Lovell et al. 1994; Anderson et al. 2005), the
information theory approach (Maasoumi 1993; Deutsch and Silber 2005;
Maasoumi and Lugo 2008), the inertia approach and factor analysis (Klasen
2000; Sahn and Stifel 2003), and methods from the psychometric literature
(Wagle 2005; Di Tommaso 2007; Krishnakumar and Ballon 2008).
Batana and Duclos (2008) draw attention to the concern that the arbitrary
nature of assumptions involved in choosing poverty thresholds and in aggre-
gating across welfare dimensions and individuals may diminish the robust-
ness of results. The multidimensional dominance approach provides a
methodology that is robust to each of these choices.
6 See Batana (2008) for a good overview and summary of the different applications.
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As noted elsewhere in this volume, the FOD approach does not impose a
weighting scheme or ad hoc simplifying assumptions on the social welfare
function. No assumptions are made about preferences for one indicator
over another. The only criterion the method imposes is that it is better to
be non-deprived than deprived in any indicator (Sonne-Schmidt et al. 2008;
Arndt et al. 2012). This is the approach adopted in this study to investigate
multidimensional poverty in Nigeria over time and space.
The FOD approach is a simple form of stochastic ordering applied in
decision situations characterized by a probability distribution over possible
binary outcomes. The approach describes the criterion in which one distri-
bution can be ranked unambiguously ‘better’ than another, allowing us to
make welfare comparisons between two populations on the basis of a
series of discrete, ordinal welfare indicators without imposing arbitary
weighting schemes or conditions on the social welfare function (Arndt
et al. 2012).
This approach is well established in the theory of one-dimensional7 and
multidimensional FOD.8 It allows for comparison between populations
over time, on the basis of a series of binary ordinal welfare indicators.
Therefore, the binary variables were created for each indicator, where ‘1’ is
the good outcome (non-deprived) and ‘0’ is the bad outcome (deprived).
Therefore, the outcome (0,0,0,0,0) indicates deprivation in all indicators of
well-being while the outcome (1,1,1,1,1) means non-deprivation in all of the
dimensions.
FOD is operationalized through the principles of the linear programming.
To ameliorate the lack of information inherent in indeterminate outcomes of
dominance, a bootstrapping approach is applied. In comparing repeated boot-
strap samples, the empirical probability of domination provides an estimate of
the extent to which one population dominates another. Furthermore, the
probability of net domination (the probability a population dominates all
other populations minus the probability that a population is dominated by
all other populations) can be interpreted as a measure of welfare, which
provides the basis to rank populations. Bootstrapping is a computational
non-parametric technique for resampling and enables conclusions to be
drawn based on the characteristics of the population. We ran the bootstrap
analysis with 100 replications.
The analysis captured both spatial and temporal welfare domination
for geopolitical zones and rural/urban sectors. Temporal FOD analysis
measures domination of one time period over another in the same
7 See sterdal (2010) and Arndt et al. (2012) for detailed discussion.
8 See Lehmann (1955), Strassen (1965), Levhari et al. (1975), Grant (1995) (cross reference from
Arndt et al. 2012).
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population. We define three possibilities of temporal domination for each
population (states, geopolitical zones, and rural/urban sectors) as follows:
0: neither t+s FOD t nor t FOD t+s
1: t+s FOD t
-1: t FOD t+s
where t is a year such as 1999 and s is greater than or equal to one. These
possible outcomes are averaged over all bootstrap iterations.
10.3.2 Data Sources
The study utilized the Nigeria Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) of 1999, 2003,
and 2008 for the analysis. The 1999, 2003, and 2008 DHS are nationally represen-
tative surveys covering both urban and rural households. The surveys follow a
stratified cluster sampling design. Details of the research design can be found in
thefinal reports (NPC andORCMacro 1999, 2004, andNPCand ICFMacro 2009).
As indicated in the surveys, 7,647, 7,225, and 34,070 households were surveyed in
1999, 2003, and 2008, respectively. Due to the removal of missing values, 7,354,
7,121,and32,896households in1999,2003,and2008wereutilizedfor theanalysis.
10.3.3 Choice of Welfare Indicators
Poverty can be reflected in various broad dimensions. The welfare indicators used
in this study are education, water, sanitation, shelter, and energy. All are binary
variables (1: not deprived 0: deprived). The indicators are defined as follows:
Water: a household is not deprived if the household’s water source is piped
water, well water, or rainwater.
Sanitation: a household is not deprived if the household uses a flush toilet,
an improved, ventilated pit latrine, or a composting toilet.
Access to electricity: a household is not deprived if the household has
access to electricity.
Shelter: a household is not deprived if the household has flooringmade of a
material other than dirt, sand, or dung.
Education: a household is not deprived if any household member has
completed three or more years of schooling at the primary level or above.
10.4 Results and Discussion
The analyses were conducted at the national, zonal, and sectoral (rural and
urban) levels. Five binary indicators were selected, as mentioned in section
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10.3.3, and the number of possible welfare combinations is 25=32, giving us
32 comparator subgroups. The national, zonal, and sectoral results are based
on the 1999, 2003, and 2008 DHS datasets.9
10.4.1 Households According to Welfare Indicators
Table 10.4 presents the proportion of Nigerian households that are not
deprived by the five different welfare indicators at national, zonal, and sectoral
levels based on the 1999, 2003, and 2008 DHS datasets. Nationally, the table
indicates a positive change in welfare indicators between 1999 and 2008 with
the exception of education, which had a small negative change. However, the
proportion of Nigerian households that had access to electricity declined from
51 per cent in 2003 to 48 per cent in 2008 and a similar decrease can be
observed for shelter (64 per cent in 2003 and 62 per cent in 2008).
The change in deprivation levels from 1999 to 2008 varies across welfare
indicators and areas. Both the urban and rural sectors experienced deterior-
ation in two indicators between 1999 and 2008—water and electricity for
urban populations and shelter and education for rural areas. The North Cen-
tral zone performed the worst with negative changes in all welfare indicators
except sanitation.
10.4.2 Share of Households in Multidimensional Welfare Combinations
Table 10.5 shows the percentage share of Nigerian households by the combin-
ation of welfare indicators for the nation, zones, and sectors from the 1999,
2003, and 2008 DHS surveys. The number of deprivations in the welfare
indicators range from 0 to 5 where 0 signifies zero deprivation (a case of non-
deprivation in any indicator (1,1,1,1,1)) and 5 implies acute deprivation
(deprivation in all welfare indicators (0,0,0,0,0)). Between the two extremes
are the various combinations of welfare indicators. However, our discussion
will only consider the twoextremes, i.e. acutedeprivationandzerodeprivation.
Nationally, the share of households experiencing acute deprivation
(deprived in all indicators) was 3.3 per cent in 1999. It declined to 2.4 per
cent in 2003, but increased to 3.1 per cent in 2008, although it remained
below the 1999 level. Substantial improvement can be observed in the per-
centage of households with no deprivation (zero), with a 5.5 percentage point
improvement from 13.4 to 18.9 per cent over the ten-year period. In the urban
sector, only 0.4 per cent of households experienced acute deprivation in 2008
compared to 4.4 per cent in the rural sector. The share of rural households not
9 Population weights are used throughout the analysis.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































deprived in any indicator marginally improved by 3.2 percentage points over
the ten-year period.
Among the geopolitical zones, acute deprivation ranged from 1.0 per cent in
the South East to 5.5 per cent in the North East zone in 1999. The proportion
of households in the North East experiencing acute deprivation increased by
over one-half from 5.5 per cent in 1999 to 8.3 per cent in 2008, while zero
deprivation declined by almost one-half in the same period, 7.2 per cent and
4.3 per cent in 1999 and 2008, respectively. Generally, the northern zones are
characterized by a higher share of acute deprivation and a marginal share in
zero deprivation compared to the southern zones.
10.4.3 Domination Comparisons: Spatial Analyses
Spatial FOD static and bootstrap comparisons from the 1999, 2003, and 2008
DHS for the nation, zones, and sectors are reported in Tables 10.6–10.11.
These are FOD comparisons across populations at a given point in time. In
each table, the row (column) averages indicate the probability that a popula-
tion dominated (is dominated by) other populations. In other words, a rela-
tively large row and column average implies a relatively well-off population
and a relatively poor population respectively.
Table 10.5. Percentage distribution of households by number of deprivations
National Urban Rural NC NE NW SE SS SW
1999
0 13.4 36.1 4.1 9.9 7.2 3.7 11.9 16.5 30.8
1 20.3 38.5 12.9 29.3 7.6 16.0 15.2 18.6 30.2
2 19.7 14.1 21.9 25.9 14.1 19.9 28.6 18.9 12.9
3 22.6 7.9 28.6 20.0 28.7 26.8 30.3 23.5 10.8
4 20.7 3.2 27.9 11.9 37.0 28.8 13.1 20.0 12.9
5 3.3 0.2 4.6 3.0 5.5 4.9 1.0 2.5 2.4
2003
0 12.7 27.3 5.4 6.7 3.9 4.5 31.0 24.2 25.9
1 21.8 40.1 12.5 18.0 10.9 21.4 27.5 18.8 45.8
2 21.9 17.8 24.0 30.9 19.9 24.5 18.5 20.6 11.5
3 22.0 9.0 28.6 25.4 27.0 23.5 15.8 23.5 7.7
4 19.2 4.4 26.6 16.7 33.5 23.9 6.5 11.8 6.9
5 2.4 1.3 3.0 2.3 4.8 2.2 0.7 1.1 2.2
2008
0 18.9 42.5 7.3 14.7 4.3 9.8 27.2 23.8 35.5
1 23.5 36.6 17.1 16.7 13.7 20.4 30.9 27.5 32.0
2 19.6 13.5 22.6 22.0 17.1 23.4 22.9 20.1 12.2
3 20.3 5.1 27.7 24.9 26.6 27.3 13.0 18.5 8.7
4 14.7 1.9 20.9 16.5 30.1 17.0 5.2 9.3 9.2
5 3.1 0.4 4.4 5.1 8.3 2.1 0.8 0.7 2.4
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1999, 2003, and 2008 Nigeria DHS
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The urban sector consistently had the highest probability of dominating in
all the three periods and strongly dominated the rural sector in all three years.
On the other hand, the average probability of the rural sector being domin-
ated steadily increased from 43 per cent in 1999 to 50 per cent in 2008 in the
bootstrapped results (Tables 10.7 and 10.11). Performance among the zones
Table 10.6. 1999 DHS static spatial FOD comparisons
Area National Rural Urban NC NE NW SE SS SW Avg.
National 1 0.13
Rural 0.00







Average 0.13 0.50 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1999 Nigeria DHS
Table 10.7. 1999 DHS bootstrap spatial FOD comparisons (probabilities)
Area National Rural Urban NC NE NW SE SS SW Avg.
National 1 0.02 0.13
Rural 0.00
Urban 1 1 0.9 1 0.79 0.01 0.59





SW 0.26 0.83 0.12 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.19
Average 0.16 0.43 0.00 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.11
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1999 Nigeria DHS
Table 10.8. 2003 DHS static spatial FOD comparisons
Area National Rural Urban NC NE NW SE SS SW Avg.
National 1 1 0.25
Rural 0.00




SE 1 1 1 1 0.50
SS 0.00
SW 1 1 1 1 0.50
Average 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2003 Nigeria DHS
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Table 10.9. 2003 DHS bootstrap spatial FOD comparisons (probabilities)
Area National Rural Urban NC NE NW SE SS SW Avg.
National 0.94 0.61 0.19
Rural 0.09 0.01
Urban 0.94 0.94 0.42 0.98 0.09 0.42
NC 0.01 0.01 0.00
NE 0.00
NW 0.2 0.03
SE 0.59 0.84 0.87 0.7 0.01 0.14 0.39
SS 0.02 0.13 0.29 0.11 0.01 0.07
SW 0.56 0.79 0.48 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.34
Average 0.26 0.46 0.00 0.26 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.16
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2003 Nigeria DHS
Table 10.10. 2008 DHS static spatial FOD comparisons
Area National Rural Urban NC NE NW SE SS SW Avg.
National 1 1 0.25
Rural 0.00




SE 1 1 0.25
SS 1 0.13
SW 1 1 1 0.38
Average 0.13 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.19
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008 Nigeria DHS
Table 10.11. 2008 DHS bootstrap spatial FOD comparisons (probabilities)
Area National Rural Urban NC NE NW SE SS SW Avg.
National 1 0.67 0.21
Rural 0.03 0.00




SE 0.09 0.83 0.97 0.32 0.28
SS 0.23 0.71 0.1 0.13
SW 0.17 0.97 0.98 0.54 0.33
Average 0.16 0.50 0.00 0.46 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.18
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008 Nigeria DHS
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indicatedthat southernzoneshadhigherprobabilitiesofdominatingcomparedto
the northern zones. Notably, the SouthWest zone almost doubled its probability
of dominating over the ten-year period. However, the probability of the North
Central and North East zones being dominated increased considerably from 13
and 16 per cent in 1999 to 46 and 42 per cent in 2008 (Table 10.7 and 10.11). This
implies that the rural sector, North Central, and North East geopolitical zones are
relatively poor while SouthWest and the urban sector are relatively wealthy.
10.4.4 Net Dominance and Inequality
Net dominance is the difference between the average probability of dominating
and being dominated by all other areas, i.e. the column average minus the row
average. Net dominance is an indicator of the strength of domination over
others and allows populations to be ranked. It is also an indicator of inequality.
While positive figures indicate a high dominancy level and negative figures
show low dominancy, an increase(decrease) in these values over time is related
to increase(decrease) in inequality across the different populations. Figure 10.3
presents the change in dominance and ranks the populations (national, rural,
and urban sectors, and the six geopolitical zones) across time.
The national net domination was 0.03 and 0.07 in 1999 and 2003
respectively but moved to marginal positive net dominance (0.05) in 2008.
While the urban sector consistently maintained the highest ranking, the rural
sector had the lowest ranking throughout the ten years. A significant change
in rankings could be observed within the populations between 1999 and
2003, but between 2003 and 2008 the movement was not dramatic with
North East moving up by one point to the seventh position and North Central
falling in ranking to the eighth position in 2008.
10.4.5 Temporal FOD Comparisons
The net temporal domination score is the average of the three possible out-
comes in comparing one year to another, i.e. the average that one year
1999 2003 2008
Domination Rank Rank Domination Rank Domination Rank
Urban 0.59 1 Urban Urban 1 0.42 1 Urban Urban 0.59 1 Urban
SW 0.19 2 SW SE 2 0.39 2 SE SE 0.28 2 SE
SE 0.00 3 SE SW 3 0.34 3 SW SW 0.26 3 SW
SS –0.01 4 SS SS 4 0.05 4 SS SS 0.13 4 SS
National –0.03 5 National NW 5 0.01 5 NW NW 0.07 5 NW
NC –0.05 6 NC National 6 –0.07 6 National National 0.05 6 National
NW –0.10 7 NW NC 7 –0.26 7 NC NE –0.42 7 NE
NE –0.16 8 NE NE 8 –0.45 8 NE NC –0.46 8 NC
Rural –0.43 9 Rural Rural 9 –0.45 9 Rural Rural –0.50 9 Rural
Constant order in rank Ascending order in rank Descending order in rank
Figure 10.3. Spatial FOD ranking and probability of net domination for national,
sectoral, and zonal levels in 1999, 2003, and 2008
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1999, 2003, and 2008 Nigeria DHS
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dominates (1), neither dominates nor is dominated by (0), or is dominated by
(1) another year over all bootstraps. Net domination scores for the nation,
zones, and sectors are presented in Table 10.12.
Nationally, the temporal results show that 2003 dominated 1999 by a very
low probability of 0.01; a slightly higher probability of 0.15 net domination
can be observed between 2008 and 1999; and neither 2008 dominates 2003
nor 2003 dominates 2008. However, these are very low probabilities indicat-
ing little evidence of advancement over the years. Among the zones, North
Central and North East experienced 1999 dominating 2003 while South East,
South South, and South West experienced positive probability of dominance
between 2008 and 2003 with the highest chance in the South South (0.24). In
the sectors, the urban sector displays some probability of decline between
1999 and 2003 but had a high probability of 2008 dominating 2003 with 0.45.
10.5 Conclusion
This study set out to appraise non-monetary multidimensional poverty in
Nigeria using the FOD approach. The methodology is quite robust and lends
credence to the general observation that the distribution of positive economic
performance in Nigeria has not translated positively to improvements in
welfare/poverty in the country over time. This is consistent with the lack of
pro-poor growth observed by Ichoku et al. (2012).
The results indicate that Nigeria registered few gains in non-income poverty
over the decade from 1999 to 2008. While there was a decrease in the per-
centage of the population experiencing acute deprivation between 1999 and
2003, an increase was observed between 2003 and 2008, which resulted in a
total decline of merely 0.25 percentage points between 1999 and 2008.
Table 10.12. Temporal net FOD comparisons, DHS (probabilities)
2003 FOD 1999 2008 FOD 1999 2008 FOD 2003






SE 1 0.36 0.38 0.05
SS 1 0.4 1 0.6 0.24
SW 0.03 0.01
Urban 1 0.37 1 0.45
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1999, 2003, and 2008 Nigeria DHS
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An examination of the performance of the five indicators over the decade
indicates that only sanitation recorded a substantial positive change; educa-
tion had a negative change; and the rest had an improvement of less than 10
per cent. The results indicate that the country has not achieved broad-based
progress across a number of welfare indicators for different populations espe-
cially in indicators like water, education, and electricity that are directly
accruable from public expenditure.
The spatial FOD comparisons indicate that regional inequalities remain
profound with huge disparities mirrored also in the results for states.10 The
FOD temporal results indicate that the probability of experiencing welfare
improvement between any two years was low. South East, South South,
South West zones, and the urban sector were the only areas with positive
probability of advancement between 1999 and 2008; however, the probabil-
ities for South South and South West zones were virtually zero.
It is imperative that Nigeria finds a recipe for making growth inclusive while
alleviating poverty in a larger part of the country, recognizing that poverty
rates appear to be geographically concentrated in some zones and rural areas.
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Growth and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania
Channing Arndt, Lionel Demery, Andy McKay, and Finn Tarp
11.1 Introduction
Tanzania is the fifth largest country in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of popula-
tion, accounting for around 5 per cent of the region’s people. It is a major
economy in East Africa and an active member of the East African Community.
Tanzania is also actively involved in Southern African discussions, being a
member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania from shortly after its inde-
pendence in 1962 until 1985, pursued a development policy based on a vision
of African socialism, in particular between 1967 and the late 1970s. The
economy deteriorated sharply over this period, leaving Tanzania as one of
the poorest and most aid-dependent countries in the world. At the same time,
Tanzania made progress in many aspects of social development. From the
1970s onwards, Tanzania increasingly borrowed from the IMF and the World
Bank; and after Nyerere’s departure in 1985, the country started to undertake
reforms in order to pursue more market-oriented policies. Over time, better
economic performance followed, though growth remained slow even in the
1990s. Since around 2000, Tanzania has reported an improved economic
growth performance.
Tanzania is also by now well known for not having been able to translate
this growth into a significant reduction in monetary poverty. This apparent
contrast, which has dominated recent literature on Tanzania’s economic per-
formance, is an important focus of this chapter. Authors who have also
addressed this conundrum include Atkinson and Lugo (2010), Demombynes
and Hoogeveen (2007), Hoogeveen and Ruhinduka (2009), Kessy et al. (2013),
Mashindano et al. (2011), Mkenda et al. (2010), Osberg and Bandara (2012),
Arndt et al. (2013), andWorld Bank (2007, 2012, 2013). The general conclusion
from these studies is that growth and consumption-based poverty are in
several respects ‘delinked’ (Pauw and Thurlow 2011). The GDP elasticity of
poverty reduction of around 0.21 for the period 2001–7 illustrates this
weak effect. While more recent data suggest a possible improvement (the
elasticity increasing to 0.80 during the period 2007–12), the available data
continue to point to a weak link between economic growth and monetary
poverty reduction.
Reflecting the above observation, this chapter begins by analysing the
recent pattern of growth in Tanzania and considers the likely consequences
of this for poverty reduction, over a period characterized by large increases in
the prices of food and fuel. The first part of the chapter focuses on the record in
terms of monetary poverty and its seeming unresponsiveness to growth.
Much of the focus is on the period since 2000 when the seeming disconnect
arises. The 1990s were characterized by limited growth and limited poverty
reduction between 1991/2 and 2001 (from 38.6 per cent to 35.7 per cent). As
noted, the national accounts data report improved growth in per capita
GDP and average per capita private consumption since around 2000, while
the rate of monetary poverty reduction has continued to be slow. Four main
household surveys are used for the analysis, the Household Budget Surveys
(HBS) conducted in 1991/2, 2000/1, 2007, and 2011/12.1 We also draw on
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) to assess progress in non-monetary
domains.
Key to understanding the difficulties in analysing how growth and poverty
interact in Tanzania is the fact that there are serious issues with the underlying
data. These concern both the national accounts estimates of economic growth
( Jerven 2011) and the household survey evidence on poverty trends (Eele
et al. 2000; World Bank 2015). Both are decidedly questionable in tracking
changes over time, which is a central concern addressed in this chapter. To
add to that, the national accounts were then rebased in November 2014 (an
issue not addressed in detail here), but this does not change the overall growth
story from the national accounts. This data uncertainty is one key feature of
this chapter. Nevertheless, both the surveys and the national accounts suggest
a somewhat slower growth in real private consumption which is then some-
what less out of line with the progress in relation to monetary poverty.
Importantly, the non-monetary indicators show reasonably good progress
since 1991.
The chapter first presents in section 11.2 the economic growth story over
a longer period of time and then in more detail over the period covered by
the four Household Budget Surveys. A discussion of the macroeconomic
1 See World Bank (2015) for the latest World Bank report.
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composition of growth considers the likely implications for progress in pov-
erty reduction. The responsiveness of poverty to growth is discussed in detail
in section 11.3. This discussion highlights major differences between the
national-accounts-based measures of growth and the growth in average
household consumption from the household surveys. How responsive pov-
erty is to growth depends critically on how growth is measured. Section 11.4
then looks at the nature of consumption poverty reduction in more detail.
While results for the more recent period might suggest a more positive
poverty reduction record, concerns about data comparability and the
adequacy of price adjustments raise the question of how robust this finding
is. Evidence on selected, more straightforwardly measured non-monetary
indicators of deprivation is briefly reviewed in section 11.5, after which
section 11.6 concludes.
11.2 The Recent Pattern of Growth in Tanzania
The data presented in this section precede the rebasing of the national
accounts in November 2014. Though the data rebased in 2007 are now
available, currently available data do not provide information before 2007
and so do not enable a longer-term consideration of growth. We use the
original data here, though comment on any points of difference over the
2007–12 period evident in the rebased data; these are generally small.
Data from World Development Indicators on real GDP in local currency
values from 1988 to 2013 (prior to the rebasing) are presented in Figure 11.1.
This chart confirms that the 1990s were characterized by at best modest
growth, as well as some periods of decline. By contrast since 2001 annual
growth in real per capita GDP averaged 3.9 per cent a year, and was never less
than 2.9 per cent, which occurred in 2009 following the financial, food, and
fuel crises.
A more detailed presentation of the national accounts is set out in
Table 11.1 corresponding to the periods covered by the four Household
Budget Surveys (HBS). This confirms the difference between the 1990s and
the period since 2000. Real GDP in 2001 prices grew at an average rate of
3.8 per cent per annum between 1992 and 2001, by 7.2 per cent per annum
between 2001 and 2007, and 6.6 per cent between 2007 and 2012 (6.2 per cent
in 2007 prices using the rebased data). Population growth averaged 2.9 per
cent over the 1992–2012 period, so this translates into slow per capita GDP
growth in the 1990s, and thenmore satisfactory, though by nomeans impres-
sive, growth in real per capita GDP since 2001.
A disaggregation of the overall growth rate provides important clues about
its expected poverty reduction impacts. Looking first at GDP by expenditure
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component, the national accounts estimate of private consumption grew by
only 0.9 per cent per annum between 1991 and 2001; but by 6.6 per cent and
6.9 per cent per annum over the periods 2001–7 and 2007–12 respectively
(5.7 per cent between 2007 and 2012 with the rebased data). Private consump-
tion therefore fell in per capita terms between 1991 and 2001. Importantly,
public consumption grew much faster than private consumption over each of
these periods.
There were also very large increases in investment over each of these sub-
periods, generally at much faster rates than consumption. Available data do
not enable a public–private disaggregation for the 1992–2001 years. The
government predominantly accounted for the investment growth between
2001 and 2007, while between 2007 and 2012 private investment dominates,
including investment for natural resource exploitation.
It is also clear that Tanzania had a sharply negative balance of trade
throughout this period. Imports supported this consumption and investment
growth. In 1991 net exports were5.8 per cent of GDP; by 2007 and 2012 this
figure had reached 15.0 and 26.8 per cent respectively. The trade deficit
growth from 1991 to 2007 probably reflects aid, while the deficit in 2007–12 is
likely related to offshore natural gas and other resource investments (predom-
inantly undertaken by the private sector).
The investments that have taken place form part of the explanation of the
faster growth in the 2000s. The increased public consumption, and public
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Figure 11.1. Growth of real local currency per capita GDP in Tanzania
Source: World Development Indicators, 2014
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for which government provision is important and help to set the stage for
faster growth in the domestic economy. The relatively slow increase in aggre-
gate private consumption taking place over much of this period suggests that
slower progress in reducing monetary poverty might be expected.
Table 11.1. Real GDP growth, by expenditure category and sector, 1992, 2001, 2007, and
2012
Mean growth rates per annum Shares
1992–2001 2001–7 2007–12 1991 2001 2007 2012
By expenditure category
Real GDP (2001 prices) 3.8 7.2 6.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Consumption 2.0* 8.0 8.0 99.7 86.8 90.7 94.9
Public 14.8* 15.0 12.0 4.2 11.9 18.1 23.2
Private 0.9* 6.6 6.9 95.8 75.0 72.6 71.7
Investment 17.4 13.3 14.0 5.9 17.4 24.3 31.9
Gross fixed capital formation 13.5 14.0 5.8 17.0 24.0 31.5
Government 26.0 5.5 3.2 8.4 8.7
Private 9.4 18.3 13.8 15.6 22.8
Change in stocks 1.8 12.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
Net exports 32.2 24.6 5.8 4.3 15.0 26.8
By sector
Agriculture and fishing 4.4 3.9 44.7 30.7 26.2 22.8
Crops 4.7 4.2 32.9 21.4 18.6 16.5
Livestock 3.1 3.1 6.3 5.0 4.0 3.3
Forestry and hunting 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.7
Fishing 5.8 2.7 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.3
Industry and construction 9.9 7.7 15.1 18.0 20.9 21.8
Mining and quarrying 15.4 3.3 1.0 1.8 2.7 2.3
Manufacturing 8.8 8.4 7.6 8.4 9.2 9.9
Electricity and water 6.2 6.1 1.4 2.6 2.5 2.4
Electricity 6.5 6.3 1.3 2.2 2.1 2.0
Water 4.9 5.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4
Construction 11.3 9.0 5.0 5.2 6.5 7.3
Services 7.9 7.9 37.5 45.5 47.3 49.9
Trade, hotels, and restaurants 7.7 7.8 14.8 15.8 16.2 17.0
Trade and repairs 8.3 8.3 0.0 13.0 13.8 14.8
Hotels and restaurants 4.6 4.9 0.0 2.8 2.4 2.2
Transport and
communication
8.7 11.6 4.8 6.6 7.2 9.0
Transport 6.3 6.7 0.0 5.4 5.1 5.1
Communication 16.9 20.8 0.0 1.2 2.1 3.9
Finance intermediation 10.2 11.0 3.4 1.5 1.8 2.2
Real estate and business serv. 7.0 6.8 5.9 10.3 10.2 10.2
Public administration 9.5 6.1 6.0 7.0 8.0 7.7
Education 4.7 7.0 1.0 2.1 1.8 1.8
Health 8.4 6.7 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.4
Other social and personal
serv.
2.8 3.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6
Note: *relates to period 1991–2001 instead of 1992–2001 due to missing data for 1992.
Source: World Bank and authors’ computation from HBS datasets
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While data are not available to analyse the sectoral pattern of the growth in
real GDP from 1992 to 2001, data in current prices for this period suggest faster
growth in industry/construction and services compared with agriculture. The
detailed pattern of real growth is available for the second and third sub-periods
in Table 11.1. Particularly fast-growing subsectors over these periods include
first and foremost communications, followed by financial intermediation,
construction, transport and communication, manufacturing, trade and
repairs, and in the earlier sub-period mining and quarrying. All showed sig-
nificant growth rates. Again agriculture grew much more slowly over this
period. Growth performance seems to have been better in urban areas than
in rural areas, where poverty is concentrated.
The above review relies on aggregate macroeconomic figures. Both the
expenditure composition of growth, which is oriented more to investment
and government spending as opposed to private consumption, and its sectoral
pattern, which is oriented towards urban sectors, suggest slower progress in
reducing consumption-based poverty than might be presumed from headline
GDP growth.
11.3 Micro-Level Evidence on Consumption Poverty in Tanzania
and its Responsiveness to Growth
In this section, we turn to household-level data. Microeconomic analysis is
possible based on the four Household Budget Surveys, conducted by the
National Bureau of Statistics in 1991/2, 2000/1, 2007, and 2011/12. These
are nationally representative surveys of the mainland Tanzania population.
Among other things, they collect the data to estimate household consump-
tion, which can then be used to measure living standards as total real house-
hold consumption per adult equivalent. There were some differences in the
survey questionnaires used through time. Some revisions in 2011/12 com-
pared with earlier rounds are of particular relevance. As a result, there were
methodological differences in the analysis conducted across the two latest
surveys, compared with the analysis originally done on the first three surveys.
For this reason, two different estimates of poverty in 2007 have been made
here in order to compare like with like.
The summary national-level poverty headcount estimates from these data,
as published by the National Bureau of Statistics (1991/2–2007) (Government
of Tanzania 2009) and the World Bank (2007–2011/12) are presented in
Table 11.2. The poverty headcount in 1992 was 38.6 per cent. Estimates for
2000/1 and 2007, based on consumption measures constructed to be as
comparable as possible, showed poverty headcounts of 35.7 per cent and
33.6 per cent respectively. Progress in reducing the poverty headcount over















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































this fifteen-year period therefore appears to be quite slow, and the absolute
numbers of poor people rose by an estimated 3.3 million. Between 2007 and
2011/12 the poverty headcount is estimated to have fallen from a revised
estimate of 34.4 per cent in 2007 to 28.2 per cent in 2011/12. This corresponds
to a reduction in the absolute numbers of poor people by around 670,000.
Given the concern expressed at the beginning at the lack of responsiveness
of poverty to growth, these figures are used next as a basis for estimating the
growth elasticity of poverty reduction. Their construction for the three sub-
periods under consideration here is reported in Table 11.2. Two ways of doing
this are pursued: one based on national accounts aggregates, and secondly an
approach using the estimated growth in household consumption from the
survey data.
In using national accounts data, the growth elasticity can be computed with
respect to growth in per capita GDP or growth in per capita private consump-
tion. With respect to per capita GDP, the elasticities are low, all less than one,
and especially low between 2001 and 2007 when growth was fast (per capita
GDP increased by 28.5 per cent) and poverty reduction was very modest,
falling by only 2.9 percentage points or 5.9 per cent. The elasticity is higher
between 2007 and 2011/12, when poverty reduction was faster and growth
slightly slower, yet it was still only 0.80. The elasticity with respect to per
capita consumption is only slightly higher than the elasticities with respect to
per capita GDP for the full period between 2001 and 2012.
Such statistics feed concerns about the poverty-reducing impact of growth
in Tanzania. The values are low compared with several other African countries
studied in this volume, to say nothing of some East Asian countries. This raises
the question of what it is about the growth experience of Tanzania that results
in such poverty outcomes, and what might be done to improve it in future.
When these same calculations are done in relation to the household-survey-
based measure of consumption, the results paint a different picture. The
growth in per capita consumption reported by the household survey data is
generally much less, especially in the 2000s. Compared with the estimates of
24 and 21 cumulative per cent changes in real per capita private consumption
expenditure over the 2001–7 and 2007–12 periods from the national accounts,
the household surveys suggest cumulative changes over these periods of 2.9
per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively. The assessment of whether growth is
effective in reducing poverty then critically depends on which of the two
measures of aggregate real consumption one takes as the basis of analysis.
In Table 11.2, when we took the ‘growth’ denominator to be the percentage
change in real private consumption per capita from the national accounts, the
consumption growth elasticity of poverty reduction (based on changes between
2007 and 2012) was just 0.86. If instead we measured ‘growth’ using the
percentage change in mean real household consumption per capita from the
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two household budget surveys, the estimated ‘growth’ elasticity of poverty
increases to 3.5. The elasticity estimated using household consumption is
also significantly higher between 2000/1 and 2007. Poverty appears to be
relatively unresponsive to growth only if the latter is measured from the
national accounts. Using consumption measured in the HBSs (which is also
used in the measurement of poverty itself) leads to a more optimistic assess-
ment in terms of responsiveness—poverty did respond to much more limited
‘growth’—but a less optimistic assessment in terms of consumption growth. In
this view, the core issue underlying the limited poverty reduction is the lack of
growth in real household consumption.
With this background, it is important to ask whichmeasure of consumption
should be considered more reliable. At the outset, it is important to recognize
that there are differences between the two approaches to estimating con-
sumption. The national accounts measure of private consumption is
a macro-founded indicator, while the household-survey-based measure is a
micro-founded indicator computed primarily for purposes of poverty analysis.
In addition, the estimates are obtained in very different ways. Typically, the
national accounts estimate of private consumption is obtained as a residual,
once absorption by firms and government is accounted for. Surveys obtain
their estimates directly from household interviews, based on respondent recall
or diary keeping. There are strengths and weaknesses to both; yet the under-
lying concepts certainly overlap closely enough to suggest that similar esti-
mates of levels and growth rates should emerge in general.
The observation that national accounts and household-survey-based
estimates of consumption can differ significantly is not an issue unique to
Tanzania; rather it is an issue which has been quite widely studied. Ravallion
(2001: 5) concludes, ‘it is evident that when the levels or growth rates from
these two data sources differ there can be no presumption that the NAS
[national accounts] is right and the surveys are wrong, or vice versa, since
they are not really measuring the same thing, and both are prone to errors’.
While these differences can be considered a problem, they also do have an
advantage, in that each source can serve to triangulate the other. Ravallion
(2001) finds that the divergence between the national accounts and survey
estimates of consumption is greater when surveys centre on measuring
income, rather than consumption. The general practice in African surveys to
rely mainly onmeasuring consumption would reduce the divergence between
the two sources. Deaton (2005), for example, finds that the average ratio of
household consumption (measured in seventy-four surveys in sub-Saharan
Africa) and private consumption from the national accounts is unity.2
2 Sub-Saharan Africa also exhibits a high variance in this ratio. Globally, the ratio of household-
based to national-accounts-based estimates is typically less than one.
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The household-survey-based approach is in many ways more closely related
to the analysis of poverty—indeed, that is the purpose for which they were
designed. In Tanzania’s case, there is a challenge caused by a change in survey
methodology between the 2007 and 2011/12 surveys. While the approach
taken to measuring consumption was better in 2011/12 than in 2007, this
change creates the risk that comparing the average consumption estimates
from these two surveys with each other may overestimate the growth in
consumption.
So, the key question is: Why are estimates of real consumption growth from
the national accounts so much greater than those of the HBS? To start to
explore this, we first compare nominal estimates of per capita household
consumption between the national accounts and the household survey in
the years of the latest two household surveys, 2007 and 2011/12. The survey
estimates of average nominal consumption per capita were 306,072 TSh in
2007 and 611,691 TSh in 2011/12, while the national accounts estimates of
private consumption per capita were 358,591 TSh in 2007 and 694,340 TSh in
2012. This implies annual growth rates of 14.9 per cent and 12.8 per cent
respectively. Both the nominal levels of per capita consumption and their
growth rates over the period are quite close despite the very different sources.
For welfare analysis, it is necessary to track changes in real consumption
over time; and it is here the two approaches part company. When the series
are deflated (the national accounts using a consumption component of the
GDP deflator and the survey using survey-based prices and weights, both
employing a single country-wide inflation estimate), there are significant
differences in estimated changes in real consumption. The national accounts
report a real per capita private consumption growth of 3.9 per cent per annum
between 2007 and 2012, whilst the survey gives a growth in per capita
household consumption of just 1.0 per cent per annum. Whereas in nominal
terms the two consumption measures correspond reasonably well, when
expressed in real terms, there is little correspondence between them; and
they imply completely different growth and poverty scenarios.
So a major issue is the choice and reliability of the price deflators. In Tanza-
nia, the implicit national accounts private consumption deflator indicates that
prices rose by only 51 per cent between 2007 and 2012. This is marginally
lower than the deflator for GDP as a whole (54 per cent). In contrast, according
to the 2007 and 2011/12 HBS data, consumer prices faced by households on
average rose by 90 per cent in the period. Thismakes amassive difference to the
time trend in real household consumption.3 A similar issue arises between
2001 and 2007, and is discussed in the studies of poverty by Mkenda et al.
3 The CPI records price inflation of 75 per cent during this period—that is, somewhere between
the national accounts consumption deflator and the HBS data.
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(2010) and Atkinson and Lugo (2010). That earlier period saw a bigger diver-
gence between the private consumption deflator and the GDP deflator
(Atkinson and Lugo 2010). But again, the key difference there is that between
the national accounts deflator (which implied that prices increased by around
60 per cent over this period) and the survey data deflator (which implied that
prices increased by 93 per cent).
The reliability of price data in Tanzania has been reviewed and analysed in
detail by Adam et al. (2012). Concerns that the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
underestimates inflation in Tanzania have been a long-standing issue. Amajor
revision of the CPI computation was made in the mid-2000s, after an IMF
review found that procedures of handling seeming outliers and other tech-
nical errors were creating a large downward bias. A World Bank study (World
Bank 2007) argued that there was still some downward bias in the series. The
analysis conducted by Adam et al. (2012) showed a significantly higher level
of food price inflation than the NBS series, and moreover their estimates were
much closer to the pattern of world price changes converted into Tanzanian
Shilling values. A similar issue seems to arise for non-food. They take this as
strongly suggestive evidence that the CPI was a downwardly biasedmeasure of
inflation in Tanzania, at least through 2007.
The inconsistency between the national accounts and survey consumption
evidence is graphically illustrated by Sandefur (2013). Dealing with the period
2000–7, he contrasts the marginal decline in poverty based on HBS data (as
seen above, 2.1 percentage points) with the significant decline in PPPUS$1/day
poverty (16.7 percentage points). Since both estimates are based on the same
survey evidence, the difference has to be attributed to the price series used to
obtain real values, the CPI being used for the PPPUS$1/day estimate. He
recalculated the PPPUS$1/day measure using instead a price deflator derived
from the HBS, and obtained a much less dramatic poverty decline (just 3.5
percentage points). This shows that the price series used to establish
trends in well-being and poverty plays a critical role, and explains in large
measure the inconsistency between the national accounts and survey-based
narratives. Sandefur (2013) clearly favours the price series obtained from
the surveys. These prices are obtained directly from the household question-
naires, and reflect the prices actually paid by Tanzanian households; and
they are derived from the same data used to compute the poverty indicators.
Official inflation estimates (such as the CPI) are based on surveys of local
urban markets only, which may not reflect the prices actually paid by
most rural households; and they face the problems already identified
by Adam et al. (2012).
It is also important to recognize that the CPI is normally a macro-weighted
index, which gives rich household consumption baskets a large weight. The
index based on the household survey places more weight on the consumption
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patterns of poorer households, meaning that basic items have a higher weight.
Consistent with world price increases over the period, one would expect more
rapid inflation in the household-survey-based index, which is more relevant
for the measurement of the monetary poverty rate.
There are therefore several reasons for arguing that, for analysing the eco-
nomic well-being of the population, the survey-based price data are to be
preferred. A corollary question may be whether the price indices used for
measuring growth (i.e. either the GDP deflators or CPI estimates) give too
favourable a view of recent economic growth. In other words, are official
estimates of real GDP (and private consumption) open to question?
In sum, using the best available data to assess changes over 2001–12, the
main issue is not so much why Tanzania’s reported fast growth led to so little
poverty reduction—rather, it is why real household consumption has grown
so slowly.
11.4 The Pattern of Poverty Change in Tanzania and an
Evaluation of its Robustness
In assessing the monetary poverty results in greater detail for Tanzania, it is
very important to review underlying measurement issues. There are two
major challenges which must be taken account of in this assessment: the
issue of the comparability of the latest two of the surveys used and the
adequacy of price data. On survey comparability, the data for the four avail-
able years all come from HBSs conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics.
The first three surveys are considered to be largely comparable with each
other. As already noted, a set of improvements in survey design and meth-
odological approach were introduced with the 2011/12 survey (World Bank
2015), creating potential issues of comparability with earlier work. For the
comparison between 2007 and 2011/12, the World Bank (2015) for its recent
Poverty Assessment recomputed the consumption aggregates for 2007 on a
comparable basis to the 2011/12 estimate.4 This revised 2007 estimate is
then not directly comparable with the earlier series; that comparison needs
to be made based on the original 2007 estimate. On prices, the data available
from the surveys may give a better assessment of inflation over the period
between the surveys, but they are still quite inadequate for adjusting for the
differences in the prices faced by different households. These issues are
revisited again later in this section; to begin with we discuss the available
results at face value.
4 Differences in sampling and survey methodology remain.
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The analysis in this section relies on national poverty lines. Data for the
poverty headcount by survey stratum (Dar es Salaam, Other Urban and Rural)
in mainland Tanzania are presented in Table 11.3, with the two different
figures for 2007 reflecting the above observation. It is clear that poverty is
consistently lower in urban areas than rural areas, and that over the entire
period much faster progress in poverty reduction has been experienced in Dar
es Salaam compared with other strata. In particular, there were quite large
poverty reductions in Dar between 1991/2 and 2000/1 and between 2007 and
2011/12. Over these periods, average real consumption in Dar grew by 4.5 per
cent and 3.3 per cent per annum respectively, while the consumption growth
rates were much slower elsewhere. In urban areas outside Dar, the poverty
headcount fell very slowly between each survey. The same happened in rural
areas between 1991/2 and 2007, while poverty seems to have fallen more in
rural areas between 2007 and 2011/12. An analysis of extreme poverty, cover-
ing those households whose consumption lies below the food poverty line,
shows very similar patterns and trends (not presented here).
The same table also provides estimates of national-level Gini coefficients.
Here, the striking features seem to be its relatively low level (compared with
neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda) and its relative
constancy over time. The only change in the Gini coefficient happens with
the recalculated 2007 consumption data, and even that change is relatively
small. This finding of a moderate and stable level of inequality may seem
surprising given, among other things, the faster progress shown by Dar es
Salaam over this period relative to the rest of the country. We highlight that it
is always a concern in household surveys that wealthier households are not
adequately captured.
The nature of these changes over time can be further explored by consider-
ing growth incidence curves for the strata between each pair of years
(Figures 11.2a–c). Between 1991/2 and 2000/1 the national pattern shows
slow growth throughout most of the distribution, except at the very bottom
and at the top (Figure 11.2a). The stratum level curves again show that growth
over this period was much faster in Dar than elsewhere. While the growth
Table 11.3. Poverty headcounts and Gini coefficients for Tanzania
Location 1992/3 2000/1 2007 2007 2011/12
National headcount 38.6 35.7 33.6 34.4 28.2
By stratum
Dar es Salaam 28.1 17.6 16.4 14.1 4.0
Other urban 28.7 25.8 24.1 22.7 21.5
Rural 40.8 38.7 37.6 39.4 33.4
Gini coefficient (national) 0.343 0.356 0.353 0.373 0.342
Source: Authors’ computation from HBS datasets
Rapid Growth but Limited Poverty Reduction
250
rate in Dar generally increased with the consumption level over this period,
there was positive growth also at the bottom of the distribution, consistent
with the poverty reduction seen there over this period. There was slower
growth in other urban areas, but generally not at the bottom of the distribu-
tion where the poor are concentrated. In rural areas, consumption growth was
very slow over this period, even if according to available data it was slightly
higher at the bottom of the distribution.
Growth incidence curves for the 2000/1 to 2007 period show very little
growth overall (Figure 11.2b).5 There appears to be no significant change in
inequality over the period; if anything, growth over this period was margin-
ally faster at the bottom of the distribution.
The stratum-level GICs over the 2007 to 2011/12 period again show much
faster growth in Dar es Salaam than the other strata, and in both other urban
and rural areas, mean real consumption actually falls over this period
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Figure 11.2a. Growth incidence curves by strata, 1991/2–2000/1
Source: Authors’ computations from 1992/3 and 2000/1 survey data
5 The fact that the growth rate is higher in the national GIC than in any of the others is
explained by significant population shifts over the period, with the population in the (poorer on
average) rural areas falling from 80.4 per cent in 2000/1 to 74.8 per cent in 2007.
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growth rate falls as households become better off. Reported growth is rela-
tively faster at the bottom of the distribution, though the absolute magnitude
of change is still quite small. The same pattern is seen in each of the strata.
As another representation of this, kernel density plots comparing the loga-
rithm of consumption per adult for 2007 and 2011/12 are presented in
Figure 11.3, with a similar plot comparing 2000/1 and 2007. The 2000/1 and
2007 curves are very close to each other, with the 2007 curve very slightly to
the right throughout much of the distribution. The difference between the
2007 and 2011/12 curves is observed at the bottom of the distribution only;
there are fewer observations at lower values of per adult consumption in 2011/
12 than was the case in 2007. This underlies the shape of the growth incidence
curves seen above. This seeming change in the distributional pattern of
growth raises the question of whether this is picking up a real phenomenon
or whether it could reflect more effective collection of the data at the bottom
of the distribution in 2011/12.
While the 2007 and 2011/12 data used here were computed on as compar-
able a basis as possible, there are still differences in the way the data were
collected. It is possible that improvements in the design and implementa-
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Figure 11.2b. Growth incidence curves by strata, 2001–7
Source: Authors’ computations from 2000/1 and 2007 survey data
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households.6 In both rounds, food consumption was collected in a fairly
similar way using a diary which the interviewers monitored on a daily
basis; it is not possible though to verify whether this monitoring was
more carefully done in the 2011/12 survey compared with the 2007 sur-
vey. There was potentially a bigger change in how the non-food data were
collected, in that in 2011/12 respondents were asked about items individu-
ally one by one while in 2007 they were asked about broader categories of
goods and asked to specify items from a list. This might create a risk of
fewer non-food items being reported in 2007 compared with 2011/12. The
food consumption data in principle ought to be more comparable.
However, this does not seem to explain the observed outcome, in that if
growth incidence curves are generated for food consumption only (which
may be more comparable) for the 2007 to 2011/12 period, a similar distribu-
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Figure 11.2c. Growth incidence curves by strata, 2007–11/12
Source: Authors’ computations from 2007 and 2011/12 survey data
6 It is important first to note that in absolute terms the gains we measure among the poorer
groups are not particularly large. For the poorest five deciles, increases in consumption amount to
only around 4,000 TSh (in 2011/12 prices) per month, and appear significant in relative terms only
because of the low levels of consumption that characterize the bottom half of the consumption
distribution in Tanzania.
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Figure 11.3. Kernel density plots of the logarithm of consumption per adult, 2000/1–7
and 2007–11/12
Source: Authors’ computation from HBS dataset
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As a further check on whether consumption measurement issues are respon-
sible for the shape of these GICs, we use imputed estimates of consumption
for 2007 (thus avoiding any use of measured consumption in 2007). For this,
household consumption per capita in 2011/12 was regressed on ownership of
assets and household characteristics, selecting only characteristics and assets
available in the 2007 survey. These 2007 regressors were then used to predict
consumption in 2007, allowing for the random error component. One hun-
dred simulations were run for each household in 2007. The percentile points
were identified for each one of these simulations, and in conjunction with the
2011/12 percentile points were used to compute 100 estimates of the change
in consumption for each percentile which were then averaged. The results
based on these simulations show that the GICs are downward-sloping
through most of the range, and this also suggests relatively more rapid con-
sumption growth among lower percentiles.
Another major concern is about the inadequate price data available for this
analysis. The survey used a single deflator for inflation for all households in
Tanzania between 2007 and 2011/12, whereas it is highly likely that inflation
rates would have differed spatially or by income group. It is certainly plausible
that poor households may have faced higher inflation overall in this period,
given the greater share of food in their consumption baskets combined with
the fact that food price inflation was higher over this period. If so, this would
affect estimates of both poverty and inequality (Arndt et al. 2015).7 While
there is not sufficient information to be able to assess this, it underlines the
need for considerable caution in deriving strong conclusions from the data.
Alternatively, the GICs may be representing a real pattern of change. One
possible explanation might be that it captures a genuine reduction in con-
sumption by the poorest in 2007. Comparing food shares across the four HBS
surveys, it is the 2007 food share which stands out as being most different
(Table 11.4). If poorer households did reduce their level of food consumption
in response to, for example, sharply rising food prices in 2007 then the shape
of the GIC between 2007 and 2011/12 may represent catch-up by the poorest
households.
Another possible interpretation of the pattern of the GICs could be positive
changes made by households over the period. The national accounts data
suggest that growth in agriculture was not faster in the 2007–12 period com-
pared with the 2001–7 period, so this is unlikely to be amajor part of the story.
The survey data do suggest some movement out of agriculture in rural areas
over this period into wage work (potentially with a higher return); and, within
7 What is less clear is whether poorer households would also have faced higher food price
inflation as well; this would need to be the case to conclude that the food consumption GICs
were also misrepresenting the pattern of change.
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agriculture, some increase in the number of households cultivating cash crops
(who tend to be better off ). There was evidence of an increase in asset owner-
ship among the poorest 40 per cent (livestock and especially cell phones); and
also evidence of an increase in access to community infrastructure (electricity,
roads). It is, however, not obvious why this should affect poorer households
more; one might argue that better-off households are restraining consump-
tion levels and increasing their saving and investment in both rural and urban
areas. But, these explanations are speculative and remain to be rigorously
assessed.
Overall, the change in the survey methodology creates a serious question
about the comparability of the 2007 and 2011/12 data despite the best efforts
made to correct for this. If there are concerns about consumption having been
more accurately captured at the bottom end of the distribution in 2011/12
compared with 2007, then this would affect both the shape of the GICs, and
the estimates of reduction in poverty which would turn out to be overesti-
mates. Clearly, it will be important that the consumption data are collected in
a fully comparable way in future surveys.
The absence of adequate data to adjust for price changes compounds this.
The survey-based deflators give a better indication of the pattern of change
over this period than do national accounts or CPI-based deflators when the
focus is on measuring poverty. At the same time, the survey-based deflator
remains unsatisfactory because a single number for inflation or food price
inflation is assumed for the entire country, which is implausible.
What we have attempted here is to make the best possible overview of the
change in poverty, given the available data. The clear result from the analysis
and the common thread to all the discussion above is the slow growth in
real per capita consumption, which translates into relatively small poverty
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reduction outside of Dar es Salaam. This is one result from the consumption
poverty analysis of which we can be reasonably confident.
11.5 The Non-monetary Poverty Story
Wenow complement themonetary poverty review by a brief analysis of trends
in various non-monetary measures of deprivation. The data used are taken
from the Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) conducted in the
years 1991/2, 1996, 2004/5, and 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics andMacro
International 1993, 1997, 2005, 2011). A nationally representative sample for
thewhole country, including Zanzibar, was taken in each case; the sample sizes
were respectively 8,327, 7,969, 10,312, and 10,300 households.
From these micro data we capture the non-monetary multidimensional
nature of poverty by identifying five binary welfare indicators at the house-
hold level based on the Bristol Indictors (Gordon et al. 2003), taken as water,
sanitation, shelter, education, and information. A household is water-
deprived if the main source of drinking water is not from a pipe, tap, or well.
For sanitation, the household is deprived if it has no flush toilet or ventilated
improved pit toilet. A household is shelter-deprived if the main floor material
is dirt, sand, dung, or planks. A household is education-deprived if the house-
hold head has not completed at least primary school. The household is
information-deprived if it does not have a functioning radio or television.
Table 11.5 presents the percentage of households not deprived in each
dimension, comparing the first and last year of the DHS surveys and compar-
ing by region of the country. To start, the results show significant hetero-
geneity between urban and rural areas and across regions. Yet, almost all
Table 11.5. Households not deprived by welfare indicator, per cent
Water Sanitation Shelter Education Information
1992 2010 1992 2010 1992 2010 1992 2010 1992 2010
Nation 64.5 71.2 2.9 11.7 18.6 30.5 31.8 56.2 36.7 64.3
Rural 56.3 67.0 1.3 3.1 9.0 16.6 27.1 49.4 29.6 59.5
Urban 92.3 85.3 8.2 40.3 51.6 76.7 47.7 78.5 60.8 80.4
Western 56.6 77.1 3.2 6.5 9.6 15.0 23.4 45.6 30.5 64.5
Northern 57.8 62.8 3.9 11.0 26.3 36.8 38.3 62.5 48.0 64.2
Central 73.5 63.3 2.5 4.9 12.3 13.0 29.4 51.4 27.9 50.9
S. Highlands 60.0 66.5 1.2 9.8 13.9 32.0 33.2 59.4 32.5 65.7
Lake 51.2 70.7 2.7 12.7 12.0 25.7 30.4 51.1 32.9 64.1
Eastern 84.9 79.0 4.5 23.8 38.9 59.1 40.3 69.0 50.4 77.3
Southern 72.4 69.2 1.0 6.7 12.5 19.1 25.2 58.8 24.6 52.1
Zanzibar 90.3 98.4 3.3 27.6 34.0 66.5 33.3 50.1 55.1 75.5
Source: World Bank
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indicators demonstrate substantial improvements between 1992 and 2010,
with the exception of water in several locations. Sanitation facilities
improved from a very low starting value of 3 per cent in 1992 to reach 12
per cent in 2010. Water, sanitation, shelter, education, and information
all show improvements at national level by respectively 7, 8, 12, 24, and 27
percentage points.
Setting aside water for a moment, changes in these indicators were more
pronounced in urban areas compared with rural areas, and increases are
observed in every region of the country. There is significant heterogeneity
by zone in the extent of change; in sanitation and shelter, for example, large
improvements are seen over this period in the Eastern zone and in Zanzibar,
while changes are small in the Central zone. In relation to water, the pattern is
more diverse; some zones such as Western, Northern, Southern Highlands,
Lake, and Zanzibar see improvements, while others such as the Central,
Eastern, and Southern zones have deterioration in water access.
The national-level figure on water access is sensitive to constraints on the
time it takes to retrieve water. When we restrict not deprived in water to
households within thirty minutes of the water source, water access only
improves from 53 to 55 per cent. When being not deprived in water is
restricted to sources within fifteen minutes, the situation shows progress is
limited to a change from 39 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2010. The
situation is even more pronounced in urban areas.
Different measures of deprivation are defined for under-five-year-old chil-
dren, where the focus is on water, sanitation, nutrition, mothers’ education,
and location of delivery as themain welfare indicators. Children under five are
education-deprived if their mothers have not completed at least primary
school. Children under five are nutrition-deprived if the child is more than
two standard deviations below the median of the reference population in at
least one of the following anthropometric measures: weight for age, height for
age, weight for height. Children under five are delivery-deprived if the child
was delivered in a home rather than a health facility. Sanitation is as defined
before.
Table 11.6 shows that the percentage of the under-fives not deprived in each
dimension has improved significantly for all indicators. Between 1992 and
2010, water, sanitation, nutrition, and education improved by seven, six,
thirteen, and thirteen percentage points respectively, while delivery improved
by five percentage points from 55 to 50 per cent, suggesting the share of
women delivering at home has decreased. Examination of zones reveals that
sanitation, nutrition, and education improved everywhere, though by varying
extents, while there was substantial heterogeneity in the performance of
the delivery indicators ranging from significant improvements to a few
deteriorations.
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The story over this eighteen-year period in Tanzania is one of overall
improvements in most key non-monetary indicators, with the exception of
water in urban areas. A more detailed analysis of these non-monetary indica-
tors, including considering multiple deprivations, is undertaken by Arndt
et al. (2014).
11.6 Conclusions
While the process has been long, Tanzania has registered more impressive
economic progress over the past fifteen years than in the 1980s and 1990s.
Economic growth has favoured urban zones, especially Dar es Salaam, with
rural areas in general and the agricultural sector in particular lagging behind.
Consequently, monetary poverty remains high in rural areas, where the large
majority of poor people reside; and progress in poverty reduction has been
slow outside of Dar es Salaam. In addition to the pattern of growth, the impact
of the world food and fuel price shocks may also have been an important
factor over the period considered here.
Except for Dar, survey-based estimates of growth in real household con-
sumption have fallen far below the reported economic growth rates, and what
poverty reduction there has been has mostly taken place in the capital too.
The question is not why poverty reduction is slow given the fast overall
growth rate; it is rather why household consumption has grown so slowly.
The patterns of change in monetary poverty presented in this chapter
remain subject to uncertainty, both in relation to the comparability of the
consumption data between the latest two rounds and in relation to the price
adjustment which it has been possible to make. The best assessment we are
Table 11.6. Children under five (0–4 years) not deprived by welfare indicator, per cent
Water Sanitation Nutrition Education Delivery
1992 2010 1992 2010 1992 2010 1992 2010 1992 2010
Nation 64.0 70.6 2.5 8.6 45.5 59.0 46.9 59.6 55.0 49.6
Rural 56.9 67.5 1.1 2.0 44.1 56.7 42.7 55.1 46.7 41.8
Urban 91.4 83.7 8.0 36.4 50.9 68.8 63.3 78.3 86.5 82.6
Western 57.0 76.4 2.4 4.6 50.7 61.8 33.0 48.3 50.8 35.2
Northern 58.6 59.0 5.5 7.7 47.3 57.1 60.5 66.2 63.9 51.2
Central 72.2 59.9 1.7 2.9 41.3 49.3 51.3 58.1 57.5 46.9
S. Highlands 61.5 65.6 1.2 9.5 40.7 52.7 50.2 66.4 53.1 50.0
Lake 53.4 71.8 1.9 9.1 51.0 63.5 39.2 57.5 40.6 44.4
Eastern 80.8 79.9 3.2 18.4 45.7 66.0 53.7 67.0 65.4 74.4
Southern 73.3 71.1 0.7 6.0 34.2 55.6 47.7 65.6 70.0 69.0
Zanzibar 88.9 98.3 2.7 26.3 39.1 60.8 42.8 57.2 32.5 48.8
Source: As for Table 11.5
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able tomake with the existing data shows slow poverty reduction from 1992/3
to 2007, which seems to have increased a little in more recent years, including
in rural areas. The rate of decline remains slow; and the slightly more
rapid poverty reduction experienced recently still needs to be verified and
adequately explained, particularly the observation that poorer households
appear to have experienced better relative consumption growth than less
poor households. In addition, it is too early to judge how sustainable the
recently observed (still modest) rural poverty reduction may be, unless policy
focus is put squarely on rural sector advance. A much stronger focus on
agriculture must play a key role in accelerating rural poverty reduction.
Tanzania’s historical record in relation to non-monetary poverty is one of
progress, one positive legacy of the Nyerere era. These indicators also confirm
a pattern of general improvement between 1992 and 2010 for households as a
whole and in relation to young children, though not all indicators improve.
These changes are less directly related to growth and more to public service
provision.We do note as well that these improvements remain relatively slow.
Tanzania’s record on non-monetary indicators is not particularly impressive
compared with neighbouring countries, and is disappointing in some regions
of the country. In other words, it would appear that the extent and efficiency
of public service provision still needs to improve significantly.
On a parallel note, we wish to conclude by stressing that the present state of
lack of clarity and consistency as regards basic data should be a matter of
concern to both policymakers and those who wish a sound evidence base for
supporting future progress.
References
Adam, C., D. Kwimbere, W.Mbowe, and S. O’Connell (2012). ‘Food Prices and Inflation
in Tanzania’, International Growth Centre Working Paper, London/Oxford, July.
Arndt, C., M. Azhar Hussain, V. Leyaro, E. Jones, and F. Tarp (2013). ‘Poverty and
Growth in Tanzania’. Paper presented at the Conference on Inclusive Growth in
Africa: Measurement, Causes and Consequences, 20–1 September 2013, Helsinki
(draft dated August 2013).
Arndt, C., V. Leyaro, and K. Mahrt (2014). ‘Multi-dimensional Poverty Analysis for
Tanzania: First Order Dominance Approach with Discrete Indicators’, UNU-WIDER
Working Paper 2014/146. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Arndt, C., S. Jones, and V. Salvucci (2015). ‘When Do Relative Prices Matter for Meas-
uring Income Inequality? The Case of Food Prices in Mozambique’, Journal of
Economic Inequality, 13(3): 449–64.
Atkinson, A. B. and M. A. Lugo (2010). ‘Growth, Poverty and Distribution in Tanzania’,
International Growth Centre Working Paper 10/0831 (November). London and
Oxford: LSE and University of Oxford.
Rapid Growth but Limited Poverty Reduction
260
Deaton, A. (2005). ‘Measuring Poverty in a Growing World (or Measuring Growth in a
Poor World)’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 87: 1–19.
Demombynes, G. and J. G. Hoogeveen (2007). ‘Growth, Inequality and Simulated
Poverty Paths for Tanzania, 1992–2002’, Journal of African Economies, 16: 596–628.
Eele, G., J. Semboja, S. Likwelle, and S. Ackroyd (2000). ‘Meeting International Poverty
Targets in Tanzania’, Development Policy Review, 18(1): 63–83.
Gordon, D., S. Nandy, C. Pantazis, S. Pemberton, and P. Townsend (2003). Child Poverty
in the Developing World. Bristol: Policy Press.
Government of Tanzania (2009). Household Budget Survey 2007—Tanzania Mainland.
Dar es Salaam: National Bureau of Statistics.
Hoogeveen, J. and R. Ruhinduka (2009). ‘Poverty Reduction in Tanzania since 2001:
Good Intentions, Few Results’. Paper prepared for the Research and AnalysisWorking
Group of the MKUKUTA Monitoring System. Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Finance and
Economic Affairs.
Jerven, M. (2011). ‘Growth, Stagnation or Regression? On the Accuracy of Economic
Observations, Tanzania, 1961–2001’, Journal of African Economies, 20(3): 377–94.
Kessy, F., O.Mashindano, A. Shepherd, and L. Scott (eds) (2013). Translating Growth into
Poverty Reduction: Beyond the Numbers. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota.
Mashindano, O., K. Kayunze, L. da Corta, and F. Maro (2011). ‘Agricultural Growth and
Poverty Reduction in Tanzania 2000–2010: Where Has Agriculture Worked for the
Poor and What Can We Learn from This?’, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Work-
ing Paper No. 208 ( June).
Mkenda, A., E. Luvanda, and R. Ruhinduka (2010). ‘Growth and Distribution in
Tanzania: Recent Experience and Lessons’, Interim Report to REPOA (Policy Research
for Development).
National Bureau of Statistics andMacro International (1993). ‘Demographic and Health
Survey, 1991–92’.
National Bureau of Statistics andMacro International (1997). ‘Demographic and Health
Survey, 1996’.
National Bureau of Statistics and Macro International (2005). ‘Demographic and
Health Survey, 2004–5’.
National Bureau of Statistics andMacro International (2011). ‘Demographic and Health
Survey, 2010’.
Osberg, L. and A. Bandara (2012). ‘Why Poverty Remains High in Tanzania: And What
to Do About It?’, Special Paper 12/3. Dar es Salaam: REPOA (Policy Research for
Development).
Pauw, K. and J. Thurlow (2011). ‘Agricultural Growth, Poverty, and Nutrition in
Tanzania’, Food Policy, 36: 795–804.
Ravallion, M. (2001). ‘Measuring Aggregate Welfare in Developing Countries: How
Well Do National Accounts and Surveys Agree?’, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 2665 (August).
Sandefur, J. (2013). ‘Africa Rising? Using Micro Surveys to Correct Macro Time Series’.
Mimeo, Center for Global Development.
World Bank (2007). Sustaining and Sharing Economic Growth in Tanzania, ed. Robert J.
Utz. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Growth and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania
261
World Bank (2012). ‘Tanzania Economic Update. Spreading the Wings: From Growth
to Shared Prosperity’, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Issue 2.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank (2013). ‘Tanzania Economic Update. Raising the Game: Can Tanzania
Eradicate Extreme Poverty?’, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit,
Issue 4. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank (2015). ‘Tanzania Mainland Poverty Assessment’. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
Rapid Growth but Limited Poverty Reduction
262
12
Assessing Progress in Welfare
Improvements in Zambia
A Multidimensional Approach
Gibson Masumbu and Kristi Mahrt
12.1 Introduction
Throughout the 2000s, Zambia achieved robust economic growth with real
gross domestic product (GDP) growing at an average annual rate of 7 per cent,
making Zambia one of the fastest-growing economies in southern Africa
(AFDB 2013; World Bank 2014) and boosting Zambia from low-income to
middle-income country status. This economic achievement is remarkable in
that it follows more than twenty years of economic decline whereby GDP per
capita fell from US$1,070 at independence to US$582 in 1994 (World Bank
2013), rural extreme consumption poverty peaked in 1993 at 84 per cent (CSO
2005), and life expectancy fell from 53 years in 1987 to 48 years in 1992
(Bonnick 1997). Despite this sustained, strong macroeconomic performance
returning per capita GDP to its level at independence, Zambia’s growth has
not proven to be inclusive and has not translated into significant consump-
tion poverty reduction.
The Zambian government has prioritized poverty reduction since the 2002
adoption of the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PSRP) and the
subsequent Fifth and Sixth National Development Plans (FNDP and SNDP).
Yet, despite targeted planning and robust growth, 2010 national consumption
lines indicate that 60 per cent of the population still lives in poverty with 42
per cent living in extreme poverty (CSO 2010b). With population growth, the
absolute number of poor increased from approximately 5 million in 1993 to
8 million in 2010 (CSO 2010b). Poverty is overwhelmingly concentrated
in rural areas where the consumption poverty rate remains persistently high at
77 per cent (compared to only 27 per cent in urban areas). Ninety per cent of
Zambians living below the extreme poverty line reside in rural areas (CSO
2010b). Despite disappointing trends in monetary poverty, the Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI) suggests recent improvements in non-monetary poverty
indicators. The 2013 HDI classifies Zambia as a middle human development
country with a rank of 141 out of 187 countries (UNDP 2014), an improve-
ment compared to its 2010 classification as a low-development country with a
rank of 164 (UNDP 2011). Nonetheless, the country’s slow progress in meet-
ing the Millennium Development Goals provides evidence that Zambia con-
tinues to lag behind in crucial areas of basic human development, including
the provision of health and education services as well as infrastructural related
services such as water, sanitation, and electricity (UNDP 2013).
In this chapter, we analyse poverty in Zambia between 1996 and 2010. We
review recent growth and consumption poverty trends, and in this context, we
evaluate the distribution and evolution of multidimensional household welfare.
Recognizing the importance of non-monetary dimensions of poverty, we
employ the first-order dominance (FOD) approach to assessing multidimen-
sional welfare developed by Arndt et al. (2012). FOD allows multidimensional
welfare comparisons across populations without imposing assumptions about
the relative importance of each welfare dimension. Applying the FOD method-
ology to the 1996, 2006, and 2010 Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys
(LCMS), five household-level binary indicators measuring welfare in water,
sanitation, shelter, energy, and education form the basis of analysis. FOD com-
parisons generate information about the relative welfare of the nine provinces of
Zambia and their performance over time. In addition, we evaluate the welfare of
households across rural agricultural strata and urban housing cost areas.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 12.2 provides an overview of
the country’s economic performance, including recent economic achieve-
ments and consumption poverty trends. Section 12.3 elaborates on the FOD
methodology and the primary data sources. Section 12.4 presents FOD spatial
and temporal welfare comparisons for both provinces and rural and urban
household strata. Finally, section 12.5 contextualizes the FOD results and
concludes.
12.2 Context
12.2.1 Economy and Growth
Zambia has one of the richest mineral deposits on the continent and is the
fourth largest copper producer in the world (Whitworth 2014). The nation is
also endowed with both substantial land resources, of which 58 per cent is
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classified as having medium to high potential for agricultural production, and
some of the best surface and underground water resources in Africa; yet only
15 per cent of arable land is currently in use (USAID 2011). At the time of
independence in 1964, Zambia was a middle-income country with one of the
fastest growing economies in the region (DiJohn 2010). Zambia’s rich mineral
wealth was well developed, and world market conditions were generally
favourable, contributing to average annual growth rates in excess of 4 per
cent through 1974 (de Kemp, Faust, and Leiderer 2011; World Bank 2014).
The country’s fortunes began to change as a result of external shocks in the
early 1970s. In 1973, oil prices quadrupled (de Kemp et al. 2011), leading to a
sharp rise in the prices of imports (Ndulo andMudenda 2004). In 1974, copper
prices dropped by 40 per cent and remained weak and unstable through the
mid-1990s (Ndulo and Mudenda 2004). Since copper accounted for 90 per
cent of Zambia’s export revenue, the economy experienced severe difficulties
adjusting to this long-lasting deterioration in terms of trade. The economy’s
weaknesses due to dependence on a single commodity began to show. With a
weak manufacturing base, an underdeveloped agricultural sector, and a rapid
opening of the economy, the effects of the shock were transmitted to all
sectors of the economy, resulting in severely reduced and even negative
growth (Figure 12.1). By 1975, Zambia faced a sharp decline in government
revenue and a serious balance of payments problem. The government, on the
other hand, continued a programme of heavy public spending financed
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Figure 12.1. GDP and GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$), 1960–2013
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014)
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In 1991, the country experienced a major political regime shift. The new
government began implementing structural adjustment reforms sponsored by
the Bretton Woods Institutions. Reforms notwithstanding, economic malaise
continued throughout the 1990s. Average annual GDP growth fell from 1.6
per cent in the 1970s to 1.4 per cent in the 1980s and 1.3 per cent in the 1990s,
implying negative growth in per capita terms (World Bank 2014). The country
performed poorly in many other economic indicators, including those related
to basic macroeconomic control such as inflation and the fiscal deficit (see
Table 12.1). In the 1970s, inflation averaged about 10 per cent but this
increased steadily over the years and hit its peak in the 1990s when it exceeded
100 per cent. The government’s fiscal deficit averaged about 2 per cent of GDP
during the late 1990s. By 2000, it stood at about 5.4 per cent (de Kemp, Faust,
and Leiderer 2011).
With rising copper prices and sounder economic policy, Zambia’s economy
began to turn around in the late 1990s and has continued to grow rapidly
(Figure 12.1). Between 2000 and 2013, Zambia maintained an average annual
GDP growth rate of 7 per cent, making it among the fastest-growing economies
in Africa (AFDB 2013;World Bank 2014). Improved economic performance has
been fuelledby, amongother factors, the cancellationof the country’s debt stock
in 2005 under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The debt
stock had reached approximately US$7 billion and was reduced to less than
US$1 billion before it began to increase in 2011/12. In addition, an upswing in
copper prices led to increased foreign direct investment in the mining sector.
Over a sustained period of time, the government managed to contain the
budget deficit, reduce inflation to single digit levels, and stabilize exchange
rates (Table 12.1). Foreign exchange reserves have accumulated to an excess of
three months’ import cover for the first time since the 1970s.
Table 12.1. Key macroeconomic indicators, annual averages, 1964–2011




5.3 3.9 0.6 0.8 2.1 0.8 3.4 5.5 8.1 8.3
Real GDP (US$
billions)
3.8 4.4 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.6 6.9 9.8 13
Real GDP per
capita (US$)
999 977 890 775 698 635 599 648 806 972
Inflation (annual
average, %)





0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 8.5 278 1,527 4,127 4,172 4,829
Source: Constructed from World Bank WDI (2014) and IMF WEO data by Cheelo and Muchimba (2012)
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Structural adjustment led to significant and lasting changes to the com-
position of the Zambian economy (see Figure 12.2); however, Resnick and
Thurlow (2014) argue that structural changes, thus far, have had little impact
on overall welfare. Economic liberalization in the 1990s led to a booming
service sector, which by the mid-1990s became the biggest contributor to
GDP and the greatest source of growth. Fuelled by large publicly funded
infrastructure projects, as well as private projects and mining developments
(Cardozo et al. 2014), construction expanded by an average of 15 per cent
annually in the 2000s. This significant growth did not translate to social
transformation, as employment creation was limited to low-wage, insecure
informal trade as well as high-wage service and construction employment
primarily benefitting urban high-income groups (Resnick and Thurlow
2014). Though large inflows of foreign direct investment, as well as relatively
high copper prices, contributed to 10 per cent annual growth in the mining
and quarrying sector, the sector’s capital intensity meant little employment
creation. In contrast, factors including privatization and trade liberalization
hit manufacturing hard in the 1990s and the sector struggled to rebound
with only low growth in the 2000s. While government agricultural supports
and good weather patterns led to recent bumper maize crops, productivity
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Figure 12.2. Value added as a percentage of GDP, 1965–2013
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014)
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12.2.2 Poverty Trends
Table 12.2 presents the national and provincial poverty headcount rates using
the national consumption poverty line (CSO 2005, 2012). Unfortunately,
assessment of long-run trends is complicated by differences in methodology.1
Nevertheless, it is useful to review the figures as they form a basis for much of
the understanding of poverty dynamics in Zambia. Based on these figures, the
national poverty headcount declined from 69 per cent in 1996 to 61 per cent
in 2010, a change driven by large improvements in urban areas, which cor-
responds with rising GDP per capita (Figure 12.1). In 1996, 46 per cent of the
urban population was poor compared to 28 per cent in 2010.2 In rural areas,
where 61 per cent of the population resides, poverty has remained stubbornly
high. In 1996, 82 per cent of the rural population lived in poverty. Corres-
ponding to a period of 3 per cent average annual growth in agricultural value
added, rural poverty declined by four percentage points to 78 per cent in 2004.
However, between 2004 and 2010 the agricultural sector declined by an
average annual rate of 2 per cent and rural poverty did not budge, ending
the period with a rural poverty rate of 78 per cent. With rural poverty levels
hovering around 80 per cent, the majority of people in rural areas have hardly
reaped the benefits of buoyant economic growth.
At the provincial level, the gap between the more highly developed Copper-
belt and Lusaka provinces and all other provinces widened between 1996 and
Table 12.2. Poverty headcount rates by area, 1991–2010
1996 1998 2004 2006* 2010*
National 69 73 68 63 61
Rural 82 83 78 80 78
Urban 46 56 53 30 28
Central 74 77 76 71 61
Copperbelt 56 65 56 37 34
Eastern 82 79 70 79 78
Luapula 78 82 79 74 81
Lusaka 38 53 48 25 24
Northern 84 81 74 79 75
Northwestern 80 77 76 71 67
Southern 76 75 69 73 68
Western 84 89 83 83 80
Note: *The 2006 and 2010 poverty rates are not comparable. These rates were calculated using year-specific Engel ratios
to derive food shares; previous years used a fixed ratio.
Source: CSO (2005, 2012)
1 Specifically, poverty rates in 2006 and 2010 are not directly comparable to previous years. In
2006 and 2010 food shares are derived using year-specific Engel ratios while prior years used a fixed
ratio.
2 This could be explained by the change in themethodology used to compute poverty statistic in
the 2006 and 2010 reports.
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2010. For example, 34 per cent of the population in Copperbelt is poor
compared to the next well-off province, Central, where 61 per cent of the
population is poor. The poorest provinces, Eastern, Luapula, andWestern, saw
little to no improvement, with approximately 80 per cent of the population
living in poverty in 2010. Table 12.3 reports consumption poverty rates by
urban housing cost areas and rural agricultural strata. Though urban poverty
fell over the period, the large divide between low- and high-cost urban hous-
ing areas increased from twenty-two percentage points in 1996 to thirty
percentage points in 2010. But this difference is dwarfed by the forty-five
and seventy-five percentage point gap between the poverty rates in low- and
high-cost urban housing areas compared to small-scale farm households.
This gap inwelfare between urban areas, Lusaka, andCopperbelt and all other
areas is made manifest in one of the highest levels of inequality in the world
(World Bank 2014). Inequality worsened from a Gini coefficient of 0.60 in 2006
to 0.65 in 2010 (CSO2012). Furthermore, in 2010, the bottom50per cent of the
Zambianpopulation received ameagre 9.1 per centof the country’s total income
compared to the top 10 per cent reaping 52.2 per cent (CSO 2012).
Interprovincial comparisons point to skewed economic development
whereby predominantly rural provinces, such as Western, Northern, Luapula,
and Eastern, are characterized by high poverty rates and low welfare compared
to the more developed Copperbelt, Central, and Lusaka provinces. Stagnation
in rural areas can be attributed in part to a persistent duality of the economic
structure. At independence, the country inherited a lopsided economy based
on the extraction of copper in the Copperbelt. Transportation infrastructure
ran from Copperbelt, through Central province, Lusaka, and Southern prov-
ince to Southern Rhodesia, and consequently commercial activities were
concentrated in Copperbelt and what came to be known as the line of rail
(Simson 1985). The newly independent government strove to redress imbal-
ances and inequalities by increasing its role in economic management and
Table 12.3. Poverty headcount rates by stratum, 1996–2010
1996 1998 2004 2006* 2010*
Low-cost housing 58 61 58 35 35
Medium cost 43 50 46 14 9
High-cost housing 36 33 30 5 5
Small-scale farms 88 84 79 82 80
Medium-scale farms 73 72 73 70 70
Large-scale farms 22 16 37 33 25
Non-agricultural 80 80 69 68 59
Note: *The 2006 and 2010 poverty rates are not strictly comparable with earlier years. These rates were calculated using
year-specific Engel ratios to derive food shares, whereas previous years used a fixed ratio. This methodology shift may
underlie the declines observed by housing cost between 2004 and 2006.
Source: CSO (2005, 2012)
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planning, including state ownership and the delivery of free social services.
The government built strategic industries in all provinces to provide employ-
ment in order to boost local economies. Free access to health care, education,
and other social amenities was meant to reduce inequities between rural and
urban areas (UNDP 2011). However, the economic downturn in the 1980s and
1990s and adherence to structural adjustment programmes drastically reduced
the government’s capacity to overcome socioeconomic imbalances. With-
drawal of public support resulted in the closure of nearly all industries away
from the line of rail as well as reductions in social services and social protec-
tion programmes. During this period, poverty peaked and the nation’s human
development fell to its lowest levels (UNDP 2011).
With 61 per cent of the population living in rural areas where consumption
poverty rates continue to hover near 80 per cent, the polarized socioeconomic
structure of the Zambian economy remains central to poverty reduction
efforts. Overall, the average salary of Zambian workers is lower than the
national consumption poverty line, and of the working poor, 81 per cent are
engaged in farming (AFDB 2013). With 60 per cent of Zambian workers
engaged in agricultural activities, growth in the agricultural sector provides
the greatest potential for inclusive growth and poverty reduction (AFDB 2013;
Diao et al. 2010). Table 12.4 presents employment by area in the formal and
informal sectors and the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The level of
formal economic activity in rural areas is very low. Within rural areas, 95 per
cent of workers are employed in the informal sector (compared to 69 per cent
in urban areas), 81 per cent of whom are employed in agriculture-related
activities. Overall, the provinces with the highest poverty rates in 2010,
Table 12.4. Employment by sector, 2012, per cent
Formal sector Informal sector
% of total non-agriculture agriculture % of total non-agriculture agriculture
National 15.4 89.7 10.3 84.6 40.1 59.9
Rural 5.5 66.4 33.6 94.5 19.3 80.7
Urban 31.3 96.3 3.7 68.7 86.3 13.7
Central 16.8 72.4 27.6 83.2 38.1 61.9
Copperbelt 30.1 96.1 3.9 69.9 69 31
Eastern 6.7 75.5 24.5 93.3 11.6 88.4
Luapula 4.0 79 21 96.0 20.5 79.5
Lusaka 31.3 93.3 6.7 68.7 90.4 9.6
Muchinga 6.1 92.9 7.1 93.9 19.3 80.7
Northern 4.6 87.3 12.7 95.4 28.9 71.1
Northwestern 13.8 84.7 15.3 86.2 23.8 76.2
Southern 8.0 87.9 12.1 92.0 40.7 59.3
Western 6.3 88.6 11.4 93.7 17.8 82.2
Note: Muchinga province was created in 2011 from Eastern and Northern provinces.
Source: CSO (2013)
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Eastern, Luapula, Northern, and Western (Table 12.2), correspond to the
provinces with the highest percentage of the population employed in the
informal sector and in agriculture.
In 2002, the government reintroduced agricultural supports with the goals
of increasing production of staple crops, particularly maize, and reducing rural
poverty (Mason and Smale 2013). Between 2004 and 2011, subsidized seed
and fertilizer distributed via the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP,
formally the Fertilizer Support Programme) and price supports via the Food
Reserve Agency (FRA) together comprised the majority of agricultural-sector
Poverty Reduction Programme spending, with FISP accounting for 30 per cent
of the total agricultural budget (Mason et al. 2013). In 2011, FISP amounted to
0.8 per cent of GDP and reached approximately 900,000 beneficiaries (Mason
et al. 2013), with the number of targeted beneficiaries increasing to 1,000,000
in 2014/15 (MAL 2014). However, recent studies suggest that disproportionate
participation of wealthier, larger farm households in FISP has resulted in
limited poverty reduction. Specifically, only 9, 11, and 30 per cent of Zambian
smallholder households received subsidized fertilizer through FISP in 2002/3,
2006/7, and 2010/11, respectively; and only 1, 10, and 27 per cent of Zambian
smallholders sold maize to the FRA in the 2003/4, 2007/8, and 2011/12 maize
marketing years, respectively (Mason and Tembo 2014; Mason et al. 2015).
Among smallholder farmhouseholds, larger farms weremore likely to receive
FISP fertilizer (Mofya-Mukuka et al. 2013). Furthermore, wealthier farmers were
not only over-represented but also received greater shares of FISP fertilizer, such
that in 2002/3 and 2010/11 respectively, the programme distributed only 7
and 15 per cent of FISP fertilizer to the poorest two income quintiles of the
smallholder population compared to 63 and 42 per cent to the richest quintile
(Mason and Tembo 2014). Poor targeting may have contributed to the meas-
ured lack of impact on poverty reduction. Programme efficiency may also be to
blame.Mason and Tembo (2014) estimate that receipt of a 200 kg fertilizer pack
only marginally reduces households’ probability of falling below the US$2/
capita/day poverty line by half a percentage point and reduces poverty severity
by one percentage point. Mason and Smale (2013) find that a 10 kg seed
pack more favourably reduces poverty severity by 0.7 percentage points and
increases income by 1.1 per cent, suggesting high private and social cost–
benefit ratios for a range of prices and administrative costs.
12.3 FOD Methodology and Data
12.3.1 Methodology
In this analysis, we seek to better understand the nature of welfare dynamics
during a period of high growth and relatively little monetary poverty
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reduction by evaluating the performance of Zambian households by province
and urban and rural strata based on a set of non-monetary household out-
comes. Despite the broad consensus on the multidimensional character of
poverty, how to evaluate multiple dimensions in a single analysis remains a
central topic of debate. The most common methods of evaluating multidi-
mensional poverty rely on either arbitrary weighting schemes or assumptions
regarding the nature of the welfare function. The FOD methodology devel-
oped by Arndt et al. (2012) advances multidimensional poverty analysis in its
ability to compare the welfare of population groups without imposing arbi-
trary assumptions. Rather, the FOD criterion merely asserts that it is better to
be not deprived than deprived in any dimension.3
Intuitively, consider a set of three ordinal, binary welfare indicators such
that ‘0’ indicates deprived and ‘1’ indicates not deprived in each dimension.
Each combination of welfare indicators is said to dominate, be dominated
by, or be indeterminate relative to other combinations. The outcome (1,1,1)
clearly is better than or dominates (0,0,0), since it is superior in every
dimension. Furthermore, the outcome (1,1,0) dominates (0,1,0) because it
is better to be not deprived than deprived in the first dimension. However,
(1,1,0) and (0,0,1) are indeterminate outcomes; without imposing assump-
tions regarding the relative importance of or substitutability between each
outcome, it cannot be determined if it is better to be not deprived in the first
two dimensions or in the third dimension. Extending to two populations,
A and B, consider the distribution of individuals falling into each combin-
ation of welfare indicators. The FOD criterion can be described as follows:
population A first-order dominates population B if one can generate distri-
bution B by transferring probability mass (i.e. moving individuals) from
better to unambiguously worse outcomes within A, where better is defined
as above.
While FOD analysis allows for comparison across populations without
imposing subjective restrictions, the criterion is strict and comes at a cost.
Specifically, FOD comparisons frequently result in indeterminate outcomes
and do not provide a sense of the extent of domination. Arndt et al. (2012)
employ repeated bootstrap samples drawn from each population such that
resulting FOD comparisons can be interpreted as empirical probabilities of
domination. Not only do probabilities of domination reduce the possibility of
indeterminate outcomes, but they also provide evidence of the extent to
which a population dominates another. Furthermore, bootstrap probabilities
allow populations to be ranked.
3 For a detailed theoretical discussion of the FOD methodology, refer to Arndt et al. (2012).
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Though FOD comparisons frequently result in indeterminate outcomes, it
should be noted that this shortcoming is countered by the strength of a
dominant result. A dominant result requires superior welfare outcomes to be
registered throughout the population and across indicators, meaning an inde-
terminate result could stem from relatively poor outcomes in a single indicator
within a small section of the population. Thus, a dominance result provides a
robust indication of broad-based superiority through time or across space
(Arndt et al. 2012).
12.3.2 Data
FOD indicators are defined using the 1996, 2006, and 2010 Zambia Living
Conditions Monitoring Surveys (LCMS) conducted by the Central Statistical
Office (CSO). These nationally representative surveys allow for welfare com-
parisons at the provincial and urban/rural levels. The sampling method also
allows for analysis of households by urban housing cost areas (low, medium,
and high cost), and rural agricultural activities (non-agricultural, small-scale
farm, medium-scale farm, and large-scale farm households). The total num-
ber of households surveyed increased over the study period from 11,787
in 1996 to 18,662 in 2006 and 19,397 in 2010. In urban areas, 65, 20, and
15 per cent of the 2010 sample reside in low-, medium-, and high-cost areas,
respectively. In rural areas, approximately 75, 10, and 15 per cent of the
2010 sample are engaged in small-scale farming, medium-scale farming, or
non-agricultural activities, respectively. Fewer than sixty large-scale farming
households were included in each sample, and therefore this stratum is
excluded from analysis.
12.3.3 FOD Indicators
We define welfare in terms of five household indicators inspired by the
national development goals as outlined in the Sixth National Development
Plan (GRZ 2011) and Vision 2030 (GRZ 2006): water, sanitation,4 housing,
energy, and education. Given the government’s prioritization of development
goals, it becomes logical to use indicators directly associated with these
expenditure priorities such that the welfare comparisons inform the alloca-
tion of public expenditure (Arndt et al. 2013). Table 12.5 defines each indica-
tor in terms of deprivations.
4 MDG definitions of improved water and sanitation (WHO and UNICEF 2014) provided a
framework for defining the water and sanitation indicators.
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12.4 Assessing the Progress in Improving Welfare
This section presents an assessment of Zambia’s household welfare in 1996,
2006, and 2010.5 We strive to place multidimensional welfare in context with
monetary poverty headcount trends as well as provide analysis pertinent to
evaluating the impact of Zambia’s national development programmes. We
begin with a discussion of trends in each of the FOD indicators and then
present spatial and temporal FOD results.
12.4.1 Levels of Deprivation
Figure 12.3 displays deprivation in each of the five indicators at the national,
urban, and rural levels and Table 12.6 presents the evolution of deprivations
across urban housing cost areas, rural agricultural strata, and all aggregate
areas. Overall deprivation in access to water, sanitation, and education signifi-
cantly declined over the period while only modest declines were registered in
deprivations in shelter and cooking fuel. In comparison to progress in redu-
cing rural consumption poverty (Table 12.2), this set of indicators provides
evidence of improved welfare driven by gains in rural areas whereas urban
welfare essentially stagnated. Further, in contrast to consumption poverty
rates by stratum (Table 12.3), small-scale farm households achieved notable
welfare gains in water, sanitation, and education. On the other hand, consist-
ent with a large decline in consumption poverty rates, non-agricultural house-
holds also achieved significant welfare gains in every indicator except shelter.
Over the study period, a great disparity persisted in deprivation levels of
Table 12.5. FOD indicators
Indicators Definitions
Sanitation Deprived if household does not have a flush toilet or covered/uncovered latrines.a
Water Deprived if main source of drinking waterb is not supplied by a tap, pipe, protected well or
spring, rainwater, or water kiosk.c
Housing Deprived if main flooring material is mud.
Fuel Deprived if household’s cooking fuel source is firewood, charcoal, or crop/livestock
material.
Education Deprived if household head has not completed primary school.
Notes: a The use of uncovered latrines should be considered a deprivation; however the 1996 and 2006 LCMS do not
distinguish between covered and uncovered latrines.
b The 1996 LCMS collected data on drinking water supply in the dry and wet seasons. The water indicator reflects
drinking water supply in the dry season.
c While water purchased from vendors is generally excluded from improved water sources, water kiosks differ in the
formal provision of safe water at regulated prices. Only the 2010 LCMS reports drinking water supply from water kiosks;
however, this does not create inconsistency since the kiosks were first introduced in 2006.
Source: Authors’ definitions
5 Population weights are used throughout the analysis.
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households residing in low-cost areas compared to medium- and high-cost
areas. However, low-cost areas outperformed all rural strata in every indicator
by a large margin. Though rural areas achieved notable gains, both the
deprivation rates and the gap between urban and rural deprivation levels
remained high.
While very little progress occurred in improving the quality of shelter and
cooking fuel over the fourteen-year period in any area or strata, the share of
the population with household heads who did not complete primary school
declined in every area and household stratum. In contrast, changes in access
to improved water and flush toilets or latrines varied substantially. In both
cases, little change occurred in urban areas whereas rural access improved by
twenty and sixteen percentage points, respectively. Improvements in rural
water access were concentrated among small farm and non-farm households
and rural sanitation access improved across all rural household strata. Inter-
estingly, provinces performing well in access to water do not necessarily
correspond to provinces with low levels of sanitation deprivation. For
instance, substantial strides were made to reduce water deprivation in South-
ern and Eastern provinces by seventeen and twenty-two percentage points,
putting these provinces on par with Copperbelt. However, Southern and
Eastern provinces have two of the highest sanitation deprivation rates. Des-
pite Luapala and Northern provinces also achieving reductions in water
deprivation close to twenty percentage points, deprivation remained
extremely high at nearly 70 per cent. Yet, Luapala and Northern province








1996 2006 2010 1996 2006 2010 1996 2006 2010 1996 2006 2010 1996 2006 2010
Water Sanitation Shelter Fuel Education
National Rural Urban
Figure 12.3. Deprivation by welfare indicator and area aggregate, per cent
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO (1996, 2006, and 2010) LCMS datasets





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































disparities remain large in both indicators at a maximum of sixty-five and
forty-two percentage points for water and sanitation respectively.
12.4.2 Number of Deprivations
Table 12.7 presents the total number of deprivations faced by households at
the national, rural, urban, and provincial levels and provides a sense of the
depth of overall household deprivation over time and across regions. Predom-
inately rural provinces (Eastern, Luapula, Northern, Northwestern, and West-
ern) follow the pattern of rural areas with the greatest shares of households
facing two, three, or four deprivations in 2010, while over the study period,
the shares of severely deprived households (facing four or five deprivations)
declined by more than twenty percentage points. Within rural areas, all
household strata follow this pattern. This decline in severely deprived rural
households was driven by gains attained by small-scale farm and non-farm
households. Households in Central and Southern provinces face fewer depriv-
ations with the greatest share of households facing one, two, or three depriv-
ations and respectively 10 and 11 per cent of households not deprived in any
indicator. Finally, the largest share of households not deprived in any indica-
tor or deprived in only one indicator reside in urban areas (38 and 35 per cent)
and Copperbelt (30 and 29 per cent) and Lusaka provinces (49 and 33 per
cent). Though little improvement occurred between 1996 and 2010 within
urban areas, households in low-cost housing areas accounted for the bulk of
this change.
12.4.3 Temporal FOD Comparisons
This section discusses temporal FOD results for areas and rural and urban
strata. FOD results are presented as the net probability of domination, which
measures the probability the welfare of an area or strata improves between two
years net of any probability of regression. Positive values indicate the prob-
ability of advancement in welfare and negative values indicate the probability
of regression.
Table 12.8 displays the net temporal FOD results for each aggregate area and
province. At the aggregate level, FOD comparisons indicate significant prob-
abilities of advancement at the national level over time. National welfare in
2010 based on the five FOD indicators dominated the welfare profiles of both
2006 and 1996 with a probability of 63 and 72 per cent. Rural areas advanced
between 1996 and 2010 with a probability of 76 per cent. At the provincial
level, Central, Eastern, Lusaka, Northern, Northwestern, and Southern prov-
inces all exhibit notable probabilities of welfare improvements in 2010. The
remaining provinces have positive probabilities of advancing from 2006–10 or
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1996–2010, though the probabilities are lower (less than 30 per cent in all
cases). Copperbelt is the only province registering a probability of decline,
with a 21 per cent probability of regression between 2010 and 2006; however
Copperbelt is equally likely to have advanced from 1996 to 2006 and from
1996 to 2010, respectively.
Measured changes in consumption or monetary poverty as per official
sources are not closely related to improvements in non-monetary poverty as
measured by the FOD. For instance, none of the areas with the greatest
probability of advancement between 1996 and 2010 (national, rural, Eastern,
Northern, and Southern) reduced consumption poverty over the same period
by more than 10 per cent (see Table 12.2); whereas the areas with the greatest
declines in monetary poverty (urban areas, Central, and Copperbelt) have
among the lowest probabilities of welfare advancement between 1996 and
2010, according to the FOD.Western province stands out as the only area with
very low consumption poverty reduction and very little probability of advan-
cing in FOD comparisons.
Table 12.9 displays the net temporal FOD results for each aggregate urban and
rural stratum. FOD comparisons suggest that no urban stratum was likely to
have achieved welfare improvements over time. In contrast, welfare improve-
ments in rural areas are likely. Households engaged in non-agricultural activities
had a 79 per cent likelihood of advancing between 2006 and 2010 and small-
scale farms had a 55 per cent chance of advancing between 1996 and 2010.
Interestingly, thoughmeasuredmonetary poverty in rural areas has been sticky
overall and for small-scale farm households in particular, over the study period
(see Table 12.3), welfare as defined by the FOD indicators is quite likely to have
improved.
Table 12.8. Temporal net FOD comparisons by aggregate area and province (probabilities)
2006 FOD 1996 2010 FOD 2006 2010 FOD 1996
National 0.20 0.63 0.72
Rural 0.09 0.30 0.76
Urban 0.30 0.19
Central 0.02 0.57 0.25
Copperbelt 0.22 0.23 0.21
Eastern 0.43 0.06 0.61
Luapula 0.15 0.27
Lusaka 0.06 0.33 0.48
Northern 0.80 0.95
Northwestern 0.18 0.04 0.58
Southern 0.63 0.46 0.73
Western 0.07 0.24 0.17
Note: Values in bold indicate domination in the static case (FOD without bootstrapping).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO (1996, 2006, and 2010a) LCMS datasets
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12.4.4 Spatial FOD Comparisons
In each year, FOD comparisons are made between all areas to determine the
degree of domination of each aggregate area and province. Tables 12.10 and
12.11 report the results of the 1996 and 2010 spatial FOD bootstrap compari-
sons. Higher row averages are associated with relatively better-off regions
(likely to dominate) while higher column averages are associated with rela-
tively worse-off regions (likely to be dominated). Row by row, values in the
inner table represent the probability that a row region dominates the corres-
ponding column region.6 FOD comparisons are also conducted between each
urban and rural stratum and results are presented in ranking tables in the
following section.
In all three years, column averages indicate that urban areas, Copperbelt,
and Lusaka dominated all other areas with a high degree of probability. The
probability of Copperbelt dominating other areas diminished over time from
80 per cent in 1996 to 54 per cent in 2010. The probability of Lusaka and
urban areas dominating other areas held fairly steady at 84 and 85 per cent in
1996 and 80 and 89 per cent in 2010, respectively. Rural areas and Western
province exhibit the highest average probability of being dominated (near 50
per cent) in both 1996 and 2010. The lack of relative progress in Western
province is consistent with both small gains in poverty rates and low prob-
ability of welfare advancement in temporal FOD comparisons. Eastern prov-
ince also has a relatively high average probability of being dominated in 1996
(43 per cent) but this average falls in 2010 (27 per cent). Finally, Northern
province experienced a notable decline in the probability of domination from
29 per cent in 1996 to 16 per cent in 2010. The gains in Eastern and Northern
provinces indicate an improvement relative to other areas and are consistent
with temporal results indicating a 61 and 95 per cent probability of advancing
over the same period.
Table 12.9. Temporal net FOD comparisons by urban and rural strata (probabilities)
2006 FOD 1996 2010 FOD 2006 2010 FOD 1996
Urban low-cost housing 0.17 0.10
Urban medium-cost housing 0.04
Urban high-cost housing
Small-scale farms 0.03 0.02 0.55
Medium-scale farms 0.05 0.03 0.02
Rural non-agricultural 0.79 0.18
Note: Values in bold indicate domination in the static case (FOD without bootstrapping).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO (1996, 2006, and 2010a) LCMS datasets
6 Note that bootstrap sampling introduces a degree of randomness into the results and care must
be taken not to place too much importance on very small probabilities.







































































































































































































































































































































































12.4.5 Ranking of Provinces
Spatial net domination scores provide a basis for ranking provinces and
conveniently presenting a more detailed perspective on the evolution of
relative well-being. Referring to Tables 12.10 and 12.11, net dominationmeas-
ures the probability that an area dominates other areas (row averages) minus
the probability it is dominated by other areas (column averages). Table 12.12
presents area rankings and Table 12.13 presents urban and rural stratum
rankings. It is worth noting that the difference in net domination scores is
often insufficiently large to distinguish between differences in welfare out-
comes and variability introduced through random bootstrapping. To avoid
misinterpreting rankings within the tables, shading identifies clusters with
similar net domination scores. Within these clusters, ranks cannot be estab-
lished with confidence.
Table 12.12 presents the ranking of the provinces based on net domination
scores. Little change in ranking occurs between 1996 and 2010. At first glance,
it appears as though a large degree of change takes place in 2006 relative to
1996 and 2010, but these changes are not generally robust. Rearranging
provinces within shaded areas could produce orderings in 2006 quite close
to those in 1996 and 2010. As indicated in the previous section, urban areas,
Lusaka, and Copperbelt are ranked in the top and rural areas and Western
provinces are ranked at the bottom, in all three years. Consistent with tem-
poral results, Copperbelt’s ranking robustly improved in 2006 and then wors-
ened again in 2010. Northern province is likely to have increased in rank
between 1996 and 2006 and 2010 from a rank as low as ninth in 1996 to a rank
as high as fifth in 2010, a result also consistent with temporal results. Eastern
province improved substantially in the extent to which it is dominated by
other areas, and its ranking improved from as low as eleventh to as high as
eighth position between 1996 and 2010, though this change in ranking is less
robust.
Table 12.13 presents rankings by urban housing cost areas and rural agricul-
tural activity based on net domination scores. Very little difference exists in
the welfare of households residing in medium- and high-cost housing areas
based on these indicators. Households in medium- and high-cost housing
areas strongly outperform households in low-cost housing areas. Households
located in low-cost housing areas, in turn strongly outperform the national
aggregate and all rural strata. Medium-scale farm households and non-
agricultural households attain similar welfare rankings in 1996 and 2006,
but non-agricultural farm households significantly outperform medium-
scale farm households in 2010, an improvement consistent with the temporal
advancement of non-agricultural households during 2006–10. Despite tem-
poral evidence of advancement in the welfare of small farm households, this































































































































































































































































































































































advancement was not sufficient to change rankings of relative well-being.
Though welfare improved, small-scale farm households remain severely
deprived relative to all other household strata, as evidenced by net domin-
ation scores of 0.9 in both 1996 and 2010. In other words, small-scale farms
were dominated in almost every comparison to all other household strata in
all bootstrap samples.
12.5 Discussion
Zambia has made strides in revitalizing its economy over the last twenty years.
The country rebounded from low and even negative growth in the 1980s and
1990s to a high average annual growth rate of 7 per cent in the 2000s. Both
external and internal factors boosted economic rehabilitation and growth,
including copper prices and debt cancellation along with consistent fiscal
discipline and economic liberalization policies. Despite strong growth, struc-
tural changes over the last twenty years have brought little social transform-
ation or employment creation (Resnick and Thurlow 2014). Though
agricultural productivity rose in recent years, productivity remains low with
agriculture’s contribution to GDP steadily declining. Consequently, impres-
sive economic growth, structural changes, and even the targeted rural farm
support programmes of the 2000s did not translate to substantial monetary
poverty reduction in the agriculture-dependent rural areas, according to offi-
cial statistics.
Table 12.12. Area rankings by probability of net domination
1996 2006 2010
Domination Rank Domination Rank Domination Rank
Urban 0.85 1 Copperbelt 0.73 1 Urban 0.88 1
Lusaka 0.84 2 Urban 0.68 2 Lusaka 0.80 2
Copperbelt 0.74 3 Lusaka 0.58 3 Copperbelt 0.41 3
Central 0.01 4 Central 0.01 4 Central 0.03 4
National 0.01 5 Northern 0.01 5 National 0.10 5
Southern 0.23 6 National 0.05 6 Southern 0.12 6
Luapula 0.25 7 Northwestern 0.14 7 Northern 0.15 7
Northwestern 0.26 8 Southern 0.14 8 Luapula 0.22 8
Northern 0.29 9 Luapula 0.22 9 Northwestern 0.24 9
Eastern 0.42 10 Eastern 0.37 10 Eastern 0.27 10
Rural 0.46 11 Rural 0.47 11 Rural 0.50 11
Western 0.52 12 Western 0.58 12 Western 0.54 12
Note: Areas grouped in shaded cells have net domination scores too close to distinguish between differences in welfare
and differences in bootstrap variation. Therefore, shaded rankings must be interpreted with caution.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO (1996, 2006, and 2010a) LCMS datasets

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In contrast to the monetary poverty figures, FOD results provide robust
evidence of broad-based gains in household welfare in Zambia between 1996
and 2010, with advancement based substantially on improved rural house-
hold welfare. Temporal FOD results suggest small farm and non-agricultural
rural households drove advancements in rural welfare. Temporal FOD also
provides robust evidence of advancement in Central, Eastern, Lusaka, North-
ern, Northwestern, and Southern provinces, with these results also driven by
improvements in rural household welfare. Nonetheless, rural households
continued to lag significantly behind their urban counterparts. Even with
broad improvements in other regions, Lusaka, Copperbelt, and urban areas
maintained vastly superior levels of well-being, though this relative superior-
ity weakened somewhat for Copperbelt. The contrast between measured
monetary poverty and FOD analysis extends into urban areas. The published
urban poverty headcount rate declined over the fourteen-year period of ana-
lysis, but FOD provides only weak support for urban welfare gains.
Despite the broad-based welfare gains (based on FOD) achieved by much of
the nation, including rural households and small farmers as a group, substan-
tial gains eluded the two provinces with the highest monetary poverty head-
count rates in 2010, Luapula and Western provinces. Temporal FOD indicates
only relatively weak probabilities of advancement of 27 per cent in Luapula
between 1996 and 2010 and 24 per cent in Western between 2006 and 2010;
in other words, the probability of no change or indeterminate outcomes is
relatively high at approximately 75 per cent.
As noted, small-scale farm households in particular and rural households in
general remain notably worse off compared with other household strata.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that, in terms of the multidimensional
indicators employed, some of the fruits of the improved growth performance
since the mid-1990s have been translated into real progress in important
development indicators on the ground.
In terms of future research, three areas are suggested. First, further analysis is
warranted to identify the extent to which FOD results are sensitive to data
restrictions and indicator choices. For instance, the Zambian government has
prioritized building covered latrines in rural areas. Yet, Living Conditions
Monitoring Surveys prior to 2010 do not distinguish between covered and
uncovered latrines and thus the sanitation indicator employed in this study
classifies all households using any latrines as not deprived. As a result, FOD
analysis could not capture improvements in sanitation for those moving from
uncovered to covered latrines and therefore welfare gains may be under-
represented. Applying FOD analysis to the 2010 and 2013 Zambia Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys would permit amore relevantly defined sanitation
indicator. Furthermore, considering alternative indicators measuring aspects
of welfare such as health, nutrition, or access to information would better our
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understanding of the sensitivity of results to indicator selection as well as
deepen our knowledge of the evolution of welfare in Zambia.
Second, the disconnect between the monetary poverty results and the FOD
merits further scrutiny. Detailed analysis of consumption levels is hampered
by the absence of quantity data within the household survey. It may (or may
not) be possible to marry the detailed consumer price index data, which
Zambia possesses, with the expenditure data from household consumption
surveys in order to get a more accurate fix on trends in consumption including
consumption poverty. This possibility should be investigated. Finally, while
the Zambian government can be credited with having converted a period of
relatively favourable commodity prices into some social gains, the economy
remains unbalanced, with large gaps in welfare between rural and urban areas,
and vulnerable to commodity price swings, particularly declines in the price of
copper. Policies to enhance inclusion and address commodity price vulner-
ability should remain in focus.
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Slow Progress in Growth and Poverty
Reduction in Cameroon
Samuel Fambon, Andy McKay, Joseph-Pierre Timnou, Olive Stéphanie Kouakep,
Anaclet Désiré Dzossa, and Romain Tchakoute Ngoho
13.1 Introduction
Cameroon is a country in Central Africa stretching over an area of 475,000
km2, with a population of about 22.5 million inhabitants in 2013 and a
density of about 39.7 inhabitants per km2. It is a member country of the
Franc Zone.1 Its currency, the franc of the Communauté Financière en Afrique
Centrale (the CFAF), is issued by Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC),2
and pegged to the euro at the fixed parity of €1 = CFAF655.55. Cameroon is
endowed with huge potentialities not only in agriculture, but also inminerals.
In addition, the country has oil resources at its disposal, which contributed
about 43 per cent of its exports in 2004, and accounted for 11.1 per cent of its
GDP (IMF 2005). Compared with other sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries,
Cameroon has a relatively diversified production base and resources, for it
produces and exports a wide range of non-oil products.3 Although the country
has been a producer and net exporter of oil since 1978, agriculture remains the
pillar of the economy and employs about 70 per cent of the labour force.
It has the largest population by some margin in the Central African region
and is the region’s leading economy. In its first twenty-six years after
1 Cameroon is also a member of the Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, of
the Commonwealth, and of the Communauté Economique des États d’Afrique Centrale.
2 The BEAC is the central bank of six Central African countries, namely: Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. The other members of the CFAF
currency area are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and since 1984, Mali,
whose common central bank is the Banque des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest.
3 These products are mainly cocoa, coffee, cotton, palm oil, bananas, rubber, and aluminium,
etc.
independence in 1960 its per capita GDP in 2005 US$ grew at 2.5 per cent per
year, reaching a maximum value of US$1,356 in 1986. At that point it was
among the wealthiest SSA countries outside South Africa. This, however, was
not a case of consistent GDP growth over this period. Per capita growth
between 1960 and 1977 averaged only 0.4 per cent per annum, but with the
discovery of oil and the start of its production from 1978 per capita growth
between 1977 and 1986 averaged 5.4 per cent per annum. This growth burst
was not sustained, and ever since 1986 Cameroon’s per capita GDP has been
significantly lower. The following twenty-eight years were not a case of
consistent decline; but since 1990 Cameroon has not had a per capita GDP
level in excess of US$1,000. It still remains relatively well-off among countries
in SSA; and it has not been significantly affected by conflict as have some of
its neighbours. But given its resources, its economic achievement has been
disappointing.
This chapter focuses predominantly on Cameroon’s record in terms of
poverty reduction. But this needs to be understood in the context of its overall
economic performance. Hence, in this chapter we begin by reviewing some of
the factors accounting for its growth performance (section 13.2), summarizing
the situation in different subperiods, and then drawing in particular on the
insights of the AERC study of Kobou et al. (2008). In section 13.2 we use
household data to look at the country’s record in reducing monetary poverty
and at the distributional pattern of growth (section 13.3). This is then com-
plemented by analysing its record in terms of non-monetary outcomes
(section 13.4). In this analysis a strong emphasis is placed on regional differ-
ences in this spatially diverse country. Section 13.5 concludes.
13.2 The History of Growth Performance in Cameroon
The growth history of Cameroon from its independence in 1960 to date is
conveniently summarized by Figure 13.1, which shows the evolution of per
capita GDP in local currency values. This is a case of a slow gradual growth,
averaging 0.6 per cent a year over the full period, but punctuated by a rela-
tively short-lived growth surge over the period 1976–85 during which per
capita growth averaged 6.3 per cent. The growth surge is relatively straight-
forwardly explained: it reflects the discovery and production of oil, at a time
when the initial oil price was high. The long-run performance calls for a more
detailed explanation, but has been the subject of a detailed and authoritative
political economy analysis by Kobou et al. (2008) on which we draw in
sections 13.2.5 and 13.2.6.
To first summarize the history of Cameroon over this period, it is conveni-
ent to subdivide into four distinct sub-periods: (i) 1960–77, before the
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exploitation of oil; (ii) 1978–86, when the oil sector played a major role in the
country’s economy; (iii) 1987–93 during which the economy witnessed a
serious economic crisis; and (iv) the period from 1994 to date, or the CFAF
post-devaluation sub-period relative to the French franc. The following para-
graphs briefly present Cameroon’s economic performance over each of these
sub-periods.
13.2.1 Prior to Oil Exploitation: 1960–77
Following independence in 1960, Cameroon adopted an interventionist
approach to industrialization and economic development. Trade policy kept
import prices high, terms of trade were stable, and there was a rapid expansion
of agricultural exports. Real GDP grew at an average rate of 3.1 per cent over
this period, but as the accompanying population growth averaged 2.4 per
cent, the per capita growth rate was much smaller. Growth was also quite
volatile during this time. The private investment/GDP ratio rose from 11 per
cent in 1963 to about 19 per cent in 1977; by contrast, public investment as a
percentage of GDP remained very low at 2 per cent. Government revenues
during this sub-period accounted for about 18 per cent of GDP, and the
average total budget deficit was low at about 1 per cent of GDP (Ghura 1997).
13.2.2 The Arrival of Oil: 1978–86
This sub-period starts with the production and exportation of oil in 1978. Real













































Figure 13.1. GDP per capita of Cameroon in constant local currency values
Source: World Development Indicators, 2014
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significant extent by the increase in oil production, which grew from less than
5 million barrels in 1978 to more than 66 million barrels in 1986. The oil
sector also contributed significantly to the budget of the state, with oil receipts
rising from less than CFAF 20 billion (1.4 per cent of GDP and 9 per cent
of total revenues) in 1980 to CFAF 330 billion in 1985 (9 per cent of GDP and
41 per cent of total revenue). Total government revenues rose from an average
of about 17 per cent of GDP over the sub-period 1965–77 to 21 per cent over
the sub-period 1978–86 (Ghura 1997).
When the government officially announced the discovery and exploitation
of important oil fields in Cameroon, it made a conscious effort to avoid
contracting ‘Dutch Disease’. This risk was reduced in the first instance by the
fact that a large proportion (about three-quarters) of oil revenues were saved
abroad. Oil receipts were excluded from the normal budgetary process and a
special off-budget account created for oil revenues, which was directly man-
aged by the Presidency of the Republic. The government sought to pursue the
Green Revolution. And traditional exports, such as cocoa and coffee, which
might lose out in such circumstances, benefitted from the government using
its liquidity position to increase agricultural export prices. The government
sought to keep the real exchange rate from appreciating.
But at the same time, taking advantage of the rise in public resources, the
government, like those of many other oil-producing countries at the time,
embarked between 1980 and 1984 on an expansionary fiscal policy character-
ized by significant consumption and investment spending.4 Ambitious devel-
opment programmes were initiated in economic and social infrastructures,
notably in transport, communications, health, education, and housing. The
rise in budgetary and extra-budgetary resources generated by the oil sector
made it possible to increase the investment rate and to control the level of the
country’s indebtedness. A large amount ofmoney was spent on capital outlays
using domestic resources with very little foreign borrowing. During this sub-
period, external funding accounted for only 6 per cent of total expenditure,
while the external debt amounted to only 27 per cent of GDP in 1988/9
(World Bank 1989).
Dutch Disease effects may have been relatively mild over this period, but at
the same time policy was inconsistent with sustained growth (Kobou et al.
2008). During this time there was an accumulation of poor performances
of public enterprises whose continued survival came to depend increasingly
on government subsidies—a situation which led to serious public finance
4 A large number of public agencies, marketing boards, and public enterprises were set up and
developed in all the sectors of the economy, often supported by government subsidies. Moreover,
the transport sector suffered from the strong intervention of the government and was
dominated by publicly owned rail, urban, air, and maritime transport enterprises, including road
maintenance, etc.
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imbalances.5 A coup attempt was experienced in 1984 which turned out to be
a prelude to the decline which was to follow shortly.
13.2.3 The Economic Crisis: 1987–93
The sub-period 1987–93 was marked by a severe economic crisis in which
there was a 40 per cent fall in real GDP. Economic activity shrank in several
sectors, in particular in the construction and public works sectors, but also in
cash crops, retail trade, and oil. Three major factors account for the deterior-
ation of the economic and financial situation in Cameroon during this sub-
period: (i) the persistent and concomitant fall of the US$ and the prices of
export products such as oil, cocoa, coffee, and cotton; (ii) the associated
appreciation of the effective real exchange rate against the US$; and (iii) the
decline in the country’s oil output.
Between 1986 and 1992 the terms of trade declined by about 40 per cent
(Ghura 1997), while the effective real exchange rate appreciated by about 40
per cent on a cumulative basis between 1985 and 1992. This was due to
inflation triggered by expansionary fiscal policies and the appreciation of
the French franc (Ghura 1997). To these causes must be added lax macroeco-
nomic management. As a result of increased government spending in this
period and a fall in revenue, the budgetary balance showed an average deficit
of 7 per cent of GDP between 1987 and 1993, compared with a surplus of 1 per
cent during the sub-period 1978–86. External and internal borrowing as well
as external arrears essentially financed the budget deficit, and debt increased
sharply. Investment plummeted by more than 70 per cent between 1985/6
and 1992/3, and consumption per head fell by nearly 40 per cent.
Enterprises faced serious problems of payment arrears due to external cred-
itors and domestic suppliers, as well as failures to reimburse debts to domestic
banks. The deterioration of financial conditions during the sub-period
1987–93 revealed the problems facing many domestic banks which were
found to be undercapitalized, poorly managed, and only marginally profitable
(Doe 1995). This situation worsened before and after the highly contested
presidential elections of October 1992 when serious confrontations occurred
between the government and the opposition (Fambon 2010). These incidents
were further aggravated when opposition leaders adopted civil disobedience as
their movement’s call for action, and instructed their members and the popu-
lation at large to stop paying taxes. The result was that the government
became financially handicapped and was unable to honour its financial com-
mitments, including its payroll.
5 It is estimated that the amount of subsidies disbursed to public enterprises in 1984/5 comes to
CFAF 150 billion (Tchoungui et al. 1995).
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To reverse this downward trend, the government attempted by the late
1980s and early 1990s to stimulate the economy with the help of a strategy
based only on domestic adjustment measures.6 Given the need to maintain
the common parity of the CFAF, the key elements of this strategy were to
reduce the budget deficit by raising tax rates; to cut salaries and subsidies to
public enterprises; and to restore external competitiveness by reducing domes-
tic costs and restructuring public enterprises. But given the extent of macro-
economic imbalances, it became apparent by the end of 1993 that strategies
solely based on internal adjustment would not be sufficient to shift the
economy back to a sustained growth recovery path. It was not possible to
restore competitiveness given that domestic prices (including salaries and
producer prices) had displayed significant downward rigidities. Moreover,
owing to declining government revenues, fiscal adjustment mainly consisted
of deep cuts in investment budgets and non-salary spending on maintenance
and other essential services, which was harmful to Cameroon’s economic
growth.
13.2.4 The Post-Devaluation Period (1994 to Date)
While the domestic adjustment strategies by themselves failed to stem the
crisis and revitalize the economy, the devaluation on 14 January 1994 of the
CFAF vis-à-vis the French franc by 50 per cent provided a major opportunity.
At the time the government adopted stabilization and structural reform pro-
grammes supported by the IMF and the World Bank, which sought to control
inflation and re-establish growth, based on expectations that the competitive-
ness of exports from the rural and urban sectors could provide adequate
primary and total budget surpluses likely to boost public savings to finance
high-priority public and social spending. A second programme followed in
August 1997 (which became the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF) in November 1999).7 The combined effects of these measures suc-
ceeded in restoring the country’s economic growth starting in 1995 after
almost a decade of economic decline. Considerable improvements were
achieved in the export and public finance sectors.
6 It is opportune to note that, when faced with unfavourable economic circumstances,
Cameroon’s public authorities first committed themselves in 1987 to an adjustment policy
supported by an autonomous programme, and without the intervention of Bretton Woods
institutions. This programme aimed to reduce government spending and to alleviate the weight
of the public sector broadly defined. These measures turned out to be inadequate in stemming the
economic crisis. Thus, the government ended up adopting an IMF stand-by agreement and a
structural adjustment credit from the World Bank.
7 This programme was supported by a Structural Adjustment Credit of the World Bank and the
Structural Adjustment Programme II of the Development Aid Fund.
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With Cameroon’s external competitiveness restored and growth re-
established, GDP per head increased by about 1.6 per cent annually while
inflation remained moderate at a rate of about 2 per cent per year during the
same period. Private investment rose from 11 per cent to 13 per cent of GDP
over 1996–2000. In addition, the fiscal reforms initiated in 1994 boosted non-
oil revenues by two percentage points of GDP, owingmainly to improvements
in tax administration and the introduction of the value added tax in 1999.
Balance of payments stability was maintained with a current account deficit of
3.2 per cent of GDP on average during 1998–2000. Furthermore, the satisfac-
tory execution of the reform programme gradually restored Cameroon’s
creditworthiness vis-à-vis the international financial community. In the con-
text of these various reforms, the public authorities were able to finalize the
country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), an interim version of
which was adopted in August 2000 (Government of Cameroon 2003). The
finalization of the PRSP in 2003 made it possible for the authorities to nego-
tiate the completion point of the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative, and completion was achieved in April 2006.
Since then, the economy has generally experienced macroeconomic stabil-
ity with moderate inflation and reasonable economic growth. Growth has
slowed down in recent years, though—for instance falling from 2.9 per cent
in 2008 to around 2 per cent in 2009. This slowdown in growth might be
attributed to the deterioration of the country’s trade balance, the stagnation of
the international economic climate, and to fiscal problems linked to the
combined effects of the international economic and financial crisis, the food
crisis, and the energy deficit. In view of this situation, the government took
emergency measures to stimulate the agricultural sector, by giving priority to
the production of food crops such as maize, rice, potatoes, and plantain
bananas. The economy has performed better in the last few years.
To sum up, it may be said that economic growth in Cameroon was quite
variable over the period, notably with major changes in economic policy
orientations and the vagaries of domestic and external shocks. Poor macro-
economic management in the oil windfall period led to subsequent long-
lasting problems in later years.
13.2.5 Sources of Growth and Total Factor Productivity
Kobou et al. (2008) conducted a growth accounting analysis of Cameroon
from 1960 to 2000 and showed that economic growth in Cameroon was
basically driven by the major factors of production without showing any
impact of technical progress (Table 13.1). Thus, for an average annual GDP
growth rate of 1.16 per cent per head, the physical capital ratio recorded an
average annual growth rate of 1.6 per cent versus 0.29 per cent for the human
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capital ratio. The average annual growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP)
was negative and stood at 0.74 per cent during the period 1960–2000.
However, this overall view of the period 1960–2000 conceals some contrasts
that appear in sub-periods. Between 1960 and 1985, the physical and human
capital ratios contributed two-thirds of per capita GDP growth, while TFP
contributed the remaining one-third, but the positive TFP contribution
occurred only in the 1978–85 period. This change of factors in the growth
process may be linked to the deliberate action of decision-makers who sought
to provide Cameroon with appropriate infrastructure and production units
likely to contribute significantly to large-scale industrialization. But between
1986 and 2000 the pattern is very different. The capital and labour ratios
increased at an average annual rate of 1.28 per cent, but which was lower
than the rates previously recorded, but TFP was shrinking at an average annual
rate of3.86 per cent, which weighed heavily on the growth process. Between
1960 and 2000 economic growth was driven by both capital and labour, but
more by capital. Under these conditions the country could not achieve sus-
tained growth, since it is productivity rather than the capital stock which is
crucial in the growth process.
The authors combined this framework with a regression model to provide a
comprehensive picture of the macroeconomic factors which affect economic
growth, analysing the roles by the macroeconomic framework, investment,
and human capital.8 By concentrating on the variables of the ‘new’ growth
theories (see, for instance, Easterly et al. 1991; Renelt 1991; Levine and Renelt
1992), the authors found that Cameroon’s per capita GDP growth rate stood at
1.37 percentage points below the world average over the entire period of the
study. Their analysis showed that unproductive government expenditure had










1960–77 1.41 1.40 0.22 0.22
1978–85 7.66 3.17 0.47 4.01
1986–2000 2.58 1.00 0.28 3.86
Mean 1.16 1.61 0.29 0.74
Source: Data based on Kobou et al. (2008)
8 It should be noted that several other studies have been carried out on Cameroon’s economic
growth, but they do not take account of the variables of the new theory of economic growth. In
effect, the study by Amin (2002) indicates that labour and capital inputs are themain factors which
affect economic growth in Cameroon. Mbaku (1993) andMost and Van Den Berg (1996) show that
domestic savings have a stronger impact on growth.
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a particular negative influence on growth, contributing 0.34 percentage
points to the deviation of the growth rate.
Finally, the trend in the contribution of the different sectors to GDP has
changed over time. The agriculture sector was the sole engine of growth and
foreign exchange earnings until the late 1970s when oil became the primary
engine of growth. By contrast, the analysis of the evolution of real GDP by
sector of activity clearly shows that between 2000 and 2007, economic growth
was above all driven by the service sector, and notably by telecommunications
which achieved a growth rate exceeding 25 per cent per year during this
period. The contribution of this sector to growth in this period is more
important than that of the primary and secondary sectors combined.
13.2.6 Policy and Political Economy Factors, Sources of Growth, and Total
Factor Productivity
Kobou et al. (2008) present a detailed analysis of the factors which have
underlain Cameroon’s ultimately disappointing growth performance. Some
of the key messages have already been discussed in section 13.2.3. Cameroon
has access to foreign exchange through natural resources such as timber and
oil, but also through agricultural exports. To some extent, the combined use of
these different resources has helped the country to shield itself against adverse
shocks, with Cameroon often increasing its exports of timber when revenue
from oil exports fell. But its economic performance remains very responsive to
terms of trade fluctuations. In addition, and as seen in section 13.2.3, this
resource wealth has been associated with lax macroeconomic management,
notwithstanding the potential advantages of the fixed exchange rate.
They argue that markets for goods and services, as well as labour, fail to
function well in Cameroon as a result of extensive government intervention.
Farmers have often adopted a survival strategy, failing to use purchased inputs
and often withdrawing from cultivating cash crops. The manufacturing sector
was very highly protected until the late 1980s, but as a result it displayed a very
low productivity, and the environment was not conducive to the conduct of
business. Small firms, which potentially could be more dynamic, particularly
faced numerous sources of disadvantage. This all created a very difficult envir-
onment for the conduct of economic activity. As noted in section 13.2.5, more
recent growth has occurred mostly in the services sector, with agriculture and
manufacturing continuing to perform poorly. Boosting productivity will
require institutions and policies which affect the incentive to generate and
disseminate innovations in the country.
The political economy context is also very important, with Kobou et al.
(2008) arguing that this has been a major constraint on growth. Governments
in Cameroon have faced a continual challenge to seek to maintain peace in a
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context of ethnic and regional tensions. The country has avoided open con-
flict, but peacebuilding has been a permanent focus of the government. Kobou
et al. (2008) identify at least four groups in the population: the North, the
Centre and South, the West, and the English-speaking regions of the South-
west and Northwest. To add to this are religious differences with the country
approximately equally divided between Christianity, Islam, and traditional beliefs.
To seek tomaintain social cohesion in this environment has been amajor focus of
all governments. The authors argue that this has led to some suboptimal decisions;
for instance, they contend that both ministerial appointments and employment
in the public sector have been seen much more as a means of sharing power
and resources among different interest groups. The public-sector payroll was used
as a means of creating employment for these groups. While this may have main-
tained peace, it has failed to provide effective service delivery.
To sum up this review, growth performance has been disappointing for
most of the period since independence with the exception of the relatively
short-lived and ultimately unsustainable growth burst the country experi-
enced between 1978 and 1986. Ineffective management of the natural
resource wealth was definitely a major part of the explanation; but even
aside from the resource wealth, weak institutions and poor implementation
of policy would appear to have been a common theme in Cameroon.
13.3 National-Level Patterns of Changes in Poverty, Inequality,
and Household Welfare
13.3.1 Data Sources and Consumption Trends
What have been the consequences of the above record of economic perform-
ance for the evaluation of poverty and living conditions in Cameroon? The
investigation begins in this section and the next with the analysis of monetary
poverty and inequality, for which the data come from the three ECAM
(Enquête Camerounaise Auprès des Ménages) household surveys from 1996,
2001, and 2007 (Institute of Statistics 1996, 2001, 2007). This then corres-
ponds entirely to the last of the four sub-periods described in section 13.2.
There is little comparable data before this period.
The three ECAM surveys collect similar data, which includes detailed infor-
mation on consumption. The ECAM2 and ECAM3 surveys have samples of
10,992 and 11,369 households, while the ECAM1 sample contains only 1,731
households. Household welfare is measured here as household consumption
expenditure per adult equivalent; further detail on the precise definition is
provided in Appendix 1 of Fambon et al. (2014). A poverty line for Cameroon
was set in 2001 based on a consumption basket comprising sixty-one food
items which provided 2,900 kcal per adult equivalent; the non-food
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component of the line was determined by a regression of the food share on the
logarithm of the ratio of total household expenditures over the food poverty
threshold, and other household consumption variables.
We begin by analysing the change in household consumption between the
survey years, which are presented in Table 13.2. Household consumption
grew by 26.2 per cent in total between 1996 and 2001 and 5.1 per cent
between 2001 and 2007; over the same periods the changes in per capita
GDP were 9.6 per cent and 4.7 per cent. Between 1996 and 2001 annualized
growth rates of consumption were high in both urban and rural areas, espe-
cially in the latter, but between 2001 and 2007 consumption fell sharply in
rural areas, while it continued to rise, though at a slower rate, in urban areas.
By region there was quite a big diversity in growth rates between 2001 and
2007. There were quite fast positive growth rates in Douala, the South, Ada-
maoua, the Northwest, and Yaoundé, but in other regions growth was nega-
tive, especially in the North and Far North, which were among the poorer
regions to begin with.
13.3.2 Patterns of Monetary Poverty
Summary poverty indices for the national level are presented in Table 13.3.
The national poverty headcount fell significantly between 1996 and 2001
from 53.3 per cent to 40.2 per cent, a period over which per capita GDP
Table 13.2. Average consumption in Cameroon in ECAM surveys
Average consumption per adult




Cameroon 310.5 391.7 411.6 4.8 0.8
Urban 400.6 484.4 515.4 3.2 1.0
Rural 235.0 315.0 280.4 4.9 1.9
Adamaoua 314.3 361.8 2.4
Centre 337.2 320.6 0.8
Coast 321.8 340.5 0.9
Douala 538.4 621.5 2.4
East 371.3 359.2 0.6
Far North 344.5 310.5 1.7
North 357.3 328.0 1.4
Northwest 327.9 378.4 2.4
South 358.0 428.5 3.0
Southwest 413.9 464.0 1.9
West 348.8 341.5 0.4
Yaoundé 584.8 649.3 1.8
Source: Computed by the authors from ECAM1, ECAM2, and ECAM3 survey data (National Institute of Statistics 1996,
2001, and 2007)
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grew by about 10 per cent. The P1 poverty measure showed a reduction of five
percentage points during the period, falling from 19 per cent in 1996 to 14 per
cent in 2001; and the severity index fell from 9 per cent in 1996 to 6.9 per cent
in 2001, a decrease of two percentage points. But there was no significant
change in the poverty headcount between 2001 and 2007, a period over
which per capita GDP also increased less. The greater reduction of poverty
over 1996–2001 compared to 2001–7 is seen for all indices presented in
Table 13.3. This shows that the government did not take advantage of either
the macroeconomic stability the country experienced during the period
2001–7, or of the opportunities offered during this period, notably by the
resources released by the IMF and the World Bank following the achievement
of the decision and completion point of the HIPC debt-relief initiative.
But the poverty severity measure P2 does show a significant reduction
between 2001 and 2007 from 7 per cent to 5 per cent; and the Watts index
too shows a significant reduction. Thus, the poverty reduction which did
happen over this period occurred mostly at the bottom of the distribution.
Poverty incidence curves (Figures 13.2 and 13.3) confirm the significant
poverty reduction from 1996 to 2001 and the very limited progress between
2001 and 2007. These curves suggest that the patterns of changes in poverty
discussed above are not likely to be sensitive to the precise location of the
poverty line, in any reasonable range. But they do also show evidence of
greater poverty reduction at the bottom of the distribution between 2001
and 2007.
These periods show substantially better progress in urban areas than rural
areas, as seen in Table 13.4, even though poverty levels were significantly
higher in the latter. This is in line with the results in section 13.3.1 on
consumption growth rates. There was a significant reduction in urban poverty
Table 13.3. Trends in monetary poverty in Cameroon, 1996–2007
Survey period
1996 2001 2007
P0 0.533 0.402 0.399
(0.0326) (0.0146) (0.0134)
P1 0.191 0.141 0.123
(0.0167) (0.0085) (0.0062)
P2 0.090 0.070 0.050
(0.0095) (0.0061) (0.0031)
Watts 0.2665 0.2091 0.1611
(0.0249) (0.0174) (0.0086)
Note: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors.
Source: Computed by the authors from ECAM1, ECAM2, and ECAM3 survey data
(National Institute of Statistics 1996, 2001, and 2007)
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Figure 13.2. Poverty incidence curve for Cameroon, 1996–2001
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Figure 13.3. Poverty incidence curve for Cameroon, 2001–7
Source: Computed by the authors from ECAM2 and ECAM3 data (National Institute of Statistics
2001 and 2007)
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between 1996 and 2001 according to all indices, which continued between
2001 and 2007. Rural poverty fell less according to all measures between 1996
and 2001, while the rural poverty headcount increased significantly between
2001 and 2007. At the same time, though, the P1 and P2 measures fell in rural
areas over this period, though not to a statistically significant extent. This
again shows an improvement in the situation of the extreme poor in rural
areas, a pattern confirmed by the rural growth incidence curve for this period
(not presented here), which shows a very similar pattern to the national curve
over the same years.
Similar information for the twelve commonly identified provinces of
Cameroon for 2001 and 2007 is presented in Table 13.5. Consistent with the
above results on both consumption growth rates and poverty, these data
confirm that the two major cities of Yaoundé and Douala have by some way
the lowest levels of poverty and have made the most progress between these
years. Among the other regions, the Southwest, West, and South had the
lowest levels of poverty in both 2001 and 2007, and poverty also fell over
this period. The poorest provinces in both years were the North, Northwest,
Adamaoua, the Far North, the Centre, and the East, though the ranking differs
from year to year. Four of these provinces (the exceptions being the Centre
and Northwest) showed increasing poverty headcounts between 2001 and
2007, this being large and statistically significant in the North and Far North
(increases of 14.6 and 24.1 percentage points respectively).9 Poverty severity
Table 13.4. Trends in monetary poverty in urban and rural areas, 1996–2007
Urban Rural
1996 2001 2007 1996 2001 2007
P0 0.414 0.221 0.122 0.596 0.499 0.550
(0.030) (0.012) (0.008) (0.046) (0.019) (0.018)
P1 0.147 0.063 0.028 0.214 0.183 0.175
(0.013) (0.004) (0.002) (0.024) (0.012) (0.009)
P2 0.069 0.027 0.010 0.101 0.093 0.072
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.009) (0.004)
Watts 0.205 0.085 0.035 0.299 0.275 0.230
(0.020) (0.006) (0.003) (0.036) (0.026) (0.012)
Average per adult
consumption
400,607 484,450 515,391 235,881 315,012 280,224
Note: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors.
Source: Computed by the authors from ECAM1, ECAM2, and ECAM3 survey data (National Institute of Statistics 1996,
2001, and 2007)
9 It is opportune at this point to mention the fact that the region of the Far North has been for a
decade the privileged target of poverty reduction projects and programmes, as well as actions for
the benefit of women in the Far North province such as PREPAFEN, the programme for the
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was particularly high in the Far North and the North in 2007. The worse
situation of these two northern provinces is consistent with the consumption
growth data presented in section 13.3.1. Thus there is some evidence of
increasing spatial differentiation over this period, with the north of the coun-
try in particular becoming worse off relative to the rest, aligning with one of
the social divides noted above and in Fambon et al. (2014).
The significant poverty increase in the Far North province may be due to
situational obstacles such as the advent of floods and invasions of granivorous
birds in this province of the country in 2007, which resulted in a serious loss of
goods and harvests that negatively affected the population. In addition, struc-
tural obstacles such as anarchic agricultural practices and the chronic rainfall
deficit contributed to the fall in agricultural production and the aggravation of
Table 13.5. Poverty in Cameroon by region
2001 2007
Region Population Share P0 P2 P0 P2
Douala 9.7 0.186 0.020 0.055 0.002
(0.016) (0.003) (0.012) (0.001)
Yaoundé 8.7 0.183 0.021 0.059 0.002
(0.020) (0.003) (0.012) (0.001)
Adamaoua 4.5 0.458 0.067 0.530 0.054
(0.049) (0.010) (0.044) (0.010)
Centre 7.8 0.604 0.135 0.412 0.031
(0.044) (0.038) (0.031) (0.005)
East 4.8 0.47 0.077 0.504 0.062
(0.051) (0.019) (0.052) (0.011)
Far North 17.7 0.418 0.056 0.659 0.112
(0.042) (0.010) (0.036) (0.010)
Coast 4.9 0.441 0.088 0.308 0.027
(0.047) (0.020) (0.027) (0.004)
North 7.3 0.491 0.069 0.637 0.086
(0.034) (0.007) (0.039) (0.008)
Northwest 11.5 0.528 0.143 0.5100 0.068
(0.052) (0.029) (0.034) (0.008)
West 12.1 0.381 0.050 0.290 0.023
(0.030) (0.006) (0.029) (0.004)
South 3.4 0.386 0.052 0.292 0.026
(0.082) (0.016) (0.047) (0.006)
Southwest 7.5 0.35 0.069 0.275 0.025
(0.057) (0.019) (0.038) (0.006)
Cameroon 100 0.402 0.070 0.399 0.050
(0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.003)
Note: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors.
Source: Computed by the authors from ECAM2 and ECAM3 survey data (National Institute of Statistics 1996, 2001, and
2007)
improvement of rural family income (PARFAR), and the Logone and Chari project. In this respect,
poverty should have decreased faster than elsewhere in the country.
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food insecurity. Moreover, the peasants are victims of an inability to store
which leads them to sell the bulk of their agricultural output at harvest time,
only to borrow money during hard times at high interest rates to buy vital
commodities to make ends meet.10 In the East province, the increase in
poverty may be explained by the slowdown in forestry activity which is very
important in this region. Moreover, some companies in the timber industry
were delocalized to establish their headquarters in Douala, a move likely to
limit the employment opportunities of the population and the tax revenues
of the municipalities of the province. The poverty increase in the regions of
Adamaoua and the North may be due to the loss of earnings in terms of
revenues caused by the completion of the construction work of the Doba-
Kribi pipeline.11 Regional-level inequality data are not presented here, but
generally show reductions over this period, many statistically significant,
but inequality in the North and Far North does not show a statistically
significant change during this time.
A decomposition of changes in poverty between 2001 and 2007 into growth
and redistribution components using the technique developed by Datt and
Ravallion (1992) (not presented here) shows that the growth effect plays an
important part in accounting for urban poverty reduction and rural poverty
increase, but that there is also a strong poverty-reducing redistribution effect
in urban areas. By-province growth effects contribute to strong poverty reduc-
tion in Douala, Yaoundé, the Centre, and the South, and there are strong
poverty-reducing redistribution effects in Douala, Yaoundé, the Southwest,
Coast, and the Centre. The increase in poverty in the northern provinces of
the North and the Far North reflects sharply adverse growth and redistribution
effects; in Adamaoua there is also an adverse redistribution effect. A similar
decomposition by the main activity of the household shows a sharp poverty
reduction among those in non-farm activities, both formal and informal
though faster in the latter, but a sharp poverty increase among those working
in agriculture. These changes predominantly reflect growth effects.
13.3.3 Distributional Pattern of Change
Values of summary inequality measures for Cameroon for the three years are
summarized in Table 13.6, which also includes separate values for urban and
rural Gini coefficients. The overall pattern shown in this table is of no
10 In addition, the slowdown of the activity of the Société d’Expansion et de Modernisation de la
Riziculture in the plain of Yagoua (SEMRY) and the cessation of that of the Programme National de
Vulgarisation et Recherche Agricole (PNVRA), which supervise the peasants, further complicated the
situation of households in this region of the country.
11 It can be noted that this type of project offered in 2001 both the possibilities of direct incomes
and of incomes mainly induced in the informal sector of the regions concerned.
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significant change in inequality at the national level between 1996 and 2001
according to the Gini coefficient or Generalized Entropy (GE) Indices, but
there were significant reductions in all these measures of inequality between
2001 and 2007. Looking at the urban–rural disaggregation, urban inequality
consistently and significantly fell over this period. In rural areas, however,
inequality increased between 1996 and 2001, before falling back significantly
between 2001 and 2007. These patterns may seem difficult to reconcile with
the regional patterns of change seen in Table 13.5, but are consistent with the
poverty incidence curves showing better progress at the bottom between 2001
and 2007.
The growth incidence curve (GIC) comparing 1996 and 2001 shows positive
growth throughout most of the distribution except at the very bottom and top
(Figure 13.4). On the other hand, the GIC for 2001–7 (Figure 13.5) shows very
little growth in consumption, but a pro-poor pattern of change with the only
positive change being seen in the first quintile. This is consistent with the
reduction in inequality in this period, with little change in the incidence of
poverty, but a reduction in the severity of poverty associated with the improv-
ing outcomes for the poorest.
13.4 Changes in Non-monetary Poverty
The main source for the analysis of non-monetary measures of poverty is the
Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 1991, 1998, 2004, and 2011.
Table 13.6. Trends in inequality in Cameroon, 1996–2007
Survey period
1996 2001 2007
Gini coefficient 0.406 0.408 0.390
(0.0169) (0.0078) (0.0060)
Urban Gini 0.449 0.406 0.352
(0.0203) (0.0096) (0.0075)
Rural Gini 0.346 0.369 0.322
(0.0310) (0.0161) (0.0065)
GE(0) 0.272 0.291 0.248
(0.0227) (0.0142) (0.0077)
GE(1) 0.317 0.316 0.279
(0.0300) (0.0155) (0.0106)
GE(2) 0.544 0.556 0.445
(0.0786) (0.0528) (0.0286)
Note: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors.
Source: Computed by the authors from ECAM1, ECAM2, and ECAM3 data (National Institute
of Statistics 1996, 2001, and 2007)






















Figure 13.4. Cameroon growth incidence curve, 1996–2001























Figure 13.5. Cameroon growth incidence curve, 2001–7
Source: Computed by the authors from ECAM2 and ECAM3 data (National Institute of Statistics
2001 and 2007)
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Some summary national-level figures, including heath indicators (mortality,
malnutrition, and vaccination), education, ownership of durable goods, and
housing amenities, are presented in Table 13.7.
Cameroon’s under-five mortality rate remains high for a middle-income
country, and did not fall at all during 1991–2004. Only since then has the
mortality rate fallen, though it still remains at 128 per thousand live births. In
terms of malnutrition, the numbers of those stunted and underweight are also
quite high; and malnutrition if anything worsened over the 1991–2004
period. Again, since then the situation has moderately improved, though
the rates still remain quite high. And while the situation in relation to the
number of children under 12 months, who had been fully vaccinated,
improved over the 1998–2011 period, by 2011 nearly half of children in this
age range still were not fully vaccinated. This suggests significant questions
about the coverage or effectiveness of the health care system in Cameroon.
Fertility remains high in Cameroon, but decreased from 5.8 in 1991 to 4.8 in
1998, remaining more or less at that level since.
Education, however, improved significantly over this period; by 2011 the
proportion of the population who had secondary education or more almost
doubled compared to twenty years before. The number of households with
access to electricity also increased substantially over this period, though there
was a much more modest improvement in the proportion having access to an
adequate drinking water source. Ownership of durable goods did not increase
much over this time, except for the percentage of households having a
refrigerator, this presumably also being linked to the greater access to electri-
city. In short, many of these indicators give an impression of very slow
improvement over most of this period, though the situation in relation to
health indicators in particular improved more noticeably in recent years. But
the absolute level of outcomes remains disappointing for a country with
Cameroon’s level of per capita GDP.
Table 13.7. Summary national-level indicators from DHS surveys
Indicator 1991 1998 2004 2011
Under-five mortality rate 144 146 148 128
% of children fully vaccinated 40.0 35.8 48.2 53.2
Height-for-age below 2 SD 22.9 29.3 29.7 24.1
Weight-for-height below 2 SD 3.8 5.9 6.7 6.2
Weight-for-age below 2 SD 16.3 22.2 19.4 18.1
% of respondents with secondary education or above 26.5 33.3 39.1 46.2
Fertility rate 5.8 4.8 5.0 5.1
% of households with electricity 29.0 40.7 47.1 53.7
% of households with adequate drinking water source 63.9 64.2 71.6 74.4
% of households owning radio 54.0 52.5 62.5 56.1
% of households owning bicycle 15.7 13.3 18.2 14.7
Source: Computed by the authors from DHS surveys
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The time pattern of change here is somewhat different from what was seen
for consumption poverty. For the latter, the situation improved between 1996
and 2001, but made limited progress between 2001 and 2007. The DHS
indicators by contrast show least progress between 1991 and 2004, but quite
good progress between 2004 and 2011. However, this difference is not sur-
prising; the surveys relate to different years, and consumption estimates in
particular can be quite sensitive to the economic conditions when the surveys
were carried out. In addition, there is no reason why monetary and different
non-monetary measures should show the same trends.
We now turn to a disaggregated analysis of some of these indicators. Here,
the 2004 and 2011 DHS surveys enable an estimation of indicators at the level
of the twelve provinces of Cameroon, but the smaller sample size in 1991 and
1998means that disaggregation is only possible into five regions, which are an
aggregation of the twelve regions. To enable comparability, the tables show
figures for these five regions for each of the four survey years, in addition to
the more detailed figures for the last two survey years. In some cases, other
forms of disaggregation will be shown, for instance by urban/rural or by
wealth quintile defined using the DHS asset indices.
Table 13.8 presents data for under-five mortality. Mortality rates are higher
for boys than girls. Over time, mortality rates change very little (in fact slightly
worsen) between 1991 and 2004, before finally falling between 2004 and
Table 13.8. Disaggregated under-five mortality rates for Cameroon
1991 1998 2004 2011
By location
Region: Yaoundé/Douala 103 91 93 75
Yaoundé 112 76
Douala 74 75
Region: Adamaoua/North/Far North 199 202 186 171
Adamaoua 136 129
North 204 191
Far North 185 168




Region: West/Coast 109 91 123 101
West 126 99
Coast 113 105
Region: Northwest/Southwest 87 98 116 93
Northwest 98 68
Southwest 143 127
Boy 144 148 154 135
Girl 143 144 141 122
Total 144 146 148 128
Source: Computed by the authors from DHS surveys
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2011. By region, sharp differences are seen; in particular mortality rates are
much higher in the Adamaoua, North, and Far North provinces in all four
years and the detailed data for 2004 and 2011 confirm that it is in the North
and Far North provinces that rates are highest. These rates are twice as high as
those in the region with the best mortality outcomes, the main cities of
Douala and Yaoundé. It is clear from these figures that the high national-
level mortality figure reflects in particular very poor outcomes in the northern
part of the country. The other regions have mortality rates more similar to
those of the main cities, though even here important differences are apparent,
notably between the Northwest (where rates in 2011 are lowest in the coun-
try) and the adjacent Southwest (where rates aremuch higher). The patterns of
change in most regions are similar to the national pattern, with the only
improvements coming between 2004 and 2011, and this improvement is
less in the Adamaoua, North, and Far North provinces.
Malnutrition levels are also highest by some magnitude in the same north-
ern regions, as demonstrated on Table 13.9 reporting on the case of stunting.
Improvements over time are also lower in this region compared to others.
Table 13.9. Percentage of under-three-year-olds with height-for-age Z score less than 2
% with height-for-age Z score less than 2
1991 1998 2004 2011
by location
Region: Yaoundé/Douala 8.7 14.7 19.6 10.2
Yaoundé 13.7 11.0
Douala 25.0 9.4
Region: Adamaoua/North/Far North 29.0 35.6 34.5 32.7
Adamaoua 25.5 25.9
North 42.0 34.8
Far North 32.5 32.9




Region: West/Coast 23.0 21.2 27.5 21.6
West 29.3 22.1
Coast 22.4 20.2




Lowest 31.7 36.4 35.4 36.8
Second 29.1 32.2 33.5 31.4
Middle 30.8 31.9 33.6 21.6
Fourth 17.3 26.0 25.4 17.0
Highest 9.1 15.3 13.5 9.9
Total 22.9 29.3 29.7 24.1
Source: Computed by the authors from DHS surveys
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Again the best outcomes are seen in the main cities. An analysis by wealth
quintile shows (i) very large gaps by quintile; and (ii) that the improvements
between 2004 and 2011 are largely confined to the top three quintiles, with
the situation in the poorest quintile actually worsening over this period. Other
malnutrition indicators show the same patterns (Fambon et al. 2014).
In relation to health inputs, the analysis of Fambon et al. (2014) shows that
vaccination rates are consistently much lower in Adamaoua/North/Far North,
and especially in the latter two provinces, and the rate actually fell in the Far
North between 2004 and 2011. Rates in the lowest quintile are less than half of
those in the richest quintile, and again the outcome worsened between 2004
and 2011 in the first quintile. Here, the best outcomes are actually not in the
big cities, but rather in the Northwest and Southwest, both of these regions
showing a big improvement between 2004 and 2011.
In relation to education (Table 13.10), the same regional pattern is apparent
in all tables so far, with significantly worse outcomes in all the northern
provinces especially in the North and Far North. By 2011, fewer than 12 per
cent of respondents had secondary education or above; this contrasts dramat-
ically with Douala/Yaoundé where an impressive 79 per cent are educated to
this level. Education levels are much higher in other regions compared to the
northern regions, but range from 69.7 per cent in the South to 44.8 per cent in
the Northwest. All regions show the same pattern of consistent improvement
Table 13.10. Percentage of respondents with secondary education or above
Percentage of respondents with secondary education or above
1991 1998 2004 2011
By location
Region: Yaoundé/Douala 62.5 72.8 71 79.3
Yaoundé 74.6 79.5
Douala 67.7 79.1
Region: Adamaoua/North/Far North 3.7 5.8 7.7 11.8
Adamaoua 20.3 22.6
North 6.6 12.6
Far North 5.2 7.9




Region: West/Coast 32.7 45.2 47.3 58.8
West 45 56.9
Coast 52.9 63.8
Region: Northwest/Southwest 22.8 32 37.9 48.7
Northwest 31.6 44.8
Southwest 47 53.8
Total 26.5 33.3 39.1 46.2
Source: Computed by the authors from DHS surveys
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in education rates over the period analysed here, but the gaps between regions
remain constant or in some cases widen.
Tables for other non-monetary indicators presented by Fambon et al. (2014)
mostly show the same patterns of regional difference. Big spatial differences
are apparent in most indicators to the disadvantage of the north of the
country, and in most cases the indicators stagnated between 1991 and 2004,
only starting to improve since.
13.5 Conclusions and Policy Priorities
The overall pattern coming from this analysis is of good progress in reducing
monetary poverty between 1996 and 2001, which then slowed down or
stopped between 2001 and 2007. In terms of non-monetary measures of
poverty there was very little progress over the 1991–2004 period except in
education, but indicators then improved between 2004 and 2011. In both
cases there has been progress for part of the period but this has not been
sustained over the full time. Overall progress has been disappointing and this
is in line with disappointing growth performance. Given the rates of growth
over the period, the rate of change in monetary poverty is not very surprising;
Cameroon has failed to reduce poverty because of poor growth performance
which is a consequence of many of the factors highlighted in this chapter,
including weak institutions and poorly formulated policies.
In addition to this, given Cameroon’s income level, and comparison with
other countries in SSA, the levels of the outcomes of the non-monetary indica-
tors do raise seriousquestions about the effectiveness of public servicedelivery in
health and education, among other areas. Themain cities may have respectable
outcomes in these indicators but much of the rest of the country lags signifi-
cantly behind. There has beenprogress in recent years, but the levels ofmortality
and malnutrition remain high for a middle-income country.
Also striking in these results is the extent and consistency of spatial inequal-
ity shown by both monetary and non-monetary welfare measures. Again, the
difference between Yaoundé andDouala compared to the rest of the country is
striking; but perhaps the most striking feature is that the northern parts of the
country are so much more deprived compared to the rest of the country. Even
if successive governments have been concerned to limit regional divergences,
this does not seem to have been particularly successful, in particular in rela-
tion to the north of the country where some of the non-monetary outcomes
compare with levels in much poorer countries in SSA. These regions in par-
ticular appear not to have benefitted from economic growth or effective
service delivery. The extent of divergence could be a potential source of
increased tension in the future.
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In terms of priorities, Cameroon’s seeming inability to sustain a reasonable
growth rate seems to be one key factor; better and more effective policy
formulation would seem to be a major policy priority here. This chapter
suggests that this raises quite fundamental questions, not just about the
effective management of resource wealth but also putting in place institutions
that would support faster sustained growth. The fixed exchange rate is poten-
tially an advantage, but with other institutional and policy weaknesses this is
not sufficient by itself. Putting in place an appropriate framework for business,
reducing support to public enterprises, addressing market failures including
those in the financial sector, and prioritizing agricultural production would
appear to be important early priorities.
An equally important priority is to address what appears to be a chronic
problem of effective delivery of public services; this can offer benefits for
growth as well as for social outcomes. Progress may have been made recently,
but the overall outcomes in terms of non-monetary indicators, especially in
the poorer regions, remain disappointing for a country with the overall
income level which Cameroon has.
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The Fall of the Elephant
Two Decades of Poverty Increase
in Côte d’Ivoire, 1988–2008
Denis Cogneau, Kenneth Houngbedji, and Sandrine Mesplé-Somps
14.1 Introduction
After having been praised as a model to follow, at the turn of the twenty-first
century, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) began to stand as a counter-example for
those eager to find auspicious signs of the ‘emergence’ of Africa. For now, the
case of this country is perhaps a reminder to others that some golden ages may
end in nightmares. In 2012, Côte d’Ivoire had just emerged from a contested
presidential election that came close to turning into a civil war between the
followers of the incumbent (Laurent Gbagbo) and the challenger (Alassane
Ouattara). For five years between the end of 2002 and 2007, the country had
also been partitioned between North and South, with UN-mandated forces
interposing between legalists and rebels. And in 1999, a coup by General
Robert Gueï had expelled the president Henri Konan Bédié from power.
When did it all start? Even on that point, different readings of history already
disagree; furthermore, it is certainly possible to find roots of such a great crisis
in the distant past, dating back at least to the colonial period (Dozon 2011).
However, opting for a narrative that is not too deterministic, it is safe to say
that bad economic and political conditions started to combine between 1990
and 1993. Macroeconomic imbalances and growth failures appeared in the
mid-1980s, the first structural adjustment programme (SAP) being launched as
early as 1981; still, the halving of cocoa producer prices was delayed until
1990, and this delay can be seen as symptomatic of a kind of denial of
macroeconomic issues by the government (Berthélemy and Bourguignon
1996; Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps 2002a, 2002b). In the same year, the first
multi-party presidential election was conceded and won by the father of the
nation Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who had ruled the country since independ-
ence (1960), and who died in December 1993. The death of the ‘vieux’ (old
man) raised the last obstacle to the CFA franc devaluation in January 1994,
illustrating how economics could be determined by politics (Jones and Olken
2005). Reciprocally, it can be argued that neoliberal economic reforms under-
mined the country’s capacity to preserve a fragile political equilibrium, in
particular between Northern and Southern elites (Boone 2007).
This chapter proposes a retrospective analysis of the evolution of living
standards in Côte d’Ivoire over two decades, from the end of the 1980s until
the end of the 2000s. It focuses on income distribution andmonetary poverty,
but also looks at access to education and to health. This ismade possible by the
exploitation of the large sample household surveys that were implemented at
various times during that period. Our analysis also makes use of available
national accounts, as well as of regional and sectoral price data. To our
knowledge, the most recent past decade has not yet been analysed in those
terms, and no such historical perspective has yet been tried. This chapter is
organized as follows. Section 14.2 is a background section that reviews the
main lines of Ivorian economic history from the colonial era until the
1980s. Section 14.3 then presents the data and the analytical methodology,
further details being given in Cogneau et al. (2014). Section 14.4 reviews the
first decade of uncertainties (1988–98), inaugurated by the great cocoa
shock (1989–93) and followed by the devaluation bounce-back (1994–8).
Section 14.5 then delves into the less-studied decade of the civil war
(1998–2008), which we divide again into two halves. The first half saw three
presidents follow one another into power (Konan Bédié, Gueï, Gbagbo) until
the partition of the country in 2002. The second half ended in 2007 after
the signature of the Ouagadougou agreements between Northern rebels and
legalist forces. We then briefly discuss recent developments between 2008
and 2013, and set out a few prospects for the ten years to come. Section 14.6
concludes.
14.2 The Rise of the Elephant until the End of the 1980s
The present-day territory of Côte d’Ivoire was first constituted as a colony of
France in 1899. Côte d’Ivoire became independent in 1960, like all the French
colonies of West and Equatorial Africa. Before 1899, the French already had
established trade posts on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, in particular on the
(Ébrié) lagoon in the Southwest (Grand-Bassam), close to the future capital of
Abidjan, and not too far from the Gold Coast (Ghana) border where the British
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were settled. They also arrived in the North, coming from the coasts of
Senegal; at the present-day Northern borders of the country with Guinea,
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, they fought a series of wars against the Diula
leader Almami Samori Ture, that ended with his capture in 1898. Before
the arrival of the French, the most structured pre-colonial polities were the
kingdoms located in the North; from West to East: the Senufo kingdom of
Kenedugu, whose capital city was Sikasso (in today’s Mali), the Kong and Buna
kingdoms (with eponymous capital towns in today’s Côte d’Ivoire), and the
Gyaman kingdom (around Bonduku). Other small polities (Sefwi, Indenie,
Sanwi) along the border with Ghana were under the dominion of the Ashanti
Empire, whose capital Kumasi lay in central Ghana. Economically speaking,
the Northern kingdoms were mostly based on trade with trans-Saharan cara-
vans, which exchanged salt, cattle, and a fewmanufactured goods for the gold
from the Northern mines and the kola nuts bought from the people of the
Southern forests. The slave trade was also present in the Northeast and along
the border with Ghana (the Ashanti Empire was based on gold and slave
trades), but this affected the populations of Côte d’Ivoire to a relatively small
degree.
During the colonial era, Côte d’Ivoire did not receive more investment
than other comparable areas like Guinea or Dahomey (today’s Benin), but
much less than Senegal, which was the central seat of the government of
former French West Africa (Huillery 2009). Cocoa production only took off
after the Second World War, in the 1950s, and this drove urbanization
( Jedwab 2011). It started at the border of Ghana, which was the world’s
first producer of cocoa at that time, as Akan planteurs (cocoa growers) imi-
tated their co-ethnic neighbours. A Baule physician and cocoa grower, Felix
Houphouët-Boigny, was elected to the French National Assembly in 1945,
and occupied a series of ministerial positions in the governments of the
French Fourth Republic. After having turned into an independentist leader,
he became the first president of Côte d’Ivoire in 1960 and, as ‘father of the
nation’, stayed in power until his death in December 1993. Houphouët-
Boigny consolidated his rule by making a political alliance with Northern
leaders (a Centre-East/North axis), allowing him to counterbalance the influ-
ence of non-Baule Akan kings and chiefs (Southeast) and to downplay the
opposition of Kru leaders (Centre West).1
At the same time, he preserved very strong links with the French, becoming
one of the main actors of what would later be called the ‘Françafrique’. He was
1 Baules are part of the larger Akan ethnic group. This political equilibrium fell apart after his
death in 1993, because of the individual competition between the Northerner Ouattara, prime
minister, and the Baule Konan Bedie, president of the National Assembly.
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rewarded by high levels of French foreign aid, as well as by the allocation of
French engineers and administrators to key technical positions within the
Ivorian administration.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘Ivorian miracle’was built upon the two pillars
of cocoa and French aid. The Baule planteurs colonized forested areas to
plant cocoa and coffee trees, moving the cocoa frontier progressively from
the East (Ghana border) to the West (Guinea border), where it had arrived by
the end of the 1990s. Part of the sharecropper labour force for cocoa was
provided by very large migration flows from Northern neighbours, first
Burkina Faso and then Mali. According to the 1998 census, 26 per cent of
residents were ‘foreigners’, even if half of them were actually born in the
country (Tapinos et al. 2002). Cotton production was developed in the
North, and kept increasing until the end of the 1990s as well. Administered
producer prices were managed by parastatals as an implicit taxation on
farmers, so that cocoa, coffee, and cotton income became central in the
government revenue. With growing fiscal resources and generous amounts
of aid, the Ivorian state could invest in roads and transportation infrastruc-
tures and in the construction of schools, and could also pay high wages to its
civil servants, including teachers. Growing cocoa income spurred urbaniza-
tion ( Jedwab 2011). Great emphasis was placed on education, and Côte
d’Ivoire succeeded in catching up with neighbouring Ghana in terms of
literacy, where it was very much lagging behind at the end of the colonial
era (Cogneau and Moradi 2014). Houphouët nicknamed Côte d’Ivoire the
‘République des bons élèves’ (Republic of the good pupils), paraphrasing the
name ‘République des professeurs’ (Republic of the teachers) that was used to
refer to the French Third Republic.
Figure 14.1 illustrates how growth was determined by income from cash
crops, in particular cocoa. Between 1960 and the beginning of the 1970s,
real GDP per capita rose by around 50 per cent, from 600 to 900 dollars
(in constant 2000 US$). In 1974–5, the international prices of cocoa, coffee,
and cotton followed the boom in oil prices and other raw materials, and
internal producer prices were dramatically increased as well, bringing GDP
per capita to the heights of US$1,100. Côte d’Ivoire overtook Ghana as the
world’s largest cocoa producer in 1977 (Eberhardt and Teal 2010). However,
this price boom did not last very long, and with the first adjustment pro-
gramme in 1981 also came disillusion with growth. The short-lived bounce of
international prices in 1985–6 allowed macroeconomic stabilization to be
postponed for a while; in 1987, Côte d’Ivoire failed to influence cocoa inter-
national prices by accumulating stocks. At the end of the 1980s, the growing
deficits of the state budget and of the cocoa and coffee marketing board could
no longer be sustained, and a large cut of producer prices was finally imple-
mented in 1989.
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Figure 14.2 provides a kind of summary of the Ivorian miracle and reversal
of fortune, using height data covering eighty-five years (1903–88). For the
early period (1903–40), we use recently collectedmilitary data on conscripts in
the French army; data on conscripts’ height gains connects nicely with data
from the 1985–8 and 2008 surveys in which the heights of males aged twenty
years and over were measured.2
The graph reveals the impressive height gain of four centimetres that was
obtained in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century. This gain com-
pares well with Fogel’s (1994) figures for twentieth-century France or United
Kingdom (6 cm over the 1875–1975 period). For cohorts born after 1975, i.e.
when GDP per capita began its great decline, we observe a significant fall in
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Figure 14.1. GDP per capita and cash crop income, 1960–2010
Note: In plain line and on left scale, gross domestic product per capita in 2000 US$. In dotted line
and on right scale, sum of cocoa beans, green coffee, and cotton seeds output, valued at inter-
national prices, deflated by GDP deflator, converted in 2000 US$ and lagged by one year.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from World Bank (2012) and FAOSTAT (2012)
2 In retrospective survey data, the heights of the oldest cohorts are affected by old-age shrinkage.
See Cogneau and Rouanet (2011) for an analysis of 1925–85 height evolutions and a comparison
with Ghana.
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14.3 Data Description and Methodology
This section presents the main choices that were made in terms of measure-
ment of living standards and poverty.3
14.3.1 Construction of the Consumption Variable
The consumption variable is the sum of consumption of own food produc-
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Figure 14.2. Average height stature of males aged 20–59 years, 1900–90
Note: Grey diamonds, circles, and triangles are average height of birth year cohorts, drawn from
three distinct data sources. Lines are locally weighted regressions of average height on year of birth.
‘French army’ (diamonds): Data from a 10,000 sample of conscripts (aged around 20 years) and
volunteers in the French army (1923–60). ‘LSMS 1985–8’ (circles): Males aged 20–59 years from
CILSS 1–4 household surveys (1985–8). ‘ENV 2008’ (triangles): Males aged 20–59 years from ENV1
(2008) household survey.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from French army (indigenous soldiers born in Côte
d’Ivoire), CILSS household surveys 1–4 (1985–8) and ENV1 (2008)
3 The working paper version of this chapter (Cogneau et al. 2014) provides a presentation of the
main data sources used in this study (five nationally representative household surveys conducted
by the Institut National de la Statistique de Côte d’Ivoire in 1988, 1993, 1998, 2002, and 2008).
Please refer to section 3.1 of this chapter for a discussion of the accuracy of the sample designs of
household surveys, and in particular the statistical representation of people born in Burkina Faso
and Mali. Refer as well to Appendix A1 of this chapter for more details on the construction of
variables from micro data (consumption, durable goods ownership, school enrolment), and to
Appendix A2 on macroeconomic indicators drawn from national accounts.
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housing, education, clothing, transport, and communication. We paid great
attention to the comparability of all the components across surveys. For
instance, we realized that imputed rent estimations could change significantly
depending on how the number of rooms had been reported (e.g. whether
toilet and bathroom were included or not).
Consumption of food products accounts for more than 50 per cent of total
consumption. Food expenditures and consumption of own food production
are recorded in two separate parts of survey questionnaires. Surveys do not
use diaries, and instead ask about consumption over a product-specific recall
period; not all surveys cover the whole year, and when they do, different
households are surveyed in successive waves. We identified four features
in survey questionnaires that could threaten comparability across time:
(i) changes in the selection of goods for which expenditures were recorded;
(ii) changes in recall periods for some goods; (iii) modifications in survey
duration and controls for seasonality of consumption; and (iv) differences in
the detail of goods. In their methodological experiment on the measurement
of consumption in Tanzania, Beegle et al. (2012) identify the same strategic
dimensions. Their results suggest that, when compared with the benchmark
of individual diaries, a detailed list of products with short recall periods is
preferable. Appendix A1 in Cogneau et al. (2014) explains in detail the way we
computed non-food and food consumption aggregates and the potential bias
induced by the changes to questionnaire designs since 1988. We produced
four estimates for total consumption, which vary according to recall periods
and declared frequency of consumption within these periods. Even if levels
may differ very much, reassuringly enough, the time pattern of consumption
is quite consistent across estimates.4
14.3.2 Consumer Prices
It has been revealed to be impossible to derive reliable/comparable unit prices
from surveys. Quantities are declared in units that can be very heterogeneous
across space, like bags or basins; furthermore, many times, units are not
specified.
For both the 1988–96 and the 1996–8 periods, disaggregated consumer price
levels in Abidjan, along with budget coefficients, were communicated by the
Ivorian National Institute of Statistics (INS). Unfortunately, the 1988–96 price
4 Dabalen and Paul (2013) propose a reweighting procedure in order to account for changes in
questionnaire designs between the 1985–8 surveys and the 1993–2008 surveys. The assumptions
implied by their methodology are questionable, as they themselves acknowledge, in particular that
of stability in the distribution of sociodemographic variables over twenty years. Further, the
correction they make appears relatively limited, and provides estimates that are rather consistent
with ours.
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data proved to be very inconsistent with the World Bank figures (World Bank
2008), as well as with the IMF figures (IMF 2013), in particular with respect to
the high inflation following the CFA franc devaluation of 1994. The commu-
nicated price data showed very modest inflation in 1994 and 1995, in contrast
with World Bank or IMF figures, which record a 26 per cent inflation rate for
1994 and 14 per cent for 1995. The cumulated 1996–2008 inflation from INS
data was also lower, compared to other sources: the World Bank, IMF, and
even Afristat, the regional statistical office. We could not elucidate the origin
of such discrepancies.
In order not to run the risk of underestimating inflation, we resolved to stick
with the consumer price index drawn up for the African Development Indi-
cators (World Bank 2008). Household consumption is deflated by this
national consumer price index, with 2005 as the base year, and translated
into 2005 international dollars using World Development Indicators (World
Bank 2012) purchasing power parity exchange rates for the year 2005. The
poverty line chosen to compute poverty indicators is US$1.25 (at the 2005 PPP
level).
We only used the disaggregate price data to analyse the potential impact of a
change in consumer baskets. For instance, we computed another consumer
price index using the budget coefficients of the average household in the first
quartile of consumption per capita as of 1998. This ‘poverty-oriented’ price
index showed little difference from the consumer price index computed with
average budget coefficients. We also varied the consumer baskets according to
the region of residence (North, East Forest, West Forest, Abidjan) and found
little difference in aggregate price evolutions (keeping inmind that only prices
collected in Abidjan were available).
Last, sparse data on price levels were also obtained for some provincial
capital cities other than Abidjan, and for two or three years lying between
1998 and 2008. Due to the disruptions of civil war, Northern provinces have
no data at all. In Southern provinces differences in price levels were found to
be small and no correction was made.
14.4 The Decade of Uncertainties: 1988–98
14.4.1 The Great Cocoa Shock: 1988–94
By all accounts, the 1988–94 period was the turning point when macroeco-
nomic crisis spread all over the country, reaching the still relatively protected
cocoa growers and formal wage earners. A fourth structural adjustment pro-
gramme was signed with the International Monetary Fund, involving very
large cuts to public wages and expenditures, and a halving of cocoa and coffee
producer prices. Félix Houphouët-Boigny had already been struck by cancer,
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and Alassane Ouattara, the first prime minister since 1960, was in practice
ruling the country. Social unrest and insecurity developed, with a series of street
demonstrations, the occupation of AbidjanUniversity, and amutinywithin the
army. In the firstmulti-party electionheld in 1990, Houphouët-Boigny still beat
his younger opponent Laurent Gbagbo, with more than 80 per cent of votes.
Between 1988 and 1993, according to national accounts, GDP per capita
again fell by US$100 (see Figure 14.3) and final private consumption per capita
was reduced by 16 per cent. Our survey data indicates an even more dramatic
collapse of household consumption per capita, from US$2.92 to US$2.02 per
capita and per day respectively (constant 2005 international dollars), i.e. a
31 per cent reduction. As a result, the US$1.25 poverty headcount almost
doubled, from 20 to 38 per cent (Table 14.1). All regions in the country were
evenly affected; whereas poverty had formerly been absent from the capital
city Abidjan, 13 per cent of its inhabitants could be counted as poor in 1993.
In 1988, welfare was unambiguously much higher on the Eastern side of
Côte d’Ivoire, at the border with Ghana. In 1993, the border differences in
income or in child nutrition had becomemuch smaller, even if, thanks to past
investments, a significant Ivorian advantage in public utilities (electricity,
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GDP per capita
Cocoa+Coffee+Cotton output per capita at int. prices
Crude oil output per capita at int. prices
Figure 14.3. GDP per capita, cash crop income, and oil income, 1988–2008
Note: GDP per capita and Cocoa+Coffee+Cotton: see Figure 14.1. Crude oil output is valued at
international prices lagged by one year, deflated by GDP deflator, and converted in 2000 US$.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from World Bank (2012) and FAOSTAT (2012)
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All social classes were affected: the consumption growth incidence curve is
nearly flat, meaning that proportional decreases in consumption per capita
were evenly spread across the income distribution (Figure 14.5).
For the first time, net primary school enrolment fell from 56 to 47 per cent
(see Appendix Table 14.A1). Early-age child nutrition deteriorated, especially
among small cocoa and coffee producers (Cogneau and Jedwab 2012). This is
also when the AIDS epidemics began to spread (Cogneau and Grimm 2008).
During the fifteen years that followed, the country would never recover
from this great shock, and poverty would mainly oscillate around the 1993
level, even reaching 41 per cent in 2008 (see also the cumulative distribution
Table 14.1. Daily consumption per capita and poverty measures over time across regions,
1988–2008
1988 1993 1998 2002 2008
Panel A: North
Consumption per capita 2.06 1.49 1.81 2.17 1.41
(0.10) (0.02) (0.12) (0.10) (0.03)
Poverty headcount 0.33 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.62
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
N 416 2,527 977 2,611 3,622
Panel B: East Forest
Consumption per capita 2.68 1.99 2.07 2.34 1.87
(0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Poverty headcount 0.10 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.39
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
N 400 2,414 934 2,604 3,003
Panel C: West Forest
Consumption per capita 2.29 1.62 1.91 1.75 1.69
(0.16) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
Poverty headcount 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.50 0.47
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 479 2,885 1,417 3,533 3,864
Panel D: Abidjan
Consumption per capita 5.59 3.39 3.77 4.29 3.96
(0.28) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
Poverty headcount 0.00 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.09
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 304 1,676 860 1,970 1,968
Panel E: All regions
Consumption per capita 2.92 2.02 2.31 2.47 2.14
(0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Poverty headcount 0.20 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.41
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 1,599 9,502 4,188 10,718 12,457
Note: Daily consumption expenditures per capita are in constant 2005 US$ PPP and the poverty line used is US$1.25 PPP
a day. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
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function curves in Figure 14.4). Figure 14.2 suggests that cohorts affected by
early-age stunting and height losses had not entirely recovered from these
effects when they reached adult age. The results of Demographic and Health
Surveys for the years 1994, 1998, and 2012 suggest that early-age stunting has
stayed on the increase throughout the last two decades (Coulibaly and N’Dri
2012). However, aside from consumption or nutrition, after having fallen
back, primary school enrolment recovered in 1998 and carried on increasing
in 2002. Secondary school enrolment exhibited continuous progresses
(Appendix Table 14.A1). Finally, on the side of durable goods, households
benefitted from the price decreases in radio and TV sets, and, most impres-
sively, in mobile phones (Appendix Table 14.A2).
14.4.2 The CFA Franc Devaluation Bounce-Back: 1994–8
After the 1993 legislative elections in France, the new French Prime Minister
Edouard Balladur aligned his position with those of the IMF and the World
Bank regarding the need for a devaluation of the CFA franc. Côte d’Ivoire
being the most important economy of the Franc Zone, the death of
Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 removed the last obstacle to its imple-
mentation, given the oath made by President Mitterrand to the old leader not


















Consumption per capita at constant 2005 US$ PPP per day
1988 1993 1998 2002 2008 Poverty line
Figure 14.4. Cumulative distribution function of consumption per capita across time
Note: Percentage of people whose consumption per capita and per day lies below the level on the
horizontal axis. Vertical bar is the US$1.25 poverty line.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
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cent in January 1994—meaning an ex ante doubling of import prices. The
objective of this devaluation was the reduction of public deficits, through
the reduction of the public wage bill in real terms, as well as increased fiscal
revenue from import tariffs and duties on cocoa. Consumer price inflation
stayed under control (around 30 per cent in 1994), so that a large real
depreciation was achieved. In terms of macroeconomic stabilization, and
according to the criteria set by the Bretton Woods institutions, the CFA
franc devaluation was to some extent a success (Cogneau and Collange
1998).
In terms of income growth and poverty, fortunately enough, international
commodity prices bounced back concomitantly, allowing increases in real
producer prices of coffee and cotton; however real cocoa prices were kept
constant, so that the marketing board deficits could be cleared (see Appendix
Figure 14.A1). Fortunately again, national cocoa output reached a historical
record (over 1.2 million tons), thanks in particular to trees reaching maturity
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Figure 14.5. Growth incidence curves
Note: Average growth in consumption per capita for each percentile of consumption per capita in
the initial year.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
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North, farmers planted more cotton (Appendix Figure 14.A2). Further, the
new structural adjustment programme was backed by large amounts of
foreign aid, translating into a doubling of public investment in infrastruc-
ture; private capital also flowed back to the country and the construction
sector boomed.
According to national accounts, in 1998 consumption per capita had
returned to its pre-shock level of 1988. Survey data are much less optimistic:
household consumption per capita reached US$2.31 per capita per day, i.e.
only 80 per cent of the 1988 value. Compared to 1993, the poverty head-
count at the US$1.25 level was reduced by six percentage points. Consump-
tion growth incidence was even slightly distorted towards upper-middle
income levels (Figure 14.5), so that poverty was reduced to a lesser extent
than an evenly distributed consumption growth would have allowed.
Indeed, in rural areas, cash crop evolutions benefitted more the ‘gros plan-
teurs’ (large cash crop growers), as illustrated by the high consumption
growth among farmers (+17 per cent) that contrasts with the modest poverty
decrease of four percentage points (Table 14.2 Panel A). In cities, informal
workers benefitted from the boom in investment and from the recovery of
household consumption (Table 14.2 Panel B). Civil servants, however, suf-
fered as their wages were not indexed to inflation; this most likely explains
why the consumption growth was very much mitigated in the top decile
(Table 14.2 Panel C).
On the political side, in accordance with the Constitution, the president of
the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié, became the new president of the
country in 1994; he was a Baule and a Christian, like Houphouët-Boigny. This
came to the disappointment of former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, a
Northern Diula and Muslim. The political competition between the two heirs
broke the Houphouëtian political equilibrium that relied on the alliance
between Centre South Baule elites and Northern elites. To bar Ouattara’s
ambitions, Konan Bédié and his followers resurrected the theme of Ivorian
national identity (‘Ivoirité’) that Houphouët’s opponent Laurent Gbagbo, a Kru
Southwest leader, had already promoted in the 1990 elections. Prior to the
October 1995 presidential elections, the National Assembly passed an anti-
Ouattara amendment in the Constitution, according to which presidential
candidates ought to have two parents of ‘Ivorian nationality’ and should not
have served as officials in another country, two criteria that Ouattara did not
meet. The 1995 elections were also boycotted by Gbagbo, giving Konan Bédié
an easy victory.
Strengthened by this victory and good economic conditions, Konan Bédié
and Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan launched a vast programme of
public investment called the ‘12 works of the African elephant’, meant to
transform Côte d’Ivoire into an emerging 10 per cent growth country by the
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2025 horizon. It was mostly based on colossal and costly infrastructures
centred around the capital city Abidjan (new airport, highways, urban train,
new thermal plant, etc.), relying on Build–Operate–Transfer agreements
with private firms; in 1999, only four projects had effectively started.
Capital-intensive industrial projects were also envisaged, in particular for the
transformation of cocoa. In the meantime, the liberalization of the economy
accelerated. Non-tariff barriers as well as internal price controls (on e.g. rice,
transport) were eliminated. More liberal regulations were adopted for private
investment, mines, labour, and telecommunications. The privatization of the
cotton parastatal in 1997 was followed by the liberalization of the coffee
(1998) and cocoa sectors (1999). Around 60 public firms were privatized, in
diverse industries from sugar through telephones to railways.
Table 14.2. Poverty measures by socioeconomic status of the household head
1988 1993 1998 2002 2008
Panel A: Household head is a farmer
Consumption per capita 1.99 1.45 1.69 1.67 1.39
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
Poverty headcount 0.30 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.59
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 800 4,277 1,908 4,744 4,675
Panel B: Household head is self-employed
Consumption per capita 3.38 2.37 2.49 2.78 2.44
(0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
Poverty headcount 0.08 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.32
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 249 1,885 835 1,950 3,388
Panel C: Household head is a civil servant
Consumption per capita 4.28 3.49 3.46 4.09 3.92
(0.23) (0.15) (0.21) (0.27) (0.18)
Poverty headcount 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
N 208 627 216 543 447
Panel D: Household head is a private-sector wage-earner
Consumption per capita 4.85 2.94 3.04 3.40 3.12
(0.37) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
Poverty headcount 0.02 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 218 1,876 883 2,321 2,510
Panel E: Household head is not working
Consumption per capita 3.51 2.07 2.85 3.09 2.39
(0.56) (0.06) (0.24) (0.10) (0.06)
Poverty headcount 0.18 0.34 0.22 0.22 0.31
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
N 124 837 346 1,160 1,437
Note: Daily consumption expenditures per capita are in constant 2005 US$ PPP and the poverty line used is US$1.25 PPP
a day. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
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14.5 The Erratic Civil War: 1998–2012
With the prospect of the presidential elections of 2000, political tensions
carried on increasing. In 1998, a new law on land was passed that introduced
not only unequal rights for nationals and foreigners, but also a notion of
autochthony; it was hardly applied in the years that followed, but contributed
to violence around access to land and land rights (e.g. Chauveau 2010).
Electoral lists were also scrutinized in order to exclude voters whose Ivorian
nationality could be contested. At the same time, growth slowed down, and
Konan Bédié was accused of stratospheric corruption. A scandal around the
embezzlement of European aid in the health sector erupted in 1998. On
Christmas Eve, 1999, a military coup overthrew Konan Bédié and called to
power Robert Gueï, the chief of the army under Houphouët, whom Konan
Bédié had forced into retirement in 1997. This event inaugurated a period of
erratic civil conflict, punctuated by intermittent episodes of hard political
violence.
14.5.1 The Elephant Falling Down: 1998–2002
General Robert Gueï committed to organizing elections, first declared he
would not present himself, then changed his mind. Ouattara’s candidature
was again barred by the new 2000 Constitution and Konan Bédié was exiled
to Ghana, so that only Laurent Gbagbo and Robert Gueï competed in the
2000 elections. Turnout was very low at 37 per cent. Yet Gueï was defeated
and ousted from power by street demonstrations by Gbagbo partisans; he
was later assassinated in Abidjan after the coup attempts of 2002. Political
violence reached a peak as fights also arose between Ouattara and Gbagbo
followers—in particular, a mass grave was found in the outskirts of Abidjan
(Yopougon). The long-term opponent of Félix Houphouët-Boigny then
became the third president of the Ivorian Republic. Gbagbo quickly endorsed
the topic of ‘Ivoirité’, trying to build an alliance of Southern ‘autochthons’
(Krus of the Southwest, non-Baule Akans of the Southeast), orthogonal to the
Houphouëtian alliance, based on long-lasting resentments dating from the
colonial and early post-colonial times (Dozon 2011).
Liberalization had not reduced corruption, nor increased fair competition in
markets, as it was not accompanied by progress in the enforcement of the law
(Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps 2002a, 2002b). No export diversification took
place. Besides, following the liberalization of themarketing of coffee, producer
prices collapsed. Foreign aid was cut following the military coup, resulting in
public and private investment collapse. At the same time, public wages were
increased by 15 per cent over the period, perhaps to buy loyalty from civil
servants and the military in times when political legitimacy was undermined.
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Over the period 1998–2002, national accounts data on final consumption
stagnated in per capita terms, while our survey aggregate increased by a small 6
per cent, from 2.31 to 2.47 (2005 international dollars per capita per day).
Despite this sluggish growth, the poverty headcount increased by three per-
centage points, from 32 to 35 per cent. The consumption growth incidence
was indeed strongly anti-redistributive and urban-biased (Table 14.4 and
Figure 14.5). Coffee producers, food crop farmers, and the poorest informal
Table 14.3. Poverty measures in households headed by a farmer
1988 1993 1998 2002 2008
Panel A: Cocoa and coffee farmers
Consumption per capita 2.14 1.51 1.66 1.60 1.46
(0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Poverty headcount 0.24 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.53
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
N 476 2,147 953 2,206 2,015
Panel B: Cotton farmers
Consumption per capita 1.47 1.35 1.32 2.22 1.20
(0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.46) (0.16)
Poverty headcount 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.50 0.76
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
N 113 398 206 387 136
Panel C: Other farmers
Consumption per capita 1.98 1.38 1.91 1.65 1.33
(0.15) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03)
Poverty headcount 0.23 0.58 0.43 0.50 0.64
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
N 211 1,732 749 2,151 2,524
Panel D: All farmers
Consumption per capita 1.99 1.45 1.69 1.67 1.39
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
Poverty headcount 0.30 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.59
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 800 4,277 1,908 4,744 4,675
Note: Daily consumption expenditures per capita are in constant 2005US$ PPP and the poverty line used is US$1.25 PPP a day.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
Table 14.4. Decomposition of changes in poverty headcount, 1988–2008
1988–93 1993–8 1998–2002 2002–8
Changes in poverty headcount 18.26 6.06 3.38 5.64
Growth 20.81 8.45 3.72 6.72
Redistribution 0.41 2.35 6.86 2.36
Residual 2.14 0.04 0.24 1.27
Note: The poverty line is set at 2005 US$1.25 PPP per day.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
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workers lost, while skilled civil servants gained (Tables 14.2 and 14.3). In the
North, very good cotton yields (Appendix Figure 14.A2 and Table 14.2 Panel
C) also very much reduced poverty in this area. Could it be that this sudden
inflow of income helped the rebels to arm themselves?
14.5.2 A Country Split in Two: 2002–8
In September 2002, military insurgents made coup attempts in the main cities
of Abidjan, Bouake, and Korhogo, and invaded the North of the country. They
were rising up from within the country and also coming from Southern
Burkina Faso and Mali where they had organized and trained; two other
movements also crossed the border of Liberia and took control of the cities
of Man and Odienne in the Northwest. The UN mandated French and Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops to interpose
between rebels and loyalists. In January 2003, the belligerents signed the
Marcoussis agreement according to which a ‘national union government’
had to be formed, with the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior given to
rebel representatives, and the participation of all political parties. The agree-
ment failed, as members of the coalition withdrew or were dismissed. Another
reconciliation meeting was organized in Accra in June 2003, according to
which Laurent Gbagbo was expected to prepare new presidential elections
while also changing the eligibility conditions that were barring the candida-
ture of Ouattara. The country remained split in two, with French, ECOWAS,
and UN troops seated along an East–West interposition line. In November
2004, loyalist planes bombed Bouake and French troops that had settled in the
airport; French planes retaliated and destroyed the Ivorian airforce. Gbagbo’s
partisans then held large street demonstrations and began attacking French
citizens, whom French forces tried to evacuate; the Ivorian and French gov-
ernments blamed each other for murders committed during these days. Some
French, Lebanese, and other foreigners left the country towards the end of
2004. Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa, was then mandated by the
African Union to act as a mediator. Under strong international pressure, a
change in the constitution was finally adopted at the beginning of 2005,
allowing the candidature of Alassane Ouattara in future presidential elections.
A political ‘détente’ process ensued, which resulted in the Ouagadougou agree-
ments that were signed in March 2007, and the nomination of Guillaume
Soro, head of the rebels, as prime minister. Presidential elections were, how-
ever, delayed every year until 2010.
Figure 14.6 presents the timeline of these events, along with the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data Project’s (ACLED) count of political vio-
lence. It illustrates that the two household surveys we use, carried out in 2002
and 2008, lie at the two ends of this second phase of the civil war. The ENV3
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2002 survey was implemented between May and July, hence just before the
September rebellion, while the ENV4 2008 ( June–August 2008) came after the
Ouagadougou agreements had brought some peace to the country.
Between 2002 and 2008, national accounts of consumption per capita fell
by 11 per cent, and rather consistently the household survey mean dropped
by 13 per cent. According to our estimates, the national poverty headcount
increased by six percentage points, from 35 to 41 per cent, i.e. the highest
figure ever recorded over the past two decades, and most likely even before
that: GDP per capita fell below the level of 600 dollars (constant 2000 US$),
as it had done in 1993, falling back to the level of the early 1960s. Very
strikingly, the Northern areas that were cut from the ‘legal country’ suffered
a lot economically: the poverty headcount increased by twenty-two percent-
age points, skyrocketing to 62 per cent. Cotton production collapsed; as of
2008, only 1 per cent of households were still growing this crop; aggregate
figures suggest that cotton production only started its recovery in 2010–11
(Appendix Figure 14.A2). Other areas instead experienced little change in
poverty, or in the case of East Forest, a limited increase, so that the bulk of
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Figure 14.6. Civil conflict
Note: Number of political violence events, 1997–2011. Political violence events reported are violence
against civilians that occurs during civil and communal conflicts, battles, and riots or protests.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from ACLED (2013)
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14.5.3 The Last Episode of Civil War (2008–11)
Presidential elections were finally organized at the end of 2010. The two former
heirs of Houphouët-Boigny, who had been enemies throughout the 1990s,
Konan Bédié and Ouattara, formed an alliance against Gbagbo, and hence
reconstructed the Centre–North alliance of the past. Alassane Ouattara opposed
Laurent Gbagbo in the second round, and both candidates claimed victory.
A last episode of civil war erupted, causing the deaths of between 900 and 3,000
and the displacement of 1 million people (IDMC 2012). With support from
French troops, the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo was arrested in his palace in
April 2011 and presented to the International Court of Justice in The Hague in
December. Since 2012, progress towards national reconciliation has been
limited. The Commission for Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation, launched
in July 2011, has been criticized for its slowness and partiality: to date, only
crimes by Gbagbo supporters have been judged, while Ouattara’s partisans also
committed reprehensible acts of violence. Whereas the most influential leaders
of Gbagbo’s political party (the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)) went into exile in
Ghana, the FPI refused to participate in any official reconciliation committee
and boycotted the municipal elections of April 2013. Security in the country
depends on the reintegration into civil society of thousands of former members
of armed militia. On the economic side, Ouattara’s government benefits from
the strong support of international donors: a substantial reduction in external
debt stock was obtained, and budget support of around 7 per cent of GDP has
been received each year since 2011. After limited growth in 2010 (2 per cent),
and a fall of 5 per cent in 2011, growth in 2012 was estimated at around 8.6
per cent (IMF 2012). This quick recovery is the result of public reconstruction
programmes and the revival of formal economic activities.
After around two decades of political and economic turmoil, from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s, it took some time for neighbouring Ghana to finally
reconstruct a stable democracy and a buoyant economy, at the turn of the
twenty-first century (Eberhardt and Teal 2010). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire,
getting back to (political and economic) ‘business as usual’ will probably not
be sufficient. In the short run, new rents from natural resources like oil or
minerals could enable the restoration of the political and economic equilib-
rium of the old days, involving a cautious balance in the distribution of state
resources: jobs and public investments. In the longer run, the burning issues
that fuelled the conflict will have to be addressed, at the least, the acquisition
of nationality and the regulation of land allocation. Further, in the context of
the exhaustion of the ‘rent’ from the forest, the intensification of smallholder
practices should become an urgent necessity, if only to enable preservation of
the high level of cocoa output that still makes up the wealth of Côte d’Ivoire
(Gockowski and Sonwa 2011). Dark predictions regarding the impact of
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climate change on the conditions for cocoa growing even suggest that shifting
away from cocoa could become an obligation (Läderach 2011).
14.6 Conclusion
At the end of the 1980s, Côte d’Ivoire entered a deep macroeconomic crisis
that put an end to the often-praised ‘Ivorian miracle’. After the death of the
founding father Houphouët-Boigny, unrestrained political competition was
combined with bad economic conditions and led to the nightmare of civil
war. Drawing from a series of five household surveys covering two decades
(1988–2008), we have told the story of this descent into hell from the stand-
point of poverty and living standards. Despite the bounce-back allowed by the
CFA devaluation in 1994, the country could never recover from the initial
shock created by the halving of cocoa producer prices and huge budget cuts. In
2008, after five years of civil war and with another episode yet to come
(2010–11), the extreme US$1.25 poverty headcount had reached a historical
record for poverty, with Northern areas deeply impoverished by the partition
of the country.
Appendix
Table 14.A1. School net attendance rates over time
1988 1993 1998 2002 2008
Panel A: Primary schoola
Girls 0.48 0.42 0.51 0.55 0.56
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Boys 0.64 0.51 0.58 0.63 0.62
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Net rate 0.56 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.59
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
N 1,985 11,439 4,504 9,980 9,479
Panel B: Secondary schoolb
Girls 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.21
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Boys 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Net Rate 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.25
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 1,550 10,399 4,443 9,892 9,231
Note: Attendance rate is estimated using the highest grade completed at the time of the survey. a The sample is restricted
to children aged 6–11 years at the time of the survey. b The sample is restricted to children aged 12–18 years at the time
of the survey.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
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Table 14.A2. Durable goods ownership
1988 1993 1998 2002 2008
Panel A: National
Cooker 10.7 10.0 11.8 13.9 14.4
Fridge 20.7 18.1 18.4 17.0 15.6
Radio 57.8 60.0 64.6 67.4 74.7
TV 26.7 29.2 31.1 34.9 45.3
Bike or motorbike 35.6 33.7 33.5 35.6 53.2
Car 4.6 5.2 4.7 5.8 3.4
Phone 6.5 20.0 65.5
Wealth scorea
Mean 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.1
Std. Dev. 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1
N 1,600 9,599 4,200 10,800 10,958
Panel B: Urban areas
Cooker 25.1 21.2 22.0 30.4 30.8
Fridge 45.1 37.6 32.7 34.3 29.8
Radio 71.3 76.8 69.9 75.0 74.9
TV 57.2 57.2 52.9 61.3 73.9
Bike or motorbike 17.8 20.1 18.7 20.1 26.0
Car 10.6 10.4 8.5 11.9 6.7
Phone 13.0 41.8 89.4
Wealth scorea
Mean 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.4
Std. Dev. 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.3
N 736 5,360 1,919 4,980 6,119
Panel C: Rural areas
Cooker 1.6 1.4 3.6 1.4 1.6
Fridge 5.2 3.3 6.8 3.9 4.5
Radio 49.3 47.2 60.3 61.6 74.5
TV 7.5 8.1 13.3 14.9 23.0
Bike or motorbike 46.9 43.9 45.5 47.4 74.4
Car 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.8
Phone 1.1 3.4 46.8
Wealth scorea
Mean 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.8
Std. Dev. 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9
N 864 4,239 2,280 5,820 4,839
Note: Share of individuals living in a household with at least one of the durable goods listed.
a Wealth score: Sum of cooker, fridge, radio, TV, bike, motorbike, and car per capita
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys
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Figure 14.A1. Real producer prices for cash crops
Note: Real producer prices: nominal producer prices deflated by consumer price index and con-
verted in 2000 US$. Cocoa and coffee prices on left scale, cotton prices on right scale (2000 US$ per
kilogram).
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Figure 14.A2. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton output
Note: Output in thousands of tons. Cocoa on left scale, coffee and cotton on right scale.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from FAOSTAT (2012)
Acknowledgements
We thank Siriki Coulibaly (Afristat) and Jonas Yao N’Dri (Institut National de la
Statistique—Côte d’Ivoire) for their contributions to this study. We thank the
National Institute of Côte d’Ivoire for giving us access to the survey data. We also
thank workshop participants at UNU-WIDER, especially Channing Arndt, Michael
Grimm, Murray Leibbrandt, Andy McKay, and James Thurlow. The usual disclaimer
applies.
References
ACLED (2013). ‘Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset’. Available at <http://www.
acleddata.com/data/africa/>, accessed June 2013.
Beegle, K., J. De Weerdt, J. Friedman, and J. Gibson (2012). ‘Methods of Household
Consumption Measurement through Surveys: Experimental Results from Tanzania’,
Journal of Development Economics, 98(1): 3–18.
Berthélemy, J.-C., and F. Bourguignon (1996). Growth and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Boone, C. (2007). ‘Africa’s New Territorial Politics: Regionalism and the Open Economy
in Côte d’Ivoire’, African Studies Review, 50(1): 59–81.
Chauveau, J.-P. (2010). ‘La loi de 1998 sur le domaine rural dans l’histoire des politiques
foncières en Côte d’Ivoire: Une économie politique des transferts de droits entre
“autochtones” et “étrangers” en zone forestière’, in J.-P. Colin, P.-Y. Le Meur, and
E. Léonard (eds), Les politiques d’enregistrement des droits fonciers: Du cadre légal aux
pratiques locales. Paris: Karthala, 105–40.
Cogneau, D. and G. Collange (1998). ‘Les effets à moyen terme de la dévaluation des
FCFA: Une comparaison Cameroun/Côte d’Ivoire’, Revue d’Économie du Développe-
ment, 3–4 (December): 125–47.
Cogneau, D. and M. Grimm (2008). ‘The Impact of AIDS Mortality on the Distribution
of Income in Côte d’Ivoire’, Journal of African Economies, 17(5): 688–728.
Cogneau, D., K. Houngbedji, and S. Mesplé-Somps (2014). ‘The Fall of the Elephant:
Two Decades of Poverty Increase in Côte d’Ivoire (1988–2008)’, UN-WIDER WP/
2014/144.
Cogneau, D. and R. Jedwab (2012). ‘Commodity Price Shocks and Child Outcomes: The
1990 Cocoa Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 60(3):
507–34.
Cogneau, D. and S. Mesplé-Somps (2002a). ‘Les illusions perdues de l’économie ivoiri-
enne et la crise politique’, Afrique Contemporaine, 206: 87–104.
Cogneau, D. and S. Mesplé-Somps (2002b). ‘L’économie ivoirienne, la fin du mirage?’,
DIAL Document de travail 2002/18. Paris: DIAL.
Cogneau, D., S. Mesplé-Somps, and G. Spielvogel (2015). ‘Development at the Border:
Economic Integration in Côte d’Ivoire and its Neighbors’, World Bank Economic
Review, 29(1): 41–71.
Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction
340
Cogneau, D. and A. Moradi (2014). ‘Borders that Divide: Education and Religion
in Ghana and Togo since Colonial Times’, Journal of Economic History, 74(3):
694–728.
Cogneau, D. and L. Rouanet (2011). ‘Living Conditions in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana,
1925–1985: What Do Survey Data on Height Stature Tell Us?’, Economic History of
Developing Regions, 26(2): 55–82.
Coulibaly, S. Z. and J. Yao N’Dri (2012). ‘Evolution de la situation nutritionnelle en
Côte d’Ivoire de 1994 à 2012, à partir des données des enquêtes démographiques et
de santé’. Mimeo. Mali: Afristat.
Dabalen, A. L. and S. Paul (2013). ‘Recovering Comparable Poverty Estimates in Côte
d’Ivoire’, Journal of Development Studies, 49(10): 1412–26.
Dozon, J.-P. (2011). Les clefs de la crise ivoirienne. Paris: Karthala.
Eberhardt, M. and F. Teal (2010). ‘Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire: Changing Places’, Revue
Internationale de Politique de Développement, 1: 33–49.
FAOSTAT (2012). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Statis-
tics Division, <http://faostat3.fao.org/home/index.html>, accessed December
2012.
Fogel, R. W. (1994). ‘Economic Growth, Population Theory and Physiology: The Bear-
ing of Long-Term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy’, American Economic
Review, 84(3): 369–95.
Gockowski, J. and D. Sonwa (2011). ‘Cocoa Intensification Scenarios and their
Predicted Impact on CO2 Emissions, Biodiversity Conservation, and Rural Liveli-
hoods in the Guinea Rain Forest of West Africa’, Environmental Management, 48:
307–21.
Huillery, E. (2009). ‘History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Invest-
ments in French West Africa’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(2):
176–215.
IDMC (2012). ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Les personnes déplacées à l’intérieur de leur propre pays
tentent de refaire leur vie sur fond de paix fragile’, <www.internal-displacement.
org/assets/library/Africa/Cote-dIvoire/pdf/201211-af-cotedivoire-overview-fr.pdf>,
accessed June 2012.
IMF (2012). ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Second Review under the Three-Year Arrangement under
the Extended Credit Facility, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria,
and Financing Assurances Review—Staff Report’, IMF Country Report 12/332.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2013). World Economic and Financial Surveys: World Economic Outlook Data-
base. Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/
index.aspx>, accessed June 2012.
Jedwab, R. (2011). ‘Why Is African Urbanization Different? Evidence from Resource
Exports in Ghana and Ivory Coast’. Unpublished, Paris School of Economics.
Jones, B. and B. Olken (2005). ‘Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth
since World War II’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3): 835–64.
Läderach, P. (2011). ‘Predicting the Impact of Climate Change on the Cocoa-
Growing Regions in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire’. Report for the Bill and Melinda
Poverty Increase in Côte d’Ivoire, 1988–2008
341
Gates Foundation. Managua, Nicaragua: International Center for Tropical Agricul-
ture (CIAT).
Tapinos, G., P. Hugon, and P. Vimard (eds) (2002). La Côte d’Ivoire à l’aube du XXIème
siècle. Paris: Karthala.
World Bank (2008). ‘African Development Indicators’. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank (2012). ‘World Development Indicators’. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction
342
15
Incomes, Inequality, and Poverty in Kenya
A Long-Term Perspective
Arne Bigsten, Damiano Kulundu Manda, Germano Mwabu,
and Anthony Wambugu
15.1 Introduction
This study aims to provide consistent estimates of what has happened to
national income, inequality, and poverty in Kenya over time, and to explain
why they evolved in the way they did. The primary focus is on the most recent
period for which we have household survey data, but first we review (in section
15.2) the evidence on long-term changes in inequality and poverty in Kenya.
In section 15.3 we discuss the problems of measuring income changes. We
present evidence on changes in incomes, employment, and economic struc-
ture in section 15.4, and on poverty and inequality in section 15.5. In section
15.6 we discuss policy challenges and in section 15.7 we conclude.
15.2 The Evolution of Kenyan Incomes, Inequality, and Poverty
during the Twentieth Century
One can distinguish four types of determinants of changes in the structure of
production and incomes. These are, first, changes in the factor endowments of
the economy. The key to growth is capital deepening, which will occur if there
is a high rate of investment in people and machinery. Second, there are the
effects of changes in output prices. The domestic prices of tradeable commod-
ities are largely exogenous, but they are also affected by government interven-
tions. Third, technical progress is important for growth and leads to higher
factor rewards. Finally, changes in the level of distortions or government
policies affect factor prices and thus incomes.
During the twentieth century, there were dramatic changes in the structure
of Kenya’s economy and in the sectorial allocation of labour. Kenya started
out with almost the whole of its labour force in agriculture and related
activities; but a century later more than half of the labour force is in formal
or informal non-agricultural activities. There has been an even more drastic
shift in the structure of output. The share of agriculture in gross domestic
product (GDP) has fallen from above three-quarters to about a quarter. This
structural transformation has driven the changes in incomes, income distri-
bution, and poverty.
15.2.1 The Period up to the First World War
Until the arrival of the British colonialists at the end of the nineteenth
century, the Kenyan inland was little integrated with the outside world,
while there were long-distance trading activities along the coast. The inland
households were pastoralists, settled farmers, small craftsmen, or traders, but
generally there was limited specialization. Individuals had generally enough
land to ensure a standard of living roughly comparable to that of the other
members of the community; regional differences in welfare levels that are so
conspicuous today were small.
With the completion of the railway in 1901, the inland was opened up to
trade and settlement. The railway construction was undertaken by Indian
workers, and about 6,500 remained in the country. The majority set up
small commercial stores, while some took up intermediate-level positions in
private industry or the public sector. A rapid increase in the numbers of Asians
and Europeans followed in the colony. By 1914 there had already been a
considerable expansion of formal wage employment (Bigsten 1984). Another
category of workers was engaged in settler agriculture, either as squatters or as
contract labour. A class of African traders and businessmen emerged. This
group was engaged in stock trading, maize milling, butchering, the selling of
food and drink, and small-scale retail trade (Kitching 1980). Finally, the period
before and during the First World War also saw an expansion of cash crop
production on African farms and an increase in the cultivated area. The
increasing differentiation in agricultural activities started to increase income
inequality.
15.2.2 The Interwar Period
By the First World War, pass laws had been introduced, and in the highlands
the Africans could only work as contract or resident labour. Themeasures were
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instituted to increase the supply of African labour, since the Europeans were
unwilling to pay competitive wages. By restricting the scope for development
on the African farms, the supply price of labour was reduced, and through
various forms of coercion and through hut and poll taxes the Africans were
made to work for still less. Asians were not allowed to own land, and Africans
were not allowed to grow a number of cash crops.
By the mid-1920s, a three-class society had been established along
racial lines, with whites monopolizing export crop agriculture, the higher
administrative posts, and the professions; the Asians trade, commerce, and
the middle reaches of the bureaucracy; and the Africans left with unskilled
wage employment, smallholder farming, petty trade at the village level, and
the lower-level clerical posts in the administration (Collier and Lal 1986: 38).
Still, African cash crop agriculture expanded in spite of the restrictions
imposed by the government, and there was a growing domestic market for
food crops.
Like other countries, Kenya was hit hard by the Depression of 1929. Since
most of the produce of the settlers went for export, several estates went
bankrupt, although many were saved by loans from the colonial government.
The squatters could supplement their income by production on their own
plots, but their standard of living deteriorated for a few years.When the effects
of the Depression receded, employment started to increase again. The eco-
nomic decline during the Depression meant that the major market for African
food crops was curtailed, but African agriculture acreage still expanded during
the 1930s. The process of commercialization of African agriculture continued
and it accelerated during the Second World War. The labour movements also
gained in importance (Bigsten 1984).
Inequality among African smallholders increased, and the major differenti-
ating factor was access to land. Those who had large landholdings in areas
where cash crops could be produced improved their relative position. Rural–
urban differences in living standards emerged; a rural elite was buying up land
for commercial farming (Kitching 1980), and an African trade and business
class was established. The most rapidly changing regions in the country were
Central and Nyanza provinces. During the SecondWorldWar, agriculturalists
as well as traders made considerable profits. Obviously, Europeans and Asians
still dominated commerce and industry, but African businessmen and traders
were making noticeable progress.
15.2.3 The Post-War Period, 1945–63
After the Second World War, wage employment was quite extensive, but
much of it was still of a temporary nature. Labour migration was very com-
mon, and African wage employment increased rapidly in the 1950s. The
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growth of agricultural employment in the 1950s reflected an increase in
labour demand due to rising producer prices and switches to new crops such
as tea and pyrethrum. The government also changed its policy towards African
small farmers, who were now allowed to grow coffee. During the period
1960–7, employment in modern agriculture fell because of the breaking up
of estates, which reduced demand for agricultural wage labour. Non-
agricultural employment declined in the run-up to independence due to
rapid increases in real wages, which among other things were due to govern-
ment efforts to increase minimum wages.
During the 1940s there was a considerable gap between agricultural and
non-agricultural wages, but this was to some extent offset by higher costs of
living and fewer opportunities in urban areas for supplementing wage
incomes with farm incomes. The gap increased rapidly during the 1950s.
Real wages in agriculture rose rapidly in the 1960s due to increasing commer-
cialization of agriculture, but non-agricultural real wages increased even faster.
Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s the gap between agricultural and non-
agricultural wages increased dramatically.
15.2.4 The First Post-Independence Period, 1963–76
The coming of independence in Kenya in 1963 implied a change in the
interracial distribution of both political power and incomes. The income
structure change was limited, but employment was no longer as systematically
racially segregated.
With the coming of independence there was a great need for qualified
manpower in the public sector. To satisfy this need the public sector increased
its relative wages dramatically. Between 1963 and 1965 public-sector real
wages increased by 48 per cent, while they increased by a mere 6 per cent in
the private sector (Collier and Lal 1986). In 1968 wages by skill were higher in
the public sector than in the private sector, although private-sector wages
started to increase rapidly from 1966. Another factor that continued to be of
importance for income distribution during the first years of independence was
the increase in minimum wages.
During the first decade after independence many smallholders experienced
marked improvements, but there were significant differences among them.
However, there remained a hard-core group of rural poor consisting of small-
holders (a) with little land or with land of low potential; (b) with inadequate
access to off-farm income or urban markets; or (c) who were reluctant to
innovate. There were also landless workers and pastoralists with little or no
education.
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15.2.5 Economic Inequality and Poverty, 1914–76
There were large changes in the collection of national statistics in the mid-
1970s; in particular, the racial breakdown of employment statistics was aban-
doned. Therefore we are forced to break this historical account of the Kenyan
economy in 1976, and show how the income distribution in the country
evolved between 1914 and 1976 (see Bigsten 1986 for a detailed presentation
of the approach).1 The estimated growth rate for Kenya for the whole period,
1914 to 1976, was a respectable 5 per cent per year. The data for the pre-war
period are very shaky, but for the period 1946–76, for which the database is
better, the recorded growth rate is 6.6 per cent per year (compared to 3.7 per
cent per year for the 1914–46 period). It therefore seems fairly safe to conclude
that income growth in Kenya was quite high during the first three-quarters of
the twentieth century.
During this period, the structure of incomes by source changed significantly
(Figure 15.1).We see that smallholder agriculture declined in importance until
1950, but then its share in incomes remained practically constant. The shares
of wage earnings and operating surplus stayed around the level of 1960 until
1976. Structural change was thus not as dramatic in the 1960s and 1970s as it
had been previously.
The income shares of different income groups depend on the number of
people engaged in different activities and their income levels. The incomes of
African businessmen and own-account workers grew very rapidly from inde-
pendence. Agricultural wage employees had a very uneven increase in their
wages, while the wage rates of African private employees increased rapidly
from the SecondWorldWar until 1970, but then declined. There was a similar
pattern for public employees, although their wages jumped immediately after
independence and their real wages were more resistant during the 1970s.
The gap between African and Asian per capita incomes declined slowly until
independence, but then increased again. The racial income gaps remained
very large, although the relative European incomes were much higher in the
colonial period. The level of the African per capita incomes increased with the
most rapid increase during the 1950s and 1960s. During the period 1970–6,
1 The basic principle was to start from the national income estimate and then to disaggregate
this by income groups by sector and race. After estimating the number of persons in each group,
one estimated the average income of each group within which the income distribution was
assumed to be lognormal. Information from available sources was then used to estimate the
variance of incomes in each group. It was used to distribute income receivers around the mean
income. Once this is done one could count the number of income receivers in each category with
an annual income in a certain range. The Gini coefficients could then be derived for each group
and any aggregation of groups. We should note that the Gini tends to become significantly higher
by this approach than when estimated from household budget surveys. One reason is that capital
income is more clearly accounted for and survey estimates use consumption instead of income,
and the former tends to be more equally distributed.
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the economic situation deteriorated and African per capita incomes declined.
Still, the overall effect of these changed factor returns and in particular
changes in the relative sizes of the three groups meant that the African share
of incomes increased (see Figure 15.2).2 It has certainly continued to do so
after 1976, but we have no data to analyse this breakdown beyond this time.
Overall inequality according to these estimates increased until 1950, then
fluctuated and finally declined slightly during the 1970s (see Figure 15.3).
Between 1950 and 1955 the Gini coefficient declined from 0.70 to 0.63,
while the variance within the thirteen income categories3 changed very little.
The reason for the decline in inequality was that smallholder incomes
increased at a higher rate than those of other groups. During 1955–60, overall
inequality increased strongly again, while inequality both in the modern and
the traditional sector changed very little. This was largely due to the fact that
traditional (mainly smallholder agriculture) incomes fell to 17 per cent of
modern incomes. Between 1960 and 1964, the modern–traditional gap
again decreased and so did the Gini coefficient. The same pattern repeats itself








































Figure 15.1. Incomes by source, per cent
Source: Based on Bigsten (1986) data
2 The shares of Europeans and Asians in the labour force peaked around 1960 at 0.8 per cent and
1.6 per cent respectively. By 1976 their shares had declined to 0.2 per cent and 0.5 per cent.
3 The categories for Africans, Europeans, and Asians were self-employed, agricultural wage
employees, non-agricultural wage employees, and public employees. The final category was
African smallholders.
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the Gini coefficient goes up, and vice versa. Overall inequality increased
between 1964 and 1971 and then fell between 1971 and 1976.
There was a long-term increase in inequality in the traditional (largely
agricultural) sector. This is consistent with increased diversification within








































Figure 15.2. Percentage distribution of income by race













































Figure 15.3. Gini coefficients, 1914–76
Source: Based on Bigsten (1986) data
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emerges. Here inequality declined. This is consistent with the view of increas-
ing integration and homogenization of themodern sector. The fact that we do
not measure income by households here does, however, create a problem.
Since many households have incomes from a variety of sources, the distribu-
tion over families might look somewhat different. The trends over time
should, nevertheless, be reasonably well captured.
Overall inequality in Kenya thus increased until about 1950 and then
stagnated at a high level. The result is similar, whether we use the modern
versus traditional income gap or the Gini coefficient as our measure of
inequality.
We can also look at the evolution of poverty. The regions with the highest
poverty rates at the time are still the poorest today, suggesting that poverty
can persist in a region or country for centuries. Figure 15.4 shows Sen’s Poverty
Index for Kenya over the period 1914–76. This index is essentially the head-
count ratio weighted by two parameters, (a) the Gini for the poor and (b) the
normalized poverty gap. We see that the income poverty rates as measured by
Sen’s Poverty Index are initially very high, but from 1950 income poverty
declined for a short period before rising again and remaining nearly constant
during the first decade of independence.
Bigsten (1986) argues that the sectorial inequality in incomes is a good
proxy for inequality in the overall distribution of income among workers or
individuals. This conclusion is confirmed by the correlation coefficient
between the sectorial inequality and the Gini, which is as high as 0.70.
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Figure 15.4. Income poverty in Kenya (Sen’s Index), 1914–76
Source: Based on Bigsten (1986) data
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the income gap between rural (traditional) and urban (modern) sectors. As this
gap increases, that is, as the low, rural incomes increase faster than the urban
incomes (see Bigsten 1986), the Gini coefficient falls.
15.2.6 Factor Incomes, 1964–2000
During the first years after independence Kenya grew quite fast, but from the
early 1970s, the country experienced increasing macroeconomic imbalances,
which were not addressed effectively. In the beginning of the 1980s, the
government embarked on a series of structural adjustment programmes. By
1993–4 it had achieved extensive trade liberalization, and the country became
an open economy according to the criteria set up by Sachs andWarner (1995).
Bigsten and Durevall (2006, 2008) evaluated the role of endowments (cap-
ital, K; labour, L; and land, T) and openness for the evolution of relative factor
prices from independence until 2000. Their estimates of factor endowment
ratios, K/L, T/L, and K/T, are shown in Figure 15.5. The K/L ratio is very
important for the pattern of specialization, the factor price outcomes, and
incomes. We see that the ratio increased until 1982, but that the trend was








Figure 15.5. Relative factor endowments in Kenya, 1964–2000
Note: K/L = _____; T/L =_ _ _ _; K/T = .. . . . . . . .. The variables have beenmean- and variance- adjusted
to increase the readability of the graph.
Source: Bigsten and Durevall (2008). Figure reproduced with permission of Journal of Development
Studies
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then reversed. The capital–land ratio grew and the land–labour ratio declined
continuously.
Labour supply growth outstripped formal-sector job creation and the use of
minimum wages to push up real formal-sector wages became increasingly
ineffective, and private-sector real wages fell. From 1968 onwards the labour
market can be characterized as competitive, although various labour market
controls remained until the 1990s. Trade unions were allowed to seek full
compensation for price increases from 1994, and the relaxation of wage
guidelines made it possible for firms and employees to negotiate wages on
the basis of productivity considerations rather than cost-of-living indices
(Ikiara and Ndung’u 1997). It also became easier to shed labour.
The evolution of real wages is shown in Figure 15.6 alongside estimates for
returns to capital and land. Real wages are measured as labour earnings,
including allowances, of employees in the private sector divided by the GDP
deflator. Real wages increased by about 25 per cent from the mid-1960s until
the beginning of the 1970s. This was followed by a slow decline until 1995,
when real wages started to increase rapidly. The growth of private-sector real
earnings between 1994 and 2000 was 65 per cent. This may have been due to
the lifting of labour market controls (IMF 2003). Real returns to land have






Figure 15.6. Indexes of real returns to factors in Kenya, 1964–2000
Note: Real return to capital = _______; real return to labour = ○___○___○; real return to land =+___+___+.
The GDP deflator was used to calculate the real values of earnings and land prices. The base year is
1982 = 1. The series for land prices is the moving average of the actual series.
Source: Bigsten and Durevall (2008). Figure reproduced with permission of Journal of Development
Studies
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increased sharply since independence. Returns to capital declined from 1964
to the mid-1970s; in total, a reduction of 50 per cent. Since 1975 it has
fluctuated slightly.
The main empirical regularity for the period 1965–2000 is that factor price
movements were driven by changes in factor endowments, while in this
regard the removal of trade restrictions had a limited effect. Changes in
income inequality have been strongly influenced by the long-term process
of structural change. The rapid increase in real wages that started in the mid-
1990s and lasted into the next decade could have been driven by labour policy
reforms, though.
15.3 Measurement Challenges
One of the challenges encountered when trying to measure growth and
income distribution in African economies is that the data are weak and
inconsistent. The first challenge for our more detailed analysis of recent
developments is to get measures of the growth of GDP.
Kenya’s GDP is measured from both the production side and the expend-
iture side, and the accounts show some discrepancy (expenditure figures are
typically up to 5 per cent larger). The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
(KNBS) relies mostly on the production approach. To get income shares, the
KNBS measures labour incomes and then deducts these from GDP to get
operating surplus, which includes capital and rental incomes.
There are two GDP time series (with different base years) that cover parts of
the relevant time period. The first series is based on 1982 prices, while the
other series is based on 2001 prices. KNBS also switched from the 1969 system
of national accounts (SNA) to SNA 1993, which implied some definitional
changes. KNBS re-estimated GDP back to 1996 using the 2001 weights. There
are considerable differences between the two series both in terms of levels and
growth rates.
The 2001 rebasing used information from the Household Budget Survey
(HBS) of 1997 extensively. New rebased series should be better than the old
ones, and they typically increase the level of GDP. We note that in the
rebasing in 2001 GDP estimates increased very significantly (at most 50 per
cent for 2001; Muchiri and Audi n.d.), because of changes in definitions and
methods, changes in data sources, and improved coverage. For example,
output of construction is considerably higher in the new series, which also
means that fixed capital formation becomes larger.4
4 For further discussion of estimation procedures, see Bigsten et al. (2014).
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There is an overlap between the two GDP series for seven years, making it
possible to compare growth rates for six years. In Table 15.1 we show growth
rates of GDP and the two components of agriculture and manufacturing. We
see that there are considerable differences in the aggregate growth estimates
between the two series. The new series gives higher GDP growth rates for all
years except the first and the last. The average growth rates over the six years
are 1.3 per cent and 1.9 per cent, respectively. Comparing growth rates in
agriculture andmanufacturing, we see that the differences for individual years
are even larger.
So why are the differences so large between the old and the new series? One
reason is that the relative weights of the different sectors have changed. The
share of manufacturing fell drastically with the new prices. For 2001 it fell
from 13 per cent of GDP to 9.6 per cent of GDP. This kind of change can
explain why the aggregate growth rates can be quite different when we have
different sectorial developments. It is harder to understand how the sectorial
growth rates can vary as dramatically as they do.
15.4 The Evolution of GDP, Factor Proportions,
and Employment, 1994–2012
As noted, we have contradictory growth estimates depending on whether we
use the old GDP series (1982 base) or the newer series (2001 base). Table 15.2
shows how the two series differ in terms of GDP growth rates and investment
shares (GFCF). The columns for capital formation are included because differ-
ences in capital formation estimates underlie differences in the GDP estimates,
but also because investment rates are of interest when we are trying to explain
growth variations. The new series is supposedly the better one, so we rely on
this as much as possible. The last column gives our preferred estimates of per
Table 15.1. Growth rates (per cent) for 1997–2002 using 1982 and 2001 prices
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average
At 1982 prices
Agricultural growth 1.0 1.5 1.2 2.1 1.3 0.7 0.6
Manufacturing growth 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.7
GDP growth 2.4 1.8 1.4 0.2 1.2 1.1 1.3
At 2001 prices
Agricultural growth 3.2 8.4 6.4 1.2 10.5 3.0 3.0
Manufacturing growth 0 1.8 4.1 1.0 1.6 0.1 0.5
GDP growth 0.3 3.4 2.1 0.5 4.5 0.6 1.9
Source: KNBS data
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capita income growth. After a long period of virtual stagnation, the Kenyan
economy went through a strong growth phase in 2003–7, as the rate of
economic growth accelerated up to 7 per cent. During the same period, total
factor productivity in manufacturing increased by as much as 20 per cent
(World Bank 2007). Aggregate capital formation increased to 19 per cent in
2006 and over 20 per cent of GDP in 2010. This is high by Kenyan standards,
but pales in comparison with that of its Asian competitors. Manufacturing
growth followed more or less the same pattern as GDP, which meant that its
share of GDP remained at slightly below 10 per cent of GDP. There has not
been any take-off for manufacturing production in Kenya.
Our main concern is to understand what has happened to the incomes of
individuals and households. We see that per capita income growth was weak
and fluctuating between 1994 and 2002. Incomes fell in 2000, which was a
drought year, and in 2002, which was an election year. Then growth stabil-
ized, but we note a drop in 2008, because of the civil conflict following the
December 2007 disputed election.
We have compared the growth of GDP per capita from the national
accounts, with the evolution of mean consumption spending according
to household surveys. Between 1994 and 2005/6 GDP per capita grew by































1994 3.0 18.9 0.1 0.1
1995 4.8 21.4 1.9 1.9
1996 4.6 16.0 19.8 0.5 0.5
1997 0.3 2.4 15.5 17.6 2.6 0.6 2.6
1998 3.4 1.8 15.6 16.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
1999 2.1 1.4 15.5 15.2 0.8 0.8 0.8
2000 0.5 0.2 16.8 14.6 2.4 2.9 2.4
2001 4.5 1.2 18.2 12.8 1.6 0.8 1.6
2002 0.6 1.1 17.4 12.9 2.3 1.1 2.3
2003 2.9 15.8 12.5 0.0 0.0
2004 5.1 16.3 2.0 2.0
2005 5.8 18.7 2.9 2.9
2006 6.4 19.1 3.5 3.5
2007 7.0 19.4 4.0 4.0
2008 1.5 19.4 1.0 1.0
2009 2.7 19.6 0.1 0.1
2010 5.8 20.3 3.7 3.7
2011 4.4 20.0 1.6 1.6
2012 4.6 20.4 1.7 1.7
Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract (annual); Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey (annual)
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3 per cent, whilemean consumption (per adult equivalent) fell by 1.2 per cent.
There was furthermore a 4 per cent increase in the share of GDP going to
investment over the period. So we think we can say that the aggregate GDP
estimates square well with the aggregate household estimates.
Factor quantity series are of interest to us, since we know (Bigsten and
Durevall 2008) that changes in factor abundance have been a crucial deter-
minant of the pattern of specialization and factor prices (and thus inequality
and poverty). The most noteworthy development is that labour force growth
has outpaced the growth of capital from the 1980s onwards. The country has
not been able to pursue a strategy of capital deepening. This has had great
implications for how the reallocation of labour in the economy has evolved.
The labour pressure on land increases, continuously pushing labour off the
land. This labour could have been absorbed by capital-intensive activities if
capital had been accumulated at a sufficiently rapid rate. But since this has not
happened, labour has had to move into activities that use little capital, that is,
the informal sector and various forms of low-productivity self-employment. It
is clear that it is mainly changes in factor endowments that drive structural
change in the Kenyan economy.
To illustrate changes in factor endowments during the period under study
we have extended the K/L, K/T, and L/T estimates of Bigsten and Durevall
(2006) to 2011 (Figure 15.7). Since the investment rate continued until 2004
at about the same rate as 1994–2000, we assume that the capital stock con-
tinued to grow at 1.7 per cent per year until 2004. We assume that the upward
shift of the investment rate by 2 per cent of GDP from 2005 led to an increase
















































Figure 15.7. Factor proportions, 1994–2011
Note: K = capital; L = labour; T = land
Source: Authors’ calculations based on KNBS data
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estimates are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(over 3 per cent growth annually), while the estimate of agricultural land is
kept constant (possibly some new land came under cultivation, but this would
not change our estimates substantially).
The capital/labour ratio has continued to shrink in the new millennium,
meaning that it has been impossible for the formal sector to absorb a major
part of the labour that enters the labour market. The majority of labour
market entrants have moved into the informal sector, which consequently
has exploded in numbers. Part of the reported increase in informal-sector
growth is certainly due to improved data coverage, but it is clear that the
vast majority of labour outside agriculture is in the informal rather than the
formal sector.
The government has had the ambition to try to attract more foreign direct
investment (FDI), but so far it has not been very successful (less than 1 per cent
of GDP). The oil and water discoveries in northern Kenya might change this.
So far, there has been FDI in relation to telecom privatization and investments
in railways, whereas not much has happened in manufacturing.
Kenya’s share of world exports had fallen from 0.085 per cent in 1980 to
0.035 per cent by the year 2000; thus Kenya became increasinglymarginalized
in the world market during this period. Over the same period, its share of
world GDP fell from 0.066 per cent to 0.040 per cent. However, Kenya’s share
of world exports has increased since 2000. There has been some diversification
in terms of export destinations, but there has not been any significant diver-
sification of Kenyan exports in terms of products.
One important determinant of overall inequality is the factorial income
distribution. We have noted that the KNBS constructs estimates of labour
income and GDP, where the income to capital and land is computed as the
difference between the two. What we can check about factor distribution is
thus whether the reported labour share has changed over time. In Table 15.3
we show the series from 1976 (when the initial story with the old data design
ended). We see that there have been some changes over time, but there is no
trend. The series starts at a 40 per cent share and ends there as well. This is a
lower share than in richer countries, but if smallholder agriculture incomes are
excluded the share should be at least 50 per cent. We can conclude that there
is no long-term trend in the distribution of income between capital (and land)
and labour.
The stability of the factorial distribution should contribute to keeping the
overall distribution stable, but inequality can of course still increase if the
distribution within the categories becomes more uneven. We have no infor-
mation about the distribution of capital incomes, but we have some data on
labour incomes. The Kenyan labour force has changed structure over recent
decades. There has been a strong decline in the proportion of employees with
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no education and an increase in the proportion with primary education
(Bigsten and Wambugu 2010). This reflects the near-universal primary educa-
tion in the country. Wages differ very much by levels of education (Bigsten
1984; Knight and Sabot 1990; Söderbom et al. 2006).
Table 15.4 shows the growth rates of formal and informal employment for
1994–2012. We see that very many of the new jobs were in the informal
Table 15.3. Labour income share in GDP, 1976–2012
Remuneration/total factor income
2000 45.9
1976 39.8 2001 46.9
1980 40.9 2002 48.3
1985 42.1 2003 41.6
1990 42.1 2004 37.2
1992 41.0 2005 41.5
1993 39.6 2006 42.4
1994 43.1 2007 42.1
1995 45.5 2008 38.6
1996 43.5 2009 39.6
1997 42.1 2010 42.3
1998 43.5 2011 40.0
1999 45.1 2012 39.6
Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey (ES) (annual until 2013)
Table 15.4. Growth of formal and informal employment and real







1994 8.3 2.0 11.9
1995 19.8 3.4 25.0
1996 11.7 4.0 18.0
1997 8.5 1.8 13.0
1998 11.2 1.1 12.2
1999 8.0 0.6 11.5
2000 4.7 0.4 11.0
2001 8.7 1.1 7.7
2002 12.7 1.3 10.0
2003 2.7 1.5 8.6
2004 9.9 2.1 8.0
2005 2.4 2.9 6.7
2006 1.3 2.8 6.6
2007 4.5 2.6 6.1
2008 10.2 1.8 5.3
2009 4.7 2.8 7.9
2010 0.4 2.9 7.6
2011 8.1 3.4 6.3
2012 4.8 3.1 6.0
Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey (annual until ES 2013)
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sector. This means that the share of formal employment has fallen to about a
fifth of total employment outside smallholder agriculture. There are no solid
data indicating the trend in the unemployment rate, but the measured rate of
open unemployment is nearly constant. In Kenya, as in other African coun-
tries, the unemployment rate is relatively small because the majority of the
populationmust work to survive. Themain labourmarket problem in Kenya is
not open unemployment but rather a large number of working poor—
subsisting in the informal sector and smallholder agriculture.
Table 15.4 also shows the evolution of real earnings in the formal sector
since 1994. What we see here is a remarkable growth of earnings during the
period that is the focus of our study, followed by dramatic declines from 2008
onwards. The start of this drop coincided with the civil strife of 2007/8, but
continues until the end of our data period in 2012.
There are no systematic income data for the informal sector. The little data
we have are from surveys for 1998/9 and 2005/6. Looking at the evolution of
formal and informal median earnings it seems as if the gap between the two
sectors has been fairly constant (Table 15.5). We do not have any clear picture
as to why real wages in the formal sector suddenly started to fall from 2008
onwards.
15.5 The Evolution of Poverty and Inequality, 1980s–2000s
In this section, we analyse the evolution of inequality and poverty over the
past two decades. The aim is to provide evidence on changes in level and
distribution of household welfare over a period for which nationally repre-
sentative datasets are available (Republic of Kenya 1996, 1998a, 2007).
Table 15.5. Labour earnings in the formal and informal sectors





Sector Mean Median Mean Median
Formal 8,152 6,105 22,813 8,000
(6,212) (4,652) (10,264) (3,599)
Informal 5,147 2,800 15,403 4,000
(3,922) (2,133) (6,930) (1,791)
Total 6,208 3,000 19,697 6,000
(4,730) (2,286) (8,872) (2,699)
Note: Real earnings in parentheses, deflated using Consumer Price Index (CPI) (1994
prices).
Source: Republic of Kenya (2003a, 2008a)
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15.5.1 Monetary Measures
Tables 15.6–15.12 show recent trends in and patterns of poverty and inequal-
ity in Kenya from the 1980s using a variety of methods and datasets (Mukui
1994; Republic of Kenya 1996, 1998a, 2007).5
The Kenya economy was on a recovery path in 2005 after the poor perform-
ance it recorded in the 1990s, and poverty declined between 1997 and 2005/6.
The region with the lowest poverty rates is Central, which got an early start in
development as we pointed out in our historical review.Wemay also note that
the capital city, Nairobi, has the lowest poverty rate in the country despite its
large in-migration.
We computed income inequality (Gini coefficient) using per adult equiva-
lent expenditures and organized around region (province) and area (rural/
urban) (Table 15.7). The national Gini coefficient increased from 0.428 in
1994 to 0.516 in 2005. This was driven by three forces. First, the urban share
of households increased, which meant that a larger share of households were
in the high-inequality region. Second, urban income inequality rose between
1994 and 2005. And finally, the urban–rural gap in inequality increased
between the two periods.
In the historical section we saw that the national Gini was driven by
changes in the urban–rural gap. Here we are able to examine Kenya’s rural–
urban disparity in per adult equivalent consumption from 1994 to 2005. We
compare the average consumption expenditure of rural and urban residents
using our household surveys. Table 15.8 presents average per adult equivalent
consumption expenditure for 1994 and 2005 and the rural/urban expenditure
ratios. These show that the average rural consumption expenditure was 46 per
cent of the average urban consumption expenditure in 1994, while it had
declined to 33 per cent by 2005. Thus, at least during this period the increase
in the overall Gini is correlated with the increase in the rural–urban gap. The
increase in urban inequality also contributed to the overall increase. Due to
data limitations, the situation for the recent period could not be assessed, but
it is possible that the redistribution and devolution initiatives started during
the Kibaki government (2003–13), especially the cash transfer programmes
and the 2010 constitutional reform, have reduced the rural–urban consump-
tion disparity.
5 A special model was developed for this UNU-WIDER project, which would make it possible to
adjust the poverty lines to account for relative price changes. We were able to get the required price
data for 2005/6, and to run the full programme for this year. It is reassuring to find that the national
poverty rate for 2005 estimated with the new toolkit (47 per cent), was not substantially different
from the estimate (46 per cent) obtained with the official constant bundle, despite notable regional
variations in the two sets of estimates. Relative price changes do not seem to be of first-order
importance for the estimates of poverty change during this period.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15.5.2 Non-monetary Poverty Measures
The most common metric of poverty is some threshold level of income or
consumption expenditure. However, poverty is multidimensional and goes
beyond the conventional single-index metrics, which ignore many wider
aspects of poverty. Empirical studies have shown that using the monetary
approach alone may be deceptive and needs to be complemented with non-
monetary measures. Poverty is associated not only with insufficient income or
consumption but also with insufficient health, nutrition, and literacy, and




Central rural 0.330 0.350
Central urban 0.350 0.390
Coast rural 0.417 0.355
Coast urban 0.339 0.390
Eastern rural 0.428 0.387
Eastern urban 0.396 0.422
Northeastern rural 0.420 0.371
Northeastern urban 0.411 0.368
Nyanza rural 0.385 0.359
Nyanza urban 0.380 0.374
Rift Valley rural 0.394 0.407
Rift Valley urban 0.343 0.431
Western rural 0.398 0.350
Western urban No data 0.382
National 0.428 0.516
Total rural 0.395 0.385
Total urban 0.426 0.497
Source: Authors’ computations from household survey data (Republic of Kenya
1996, 2007)








Rural 9,171 16,030 13,533 0.4585
Urban 1,455 34,951 44,989
Total 10,626 18,621 21,848
2005
Rural 8,473 25,730 22,274 0.3262
Urban 4,682 78,866 121,629
Total 13,155 44,642 78,939
Source: Authors’ computations based on household survey data (Republic of Kenya 1996, 2007)
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with deficient social relations, insecurity, and low self-esteem and powerless-
ness (Hulme et al. 2001). In order to capture the multidimensional nature of
poverty, we will consider some key non-monetary indicators of well-being.
We analyse the trends of the non-monetary indicators of poverty in Kenya
using data from the various Demographic Health Surveys (DHS for 1989,
1993, 1998, 2003, 2008). The non-monetary indicators of welfare we use
include measures of health, education, environment, and nutrition.
The indicators for health poverty presented in Table 15.9 include neonatal
mortality, post-neonatal mortality, infant mortality, child mortality, under-
five mortality, and maternal mortality.
Health status in Kenya has on the whole been improving since 1989. In
particular, most forms of mortality have declined. However, the trend in life
expectancy is irregular, perhaps due to effects of HIV/AIDS, the timing of anti-
retroviral treatments, and access to water and sanitation over the period
analysed (State of World Population 2011). Access to medical services as
proxied by the vaccination coverage improved from 44 per cent in 1989 to
79 per cent in 1993 then declined to 57 per cent in 2003. Between 2003 and
2008, it improved by twenty percentage points, indicating that Kenya is on a
good track to universal health care coverage. In general, the year 2003 saw bad
performance in many of the indicators, such as infant mortality rates and life
expectancy, due to extreme weather conditions, including drought, land-
slides, and floods that were widespread in that year, leading to food deficits
in most parts of the country (Republic of Kenya 2004).
Table 15.10 indicates that the fraction of people without access to safe
drinking water in Kenya decreased from about 55 per cent in the late 1980s,
stabilized in 2002, and remained more or less constant between 2004 and
2008. The general trend in access to water is not clear. However, the emerging
picture is that there is a slight improvement in access to safe drinking water in
the country. As can be seen from Tables 15.10 and 15.11, data on mortality,
Table 15.9. Health poverty
Year and welfare indicators 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008
Neonatal mortality (per 1,000 births) 28.2 25.7 25 35 31
Post-neonatal mortality (per 1,000 births) 35.2 35.9 34 32 21
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 62 63 71 75 59
Child mortality rate (per 1,000 children surviving to
12 months of age)
36.7 28.1 37 29 23
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births) 113 96.1 112 115 74
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 births) 365 423 590 414 488
Life expectancy at birth in years 60 57 51 47 55
Vaccination coverage (% of children 12–23 months fully
vaccinated)—proxy for access to medical services
44 79 65 57 77
Source: Republic of Kenya (1989, 1993, 1998b, 2003a, 2008b)
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life expectancy, and access to clean water do not yield the same trend in non-
income poverty profiles. Thus, there is a need to combine these metrics in the
measurement of population welfare.
The main nutritional indicators in Kenya and elsewhere are child anthropo-
metrics. They include height-for-age stunting (percentage of children under
five years classified as malnourished); weight-for-height wasting (percentage
of children under five years classified as malnourished); weight-for-age under-
weight (percentage of children under five years classified as malnourished);
children stunted (percentage overall); and children underweight (percentage
overall). These are standard indices of physical growth that describe the
nutritional status of children. Children falling below the cut-off point of
minus two standard deviations (2 SD) from the median of the reference
population are classified as stunted (Republic of Kenya 2008b).
Table 15.11 shows the nutritional status of children under five for the DHS
surveys. The nutritional status of children under five has improved somewhat
since the early 1990s. The height-for-age stunting declined from 32.7 per cent
in 1993 to 29.6 per cent in 2008. The weight-for-height stunting has remained
more or less constant during this period, while weight-for-age underweight
declined from 22.3 per cent in 1993 to 20.3 per cent in 2008.
Education level is a key measure of non-income poverty. School enrolment
rates, dropout rates, and literacy rates are good indicators of non-income
poverty. School enrolment rates tend to be higher in rich households and
lower in income-poor households. However, this enrolment-income gradient
Table 15.10. Percentage of people without access to improved drinking water
Year and welfare indicators 1989 1994 2000 2002 2004 2005 2008
Access to safe/improved drinking water
(% not using any improved source of
drinking water)
55 47 51 38 39 44 41
Source: Constructed from <www.worldwater.org/data.html> (Pacific Institute n.d.)
Table 15.11. Percentage of children under five years classified as malnourished,
1993–2008
Year and welfare indicators 1993 1998 2003 2008
Height-for-age stunting 32.7 35.3 30.3 29.6
Weight-for-height stunting 5.9 6.0 5.6 5.8
Weight-for-age underweight 22.3 21.2 19.9 20.3
Children stunted (% overall) 31.2 30.9 30.1 29.8
Children underweight (% overall) 23.3 21.5 20.1 19.5
Source: Republic of Kenya (1989, 1993, 1998b, 2003a, 2008b)
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does not always hold. Table 15.12 shows enrolment rates for the period 2000
to 2009.
The school enrolment rates for both primary and secondary schools
improved between 2000 and 2009. Primary gross enrolment has been on the
rise since the year 2000. However, between 2004 and 2009, the gross enrol-
ment rate increased due to the introduction of free primary education. Net
primary enrolment has also increased steadily in the last decade, with the
lowest being recorded in 2002, while the peak was in 2009. Both gross and net
secondary enrolments have increased since the year 2000. This can be attrib-
uted to subsidized secondary school education which was commenced in the
year 2008.
Table 15.13 shows that the literacy rates have been improving for the last
fifteen years or so. The proportion of people who can read and write was 78.1
per cent in 1995 but steadied at an average of about 86 per cent between 2003
and 2010.
Overall, the social indicators show a moderate positive trend, which is
consistent with the moderate increase in incomes and the reduced poverty
rates after 1997.
15.6 Policy Challenges
We have presented different measures of the level and distribution of the
standard of living in Kenya for the period 1900–2012. Over the past century,
Table 15.12. Indicators of access to education
Year and welfare indicators 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009
Primary gross enrolment (%) 95.20 91.46 107.05 105.38 113.27
Primary net enrolment (%) 65.08 61.72 73.53 75.13 82.78
Secondary gross enrolment (%) 39.20 40.81 46.94 49.85 60.17
Secondary net enrolment (%) 33.23 34.51 38.97 42.07 50.03
Tertiary gross enrolment (%) 2.75 2.82 2.92 2.96 4.03
Source: UNESCO (2010)
Table 15.13. Literacy rates
Year/Indicators 1995 2003 2008 2009 2010
Literacy rate (% of population aged 15 and
above who can read and write)
78.1 85.1 86.5 87.1 87.4
Source: World Bank (various years), <www.worldbank.org>
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low growth, limited transformation of the economy, high inequality, and
poverty have been the dominant features of the Kenyan economy. What
can be expected of the economy over the next 100 years? What policies can
be pursued over that time horizon to accelerate growth, reduce poverty,
improve equity, and transform the economy’s informal and agrarian activities
into high-productivity manufacturing enterprises?
The main aim of current Kenyan economic policy is to reduce poverty.
Success in this endeavour will depend on growth and changes in income
distribution. The quality of economic and political governance is probably
the main determinant of the extent to which Kenya will be able to create an
inclusive growth process that would increase the incomes of the poor.
One aspect of development that is important for income distribution is
regional integration or the lack thereof. The Kenyan economy is characterized
by large regional differences in welfare (Bigsten 1980), which is also politically
problematic since it more or less also reflects ethnic differences across regions.
A lot of the politics in Kenya is played along ethnic lines, with detrimental
effects on equity and economic efficiency. Regional inequality in Kenya is
caused by agro-climatic conditions, weak institutional and infrastructural
developments, fragmented domestic markets, and ethnic politics. Income
inequality arising out of regional differences makes a substantial contribution
to overall inequality.
To reduce inequality and poverty, Kenya must continue the transformation
of its economy from a dual economy to a more integrated and modern
economy. This requires a continued shift of labour from agriculture into
preferably well-paying formal-sector jobs. In recent decades the investment
rate has been too low to increase the amount of capital per worker. This has
meant that the number of jobs in the formal and relatively capital-intensive
sector has stagnated, while the labour force increase has had to be absorbed by
the informal sector. This is where many of the new entrants to the labour
market end up, and the income level is often modest. Still, this sector is
currently an indispensable part of the process of structural transformation
and the shift in the labour force out of agriculture. And the pace of this shift is
crucially important for the sustained growth of the Kenyan economy and for
the eventual integration of different sectors and thereby a more even distri-
bution of income.
What does all this imply for policymaking? First, on the macro level there is
a need to bring about a shift to a policy that is credible to domestic as well as
foreign investors. Formal firms have been confronted with all kinds of prob-
lems in dealing with governments, such as regulatory red tape, corruption,
and lack of security. Thus, part of a policy to bring about a shift of firms to the
formal sector is to clean up the way the government deals with formal-sector
firms to reduce the incentives for firms to take shelter in the informal sector.
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To bring about informal-sector growth and absorption into the formal
sector, the government needs to design its general policies so that they are
relevant also for informal firms, and design specific programmes targeting
informal firms. The skill levels and policy environment of informal firms
need to be improved to make it possible for them to graduate to the formal
sector.
15.7 Concluding Remarks
The chapter has analysed incomes, poverty, and inequality in Kenya over a
period long enough to permit identification of key determinants of these
welfare indicators. In contrast to previous studies in this area that have relied
on single data sources and methods, the chapter has used multiple datasets
and different methods to assess the development process in Kenya over a
period of 100 years. We find that irrespective of the data type and measure-
ment method, poverty and inequality in Kenya are high, and have been
persistently high for a long time. Moreover, and importantly, the structure
of the economy has not changed enough to make a real dent in poverty levels.
At the beginning of the new millennium, Kenya remained an agrarian econ-
omy, with a large and rapidly expanding informal sector. The capital/labour
ratio is still declining, and the manufacturing sector is small and stagnant,
which is why few good jobs are being created for the rapidly increasing labour
force. The main labour market problem is that of the working poor, rather
than that of the openly unemployed. Thus, there is a need to implement
short-run policies to increase labour incomes in agriculture and the informal
sector. The slow progress in terms of poverty reduction is clearly linked to the
slow growth of the formal sector. High growth and poverty reduction can only
be achieved through productivity-enhancing transformation of the economy.
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Utility-Consistent Poverty in Madagascar,
2001–10
Snapshots in the Presence of
Multiple Economy-Wide Shocks
David Stifel, Tiaray Razafimanantena, and Faly Rakotomanana
16.1 Introduction
By all estimates, Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in the world, with
macroeconomic indicators suggesting that the nation is poorer today than it
was over forty years ago. Average real per capita income in 2010 was approxi-
mately one-third of what it was in 1960. Yet our understanding of poverty in
Madagascar is incomplete because it is hampered by issues with data and
methodology. This is not surprising given the complexity of measuring pov-
erty in a manner that is consistent over time and space, yet is also sensitive to
local conditions. The contemporary literature on poverty in Madagascar has
stressed consistency over time by focusing on the comparability of the survey
instruments used to estimate nominal household consumption aggregates,
the key welfare measure used in calculating poverty (Paternostro et al. 2001;
Amendola and Vecchi 2007). Evidence that differing commodity lists
(Pradhan 2000) and recall periods (Scott and Amenuvegbe 1990) affect the
levels of reported consumption from household surveys led Malagasy statist-
icians to make every effort to ensure that the survey instruments used to
measure poverty were comparable from 2001 onward.
The nominal household consumption aggregate, however, is but one admit-
tedly important component of poverty measurement. Another is the poverty
line. The appropriate estimation of poverty lines is essential not only to gauge
a poverty threshold, but also as a cost-of-living index that allows interpersonal
welfare comparisons when the costs of consuming basic needs vary over time
and space (Ravallion 1998). The challenge is to estimate poverty lines that are
consistent over time and space (i.e. the reference standard of living is fixed),
and yet are also characterized by specificity in which the poverty lines reflect
local consumption patterns and norms (Ravallion and Bidani 1994).
In this chapter, we analyse poverty in Madagascar between 2001 and 2010
by starting with a series of surveys for which a comparable set of survey
instruments were used, and applying to those surveys Arndt and Simler’s
(2010) utility-consistent approach to calculating cost-of-basic-needs (CBN)
poverty lines. These consistent yet specific poverty lines, along with consump-
tion aggregates calculated from comparable survey instruments, form the
basis of the poverty analysis in this chapter.
Another conceptual issue that arises when analysing trends in poverty is
that poverty estimates are based on nationally representative household sur-
veys that are not typically conducted every year. As such, they represent
snapshots of poverty during the particular years in which the survey took
place. The challenge is to disentangle the long-term poverty trends from the
short-term shocks that may affect poverty estimates in a particular year. This is
particularly the case for Madagascar given that two major political crises,
along with a rice price crisis and multiple cyclones, hit the country during
the first decade of the twenty-first century. As such, we place the monetary
poverty measures in context by comparing them to other macro- and micro-
economic indicators. While recognizing that short-term shocks may also
affect the long-term structure of the economy, we conclude that the poverty
estimates for Madagascar are more of a reflection of short-term shocks than of
long-term trends.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 16.2, we elaborate on
the methodology used to calculate poverty and describe the primary data
sources. Section 16.3 provides a description of the political and economic
context in which the surveys took place to better understand the long-term
trends and short-term shocks. In section 16.4, we present the estimates of
poverty and inequality based on the utility-consistent approach to calculating
poverty lines, and triangulate these results with other monetary and non-
monetary indicators. Section 16.5 provides concluding remarks.
16.2 Data and Poverty Lines
The primary data sources used in this analysis are the 2001, 2005, and 2010
Madagascar Enquête Périodique auprès des Ménages (EPM). The EPM are general-
purpose LSMS-type cross-section surveys conducted by the Institut National
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de la Statistique (INSTAT). They are nationally representative, stratified, and
clustered surveys conducted over three-month periods at the end of the
calendar year, and contain information on household characteristics, expend-
iture, activities, and infrastructure. Detailed consumption information is
collected for the purpose of constructing welfare measures.
Over the course of the three surveys, the sample size grew from 5,080 in 2001
to 11,781 in 2005, and to 12,460 in 2010. This reflects the need for the latter
two surveys to be representative, at the urban and rural levels, of each of the
twenty-two administrative regions created in 2004 as part of the government’s
decentralization programme. Fortunately, the forty-four strata in these 2005
and 2010 surveys can be grouped to represent the same twelve strata in the
2001 survey (urban and rural for six provinces). Further, while slight changes
were made to the questionnaire in response to demands from the government
and from donors who financed the surveys, INSTAT’s efforts over the years
to maintain comparability for welfare measurement—reflected in the nearly
identical questionnaire modules for food and non-food expenditures, educa-
tion and health expenditures, housing values and characteristics, ownership
of durable goods, gifts and remittances, and in-kind payments—bode well for
consistent poverty and inequality measurement.
The utility-consistent regional poverty lines estimated from the EPM
(Table 16.1) show that between 2001 and 2010, the costs of basic needs have
risen by over 116 per cent (an average of 8.0 per cent per year). In some
regions, such as urban Mahajanga, they have risen even further (200 per
cent). Rising costs of basic non-food items drove the rise in overall basic
needs costs between 2001–5, while rising costs of basic food items were
more responsible for rising overall basic needs costs in rural areas between
Table 16.1. Original and utility-consistent (UC) poverty lines, Madagascar, 2001–10
Ariary per person per day Relative to Urban Antananarivo
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010
Antananarivo (urban) 358 646 866 100.0 100.0 100.0
Antananarivo (rural) 340 536 770 94.9 82.9 89.0
Fianarantsoa (urban) 326 521 851 91.2 80.6 98.3
Fianarantsoa (rural) 301 451 762 84.0 69.8 88.0
Toamasina (urban) 362 572 937 101.0 88.4 108.3
Toamasina (rural) 333 501 789 93.0 77.5 91.1
Mahajanga (urban) 338 574 922 94.4 88.8 106.5
Mahajanga (rural) 347 514 748 96.9 79.5 86.4
Toliara (urban) 406 502 940 113.4 77.6 108.6
Toliara (rural) 338 498 819 94.4 77.1 94.6
Antsiranana (urban) 473 718 1,080 132.1 111.1 124.8
Antsiranana (rural) 420 593 920 117.4 91.8 106.3
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM data
Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction
372
2005 and 2010. The poverty lines also illustrate substantial regional variation
in costs of basic needs. For example, in 2005 the rural Fianarantsoa poverty
line was 30 per cent below the urban Antananarivo poverty line, while in 2011
the urban Antsiranana poverty line was 25 per cent higher than in urban
Antananarivo. In short, the different poverty lines and differential changes in
these poverty lines lend credence to the need for specificity in constructing
poverty lines.
16.3 Context
The first decade of the twenty-first century was a tumultuous one for
Madagascar, with important political and economic shocks hampering gains
made during the intervening years. It is thus important to place the snapshots
of poverty as measured in the 2001, 2005, and 2010 EPM in the broader
context of the events that took place in Madagascar during this time period
and the decades leading up to it. In this section, we lay the groundwork for the
poverty analysis by describing the general political and economic environ-
ment since independence and focus particularly on the first decade of the
twenty-first century to relate this to the timing of the EPM surveys.
Madagascar gained independence from France in 1960. Nonetheless, colo-
nial influence remained strong for a decade under the new Philbert Tsiranana
government as a robust French military presence remained, foreign trade
regulations favoured French business interests and trade with France, and
the country maintained its membership in the Franc Zone (and consequently
had no independent central bank) (Pryor 1990). As illustrated in Figure 16.1,
per capita GDP grew by roughly 10 per cent over the first decade of independ-
ence. But this growth fell short of expectations and was not shared by all. This
contributed to a growing nationalist movement that demanded economic
independence from France and eventually toppled the government in 1972.
The policies of the transitional government of Gabriel Ramanantsoa (1972–5)
that restricted trade and led to the departure from the Franc Zone (France no
longer guaranteed convertibility of the new Malagasy currency) disrupted the
economy and began a long period of economic decline (Figure 16.1).
The perceived failure of President Tsiranana’s economic policies discredited
liberal policies and gave credence to a more ardent form of socialism that
gained favour under President Didier Ratsiraka in 1975 and lasted until 1985.
Importantly for rural dwellers at this time, nationalized enterprises to pur-
chase crops were established, displacing private rural traders and leading to
the ‘disintegration’ of agricultural markets (Pryor 1990). Further, the combin-
ation of nationalizing foreign enterprises and removing colonial-era poll
and cattle taxes placed strains on the public purse. This did not stop the


















































































































































government in the late 1970s, however, from investing heavily in ill-chosen
projects that had limited effect on the economy and that were financed by
short-term debt (Pryor 1990). By 1984, real GDP per capita had fallen by over
20 per cent, leading the cash-strapped government to agree in 1985 to a
liberalization plan as a condition for structural adjustment loans from the
IMF and World Bank. Although moderate recovery followed, the adverse
social effects of the stabilization plan along with growing demand for political
freedoms resulted in a political crisis that toppled the Ratsiraka government
and resulted in a fall in per capita GDP growth that did not recover until
Ratsiraka was re-elected in 1997 (see Figure 16.1) on a platform of continued
liberal reforms.
By the turn of the millennium, Madagascar had experienced its fair share of
economic mismanagement and political shocks that resulted in per capita
GDP levels that were roughly 40 per cent below what they were at the time
of independence (Figure 16.1). Nonetheless, there was much hope that the
next decade would not resemble the previous ones as liberalization reforms
began to take hold. This was not to be, however, as the decade was also
characterized by economic and political shocks that disrupted what could
have potentially been a long-term turnaround. It is in this setting that the
period of analysis in this chapter takes place.
The 2001 EPM survey was conducted at the end of 2001, just prior to the 16
December national elections. As such, it provides a reflection of livelihoods in
Madagascar during the year prior to the negative fallout of the disputed
elections. This was a year in which the IMF and the World Bank approved
US$819 million worth of debt relief for the country, and in which Madagascar
qualified for the United States African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
and ‘Wearing Apparel’ provisions. Growth of real per capita income in this
year was a modest 3.1 per cent, driven largely by increased production in the
industrial and service sectors (Table 16.2).
The year immediately following the survey, however, was one of economic
and social disruption due to a disputed presidential election. Supporters of the
incumbent president, Didier Ratsiraka, effectively blockaded the capital of
Antananarivo by blowing up six bridges in protest against a 29 April ruling
by the constitutional court that the challenger and former mayor of the
capital city, Marc Ravalomanana, had won the first round of the election
outright. By August, Ratsiraka had fled the country to live in exile in France,
and the international community pledged US$2.3 billion in support to the
newly instated Ravalomanana government. But the damage had been done.
The first eight months of the year witnessed tourism drying up, textile exports
halting, some thirty textile factories shuttering their doors, fuel and foodstuff
prices skyrocketing in the capital due to shortages, and foreign investors
staying away. As a result, real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) shrank
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by 15 per cent over the course of the year, and by the end of 2002 the general
price level was 16.5 per cent higher than in the previous year (Table 16.2). The
industrial and service sectors were hardest hit, with production shrinking by
20.8 per cent and 15.0 per cent respectively. Given the remoteness that is
characteristic of much of the agricultural sector, however, production in the
primary sector fell by only 1.3 per cent. Clearly urban areas were hit hardest by
the 2002 political crisis.
While 2003 was a year of recovery and of implementation of the country’s
first Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2004 was characterized by yet another crisis.
This time, however, the origin was economic in nature, though it was likely
exacerbated by the government’s response. The combination of a 58 per cent
depreciation of the Malagasy currency relative to the US dollar, along with a
43 per cent rise in the Bangkok US dollar price of rice in 2004, meant that
domestic rice prices rose as the rice import parity rose substantially for a
country that typically imports rice, its main staple crop. Coupled with uncer-
tainty over government intentions and the harassment of rice importers,
private-sector traders were discouraged and rice imports ended up being only
151 thousand tonnes in 2004, compared to 254 thousand tonnes in the
previous year (Minten and Dorosh 2006). The reduction in the supply of rice
in the domestic market manifested itself in an average increase in paddy rice
prices of 50 per cent. Given the importance of rice in the Malagasy consump-
tion basket and given the exchange rate depreciation, this also meant that
general inflation was high at 14 per cent in 2004 (Table 16.2).
Table 16.2. Production and inflation in Madagascar, 2001–10




984 836 893 914 930 951 982 1,024 955 933
Growth of real per
capita GDP
3.1 15.0 6.8 2.4 1.8 2.2 3.3 4.2 6.7 2.3
GDP (billions of 2010
Ariary)
15.0 13.1 14.4 15.2 15.9 16.7 17.7 19.0 18.2 18.3
—Primary 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.8 5.6
—Industry 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.0
—Services 7.3 6.2 6.8 7.2 7.7 8.3 8.9 9.6 8.9 9.0
Growth of real GDP 6.0 12.7 9.8 5.3 4.6 5.0 6.2 7.1 4.1 0.4
—Primary 4.0 1.3 1.3 3.1 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.9 8.5 3.4
—Industry 7.6 20.8 14.6 6.5 3.0 3.5 9.8 3.6 7.8 0.2
—Services 6.1 15.0 10.6 6.0 6.1 7.4 7.8 8.2 7.5 1.7
Rice (paddy) price
inflation
16.4 0.8 5.3 50.6 33.6 18.3 33.1 16.2 14.3 4.9
General inflation 7.4 16.5 1.7 14.0 18.4 10.8 10.3 9.2 9.0 9.2
Note: Shaded areas indicate years during which EPM surveys were conducted.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from INSTAT and FAOSTAT
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The 2005 EPM was conducted during a period of political stability and
continued overall growth led primarily by services and industry. This growth
however was moderate and per capita incomes did not recover to pre-political
crisis levels until 2007. Inflation remained high during this period, led largely
by rapid rice price inflation, as changes in domestic rice prices in the latter half
of the decade reflected changes in international rice prices. Tight monetary
policy prevented general inflation from being even higher. This was also a
period when Rio Tinto invested over US$500 million in an ilmenite mine in
southern Madagascar, and when a consortium led by Sherrit International
initiated the construction of a US$4.76 billion nickel laterite mine in the
eastern part of the country. Further, while the textile sector benefitted from
exports growth under AGOA and the preferential access Madagascar had to
European markets under the Lomé Convention, textile exports did take a hit
from the dismantling of the Multi-Fibre Agreement in March 2005 (Africa
Confidential 2005).
The government ofMarc Ravalomanana was generally viewed favourably by
the international community as it made strides to attract foreign investment.
Madagascar joined the South African Development Community (SADC) in
2005, and was the first country to sign a compact with the United States
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) when it signed a US$110 million
poverty reduction agreement in April 2005. Following his re-election in
2006, Ravalomanana’s government developed its second poverty reduction
strategy, dubbed the Madagascar Action Plan, in consultation with the inter-
national financial institutions. Under his watch, the economy continued its
steady growth as per capita incomes grew annually by 2 to 4 per cent through
2008.
On the domestic front, however, resentment began to build over the presi-
dent’s potential conflicts of interest with respect to his agro-industrial corpor-
ation, his attempts to rapidly reform the army, the government’s purchase of a
luxurious official airplane, and the government’s 2008 agreement to lease 1.3
million hectares of arable land to the South Korean conglomerate, Daewoo,
for ninety-nine years. Protests in the streets of the capital, led by the presi-
dent’s rival and mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, and supported by
factions of the army, led to Ravalomanana’s eventual ousting in March 2009.
Unlike the 2002 political crisis when the international donors rallied
around the new government by rapidly recognizing it and by providing US
$2.3 billion in support, the 2009 political crisis was followed by a slashing of
aid. The ascendency of Rajoelina to Madagascar’s top office was officially
viewed by most of the international community as effectively a coup d’état.
As such, most donors cut all but humanitarian assistance, as net official
development assistance receipts fell from US$843 million in 2008 to US$444
million in 2009 (OECD-DAC 2013). Further, Madagascar was suspended from
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SADC and had its AGOA access terminated by January 2010. As a conse-
quence, the 6.7 per cent fall in per capita income during 2009 was not
followed by a recovery as seen in 2003, but rather by a stagnation of total
GDP and a further 2.3 per cent fall of per capita GDP, negating all of the gains
made after 2005. It is this environment of stagnation following the 2009 crisis
(some would say ‘continued crisis’) that is characterized by the 2010 EPM.
16.4 Poverty and Inequality in the 2000s
It is within the context of these multiple political and economic shocks that
we analyse snapshots of poverty and inequality in Madagascar in the first
decade of the 2000s. As illustrated in Figure 16.2, if we simply compare real per
capita incomes during the EPM survey years (2001, 2005, 2010), we would
conclude that the decade was characterized by stagnation and a persistent
deterioration of well-being. However, when the intervening years are
included, the picture becomes one of growth interrupted by political and
economic shocks. As such, once we have described poverty and inequality
levels using utility-consistent poverty lines for the three household survey
years, we complement the analysis with indicators from other data sources to
substantiate the consistency of these poverty and inequality estimates with
the broader dynamic picture.
16.4.1 Monetary Poverty and Inequality
Poverty rates in Madagascar are high and rose over the course of the three
survey periods (Table 16.3). In 2001, 57.8 per cent of the population was poor,
compared to 59.1 per cent in 2005, and 61.7 per cent in 2010. Although
poverty is largely a rural phenomenon, with over 63 per cent of the rural
population below the poverty line, it is also becoming increasingly urban. The
urban headcount ratio rose by a substantial 9.6 percentage points, from 34.2
per cent in 2001 to 43.8 per cent in 2010.
The more distribution-sensitive measures of poverty reveal that the head-
count ratios alone mask important distributional differences in changes in
poverty. Indeed there is little change in the depth and severity of national
poverty over the decade, and the changes that are observed indicate a slight
reduction, not an increase. The poverty incidence curves shown in Figure 16.2
illustrate this graphically, as the crossing curves indicate no first-order dom-
inance. For example, the real per capita household consumption levels (tem-
porally and spatially deflated by the poverty lines to 2010 urban Antananarivo
values) of the richest 55 per cent of the population fell between 2001 and 2005
(dark solid line above the light solid line), and did so again slightly between
Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction
378
2005 and 2010 (dashed line above the dark solid line). At the same time, the
poorest 40 per cent of the population experienced slight improvements in real
consumption. Because the standardized poverty line1 is above the consump-
tion level for the 45th percentile, the headcount ratio captures the deteriorat-
ing consumption levels for those above this level. The improvements in
consumption levels of the poorest 40 per cent of the population are not
captured by the headcount ratio because these households remain poor
throughout the decade. Nonetheless, these improved living standards for
the poorest 40 per cent are captured by the decreases in the depth and severity
of poverty. In short, the well-being of the poorest of the poor improved. It was
just not enough to raise them out of poverty.
In urban areas, all of the poverty measures show a worsening of poverty,
with the bulk of the change occurring between 2001 and 2005 (an 8.4 per-
centage point increase, compared to a 1.2 percentage point increase between
2005 and 2010). This is illustrated graphically in Figure 16.3a, where the
poverty incidence curves for 2005 and 2010 are substantially higher than for
2001 for all but the poorest 10 per cent of the population. As noted in section
16.3, urban areas were hit hardest by the 2002 political crisis. The poverty
Table 16.3. Monetary poverty in Madagascar, 2001–10
Levels Changes
2001 2005 2010 2001–5 2005–10 2001–10
National
Headcount ratio (P0) 57.8 59.1 61.7 1.2 2.6 3.9
Depth of poverty (P1) 24.8 23.3 23.4 1.5 0.1 1.4
Severity of poverty (P2) 13.4 12.0 11.6 1.4 0.4 1.8
Urban
Headcount ratio (P0) 34.2 42.7 43.8 8.4 1.2 9.6
Depth of poverty (P1) 12.8 15.4 16.0 2.5 0.7 3.2
Severity of poverty (P2) 6.5 7.6 7.8 1.1 0.2 1.3
Rural
Headcount ratio (P0) 64.6 63.7 66.2 0.9 2.5 1.6
Depth of poverty (P1) 28.2 25.5 25.3 2.7 0.2 2.9
Severity of poverty (P2) 15.4 13.3 12.6 2.1 0.7 2.8
Note: Poverty measures are multiplied by 100.
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM data
1 Because all per capita household consumption aggregate values are converted into 2010 urban
Antananarivo values by using the regional poverty lines, the 2010 urban Antananarivo poverty line
represents the standardized poverty line for all households in each survey year.
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incidence curves in Figure 16.3a suggest that these areas had not recovered
from the crisis by 2005, and that the 2009 crisis prevented real urban con-
sumption levels from sustainably returning to 2001 levels. Higher levels of
urban poverty, along with lower consumption levels among the non-poor, are
arguably the legacy of the political and economic shocks that hit the country
during this period.
Despite a greater percentage of the rural population falling below the pov-
erty line over the course of the decade, the rural poor for the most part fared
slightly better. As illustrated by the declining poverty depth and severity
measures and by the improvements in the poverty incidence curves (lower)
among the poorest 55 per cent of the rural population, the poorest half of the
rural population was slightly better off at the end of the decade than it was at
the beginning (Figure 16.3b). Nonetheless, although rural areas weathered the
storm better than urban areas, rural poverty remains high by any measure.
Further disaggregation of poverty by region reveals some interesting mes-
sages. First, in 2001, urban poverty rates in all six of the provinces were lower
than the poverty rates in all of the rural areas, with the exception of rural
Antananarivo (Table 16.4). The 45.3 per cent of the rural Antananarivo popula-
tion that was poor was lower than the 46.8 and 50.2 per cent in urban Toama-
sina and Toliara, respectively. The spillovers from the national capital andmajor
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Figure 16.2. Poverty incidence curves, Madagascar, 2001–10
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non-food items there, were likely responsible for the relatively low level of
poverty in rural Antananarivo. The relatively high poverty rate in urban
Toamasina is somewhat surprising given that this area includes one of the
most important ports in the country, though the region is particularly
susceptible to the adverse effects of annual cyclones given its location
along the east coast.
Second, in 2001, poverty rates were lowest in urban Antananarivo (location
of the capital) and urban Antsiranana, at 21.1 and 21.9 per cent, respectively.
This is not surprising given that the national capital is in the former, and given
the importance of the deep-water port, vanilla exports, and tourism in the
latter. The poorest regions in the country, rural areas in Toliara, Mahajanga,
Toamasina, and Fianarantsoa, were considerably poorer (more than 70 per
cent of the populations) than urban Antsiranana and urban Antananarivo.
Third, the changes in regional poverty over the three survey years were not
uniform, nor were they necessarily consistent with the observed changes at
the more aggregated urban and rural levels. For example, while the rural
headcount ratio rose by some sixteen percentage points in rural Antananarivo
between 2001 and 2005, they actually fell in the three poorest regions—rural
Mahajanga, Toamasina, and Fianarantsoa. In urban areas, poverty rates rose
by over nine percentage points overall during the period, while falling in
urban Toamasina and Toliara. At the same time, urban poverty rose by over
sixteen percentage points in Antananarivo and Fianarantsoa. This pattern is
consistent with the directed and lasting effects of the blockade of the high-
lands (Antananarivo and Fianarantsoa) in 2002.
Table 16.4. Regional poverty in Madagascar, 2001–10
Per cent poor Changes
2001 2005 2010 2001–5 2005–10 2001–10
Antananarivo (urban) 21.1 37.3 35.1 16.2 2.2 14.0
Antananarivo (rural) 45.3 64.2 53.1 18.9 11.2 7.7
Fianarantsoa (urban) 42.5 59.7 54.7 17.2 5.0 12.3
Fianarantsoa (rural) 74.3 65.9 77.4 8.5 11.5 3.1
Toamasina (urban) 46.8 44.3 45.8 2.5 1.5 1.0
Toamasina (rural) 74.2 62.4 65.1 11.8 2.7 9.1
Mahajanga (urban) 36.5 37.8 45.9 1.3 8.2 9.5
Mahajanga (rural) 71.8 62.4 60.5 9.4 1.9 11.3
Toliara (urban) 50.2 43.7 57.1 6.5 13.4 6.9
Toliara (rural) 70.5 65.0 72.9 5.5 7.9 2.5
Antsiranana (urban) 21.9 27.8 27.8 5.9 0.0 5.9
Antsiranana (rural) 60.0 54.1 68.1 5.9 14.0 8.2
Urban 34.2 42.7 43.8 8.4 1.2 9.6
Rural 64.6 63.7 66.2 0.9 2.5 1.6
National 57.8 59.1 61.7 1.2 2.6 3.9
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM data
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Clearly, the differing poverty rates indicate that not all regions in Madagas-
car are equal. We now turn to how that translates into overall inequality of
household consumption in the country as well as in urban and rural areas. The
first thing to note is that the degree of inequality in Madagascar is typical of
many African countries (World Bank 2011), as the Gini coefficient was 0.45 in
2001 (Table 16.5). Second, inequality fell over the course of the decade, as
indicated by the Gini coefficient falling from 0.45 in 2001 to 0.39 in 2010, and
the Theil index falling from 0.37 to 0.33. This is not surprising, given the
compression of the consumption distribution observed in Figure 16.1, as the
top half of the population experienced worsening conditions while the bot-
tom half saw marginally improved conditions.
The degree of inequality in rural areas was higher than in urban areas in
2001. But due to declining rural inequality, urban inequality was greater by
2010. As with national inequality, the fall in rural inequality over the three
survey periods is also consistent with the compression of the poverty inci-
dence curves in Figure 16.2b as the poorest half of the population witnessed
improved conditions alongside the worsening conditions of the richest 40 per
cent. Unlike rural inequality, urban inequality worsened. It first rose between
2001 and 2005, but the change was ambiguous between 2005 and 2010. The
Gini coefficient, for example, suggests that urban inequality fell back to 2001
levels by 2010, while the Theil index suggests that it rose further. This is
consistent with crossing urban Lorenz curves during this time period (not
shown here). However, what is clear about inequality in Madagascar is that
it is driven primarily by inequality within urban and rural areas, rather than
by the inequality between the two. Despite urban consumption levels being
over 50 per cent higher on average than in rural areas, 94 per cent of total
inequality is due to within-group inequality (Figure 16.5). This follows largely
from the rural population accounting for roughly 80 per cent of the
Table 16.5. Inequality in Madagascar, 2001–10
2001 2005 2010
Gini coefficient
National 0.454 0.410 0.393
Urban 0.427 0.431 0.426
Rural 0.438 0.383 0.365
Theil index
National 0.370 0.341 0.330
Urban 0.319 0.354 0.356
Rural 0.352 0.306 0.295
Per cent due to
Within-group inequality 92.1 93.9 94.7
Between-group inequality 7.9 6.1 5.3
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM data
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national population. As with poverty, rural inequality largely drives national
inequality.
16.4.2 Poverty and GDP
National poverty rates in 2001, 2005, and 2010 are consistent with volatile
trends in real per capita GDP over the decade. To illustrate this, we plot the
poverty estimates from the EPM surveys along with real per capita GDP in
Figure 16.4. What is clear from this graph is that the short-term shocks to the
economy (primarily the 2002 and 2009 political crises, but the 2004 rice price
crisis as well) appear to dominate long-term trends in growth and poverty. In
short, the adverse consequences of the 2002 political shock between the 2001
and 2005 EPM surveys meant that despite the subsequent recovery, poverty
rates were higher in 2005 than 2001. Similarly, given that the 2009 political
crisis occurred between the 2005–10 EPM surveys, the gains in poverty reduc-
tion that likely occurred along with the persistent growth between 2005 and
2009 are not reflected in the 2010 headcount ratio, which is higher than in
2005. It would be amistake to infer from these poverty estimates that there is a
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Figure 16.4. Poverty and real per capita GDP, Madagascar, 2001–10
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM data and INSTAT
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when we consider that the effects of the short-term shocks were not felt
uniformly across the country. Indeed, the moderate and persistent increases
in consumption levels of the poorer rural population throughout this time
period (as illustrated in Figure 16.3b and as manifested by the slightly lower
depth and severity of national poverty in Figure 16.4) suggest that poorer and
more remote areas (Stifel and Minten 2008) fared better during this time
period and were cushioned from the shocks that afflicted urban and less
remote rural areas.
A sectoral breakdown of GDP is instructive vis-à-vis the differential impact
of the shocks on poverty, and it provides insights into the sources of growth
and the volatility of this growth. In Figure 16.5, we plot real GDP by sector
along with regional poverty rates to illustrate the sectoral production trends
and how they relate to poverty. We begin with the non-mining primary
sector, given that it makes up 80 per cent of the labour force (Table 16.6),
and given its strong link to the livelihoods of the poor (Randrianarison and
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political crises, the primary sector experienced moderate growth that was
slower than the industrial and service sectors (see also Table 16.2). Further,
with the exception of 2009 when the growth rate was unexpectedly high,2
this growth was not enough to keep up the with the population growth rate.3
As such, while the primary sector did not serve as an engine for growth, it
appears that it did, however, serve as a safety net for urban households who
resorted to primary-sector activities in the wake of falling production in the
service and industrial sectors during the crisis years. For example, the share of
urban employment in the primary sector rose from 39.6 per cent in 2001 to
54.5 per cent in 2010, while it fell in services and industry from 17.1 to 9.8 per
cent, and 43.4 to 35.7 per cent, respectively. In rural areas, nonetheless,
primary-sector growth did serve as a source of poverty reduction as the head-
count ratio for rural households in this sector fell from 70 per cent to 65 per
cent. Further, given the large portion of the rural population involved in
agriculture, primary-sector growth likely contributed to the declining depth
and severity of poverty illustrated in Figure 16.3b.
The service sector, which employs 15 per cent of the total labour force,
accounts for the largest share of real GDP (54 per cent in 2010), and
Table 16.6. Sectoral distribution of employment and the poor in Madagascar, 2001–10
Headcount ratio by
sector
Distribution of workers by
sector within residence
Distribution of workers by
residence within sector
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010
National
Primary 69.3 64.4 64.6 76.4 82.0 80.4 100 100 100
Industry 22.6 31.1 38.0 6.8 3.4 4.6 100 100 100
Services 19.3 30.5 30.1 16.8 14.6 15.0 100 100 100
Total 57.8 59.1 61.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100 100
Urban
Primary 64.8 61.6 62.0 39.6 48.4 54.5 9.3 11.3 12.9
Industry 16.2 29.6 24.7 17.1 11.0 9.8 44.9 61.6 40.6
Services 17.0 26.0 20.0 43.4 40.6 35.7 46.1 53.3 45.1
Total 34.2 42.7 43.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 17.9 19.2 19.0
Rural
Primary 69.8 64.8 64.9 84.4 89.9 86.5 90.7 88.7 87.1
Industry 27.8 33.5 47.2 4.6 1.6 3.4 55.1 38.4 59.4
Services 21.3 35.6 38.5 11.1 8.5 10.2 53.9 46.7 54.9
Total 64.6 63.7 66.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 82.1 80.8 81.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM data
2 According to FAO and Ministry of Agriculture data, the volume of rice production grew by 16
per cent in 2009 (see Figure 16.1), contributing significantly to the 10.7 per cent growth of
agricultural production that year.
3 Estimated by INSTAT to be between 2.8 per cent and 3.1 per cent.
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experienced the most rapid intra-crisis growth rates. But it is also the sector
that was most negatively affected by the political shocks. For example, real
production in this sector fell by 1.1 billion Ariary in 2002, or roughly a 7 per
cent fall in total real GDP. While industrial production also fell by 0.3 billion
Ariary, it was the decline in service-sector production that contributed sub-
stantially to the increase in urban poverty observed between 2001 and 2005,
despite the recovery in this sector beginning in 2003. This follows from the
service sector accounting for the lion’s share of urban employment (43.4 per
cent in 2001), and the nine percentage point rise in the urban service-sector
headcount ratio, even after 6 per cent of the labour in this sector shifted to
agriculture. The impressive average annual 7.7 (6.8) per cent growth of service-
(industrial-)sector production between 2003 and 2008 undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the six percentage point decline (4.9 percentage point increase) in
poverty in this sector between 2005 and 2010, though the decline would likely
have been greater, and perhaps reduced poverty levels to 2001 levels, if not for
the 2009 political crisis.
16.4.3 EPM Poverty and Other Data Sources on Monetary Poverty
Other non-nationally representative data sources show pictures of changes in
poverty that are broadly consistent with those from the EPM. For example, a
series of labour force surveys conducted in the capital Antananarivo, by
Madio, show that wage poverty among formal-sector wage labourers rose
significantly in the wake of the 2002 political crisis (Table 16.7), from 32 per
cent to 38 per cent. These data also suggest, however, that by 2004 wage
labourers in the capital had more than recovered as poverty for this group
fell to less than 30 per cent. It is worth noting that these data did not include
Table 16.7. Urban labour poverty and rural household consumption in Madagascar,
2001–10
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Urban poverty
Per cent of Antananarivo
workers who are poor




Thousands of 2001 Ariary
Central (Itasy) 61.0 66.1 74.2 126.6 158.1 115.8 119.8 115.6
South (Toliara) 81.0 73.8 62.0 120.5 167.9 150.1 127.7
Northeast (Fenerive) 93.0 75.5 84.7 107.4 117.3 126.3 107.8
Northwest (Marovoay) 109.0 88.4 89.1 172.6 161.4 149.2 150.5
Notes: Shaded columns represent EPM survey years. * The 2010 survey includes both formal- and informal-sector labour.
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from Antananarivo Labour Force Survey and Réseaux Observitoires Ruraux
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formal-sector labour until the 2010 survey (note the considerably higher
estimate of wage poverty that year), and that the higher 2005 urban Antana-
narivo poverty rate from the EPM, shown in Table 16.3, suggests that informal
non-wage labour earnings were slower to recover.
Household per capita consumption measured from annual panel data from
four rural communities collected from 1999 to 2008 (Réseaux Observitoires
Ruraux), shows that although real per capita consumption levels fell during
the 2002 political crisis for three of the four communities, they rose to above
2001 levels by 2005. This is consistent with the decline in rural poverty as
measured by the depth and severity of poverty in rural areas in the EPM
between 2001 and 2005.
16.4.4 Poverty and Non-monetary Measures of Well-being
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for Madagascar provide a nation-
ally representative set of non-monetary indicators that complement the pov-
erty estimates from the EPM. Although the timing of these surveys (1997,
2003–4, 2008–9, 2011) is not the same as the EPM (2001, 2005, 2010), they
nonetheless provide a rough sense of consistency with the trends in monetary
poverty, and in some cases may indicate long-term trends in welfare. For
example, stunting rates in children under five have declined over the period
between the three years (1997, 2004, and 2009) for which the DHS include
anthropometric data for Madagascar (Table 16.8). While this high level of
malnutrition—nearly half of all young children—is consistent with the high
poverty rates in the country—over half of all individuals—the declines in
Table 16.8. Stunting rates in Madagascar
1997 2004 2009
National 48.3 47.3 45.4
Gender
Male 51.8 48.5 47.6
Female 44.8 46.2 43.1
Residence
Urban 41.3 37.0 34.3
Rural 49.2 48.9 46.4
Province
Antananarivo 57.0 52.4 48.6
Fianarantsoa 51.6 47.8 51.2
Toamasina 47.8 47.3 48.3
Mahajanga 41.0 47.6 30.3
Toliara 36.5 40.5 43.8
Antsiranana 37.1 37.1 33.3
Note: Sample of children under age five
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Madagascar DHS+
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stunting are also potentially consistent with the snapshots of poverty meas-
ured in the EPM. Declines in monetary poverty after 1997 (Paternostro et al.
2001; Amendola and Vecchi 2007), along with over US$100 million in donor-
supported nutrition and health-sector projects, suggest that stunting rates
likely fell between 1997 and 2001. These improvements, however, were inter-
rupted by the political crisis in which skyrocketing fuel prices and road block-
ages led to farm incomes in 2002 falling by over 35 per cent (Randrianarison
et al. 2002) and basic food prices more than doubling (Minten 2002), which
disrupted household food consumption among rural households for an
extended period of time and consequently worsened chronic child malnutri-
tion (World Food Program 2002). Further, the 2004 rice price crisis, in which
prices for themain staple crop rose by over 50 per cent, had detrimental effects
on household rice consumption for net buyers of rice who tend to be the poor
(Barrett and Dorosh 1996). As such, the 2004 stunting rates measured in the
DHS would likely have been even lower had these two crises not occurred.
Birth history data collected in the 2004 and 2009 DHS enable us to construct
retrospective estimates of infant (under age one) mortality rates (IMR) for each
of the eight years prior to, but not including, the survey year. Plotting these
IMRs shows two things (Figure 16.6). First, mortality rates are high, which is
not surprising given high monetary poverty in Madagascar. For example, in
2001, roughly 60 children per 1,000 live births died before they reached their
first birthday. Second, there is evidence of a long-term trend of improvements
consistent with the stunting data. But unlike the stunting data, because we
estimate IMR for each year, not just the survey years, we observe a sharp rise in
mortality rates coinciding with the 2002 political crisis, and a levelling-out in
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Figure 16.6. Annual infant mortality rates, Madagascar, 2000–8
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Madagascar DHS+
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Finally, as with other non-monetary measures of well-being, net schooling
enrolment rates showed persistent improvement between 2001 and 2010
(Table 16.9), despite the increases in monetary poverty measured over the
survey years. For example, the net primary enrolment rate rose from 49.4
per cent in 2001 to 73.4 per cent in 2010. In line with the Millennium
Development Goal of equal access to education for girls, enrolment rates for
girls rose faster than for boys over the decade. By 2010, girls’ enrolment rates at
all primary and secondary levels were higher than boys’ enrolment rates
regardless of area of residence. While more boys and girls attended school at
the end of the decade, there is still considerable room for improvement. Only
6.3 per cent of upper-secondary school-aged (lycée) children were enrolled in
school in 2010. This low level of human capital accumulation is going to
prove challenging for future poverty reduction in Madagascar.
16.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we analyse poverty in Madagascar in 2001, 2005, and 2010
using Arndt and Simler’s (2010) utility-consistent approach to calculating
cost-of-basic-needs (CBN) poverty lines. These consistent yet specific poverty
lines, along with consumption aggregates calculated from comparable survey
instruments, form the basis of the monetary poverty analysis in this chapter.
The Madagascar case is complicated by the fact that two major political
crises along with a rice price crisis occurred between the survey periods. As
such, the snapshots of national poverty rising from 57.8 per cent in 2001 to
Table 16.9. Net schooling enrolment rates in Madagascar, 2001–10
Total Boys Girls
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010
National
Primary 49.4 66.2 73.4 50.6 65.9 72.4 48.2 66.4 74.5
Secondary (collège) 6.4 12.9 22.7 5.4 12.3 21.0 7.5 13.4 24.5
Secondary (lycée) 4.1 2.8 6.3 3.1 3.1 6.0 5.1 2.6 6.7
Urban
Primary 67.5 72.5 80.1 63.8 71.5 78.9 70.9 73.6 81.4
Secondary (collège) 15.6 24.0 37.8 15.4 22.1 33.7 15.8 25.9 42.3
Secondary (lycée) 7.7 9.0 17.2 5.2 11.3 17.0 9.5 6.9 17.5
Rural
Primary 45.0 64.7 71.9 47.5 64.6 70.8 42.7 64.8 73.0
Secondary (collège) 3.7 9.9 19.2 2.7 9.7 18.0 4.9 10.0 20.4
Secondary (lycée) 2.9 1.0 3.4 2.6 0.8 3.3 3.3 1.3 3.5
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM data
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59.1 per cent in 2005, and to 61.7 per cent in 2010, are not necessarily
indicative of a trend of persistently rising poverty. The challenge is to disen-
tangle the long-term poverty trends from the short-term shocks that may
affect poverty estimates in a particular year. Indeed, complementary data
from the national accounts, non-nationally representative surveys, and non-
monetary measures of well-being suggest that in the time periods between the
shocks, the well-being of the poorer segments of society improved. This
evidence suggests that poverty estimates for Madagascar are more of a reflec-
tion of short-term shocks than of long-term trends.
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Poverty, Inequality, and Prices in
Post-Apartheid South Africa
Murray Leibbrandt, Arden Finn, and Morné Oosthuizen
17.1 Introduction
The widespread poverty and extreme inequalities prevalent at the time of
the democratic transition represented a key area of policy focus for the first
democratic government, as well as one of the sets of outcomes against which
its performance has often been judged. Poverty and inequality trends during
the post-apartheid period have consequently been the subject of intensive
analysis in South Africa. While little data on household incomes and expend-
itures existed prior to the transition, regular nationally representative house-
hold surveys undertaken since the early 1990s by Statistics South Africa and
other institutions have filled this gap. The availability of these data provided
the platform for the research effort.
That said, the effect of prices on purchasing power is typically given only
passing attention in the South African literature on poverty and inequality.
Typically, incomes or expenditures are deflated by a scalar derived from some
version of the consumer price index (CPI) in order to make comparisons over
time. This leaves the effect of differential price movements across the distri-
bution as a key gap. It is hoped that this chapter will contribute towards filling
this gap bymore purposefully considering the impact of prices on estimates of
poverty and inequality.
The chapter starts by reviewing the received wisdom on post-apartheid
growth and poverty well-being. It summarizes the secondary literature along
with some new descriptive work that uses income data and non-money-metric
sources. Section 17.3 reviews the available national expenditure data covering
the past almost twenty years, with a view to choosing appropriate datasets for
the analysis of the role of prices. It also considers the relevant available price
data. The section goes on to assess in detail the sensitivity of poverty and
inequality estimates to differential price movements over this period. The
central task of section 17.4 of the chapter is to tease out which prices changes
were particularly influential in driving these findings. Section 17.5 concludes
by summarizing findings, paying particular attention to the implications for
policies that have been put in place over the post-apartheid period to address
the apartheid legacy of high poverty and inequality.
17.2 Existing Evidence on the Evolution of
Post-Apartheid Well-being
17.2.1 The Narrative
South Africa’s economy has undergone substantial changes since the advent
of democracy in 1994. Economic growth stagnated during apartheid due to
sanctions on international trade and investment, uncompetitive local indus-
tries, rigid exchange controls, restricted skills development, and high levels of
poverty and inequality (Aron et al. 2008). After the first democratic election,
economic sanctions were dropped, labour restrictions were lifted, and policies
were put in place to advance the interests of African workers. South Africa has
since had stable macro management and, as shown in Table 17.1, the econ-
omy has grown steadily both in real and nominal terms.
Over the same period, the schooling system was transformed from one
characterized by highly skewed spending across racial groups to one based
on equitable government funding. School enrolment rates rose, though learn-
ing achievements remain very poor in previously disadvantaged schools (Van
der Berg 2007). The new, young labour market participants have more educa-
tion, on average, than their parents. Two in five young adults graduate with
Table 17.1. South African macroeconomic trends, 1993–2012
GDP (ZAR million) GDP growth (%) GDP per capita GDP per capita
growth (%)
1993 1,065,830 1.2 28,277 0.9
1997 1,214,768 2.6 29,582 0.5
2001 1,337,382 2.7 30,024 0.8
2005 1,571,082 5.3 33,176 3.9
2008 1,814,594 3.6 36,392 2.3
2010 1,842,052 3.1 36,079 1.9
2012 1,954,303 2.5 37,476 1.5
Avg. 1993–2012 1,470,001 3.2 32,031 1.5
Source: Updated from Leibbrandt et al. (2010); South African Reserve Bank (2013)
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Matric certificates (the qualification awarded to those who pass nationally set,
standardized exams at the end of secondary schooling).
Other countries, such as Brazil and India, have seen education gains trans-
late into productivity and employment growth, and large decreases in poverty
and inequality. Job creation in a dynamic labour market served as the key
pathway through which these societies generated high social returns to
improved education and indirect benefits to social transfers.
South Africa has not made similar gains. Over the post-apartheid period,
poverty has fallen only sluggishly. Eighteen years after the first democratic
election, the share of people living below a US$2 per day poverty line has
declined by no more than four percentage points from 34 per cent in 1993 to
30 per cent in 2008. These gains are often attributed to social policy reforms (a
massive expansion of cash grant transfers) rather than economic development
(Leibbrandt et al. 2010). Of equal concern is the fact that inequality has risen
further from its very high levels under apartheid (Leibbrandt et al. 2010).
Just as the labour market was the key intermediary in the successes in Brazil
and India, so the unsatisfactory performance of the labour market sits centre
stage in South Africa’s disappointing development outcome. A total of 2.74
million jobs (net) were created between 1993 and 2008, of which 2.5 million
were targeted at skilled labour, while unskilled workers lost a total of 770,000
jobs (net). Over the same period, unemployment rates more than doubled
from 14 per cent in 1993 to a peak of 29 per cent in 2001, before declining to
23 per cent in 2008. By the time of the economic crisis in 2010, the unemploy-
ment rate had risen to 25 per cent, using the narrow definition of unemploy-
ment (National Treasury 2011). If discouraged workers—those who have
stopped looking for work ‘because they do not anticipate finding any’—are
included in this definition, the figure is substantially higher at about 32 per
cent (Statistics South Africa 2012b). Of the total population of four million
unemployed, 75 per cent are long-term unemployed and many young job
seekers report having limited or no formal work experience, even at age 30
(National Treasury 2011). The informal sector is small, with only 6 per cent of
South Africans in self-employment. The supply of labour is therefore primarily
directed at jobs in the formal sector.
In general, this labour market situation has had a negative impact on
poverty because of the failure to pull individuals from poor households into
employment. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) show that, in 2008, 32 per cent of South
Africa’s 13.2 million households were no-worker households. The same figure
was 26 per cent in 1993, implying an increase over the last fifteen years in the
number of households relying on assistance, especially child support grants,
as their main form of income. Indeed, the improved aggregate poverty situ-
ation is due to increased support from social grants, and not from the labour
market. Even in one-worker households, the poverty incidence remains high
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as many workers are in low-paid employment. Clearly an employed person
within a household does not a guarantee an escape from poverty.
The poverty impacts of pervasive unemployment are compounded by
a social protection gap that exists for unemployed adults, as social cash
grants target people who are not expected to be economically active: children,
pensioners, and people with disabilities. This leaves unemployed adults
deeply dependent on goodwill transfers from within their communities, pla-
cing a large care burden on communities and deepening poverty.
Leibbrandt et al. (2010) show that these same labour market dynamics have
played a dominant role in driving inequality over the post-apartheid period.
Even though the average share of wage income in total income has remained
constant at around 70 per cent, wage income has contributed 85–90 per cent
of the total inequality in household income. In contrast, state transfers are
shown to be mildly redistributive or to have a neutral impact on the overall
Gini coefficient.
17.2.2 Trends in Money-Metric Poverty and Inequality
Most of the analysis of poverty and inequality in post-apartheid South Africa
has used income as the welfare measure. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) use house-
hold income per capita to track changes in inequality and poverty between
1993 and 2008, and include a short section on the comparability of income
and expenditure in the datasets that were used. It is understood that the
expenditure data in 1993 are not as reliable as the income data, thus motiv-
ating the focus on an income-based comparison.
We briefly present some of the quantitative analysis that has been under-
taken in support of the above narrative using income data from national
household surveys. Figure 17.1 shows three post-apartheid real income per
capita densities as an example of extensive empirical work that has been
undertaken on the distribution of income (Fedderke et al. 2003; Simkins
2004; Hoogeveen and Özler 2006; Van der Berg et al. 2006, 2008). It provides
a representative snapshot of the weight of evidence.1 A poverty line is inserted
on the graph as a reference point. It is a cost-of-basic-living poverty line
developed by Hoogeveen and Özler (2006) and has a real value of ZAR573
per person per month.
The graph shows that the distribution of real income shifted rightwards at
almost all points between 1993 and 2010. At the bottom of the distribution,
the major shift took place between 1993 and 2000, with relatively little
movement between 2000 and 2010. This pattern is reversed as we move up
1 This section is based on Finn et al. (2014).
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the distribution (but remain below the poverty line) where we see that there
was a significant rightward shift from 2000 to 2010.
There is evidence of a significant rightward shift at the very bottom of the
distribution, and poverty dominance analysis confirms a reduction in poverty.
However, this is not a dramatic decrease in poverty. According to the poverty
head count ratio—simply the proportion of the population living below the
poverty line—the poverty rate at the lower poverty line stood at 56 per cent in
1993 and remained steady at around 54 per cent for the later years in our
analysis. The reduction in poverty incidence using the upper poverty line also
stands at two percentage points—from 72 per cent in 1993 to 70 per cent in
the late 2000s. The rightward shift at the bottom of the distribution is reflected
by consistent decreases in the poverty gap rate, which gives us a broad meas-
ure of the depth of poverty in society. The main driver behind increasing
incomes at the bottom of the distribution is the rapid expansion of the
government social support programme. The importance of state grants in
raising these incomes is highlighted in Leibbrandt et al. (2010), who note
that in 1993 one-fifth of households were beneficiaries of state grants, while
in 2008 this proportion had climbed to one-half, and Leibbrandt and
Levinsohn (2011), Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen (2011), and Woolard
and Leibbrandt (2011) show clearly that social grants reduced both poverty
and inequality.
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Figure 17.1. Distributions of income, 1993, 2000, and 2010
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from PSLSD 1993, Income and Expenditure Survey (IES)
2000, and NIDS Wave 2 2010
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The expansion of government grants was not complemented by a reduction
in the unemployment rate. The labour market is by far the most important
factor to consider when decomposing poverty (see Leibbrandt et al. 2010).
While the expansion of state support has helped to lower poverty, persistently
high levels of unemployment have prevented poverty reduction on a substan-
tial scale. In 1993, almost 90 per cent of individuals living in a workless
household were living below the poverty line. This reduced somewhat to
around 80 per cent in the period under study, but it remains very high. In
fact, almost half of the poor in the country live in a workless household. This is
in contrast to the poverty share of those living in households with two or
more workers, which stands at around 17 per cent.
Leibbrandt et al. (2010) decompose poverty by different groups and reveal
that the decrease in poverty in post-apartheid South Africa is drivenmainly by
a fall in the poverty incidence among Africans, and particularly African males.
Poverty rates for this group fell from 66 per cent to 60 per cent, while the
corresponding figures for African females are 72 per cent and 68 per cent.
Despite these changes, the African share of overall poverty remained constant
at 93 per cent in 1993, 2000, and 2010. This far outweighs the African share in
the overall population, which is close to 80 per cent.
A great deal of rural–urban migration took place in South Africa in the
period under study. Our data reflect that the share of urban residents in the
population rose from 49 per cent in 1993 to 60 per cent in the late 2000s. As a
result of this movement, the urban share of total poverty rose from 30 per cent
to about 43 per cent. That said, the poverty rate in rural areas was higher than
in urban areas for any choice of poverty line.
We move now to a discussion of inequality. At the start of the post-
apartheid period South Africa stood as one of the most unequal societies of
all countries with reasonably good survey data. In panel A of Figure 17.2, we
plot three Lorenz curves for 1993, 2000, and 2010.
All three Lorenz curves suggest the high level of inequality. The richest 20
per cent of people earn about 70 per cent of the total income, and the second
richest about 20 per cent of total income. Thus the poorest 60 per cent
together earn about 10 per cent of the total income in the population. This
is approximately true regardless of which dataset is being used, and is excep-
tionally low by international standards. The primary observation is that the
distributions do not vary much with time. In this case, the 2000 graph lies
slightly below 1993, and the 2010 distribution almost perfectly overlaps with
1993. The big picture conclusion is that inequality has remainedmostly stable
and stubbornly high over the post-apartheid era (see Leibbrandt et al. 2010;
Van der Berg 2011).
Whereas Lorenz curves are unaffected by the mean of the income distribu-
tion, the generalized Lorenz curves of panel B are shifted up by mean income.
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While the Lorenz curves give a graphical measure of income inequality, the
latter provide a graphical measure of social welfare through the inclusion of
both inequality and mean income. If everyone in a society earned twice as
much as they previously did, the new generalized Lorenz curve would rotate
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Figure 17.2. Lorenz curves, 1993, 2000, and 2010
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from PSLSD 1993, IES 2000, and NIDS Wave 2 2010
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We observe from panel B that the 1993 distribution is always below the 2000
distribution, which in turn is always below the 2010 distribution. Thus, panels
A and B together reflect a society with high but stable inequality and with
rising mean incomes amounting to an improvement in aggregate welfare over
this time period.
However, an increasingly pressing policy focus has developed as to why
South Africa’s inequality seems to be so stubbornly persistent. Some of the
evidence points to the emergence of a small but well-paid black professional
class. Hoogeveen and Özler (2006) find increases in inequality between 1995
and 2000, and attribute thismostly to increases in inequality among the African
subpopulation. Using decomposition work, Leibbrandt and Levinsohn (2011)
have emphasized the importance of unemployment and earnings. Pushing
further down this road, a literature has highlighted the high rates of return to
tertiary qualifications in conjunction with wide variations in the quality of
primary and secondary schooling (Van der Berg 2009; Pellicer and Ranchhod
2012; Branson and Leibbrandt 2013a, 2013b).
Figure 17.3 follows on to provide a representative snapshot of the empirical
work that has been undertaken to understand the drivers of these changes. It
shows the share of income sources in total household income by income
quintile in 2008. The proportion of income derived from wages increases
linearly by income quintile. If a person is a member of a household situated
in the poorest five deciles, the person is likely to receive relatively little wage




















Figure 17.3. Share of household income from various sources, 2008
Source: Authors’ illustration; see text
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17.2.3 Trends in Non-Money-Metric Poverty
The concept of welfare extends beyond the simple flow of income or expend-
iture into and out of a household and includes, among other things, the
various assets accumulated by households over time. Further, in the context
of public policy, many government interventions involve the transfer of assets
and provision of services to households that are not picked up in income
measures and are not necessarily easily valued in currency terms. Such assets
include, for example, the provision of sanitation services or housing.
This makes the non-money-metric welfare story of the post-apartheid era
considerably more straightforward than the money-metric story. These meas-
ures of non-money-metric welfare include a large number of services and
assets that are directly impacted by the state’s roll-out of services. The provi-
sion of low-cost housing, the provision of access to water, improved sanita-
tion, andmassive electrification of particularly poor township areas have been
prioritized and have boosted access rates. As a result, all the studies point to
declines in non-money-metric poverty and inequality irrespective of the
period within the last twenty years since 1993.
Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen (2013), using factor analysis, construct an
asset index and find significant declines in non-income poverty and inequal-
ity between 1993, 1999, and 2004. Non-income poverty rates and the non-
income poverty gap declined across a number of demographic covariates, with
the results robust to the choice of poverty line (Bhorat and Van der
Westhuizen 2013: 18). The non-income measure included dwelling type
(formal or not); construction materials for roofs and walls; water access;
power sources for lighting and cooking; sanitation; access to telecommunica-
tions, to a vehicle, and to a television. While well-established South African
patterns of deprivation are reaffirmed in the study—Africans, females, and
rural dwellers are typically worst off—the authors find that improvements in
asset poverty and inequality were concentrated in the immediate post-
apartheid period, rather than in the latter half of the period.
Bhorat et al. (2007) construct a so-called Comprehensive Welfare Index, as
well as separate private and public asset indices. The Comprehensive Welfare
Index is constructed to include both private and public assets, wage and non-
wage income, and education levels. The analysis reveals that while poverty
across all three of these indices declined between 1993 and 2005, the decline
was more rapid for the Comprehensive Welfare and Public Asset indices
between 1993 and 1999, and more rapid for the Private Asset Index between
1999 and 2005 (Bhorat et al. 2007: 48). Given increasing fiscal allocations
towards public services and assets, this suggests that earlier interventions
may have targeted ‘low-hanging fruit’, meaning they were simpler, cheaper,
and had higher numerical impact. The later rapid improvements in the Private
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Asset Index were underpinned by the period’s relatively good economic
performance.
Wittenberg and Leibbrandt (2014) add a detailed discussion of asset inequal-
ity to this corpus. They begin by flagging the fact that it is hard to make
comparisons of asset indices over the post-apartheid period because a standard
asset bundle changes substantially between the beginning and the end of the
period. Nonetheless, after extensive sensitivity checks to settle on a defensible
set of asset bundles, they affirm the fact that these bundles show real welfare
gains for South Africans over the period. They then use these asset indices and
recently derivedmethods to estimate changes in asset inequality over time. This
shows a clear andmarked fall in asset inequality over the post-apartheid period.
Finn et al. (2013) construct a multidimensional poverty index (MPI) and
comparemeasures ofmultidimensional poverty from the 1993 PSLSD (SALDRU
1994a, 1994b) and the second wave of NIDS (SALDRU 2008; Brown et al. 2012)
in 2010/11. The index comprises three dimensions—education, health, and
living standards—which themselves contain nine indicators. Some examples of
indicators include school attendance, child mortality, nutrition, access to water
and electricity, as well as an asset index. Using an MPI poverty line of depriv-
ation in at least one-third of weighted indicators, the authors calculate multi-
dimensional headcount rates of 37 per cent in 1993 and 8 per cent in 2010. The
proportion of the population in severe MPI poverty also dropped substantially
from 17 per cent to 1 per cent. This strong decrease is reflected in the MPI
measure itself (the MPI headcount multiplied by the intensity of poverty),
which fell from 0.17 to 0.03 over the period. The largest drivers of the reduction
in multidimensional poverty were access to water and electricity. The authors
compare the drop in MPI poverty to money-metric poverty between 1993 and
2010, and demonstrate that MPI improvements were notably larger.
The consensus is that non-income measures of poverty and inequality tell a
more positive story of the post-apartheidperiod, and one that does not appear to
bematerially impacted by the choice of base year for comparison. Asset poverty
and inequality levels have declined as the state actively intervened to uplift poor
and marginalized communities through the provision of basic services and
improved housing. Importantly, the evidence suggests that demographic and
locational markers of disadvantage are being eroded quite significantly over
time, aswithin-groupdifferences explain an increasingproportionof inequality.
17.3 Poverty, Inequality, and Prices
17.3.1 The Availability of Data to Assess the Role of Prices
The above story of slight declines in money-metric poverty, stronger declines
in asset poverty, and persistently high inequality is consistent with a large
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body of evidence and is pretty settled. However, expenditure patterns differ
considerably across the distribution as do the price indices for different con-
sumption components (Oosthuizen 2007; Finn, Leibbrandt, and Oosthuizen
2014). The impact of these relative price changes and relative inflation rates is
a near unexplored aspect of these changes in well-being. This is despite the
fact that the way in which price changes are accounted for may impact on the
observed rankings themselves, as well as the rankings relative to the poverty
line, distorting the chosen measures of poverty and inequality.
The analysis in this chapter thus far has used the headline CPI to deflate
nominal household incomes and expenditures to 2008 prices. However, this
implies that each expenditure item or category within the aggregate has
experienced identical price changes. Even a cursory glance at the various
published product indices will confirm that is contentious. In combination
with differences in consumption bundles across households, this means that a
single deflator is unable to adequately account for price changes for all house-
holds. Indeed, household-specific inflation rates can vary quite substantially
in a given period. Between January 1998 andDecember 2008, for example, it is
estimated that an average of one-third of urban South African households
actually experienced rates of inflation within one percentage point of the
overall urban inflation rate (Oosthuizen 2013).
Various household surveys collecting information on household expenditures
have been conducted in the past twenty years in South Africa, varying in level of
detail, geographical coverage, and representivity. Moreover, the expenditure
data in these various datasets reveal some awkward anomalies that complicate
comparisons over time (Finn, Leibbrandt, and Oosthuizen 2014). Taking these
expenditure datasets at face value results in a volatile picture of poverty and
inequality trends that lacks plausibility when benchmarked against the the
extensivemoney-metric and non-money-metric literature. Given the similarities
in methodology, Statistics South Africa’s Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES)
of 2005/6 (Statistics South Africa 2008) and 2010/11 (Statistics South Africa
2012a) and Living Conditions Survey (LCS) of 2008/9 (Statistics South Africa
2011) seem to provide a coherent and plausible picture of the most contempor-
ary period. Therefore we use them for the analysis that follows. Unfortunately,
this analysis deems that there is not a 1990s dataset that is a plausible compara-
tive baseline of the early post-apartheid period. The chosen period of analysis
also coincides with a period in which the geographical coverage and classifica-
tion system of the CPI is generally consistent. Going forward, we make use of
official price indices for all urban areas.2
2 Since price data at the product level are not publicly available, the approach taken here is to use
price indices at the most detailed level of disaggregation available (typically at a product group
level).
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17.3.2 Does Accounting for Price Changes Affect Poverty Trends?
Different households consume different baskets of goods and experience
differing rates of inflation over time. How important were price changes for
headcount poverty rates in South Africa between 2005 and 2010? In answer-
ing the question, we compare CPI-adjusted cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) to percentile-specific price inflation indices (PCPI) CDFs. In all cases we
are converting nominal expenditures for 2005 and 2010 into 2008 real Rand
equivalents. For the CPI CDFs we deflate (2010) or inflate (2005) each per-
centile of the entire distributions using the same headline CPI price index. For
the PCPIs we deflate or inflate each percentile of the expenditure distribution
for each period by its own price index.
Constructing the PCPI involves two steps. First, we calculate the share of
each expenditure item in total consumption expenditure for each percentile
in 2008, and then assign this share as the weight for each relevant item. This is
done at the most detailed level of disaggregation for which Statistics South
Africa publishes price indices. Second, we multiply the weight by the price
change for each item and then sum across each item for each percentile to
arrive at the PCPI. So, for example, the percentile-specific inflation faced by









where w(i,x) is the weight of expenditure item i for percentile x and pi is the
price of item i. For comparability with the CPI-adjusted CDFs and in order to
focus on price changes, the weights were held constant across the years, and
were based on the shares derived from the 2008 LCS dataset.
A quick way of graphically assessing the impact of percentile-specific price
changes on poverty is to compare CDFs where expenditure is inflated or
deflated by CPI in one case and by PCPI in the other. This is what is shown
in Figure 17.4. In the upper panel representing the 2005 situation, the solid
line inflates the 2005 expenditure distribution into a 2008 real equivalent,
assuming that each good consumed by anyone anywhere along the distribu-
tion experienced the same price change between 2005 and 2008—namely,
that represented by the increase in the CPI over the period. The PCPI adjusts
expenditures using a percentile specific price index. The dashed line plots this
CDF. It is nowhere below that of the solid line which corresponds to the CPI
deflator. This implies higher proportions of the population have lower real
expenditure levels when the PCPI is used compared to the CPI situation. The
value of goods that 2005 expenditures can buy is less and headcount poverty
rates are higher at the poverty line of ZAR6,084 or any other poverty line when
percentile-specific price changes are taken into account.
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Figure 17.4. Impact of prices on poverty as demonstrated by CDFs
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from IES 2005/6, LCS 2008/9, IES 2010/11, and pub-
lished price indices
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The lower panel shows that the situation is different in the IES 2010 data.
Now, the CDFs deflating by the CPI and the PCPI overlap almost perfectly over
the range R0 to ZAR15,000 of household expenditure per capita per year.
Between 2008 and 2010 the magnitude of each percentile specific price
change was slightly less but very close to the price change reflected in the
overall CPI. As a consequence, headcount poverty is very close too at the
poverty line of ZAR6,084 or any other poverty line.
Given that the 2005 PCPI CDFs are notably above their respective CPI
equivalents whereas the 2010 PCPI CDFs are very close to their CPI equiva-
lents, the net effect of percentile-specific inflation over the period 2005 to
2010 worsens poverty at any poverty line. Finn, Leibbrandt, and Oosthuizen
(2014) illustrate this point by decomposing poverty changes at one specific
poverty line into a growth component, a redistribution component, and a
price component, making use of the Günther and Grimm (2007) extension of
the Datt and Ravallion (1992) poverty decomposition. This analysis shows
that over the period 2005–10, price changes were anti-poor whether measure-
ment is at the national level or separated into urban and rural components.
Indeed, the rural poor were particularly hard-hit.
17.3.3 Does Accounting for Price Changes Affect Inequality Trends?
The relationship between prices and consumption inequality is complicated
by the fact that higher expenditure households have a larger weighting within
the calculation of consumer price indices. As a result, the expenditure weights
underlying the official CPI are biased towards higher expenditure groups and
the ‘representative household’ that the CPI is meant to track may not be
representative of the broader population.
Exactly where in the distribution the representative household is located
depends on the extent of inequality: higher levels of inequality are associated
with a location further up the distribution. For example, the representative
household in Spain in the 1990s was located at the 61st percentile of the
distribution (Izquierdo et al. 2003: 149) and in the 75th percentile in the
United States in 1990 (Deaton 1998: 43). In Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and
Peru, the representative household is located between the 80th and 90th
percentiles based on data between the 1980s and the early 2000s (Goni et al.
2006: 7). In South Africa, the representative household was located in the 95th
percentile in 2000 (Oosthuizen 2007: 20). Conventional CPIs, therefore, do
not track the experiences of what would be considered the ‘average’ house-
hold and provide an imperfect measure of the inflation experienced by poor
households.
Not surprisingly therefore, visual inspection of Lorenz curves is very useful.
In Figure 17.5, we compare Lorenz curves for 2005 and 2010. In each year, the
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Lorenz curves are plotted using nominal expenditure and, in 2005, we plot the
2005 expenditures in 2010 prices. Comparing the nominal Lorenz curves in
the two years suggests that inequality declined between 2005 and 2010—the
2010 Lorenz curve lies closer to the line of equality than does the 2005 curve.
When the 2005 basket is priced in 2010 prices it is marginally closer to the
line of equality at the lower end of the distribution and slightly further away
from the line of equality for the richest quarter of households. The gap
between the own-priced Lorenz curves for 2005 and 2010 reflects the total
change in nominal inequality and is equivalent to comparing the Gini
coefficients of the two nominal distributions. The gap between the two
Lorenz curves based on 2010 prices and in which only the baskets differ
offers a measure of the change in real inequality. The gap between the
two Lorenz curves based on the 2005 basket—in which only the prices
differ—corresponds to the effect of differential inflation.
The effect of prices on inequality measures can be estimated more precisely.
Following Ruiz-Castillo et al. (2002) and Goni et al. (2006), we assume an
inequality index, ξ(xt), in period t to be an increasing function in the level of
inequality. The vector xt measures nominal expenditures, i.e. xt = (x
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Figure 17.5. Impact of prices on inequality as demonstrated by Lorenz curves
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from IES 2005/6, IES 2010/11, and published price
indices
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1, . . . ,H). If xt,s = (pt0c
1
s, . . . ,pt0c
H
s)0 is the vector of household consumptions in
periods evaluated at the prices of period t, then:
Δξ ¼ ξðxtÞ  ξðxt1Þ
¼ ξðxt;tÞ  ξðxt1;t1Þ
¼ ξðxt;tÞ  ξðxt;t1Þ þ ξðxt;t1Þ  ξðxt1;t1Þ ð17:2Þ
¼ ξQ  ΔξP ð17:3Þ
The first pair of terms in Equation (17.2) refers to the difference in the inequal-
ity measure when the baskets from the two different periods (t and t1) are
priced in terms of the prices of a single period (period t)—the only difference
between the two sets of baskets being the quantities consumed. The second
pair of terms refers to the change in the inequality measure when the base
period baskets (i.e. period t1) are priced using the sets of prices from each
period. In this case, the only difference between the two sets of baskets is the
prices at which they have been valued. Changes in nominal inequality
may therefore be thought of as consisting of a component that reflects the
effects of changes in quantities consumed (ΔξQ) and a component that reflects
the effects of changing prices (ΔξP). Goni et al. (2006: 5) describe ΔξQ as
‘changing real inequality’ and ΔξP as ‘inflation inequality’. In terms of the
Lorenz curves presented in Figure 17.5, ΔξQ corresponds to the comparison of
the two baskets in 2010 prices, while ΔξP corresponds to the comparison
of the two Lorenz curves based on the 2005 basket.
Table 17.2 presents the decompositions for the 2005–10 period as a whole,
by repricing individual households’ expenditure baskets using product cat-
egory price indices. Estimates of inequality are estimates of nominal inequal-
ity. The percentage change in the estimates of inequality over the period is
then decomposed into an inflation inequality component (PΔ) and a real
inequality component (QΔ). Since the chosen base period may impact on
the results—the base period refers to the consumption basket used—the
decomposition is performed using first the initial period and then the final
period as the base period.
The data show that inequality declined in nominal terms between 2005 and
2010, with the Gini coefficient falling from 0.668 to 0.636. However, in real
terms, the decline has been smaller, with inflation inequality estimated to
account for between 35 per cent and 56 per cent of the observed changes in
nominal inequality, depending on the base and the inequality measure. For
example, price changes are responsible for 2.1 percentage points or 1.7 per-
centage points of the almost 4.8 per cent decline in the level of the Gini
coefficient between 2005 and 2010, depending on the base period.
This is not a positive situation. As ΔξP is negative for the 2005–10 period,
price changes have been against those at the bottom of the distribution.
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Differential price changes, therefore, created a ‘wedge’ between real inequality
(ΔξQ) and nominal inequality (Δξ). For the period under review, the effect of
prices has been to exaggerate the changes observed in terms of real inequality
as both the real inequality and the inflation inequality effects were in the same
direction.3 This finding is consistent with the finding of anti-poor price move-
ments in terms of the above analysis of poverty.
17.4 Which Prices Drove these Price Impacts on Poverty
and Inequality?
The poverty and inequality decompositions presented above confirm that
differential inflation rates across the distribution matter for the measurement
of poverty and inequality trends over time in South Africa. Both the poverty
and the inequality decompositions characterize the 2005–10 period as one
during which price changes were anti-poor, with inflation rates for poorer
households typically exceeding those of better-off households. In this section
we seek to understand these changes by probing the expenditure categories
that have promoted a gap between the inflation rates of poor and non-poor
households.
In order for poor households to experience higher average rates of inflation
over a given period, poor households must be ‘overexposed’ to relatively high-
inflation items and ‘underexposed’ to relatively low-inflation items, with
3 Although not presented here, separate urban and rural decompositions are broadly consistent
with these aggregate results. Results for urban and rural areas separately can be found in Finn,
Leibbrandt, and Oosthuizen (2014).













PΔ QΔ PΔ QΔ
National—2005 vs 2010
Gini coefficient 0.668 0.636 4.77 2.10 2.67 1.68 3.09
Theil index 0.957 0.829 13.37 5.33 8.05 5.08 8.29
Mean log deviation 0.838 0.756 9.80 5.46 4.35 4.09 5.71
Note: (a) Estimates of nominal inequality use prices fromMarch 2006 for the 2005/6 IES expenditures, fromMarch 2009
for the 2008/9 LCS expenditures, and fromMarch 2011 for the 2010/11 IES expenditures. Thesemonths are the same as
those used by Statistics South Africa as the basemonth for IES and LCS data. (b) Inequality measures are calculated on the
basis of per capita household expenditure (i.e. these are individual-level measures).
Source: Authors’ calculations
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over- or underexposure defined in terms of these items’ weights among poor
relative to non-poor households. Figure 17.6 illustrates this by plotting the
relative weights of each expenditure category in the CPI—calculated as
the ratio between the weight for the poorest 40 per cent of households and
the weight for the richest 60 per cent of households—against each category’s
average annual price change. The horizontal line indicates the average rate of
inflation for the period and the vertical line shows the categories in which
poor households are underexposed (to the left of the line) or overexposed (to
the right of the line).
Expenditure categories with both high relative weights and above-inflation
price increases over the period contribute to widening the gap in the price
indices of poor and non-poor households. Ten of these have been highlighted.
Of these, six are food categories and a seventh is a beverage category. The
remaining three categories are electricity (a price regulated by government),
tobacco (a price that is strongly affected by government, through taxation), and
household supplies and services. At two extremes are electricity and bread and
cereals. Bread and cereals have a very high relative weight—poor households
spend 3.5 times more than non-poor on this expenditure category relative to
Bread and cereals




Sugar, sweets, and desserts
Hot beverages
Electricity


























0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Ratio of weights (poorest 40% : richest 60%)
Figure 17.6. Poor households’ exposure to high-inflation expenditure categories,
2005–10
Note: Four expenditure categories with negative overall price changes were omitted from the scatter
plot. These are: postal services and telecommunication services (11.4 per cent per annum; 0.7
relative weight); furnishings, floor coverings, and textiles (2.1 per cent per annum; 1.1 relative
weight); footwear (0.5 per cent per annum; 2.0 relative weight); and purchase of vehicles (0.5
per cent per annum; 0.01 relative weight).
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from IES 2005/6, IES 2010/11, and published price indices
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their total expenditures—so that almost any rate of price increase above infla-
tion would make this category a substantial contributor to the gap between
poor and non-poor price indices. Electricity, on the other hand, has a moder-
ately high relative weight—the weight for poor households is 2.8 times that for
non-poor—but its rate of price increase has been particularly strong. In fact,
electricity is by some margin the expenditure category with the highest rate of
price increase, having increased by 15.3 per cent per annum over the five-year
period.
While the figure highlights expenditure categories characterized by rapid
price increases and relatively high expenditure weights for poor households, it
does not show that the higher average rate of inflation experienced by poor
households is also caused by poor households’ underexposure to low-inflation
items. The key items in this regard are purchase of vehicles; domestic worker
wages; tertiary education fees; insurance; postal services and telecommunica-
tion services; and recreational and cultural services. Using more detailed
price data for the 1997–2006 period and expenditure data for urban areas
only, earlier work finds that purchases of vehicles, insurance of buildings,
and computers and telecommunication equipment widen the gap between
decile one and all urban households due to poor households’ underexposure
to low-inflation items (Oosthuizen 2007: 54). Paraffin, other tobacco prod-
ucts, matches, and candles were found to widen the gap through poor house-
holds’ overexposure to these high-inflation items.
In Table 17.3 we investigate whether our analysis of the 2005–10 period is
likely to apply to the whole decade. We do this by determining if the inflation
rate for poor households is higher than the overall inflation rate over the
2000s. If so, inflation can be said to be anti-poor, and vice versa. The table
presents a matrix of income and/or expenditure datasets from the 2000s,
which yield a number of periods based on comparisons between pairs of
Table 17.3. Patterns of inflation, 2000–13
IES 2000 IES 2005/6 LCS 2008/9 IES 2010/11 Census 2011
IES 2005/6 Anti-poor
LCS 2008/9 Anti-poor + Anti-poor
IES 2010/11 Anti-poor + Anti-poor Pro-poor 
Census 2011 Anti-poor + Anti-poor Neutral Anti-poor 
Oct. 2013 Anti-poor + Anti-poor Anti-poor  Anti-poor Neutral
Notes: (a) Base periods for prices are as follows: IES 2000–2000 (since total country price indices are not available prior to
2002); IES 2005/6–March 2006; LCS 2008/9–March 2009; IES 2010/11–March 2011; and Census 2011–October 2011.
(b) ‘Neutral’means that the gap between the All Items price index and the All Items index for the poorest 20 per cent of
households is less than one point. ‘Anti-poor +’ means that the gap between the All Items price index and the All Items
index for the poorest 20 per cent of households is greater than twenty points. A minus sign (‘’) indicates that inflation is
weakly pro- or anti-poor (i.e. the difference in indices is more than one but less than three index points).
Source: Authors’ calculations
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datasets. Based on the datasets’ respective base periods in terms of prices, the
pattern of inflation in each period can be determined. We have chosen to
compare quintile one households (i.e. the poorest 20 per cent of households)
with the national average. Patterns of inflation are described as pro- or anti-
poor, or neutral. Inflation patterns are described as neutral when the difference
between the two national indices and the quintile index is less than one point.
The table confirms that for most two-way comparisons between the five
datasets (or points in time they represent), inflation was anti-poor. This means
that conventional estimates of changes in poverty that deflate expenditures
using the headline inflation rate would upwardly bias improvements in real
incomes or expenditures for the bottom quintile. Similarly, not deflating
expenditures or incomes (or using headline inflation to deflate) would over-
state improvements in inequality or understate the extent of worsening real
inequality. This effect would be quite strong when making comparisons
between the IES 2000 and any of the later datasets. However, the effect
would be much weaker when comparing any dataset from the LCS 2008/9
onwards with another later dataset. The effects here are typically weak and
effectively neutral.
17.5 Conclusion
This chapter had two specific objectives. The first was to tell the story of the
evolution of poverty and inequality in post-apartheid South Africa in a way
that covers both money-metric and non-money-metric dimensions of well-
being and teases out the drivers of these changes. For the most part, this was
based on a review of an existing corpus. The second goal of the chapter was to
assess the impact of prices on estimates of poverty and inequality, an issue
that has received very little attention.
The post-apartheid narrative has to start with the inherited legacy of very
high inequality and high poverty. Most obviously, the markers were the
strong racial and spatial (rural) disadvantages associated with apartheid.
Using income data from 1993 and an extensive literature that draws on
these data, we detail the unequal human capital, asset, and labour market
situation at the start of the post-apartheid period. At the broadest level, the
specific intent of post-apartheid policymaking has been to confront and
overturn this inherited situation. With the benefit of hindsight and our
current knowledge about poverty traps, inequality persistence, and socioeco-
nomic marginalization, we can understand how the pernicious correlation of
these racial and spatial legacies with poorer human capital accumulation and
poorer household and community assets presented the post-apartheid gov-
ernment with a most daunting set of constraints.
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Jumping ahead to the contemporary situation, we used comparable,
national 2010 income data to show a somewhat improved money-metric
poverty situation and an income inequality situation that is, at best, as
unequal as the 1994 situation. This shows just how hard it has been to
overturn the embedded apartheid dynamics of persistence poverty and
inequality. That said, there are signs of progress. A comparison of multidi-
mensional poverty indices shows that there have been improvements in
human capital. Access to education and average years of schooling have
expanded, and on the health side, there have been improvements in child
mortality and nutrition. Plus there have been notable improvements in access
to assets. Work on multidimensional poverty and the derivation of asset
indices collectively show notable improvements in access to water and elec-
tricity, even for the poor. An analysis of asset indices shows improvements in
access to sanitation and housing too. It is clear that asset inequality has fallen
over the post-apartheid period.
These improvements in multidimensional poverty represent notable policy
achievements. However, these achievements are not mirrored in equivalent
money-metric improvements and this raises a fundamental question in
understanding South Africa’s post-apartheid performance. Why has South
Africa not generated social returns from its investments in human capital
and assets? We have some but not all of the pieces of this puzzle in place.
Drawing on a decomposition literature we show that South Africa’s failure to
generate more jobs has been central to the inability to see improved human
capital realized in more earners and in higher earnings for more productive
workers. A dynamic labour market has to be the central mechanism through
which a society transforms itself, through which assets embodied in people
become livelihoods and income. The South African labour market has been
very static and has not done this.
We reference a literature that situates some of this failure within the
schooling system itself. This literature argues that the quality of schooling
has declined. The apparent schooling improvements are a cruel mirage. This
view needs to be balanced against the fact that the post-apartheid economy
has operated in the global economic environment and a skills twist in the
demand for labour. South Africa—along with all developed economies and
many middle-income developing economies—has seen an increasing
demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour and very flat demand for
unskilled labour. What makes this skills’ twist so pernicious in the South
African context is that the improvements in years of schooling (from seven
to ten years) lie in the zone of falling returns. We have yet to see large
increases in complete secondary (twelve years) or tertiary education. The
market has strongly dampened the returns to the improved educational
access that has been achieved.
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Another dimension of the labour market failure is a sluggish employment
response to economic growth. Partly this failure is about the levels of growth.
Our growth rates have hovered just below 3 per cent for most of the post-
apartheid period. Nearly all planning models of the economy have been clear
that we require growth rates in excess of 5 per cent to kickstart robust job
creation. In the mid-2000s South Africa’s growth rates inched upwards
towards these levels only for the financial crisis to cut them back to close to
zero in 2008. We show that growth has been pro-poor. However, the key
mechanism has not been strongly inclusive employment creation. Rather,
increased tax revenues have been used to finance significantly increased
state expenditures on social grants. However, as with education and health,
without a dynamic labour market, these grants remain remedial. They are
not generating second-round effects or pathways out of poverty through
financing labour market entry or through financing the creation of small
enterprises.
Thus, there have been significant successes but the need to generate
labour-absorbing growth is highlighted as a fundamental challenge to further
reductions in poverty and to reducing inequality. Does this picture require
significant adjustments when giving account to different consumption bun-
dles across the distribution and the different prices and price changes of these
bundles?
We explored the role of prices in driving expenditure-based poverty and
inequality over the 2005–10 period using price/poverty decompositions and
price/inequality decompositions. In line with our earlier analysis, we showed
that both growth and redistribution were pro-poor. However, percentile-
specific price indices dampen improvements in poverty. In addition, while
measured inequality declined somewhat over this period, this decline is exag-
gerated by the fact that inflation was anti-poor. In other words, giving specific
attention to what the poor and those at the bottom of the income distribution
consume, and pricing this bundle as accurately as possible, we showed that
these groups have to spend more than an average CPI adjustment would
reveal on their consumption bundles. At the end of the day it is the consump-
tion bundle that is the real measure of well-being and expenditure is merely a
proxy measure. Indeed, the implication of our decomposition work is that
some of the increase in the expenditures of the poor do not signal an increase
in consumption and therefore in real well-being but rather an increase in the
cost of the same consumption bundle.
Adding prices into the post-apartheid narrative does not make things look
any better. Rather, it cautions that, over the 2000s, the real support for those at
the bottom of the distribution has not been as substantial as usually indicated.
Our detailed analysis signals the exposure that those at the bottom of the
expenditure distribution have had and continue to have to food price
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movements. This would be true anywhere in the world; although the particu-
lar vulnerability of rural communities in South Africa flags the absence of
support from subsistence food production. More novel is our finding that
those at the bottom of the distribution have been relatively overexposed to
high-inflation items such as electricity and food, and underexposed to lower-
inflation items such as services generally and transport. Our review of non-
money-metric well-being has shown evidence of the successful rollout of such
services in the post-apartheid period. Success in the fight against poverty can
be undermined by sharp increases in the pricing of such services. Moreover,
basic foodstuffs and these services are more important components in the
consumption bundles of those at the bottom of the distribution than those at
the top. In the 2000s their prices rose more sharply than those goods con-
sumed by the better-off, and this worsened inequality.
References
Aron, J., B. Kahn, and G. Kingdon (2008). ‘South African Economic Policy under
Democracy: Overviews and Prospects’, in J. Aron, B. Kahn, and G. Kingdon (eds),
South African Economic Policy under Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–27.
Bhorat, H. and C. Van der Westhuizen (2011). ‘Pro-Poor Growth and Social Protection
in South Africa: Exploring the Interactions’. Unpublished submission to the National
Planning Commission. Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of
Cape Town.
Bhorat, H. and C. Van der Westhuizen (2013). ‘Non-monetary Dimensions of Well-
being in South Africa, 1993–2004: A Post-Apartheid Dividend?’ Development Southern
Africa, 30(3): 295–314.
Bhorat, H., C. Van der Westhuizen, and S. Goga (2007). ‘Welfare Shifts in the Post-
Apartheid South Africa: A ComprehensiveMeasurement of Changes’, DPRUWorking
Paper 07/128. Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape
Town.
Branson, N. and M. Leibbrandt (2013a). ‘Education Quality and Labour Market Out-
comes in South Africa’, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 1021. Paris:
OECD Publishing.
Branson, N. and M. Leibbrandt (2013b). ‘Educational Attainment and Labour Market
Outcomes in South Africa, 1994–2010’, OECD Economics Department Working
Paper 1022. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Brown, M., R. C. Daniels, L. De Villiers, M. Leibbrandt, and I. Woolard (2012). National
Income Dynamics Study Wave 2 Beta Release User Manual. Cape Town: Southern Africa
Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Datt, G. and M. Ravallion (1992). ‘Growth and Redistribution Components of Changes
in Poverty Measures: A Decomposition with Applications to Brazil and India in the
1980s’, Journal of Development Economics, 38(2): 275–95.
Poverty, Inequality, and Prices in South Africa
415
Deaton, A. (1998). ‘Getting Prices Right: What Should Be Done?’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12(1): 37–46.
Fedderke, J., J. Manga, and F. Pirouz (2003). ‘Challenging Cassandra: Household and
Per Capita Household Income Distribution in the October Household Surveys
1995–1999’. Unpublished mimeograph, University of Cape Town.
Finn, A., M. Leibbrandt, and M. Oosthuizen (2014). ‘Poverty, Inequality, and Prices in
Post-Apartheid South Africa’, WIDER Working Paper 2014/127, October. Helsinki:
World Institute for Development Economics Research.
Finn, A., M. Leibbrandt, and V. Ranchhod (2014). ‘Post-Apartheid Poverty and Inequal-
ity Trends’, in R. Kanbur (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Economics of South Africa.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 291–7.
Finn, A., M. Leibbrandt, and I. Woolard (2013). ‘What Happened to Multidimensional
Poverty in South Africa between 1993 and 2010?’, SALDRU Working Paper Series 99.
Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of
Cape Town.
Goni, E., H. Lopez, and L. Serven (2006). ‘Getting Real about Inequality: Evidence from
Brazil, Colombia,Mexico, and Peru’, World Bank Policy ResearchWorking Paper 3815.
Available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6525971/getting-
real-inequality-evidence-brazil-colombia-mexico-peru>, accessed January 2013.
Günther, I. and M. Grimm (2007). ‘Measuring Pro-Poor Growth When Relative Prices
Shift’, Journal of Development Economics, 82(1): 245–56.
Hoogeveen, J. and B. Özler (2006). ‘Poverty and Inequality in Post-Apartheid South
Africa: 1995–2000’, in H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur (eds), Poverty and Policy in Post-
Apartheid South Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 59–94.
Izquierdo, M., E. Ley, and J. Ruiz-Castillo (2003). ‘The Plutocratic Gap in the CPI:
Evidence from Spain’, IMF Staff Papers, 50(1): 136–55.
Leibbrandt, M. and J. Levinsohn (2011). ‘Fifteen Years On: Household Incomes in
South Africa’, NBER Working Paper 16661. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Leibbrandt, M., I. Woolard, A. Finn, and J. Argent (2010). ‘Trends in South African
Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid’, OECD Social, Employ-
ment and Migration Working Papers 101. Paris: OECD.
National Treasury (2011). ‘National Budget Speech’. Available at <http://www.treasury.gov.
za/documents/national%20budget/2011/speech/speech2011.pdf>, accessed January
2013.
Oosthuizen, M. (2007). ‘Consumer Price Inflation across the Income Distribution in
South Africa’, DPRU Working Paper 07/129. Cape Town: Development Policy
Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Oosthuizen, M. (2013). ‘Inflation Inequality in South Africa’, DPRU Working Paper
13/158. Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Pellicer, M. and V. Ranchhod (2012). ‘Inequality Traps and Human Capital Accumula-
tion in South Africa’, SALDRU Working Paper Series 86. Cape Town: Southern Africa
Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Ruiz-Castillo, J., E. Ley, and M. Izquierdo (2002). ‘Distributional Aspects of the Quality
Change Bias in the CPI: Evidence from Spain’, Economics Letters, 76(1): 137–44.
Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction
416
SALDRU (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit) (1994a). ‘Project for
Statistics on Living Standards and Development, 1994. South Africans Rich and Poor:
Baseline Household Statistics’. Cape Town: SALDRU.
SALDRU (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit) (1994b). ‘Project for
Statistics on Living Standards and Development’. Cape Town: SALDRU.
SALDRU (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit) (2008). ‘National
Income Dynamics Study’. Cape Town: SALDRU.
Simkins, C. (2004). ‘What Has Happened to the Distribution of Income in South Africa
between 1995 and 2001?’. Mimeo, South African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN),
Pretoria.
South African Reserve Bank (2013). ‘Quarterly Bulletin Online Statistical Query’.
Online database. Available at <http://www.reservebank.co.za/>, accessed June 2013.
Statistics South Africa (2008). ‘Income and Expenditure of Households 2005/2006’,
Statistical Release P0100. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Available at <http://www.
statssa.gov.za/>, accessed January 2013.
Statistics South Africa (2009a). ‘Consumer Price Index Collection Frequency’. Available
at <http://www.statssa.gov.za/>, accessed January 2013.
Statistics South Africa (2009b). ‘The South African CPI Sources and Methods Manual’.
Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Available at <http://www.statssa.gov.za/>, accessed
January 2013.
Statistics South Africa (2011). ‘Living Conditions of Households in SA: 2008/2009’,
Statistical Release P0310. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
Statistics South Africa (2012a). ‘Income and Expenditure of Households 2010/2011’,
Statistical Release P0100. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
Statistics South Africa (2012b). ‘Quarterly Labour Force Survey (2012Q1)’, Statistical
Release P0211. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
Van der Berg, S. (2007). ‘Apartheid’s Enduring Legacy: Inequalities in Education’,
Journal of African Economies, 16(5): 849–80.
Van der Berg, S. (2009). ‘The Persistence of Inequalities in Education’. In J. Aron,
B. Kahn, andG. Kingdon (eds), South African Economic Policy under Democracy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 327–54.
Van der Berg, S. (2011). ‘Current Poverty and Income Distribution in the Context of
South African History’, Economic History of Developing Regions, 26(1): 120–40.
Van der Berg, S., R. Burger, R. Burger, M. Louw, and D. Yu (2006). ‘Trends in Poverty and
Inequality since the Political Transition’, DPRU Working Paper 06/104. Cape Town:
Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Van der Berg, S., M. Louw, and D. Yu (2008). ‘Post-Transition Poverty Trends Based on
an Alternative Data Source’, South African Journal of Economics, 76(1): 58–76.
Wittenberg, M. and M. Leibbrandt (2014). ‘Measuring Inequality by Asset Indices: The
Case of South Africa’. Paper delivered at the UNU-WIDER conference ‘Inequality—
Measurement, Trends, Impacts, and Policies’, 5–6 September, Helsinki.
Woolard, I. and M. Leibbrandt (2011). ‘The Role of Cash Transfers in Reducing Poverty
and Inequality in South Africa over the Post-Apartheid Period’. Unpublished submis-
sion to the National Planning Commission. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and
Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.







Growth and Poverty in the Democratic
Republic of Congo
2001 through 2013
Malokele Nanivazo and Kristi Mahrt
18.1 Introduction
With the largest area in sub-Saharan Africa (2,344,858 square kilometres), the
third largest population (76 million inhabitants) (CIA World Fact Book 2013),
and nine bordering countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) holds
a position of influence in central Africa. According to the World Bank, with
its ‘immense and extraordinary agricultural and mineral resources, the DRC
has the potential to become one of Africa’s richest countries and one of the
continent’s key engines for growth’ (World Bank 2013a). Twelve years after
the end of the Second Civil War, ongoing local conflict and political instabil-
ity have produced a precarious environment plagued by endemic corrup-
tion, an uncertain legal framework, lack of adequate infrastructure, and
substandard macroeconomics policies. It is perhaps a measure of how far
below potential DRC has sunk that, in spite of these unfavourable condi-
tions, evidence suggests the DRC has begun a path to recovery. Since 2002,
the DRC has sustained an estimated average annual growth rate of 6 per cent
(World Bank 2014) and signs of economic recovery are evident in the
agricultural, industrial, manufacturing, services, and mining sectors.
Despite improving economic conditions, high positive growth has not yet
translated to corresponding reductions in consumption poverty and the
majority of the population remains in a fragile position. The DRC remains
one of the poorest countries in the world with a GDP per capita of only US
$288 (constant 2000 US$) in 2013 (World Bank 2014). Based on national
consumption poverty lines, 71 per cent of the population was poor in 2005
compared to 63 per cent in 2012 (UNDP 2014a). A disaggregation of the 2012
poverty rates reveals that the situation is worse in rural areas (65 per cent)
compared to urban areas (60 per cent) (UNDP 2014a). Despite this reduction
in consumption poverty, basic welfare continues to lag behind. This lack of
progress is evident in the 2014 DRC Millennium Development Goals Report
assertion that the DRC is unlikely to achieve any of the eight Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 (UNDP 2014a).
It is worth emphasizing that data collection is a challenging endeavour in
DRC. Given its recent tumultuous history, institutional weaknesses, and the
lack of trust of the population vis-à-vis agents of the government (enumer-
ators), the scope for non-sampling error is large. Even sample biases are
difficult to control. All recent national surveys, the Demographic Health
Survey (DHS), the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), and the Enquêtes
1-2-3, base their sample frames on combinations of the 1984 census and
administrative censuses. This is well short of ideal. All surveys follow a similar
sampling scheme with stratification by provinces as well as cities, towns, and
rural areas. Sample sizes tend to increase over time such that the 2001 and
2010 MICS include 8,622 and 11,393 households, the 2007 and 2010 DHS
include 8,886 and 18,171 households, and the 2005 and 2012 Enquêtes 1-2-3
include 12,098 and 21,454 households.
The Enquête 1-2-3 obtains consumption information that forms the basis for
official poverty headcount measures and as such these figures should be
interpreted with a degree of caution. In this uncertain and limited data envir-
onment, triangulating poverty estimations through the use of both an array of
welfare measures and multiple data sources is essential.
This chapter seeks to provide a broader understanding of welfare in the DRC
through an analysis of the distribution and evolution of multidimensional
welfare for the eleven provinces over the twelve-year span from 2001 through
2013. We begin with a review of growth and consumption poverty trends on
the basis of existing published figures. We then evaluate multidimensional
welfare with a focus on indicators of relevance to children. For this purpose,
we apply Arndt et al.’s (2102) first-order dominance (FOD) approach to assess
child multidimensional poverty using ordinal, binary welfare indicators with-
out imposing arbitrary assumptions regarding the relative importance of each
indicator. Applying the FOD approach to the 2001 and 2010 MICS and the
2007 and 2013 DHS takes advantage of alternative data sources, while allow-
ing for a thorough examination of the impact of macroeconomic policy on
relevant welfare indicators over time and throughout the nation during key
periods of transition, rebuilding, and reform.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 18.2 provides an
overview of the economic context since independence with a focus on reform
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and progress since 2001. Section 18.3 reviews both monetary and non-
monetary poverty measures. Section 18.4 presents the FOD methodology and
the child welfare indicators. Section 18.5 presents the FOD results. Section 18.6
concludes and discusses key results.
18.2 Economy and Growth
18.2.1 Independence to 2002: Instability and Recovery
Since its independence (1960), the DRC’s economic performance can be
characterized by repeated cycles of instability driven by government failure,
conflict, and ineffective macroeconomic policies.1 In the short period imme-
diately following independence, the DRC experienced great political and civil
upheaval, including three regime changes, resulting in a sharp initial decline
in GDP (see Figure 18.1). The takeover of Joseph Mobutu in 1965 initially
brought about a period of stability and growth as the state increased its
economic presence through public investment, and later the nationalization
of all mining and foreign enterprises (Zaireanization). This period was short-
lived as capital flight, declining terms of trade, and mounting debt resulted in
a sharp economic downturn and reduced spending on the maintenance of
critical infrastructure and productive capital. From 1983 to 1989, the govern-
ment implemented a number of policies to improve long-term economic
1 For a detailed discussion of economic performance over this period, refer to Ulloa et al. (2009)
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Figure 18.1. Evolution of GDP and GDP per capita with marked regime changes and
wars, 1960–2013
Source: Authors’ illustration based on World Bank (2014)
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growth, including a structural adjustment programme, which, combined with
a strong upturn in copper prices, spurred a period of recovery and growth.
However, the recovery was short-lived. The subsequent decade brought polit-
ical instability, the ousting of Mobutu, the takeover and assassination of
Laurent Kabila, and the First (1996–7) and Second (1998–2002) Congo Wars,
resulting in economic devastation. Over the period from 1990–2002, the
economy contracted by approximately 40 per cent and GDP per capita
declined by 60 per cent (World Bank 2014). GDP per capita declined to only
30 per cent of its value at independence. Ulloa et al. (2009) note that the
contribution of industry and services to GDP plummeted proportionately as
the economy reverted to subsistence agriculture.
18.2.2 2001–14: Recovery and Growth
18.2.2.1 REFORM STRATEGIES
The transitional government of Joseph Kabila sought to reverse the effects of
the worst economic and social crisis since independence. The government
embarked upon macroeconomic and liberalization reforms in conjunction
with the IMF. The formulation of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (I-PRSP 2001–2), the Government Economic Programme (PEG 2002–5),
and the first Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP 1 2006–10)
sought to implement economic reforms aimed at creating a conducive economic
environment for growth and attracting private investment. The plans recog-
nized the extent to which conflict, government failure, and economic collapse
were interconnected. These plans aimed to promote good governance and peace
through reformed institutions, macroeconomic stability, and growth.
18.2.2.2 INFLATION
With the implementation of the three reform programmes came an amelior-
ation of economic growth and inflation rates. Annual GDP growth increased
from7 per cent in 2000 to 3 per cent in 2002 and was sustained at an average
annual growth rate of 5 per cent in the 2000s in contrast to 4 per cent in the
1990s. In addition, better public financial management and fiscal policies
brought hyperinflation to a halt (see Fischer, Lundgren, and Jahjah 2013).
Between 2000 and 2003, inflation as measured by the consumer price index
(CPI) decreased from more than 500 per cent to about 13 per cent per annum
(World Bank 2014). In 2004, the CPI returned to single digits for the first time
in fourteen years.
18.2.2.3 SECTORAL GROWTH
The DRC has substantial potential for economic growth. The DRC’s primarily
untapped mineral endowment is among the richest in the world with 1,100
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minerals, precious metals, and crude oil. Historically, the mining sector was a
key component of the economy with state-owned mining corporations con-
trolling the majority of production. However, the mining sector’s contribu-
tion to GDP fell from approximately 25 per cent in the mid-1980s to less than
10 per cent in 2001 (IMF 2005). This sharp decline is partly a statistical artifact
as a consequence of official mining being replaced by unofficial mining
activities (smuggling, unofficial trade, and artisanal and informal mining)
due to factors including failed economic policies beginning with Mobutu’s
Zaireanization, deterioration of infrastructure, lack of fiscal capacity in tax and
revenue collection, and conflict at the eastern border. The extent of the
decline in official production can be seen in copper production by the state-
owned firm GECAMINES dropping to 5 per cent of its 1980 output level, its
cobalt production falling by 70 per cent, and its production of zinc coming to
a halt by the 1990s (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma 2004).
In 2002, the DRC revised its mining laws, giving the state the role of regula-
tor, facilitator, and taxer as opposed to the government’s previous ownership
role. Perhaps not surprisingly, government has had difficulty capturing revenue
from unofficial mineral trade. Government mining revenue in 2002 and 2004
was extremely low, though it did increase from 0.18 per cent of GDP in 2002 to
0.24 per cent in 2004 (IMF 2005). The future ability to harness the full economic
benefits of the mining sector remains a challenge due to weak institutions and
the continued lack of fiscal capacity in revenue and tax collection.
The agricultural sector provides direct employment to more than 75 per
cent of the labour force, accounts on average for about 45 per cent of real GDP
(Akitoby and Cinyabuguma 2004), and represents the DRC’s greatest potential
source of inclusive growth and food security. The nation possesses more than
80 million hectares of fertile arable land, ranking DRC among the world’s
areas with the highest potential agricultural value for major crops (maize,
palm oil, soybean, and sugarcane). Despite this potential, agricultural prod-
uctivity in 2006 had fallen to 60 per cent of its 1960 level as the population
reverted increasingly to subsistence agriculture (IMF 2013; Ulloa et al. 2009).
As a result, the DRC is now dependent on imported food (World Bank 2013b).
18.2.2.4 CHALLENGES TO GROWTH
The recent progress realized in the DRC is threatened by insecurity created by
sporadic fighting in its eastern provinces and the state’s lack of legitimacy,
sovereignty, and authority outside of the urban centres. International organ-
izations and donors frequently point to a culture of corruption as a challenge
to growth (AFDB 2013; USAID 2014). The DRC’s inadequate infrastructure is a
major constraint for economic growth and hampers efforts to sustain product-
ive economic activities. Only 2 per cent of the 152,400 km long national road
network and 11 per cent of the 86,821 km agricultural road network are in
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good condition (IMF 2013). In energy, the DRC has a hydroelectric power
potential estimated at about 106,000 MW, equivalent to 66 million tons of oil
per year or 13 per cent of global potential for hydroelectricity, nearly all of it
unexploited (AFDB 2013; IMF 2013). According to the AFDB (2013), poor
electrical supply is a major obstacle in sustaining small-scale enterprises.
18.3 Poverty Profile
18.3.1 Monetary Poverty and Inequality
The 2014 Human Development Report (UNDP 2014b) presents consumption
poverty headcount figures based on national poverty lines calculated from the
2005 and 2012 DRC Enquêtes 1-2-3. In 2005, 71 per cent of the population was
poor, compared to 63 per cent in 2012. This nine percentage point drop in
poverty can be attributed to a decline in rural poverty from 76 to 65 per cent
whereas urban poverty essentially stagnated at 61 and 60 per cent in 2005 and
2012, respectively. The depth and severity of poverty both decreased (six and
eighteen percentage points, respectively). In the same period, the Gini index
increased from 0.42 to 0.45, indicating increased inequality in the country.
Table 18.1 shows the extent to which consumption poverty varies by
provinces within and across years. In 2012, the four poorest provinces were
Bandundu (75 per cent), Kasaï Oriental (79 per cent), Kasaï Occidental (75 per
cent), and Equateur (77 per cent). Between 2005 and 2012 Kasai Occidental
and Kasai Oriental experienced a significant increase in poverty of 34 and
26 per cent, respectively, whereas Sud Kivu and Nord Kivu saw the greatest
declines in poverty of 28 and 29 per cent, respectively.
Table 18.1. Consumption poverty headcount in 2005 and 2012, per cent
2005 Rank 2012 Rank Change Percent change Change in rank
National 71.3 8 63.4 8 7.9 11.1 0
Urban 61.5 4 60.4 6 1.1 1.8 2
Rural 75.7 11 65.2 9 10.5 13.9 2
Bandundu 89.1 13 74.6 11 14.5 16.3 2
Bas Congo 69.8 7 56.9 3 12.9 18.5 4
Equateur 93.6 14 77.3 13 16.3 17.4 1
Kasaï Occidental 55.8 2 74.9 12 19.1 34.2 10
Kasaï Oriental 62.3 5 78.6 14 16.3 26.1 9
Katanga 69.1 6 66.6 10 2.5 3.7 4
Kinshasa 41.6 1 36.8 1 4.8 11.5 0
Maniema 58.5 3 62.9 7 4.4 7.5 4
Nord Kivu 72.9 9 52.4 2 20.5 28.1 7
Orientale 75.5 10 56.9 4 18.6 24.7 6
Sud Kivu 84.6 12 60.2 5 24.4 28.8 7
Source: DRC Enquêtes 1-2-3 reported in the DRC MDG Status Report (UNDP 2014a)
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18.3.2 Non-monetary Poverty Profile
Since poverty rates are limited to 2005 and 2012, non-monetary welfare
indicators comprise an essential component of the DRC’s poverty profile.
The DRC’s low ranking on various international poverty indices reflects the
impact of years of political, social, and economic turmoil. For instance, in
2013, the DRC ranked 186th out of 187 countries based on the UNDP’s
Human Development Index. In 1980, the DRC’s human development was
on par with the UNDP’s low Human Development Index; however, between
1980 and 2000, corresponding to a period of severe economic deterioration
and civil wars, the DRC’s human development sharply declined.Mirroring the
restoration of relative peace and economic recovery, human development
steadily improved throughout the 2000s but has yet to return to its 1980
value and remains significantly below that of sub-Saharan Africa and even
the low Human Development Index (UNDP 2014b).
TheMDGs provide another useful tool for monitoring the DRC’s progress in
improving eight key aspects of well-being. According to the most recent DRC
MDGs report, the country is unlikely to meet any of the eight MDGs by 2015
(UNDP 2014a). Of particular concern, the 2013 infant and under-five mortal-
ity rates of 86 and 118 per 1,000 live births andmaternal mortality rates of 730
per 100,000 live births (World Bank 2014) remain significantly higher than
theMDG targets of 30 and 60 per 1,000 births and 322 per 100,000 live births,
respectively (UNDP 2014a). The primary cause of infant and child death in the
DRC is malaria. It is estimated that malaria strikes children with an average of
ten episodes per year and kills between 150,000 and 250,000 children under
five annually (IMF 2013).
Economic upheaval adversely affected the education system in terms of
insufficient funding, dilapidated infrastructure, and inadequate facilities and
materials, resulting in low school enrolment in secondary and tertiary levels,
high dropout rates, and low completion rates. Gross school enrolment rates at
the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education were 98, 43.3, and 8.2
per cent in 2012 and biased in favour of boys (UNDP 2014a; World Bank
2014). The DRC is unlikely to reach the MDG target of a one-to-one ratio of
girls to boys in primary, secondary, and tertiary education as in 2012 these
ratios were 0.87, 0.59, and 0.55, respectively (World Bank 2014). Other
important indicators also remain low. In 2012, only 31 and 47 per cent of
population had access to improved sanitation and water sources compared to
the MDG goals of 71 and 55 per cent. There is a large disparity between the
urban and rural areas’ access to improved water sources (79 versus 29 per cent)
and improved sanitation (29 versus 32 per cent) (World Bank 2014).
In the DRC, poverty has the face of a woman. The political, economic, and
social constraints faced bywomen are captured in the DRC’s gender inequality
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index score of 0.67, ranking the country 147th out of 151 countries (UNDP
2014b). With the decreased productivity of the agricultural sector, where 73 per
cent of economically active women are employed, women face a greater risk of
poverty (FAO 2011). The imbalanced school enrolment figures noted above
substantially hamper the ability of women to move to other sectors or into
the formal sector. Discrimination is reinforced by the legal and institutional
framework, which incapacitates married women from participating in the
labour force by requiring their husbands’ authorization to work (AFDB 2013).
18.4 FOD Methodology and Data
18.4.1 Methodology
This study seeks to move beyond the examination of individual non-monetary
indicators and analyse multidimensional poverty across time and the provinces
of the DRC. Despite the broad consensus on the multidimensional character
of poverty, how to evaluate multiple dimensions in a single analysis remains a
central topic of debate. The most commonmethods of evaluating multidimen-
sional poverty rely on either weighting schemes2 or the signs of the second-
or higher-order cross-derivatives,3 yet the assumptions required by these
approaches remain contentious.4 The FOD methodology developed by Arndt
et al. (2012) advances multidimensional poverty analysis in its ability to com-
pare the welfare of population groups across time and space without imposing
arbitrary assumptions. Rather, the FOD criterion merely asserts that it is better
to be not deprived than deprived in any dimension.5
Intuitively, consider a set of three ordinal, binary welfare indicators such
that ‘0’ indicates deprived and ‘1’ indicates not deprived in each dimension.
Each combination of welfare indicators is said to dominate, be dominated by,
or be indeterminate relative to other combinations. The outcome (1,1,1)
clearly is better than or dominates (0,0,0), since it is superior in every dimen-
sion. Furthermore, the outcome (1,1,0) dominates (0,1,0) because it is better to
be not deprived than deprived in the first dimension. However, (1,1,0) and
(0,0,1) are indeterminate outcomes; without imposing assumptions regarding
the relative importance of or substitutability between each outcome, it cannot
be determined if it is better to be not deprived in the first two dimensions or in
the third dimension. Extending to two populations, A and B, consider the
distribution of individuals falling into each combination of welfare indicators.
2 See Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003); Alkire and Foster (2011a, 2011b).
3 See Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006), Atkinson (1987), and Foster and Shorrocks (1988a,
1988b, 1988c).
4 See, for example, Ravallion (2011).
5 For a detailed theoretical discussion of the FOD methodology, refer to Arndt et al. (2012).
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The FOD criterion can be described as follows: population A first-order dom-
inates population B if one can generate distribution B by transferring prob-
ability mass (i.e. moving individuals) from better to unambiguously worse
outcomes within A, where better is defined as above.
While FOD analysis allows for comparison across populations without
imposing subjective restrictions, the criterion is strict and comes at a cost. Specif-
ically, FOD comparisons frequently result in indeterminate outcomes and do not
provide a sense of the extent of domination. Arndt et al. (2012) employ repeated
bootstrap samples drawn from each population such that resulting FOD compari-
sons can be interpreted as empirical probabilities of domination. Not only
do probabilities of domination reduce the possibility of indeterminate outcomes,
but they provide evidence of the extent to which a population dominates
another. Furthermore, bootstrap probabilities allow populations to be ranked.
Though FOD comparisons frequently result in indeterminate outcomes, it
should be noted that this shortcoming is countered by the strength of a
dominant result. A dominant result requires superior welfare outcomes to be
registered throughout the population and across indicators, meaning an inde-
terminate result could stem from poor outcomes in a single indicator within a
small section of the population. Thus, a dominant result provides a robust
indication of broad-based superiority through time or across space (Arndt et al.
2012).
18.4.2 Deprivation Indicators
This analysis employs the FOD approach to empirically evaluate child well-
being in the DRC among the eleven provinces and three aggregate areas
(national, urban, and rural) in 2001, 2007, 2010, and 2013. Given the deep
and extensive nature of poverty in the DRC, child well-being is defined in
terms of severe lack of access to basic needs. Gordon et al. (2003a, 2003b)
develop a set of severe deprivation indicators to measure child well-being,
known as the ‘Bristol Indicators’. In particular, Gordon defines severe depriv-
ations as ‘circumstances that are highly likely to have serious adverse conse-
quences for the health, well-being, and development of children’ (Gordon
et al. 2003b: 5). The welfare indicators used in this analysis closely follow the
‘Bristol Indicators’ and are defined as follows.
1. Water deprivation: Children with only access to surface water for drinking
or for whom the nearest source of water is more than a thirty-minute
walking distance from their dwellings.
2. Sanitation deprivation: Children with no access to any kind of latrines or
toilets.
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3. Shelter deprivation: Children living in dwellings with five or more people
per room or with no flooring material (e.g. a mud floor).
4. Health deprivation: Children who did not sleep under a mosquito net the
previous night.6
5. Information deprivation: Children who belong to a household where there
is no access to a television, radio, or phone.7
6. Nutrition deprivation: Children whose Z-scores for any anthropometric
measures (stunting, wasting, or underweight) are below three standard
deviations from the mean of the reference population.
7. Education deprivation: Children who have never been to at least primary
school or are not currently attending school.
18.4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The deprivation indicators are drawn from the 2001 and 2010 DRCMICS and
the 2007 and 2013 DRC DHS. Within each survey, we utilize three sub-
samples: (1) children under five years old, (2) children aged 7 through 17,
and (3) children aged 0 through 17. Child welfare for the three subsamples is
measured in terms of access to water, sanitation, shelter, health, and informa-
tion. In addition, the analysis of children under five incorporates the nutrition
indicator and the analysis of children 7 through 17 includes education.8,9
Table 18.2 reports the percentage of children aged 0–17not deprived inwater,
sanitation, shelter, health, and information by areas and years. Tables 18.3 and
18.4 present children under five not deprived in nutrition by gender and chil-
dren aged 7–17 not deprived in education by gender. Though the deprivation
indicators provide mixed evidence of advancement and stagnation, the overall
picture is one of progress. All aggregate areas and provinces advanced in terms of
bed net usage, primary school enrolment, malnutrition, and access to informa-
tion.National use of bednetsmore than tripled from2007 to47per cent in2013
by which time they were used nearly equally in urban and rural areas.
Nationally, access to information increased from 36 per cent in 2001 to
62 per cent in 2013, though the difference in urban and rural access increased
to forty percentage points. The percentage of children categorized as not
6 The Bristol health indicator is defined in terms of immunizations. Due to the limited sample
for which this data is available and the FOD requirement that no indicator has missing values, we
define health in terms of the use of mosquito nets.
7 Data on the possession of mobile phones was not collected in 2001. However, given the
limited usage of mobile phones in 2001, this is not likely to significantly impact results.
8 The 2007 and 2013 DHS surveys collect anthropometric measures for a subsample of children
under five and thus sample sizes are smaller for under-fives in these years.
9 Data on the use of mosquito nets was not collected for children older than 5 in 2001, thus the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nutrition-deprived improved from 72 per cent in 2001 to 81 per cent in 2013
with a similar improvement occurring in both rural and urban areas.10 Though
the percentage of children identified not nutrition-deprived declined across all
areas, comparing Kinshasa and Sud Kivu reveals that the provincial gap
widened considerably to twenty-six percentage points. Finally, by 2013 the
percentage of children who have ever attended primary school approached 90
per cent or greater in every area. Furthermore, the urban gender gap was nearly
eliminated and the rural gap declined from twelve to four percentage points.
In contrast, access to water improved only in rural areas, quality of housing
improved only in urban areas, and access to sanitation deteriorated slightly in
both urban and rural areas. Progress in housing quality and access to water
varied significantly among the provinces. For example, access to water nearly
or more than doubled in Bandundu, Maniema, and Nord Kivu, but was
stagnant and even declining in Equateur, Kasai Oriental, Katanga, and Orien-
tale. Even within provinces progress was not consistent. Bandundu and
Maniema, with the greatest advancements in water, were also the only two
provinces with declining housing quality. Only Sud Kivu and Nord Kivu
achieved an improvement in all seven indicators.
Table 18.5 presents the total number of deprivations faced by children at the
national, rural, urban, and provincial levels and provides a sense of the depth of
overall deprivation over time and across regions. For instance, the distribution
of children across a number of deprivations highlights the DRC’s rural/urban
welfare divide. In 2013, 1 per cent of rural children were deprived in zero or in
one indicator compared to 24 per cent of urban children, whereas 29 per cent of
rural children were deprived in four or five indicators compared to 5 per cent of
urban children. This pattern is even more extreme when comparing provinces.
For example, in Kinshasa 42 per cent of children faced zero or one deprivation
and virtually no children faced four or five deprivations. In stark contrast,
2 per cent of children face zero or one deprivation in Kasai Occidental.
18.5 Results: FOD Comparisons
This section reports the results of the temporal and spatial FOD bootstrap
comparisons (Tables 18.6–18.10) and spatial rankings. For each subsample of
children, temporal FOD comparisons are conducted between time periods for
each area and spatial FOD comparisons are conducted between areas in each
time period.
10 Most areas experienced a temporary increase in malnutrition in 2010 explainable by high
food prices (52 per cent increase in June 2009 compared to May 2008) and a reliance on






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18.6 reports temporal net domination results for children under five and
children aged 0–7. Temporal net domination measures the probability that an
area advances between two years net of any probability of regression, such
that positive values report the probability of advancement in welfare, blank
cells suggest stagnation, and negative values report the probability of regres-
sion. Bold values indicate domination in the static case (FOD comparisons
without bootstrapping).
FOD comparisons in the subsample of children aged 0–17 indicate significant
probabilities of advancement between 2010 and 2013 in Kasai Occidental
(65 per cent) and Nord Kivu (64 per cent), and between 2007 and 2013 in
Nord Kivu (57 per cent). In addition, the under-five sample suggests a 42 per
cent probability of advancement in Sud Kivu between 2001 and 2013. This
evidence of improved welfare in Kasai Occidental between 2010 and 2013 is
inconsistent with consumption poverty figures (Table 18.1), which indicate
that poverty increased by twenty percentage points between 2005 and 2010.
The FOD results are likely due to the water, sanitation, and shelter indicators
rebounding after deteriorating between 2007 and 2010 rather than a reflection
of improvements in a broader context (Table 18.2). In contrast, the advance-
ment in Nord and Sud Kivu is consistent with twenty and twenty-five percent-
age point reductions in the consumption poverty rates and significant and
generally steady advances across all FOD indicators. Finally, FOD comparisons
Table 18.6. Temporal net FOD comparisons (bootstrap probabilities)




























National 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
Rural 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.12
Urban 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.01
Bandundu 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.27
Bas-Congo 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.30
Équateur 0.32 0.23 0.03 0.03
K. Occidental 0.01 0.03 0.65 0.12 0.65
K. Oriental 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03
Katanga 0.03 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.19
Kinshasa 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.12
Maniema 0.01 0.05 0.05
N. Kivu 0.38 0.01 0.36 0.10 0.25 0.04 0.57 0.64
Orientale 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.33 0.42 0.17
S. Kivu 0.12 0.42 0.02 0.04 0.10
Note: Figures in bold indicate FOD in the static sample.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on DHS and MICS data
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indicate advancement, though probabilities are lower, in Bandundu, Bas
Congo, Equateur, and Orientale, which correspond to the remaining provinces
with a reduction in consumption poverty greater than ten percentage points.
18.5.2 Spatial Comparisons
Spatial results are quite similar among the three subsamples and therefore this
section focuses on the subsample of children aged 0–17. Tables 18.7 and 18.8
report the results of the 2007 and 2013 spatial FOD bootstrap comparisons,
with values in bold indicating domination in the static sample. Row (column)
averages display the probability that an area first-order dominates (or is dom-
inated by) other regions. Therefore, regions that are relatively better off have
larger row and lower column averages.11
Considering row averages, Kinshasa and urban areas have relatively higher
welfare than other regions. Specifically, Kinshasa dominates all other regions
with an average probability of 86 per cent in 2007. This row average declines
to 38 per cent in 2013. Urban areas, of which Kinshasa is a major part, show
similar trends with average probabilities of 68 and 40 per cent in 2007 and
2013 respectively. To a lesser extent, FOD also indicates that Sud Kivu is better
off than other regions (row average probabilities of 37 and 23 per cent in 2007
and 2013). In 2013, Kinshasa, urban areas, and Sud Kivu dominate fewer
regions and dominate to a lesser extent, suggesting that over time, the welfare
gap between high-performing areas and all other areas narrowed.
Turning to column averages, in 2007 Kasai Occidental, rural areas, and
Bandundu were relatively poor, with average probabilities of being dominated
of 40, 39, and 27 per cent, respectively. Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental
deteriorated relative to other regions, registering increased probabilities of
being dominated in 2010 and 2013. On the other hand, in 2013, the prob-
ability of rural areas being dominated by other areas declined (23 per cent) and
Bandundu registered zero probability of being dominated, a gain in welfare
supported by temporal results.
18.5.3 Spatial Rankings
Spatial net domination provides a basis for ranking regions and conveniently
presenting a more detailed perspective on the evolution of relative well-being.
Net domination measures the probability that an area dominates other areas
minus the probability it is dominated by other areas. Tables 18.9 and 18.10
present area rankings for the subsamples of children aged 0–17 and children
11 Note that bootstrap sampling introduces a degree of randomness into the results and care
must be taken to not place too much importance on very small probabilities.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































under five. Generally, the rankings are consistent between the three
subsamples.
It is worth noting that the difference between net domination scores is often
not sufficiently large to distinguish robustly between differences in welfare
outcomes and variation introduced through random bootstrapping. To avoid
misinterpreting rankings, within the tables, shading identifies clusters with
similar net domination scores. Within these clusters, ranks cannot be estab-
lished with confidence. Furthermore, for areas with similar scores, small
changes in bootstrap probabilities may lead to disproportionately large rank
changes. This sensitivity to small perturbations is a likely explanation for
some of the fluctuations in rank changes among provinces.
Despite the need for caution in interpreting rankings, several conclusions
can be drawn. Kinshasa and urban areas are ranked first or second throughout
the twelve-year period. Kasai Occidental is ranked last or second to last in all
years and is solidly last in 2103 in all subsamples. Katanga, Bandundu, and
rural areas improved in rank, while Kasai Oriental deteriorated—results that
are most decisively evident in the children aged 0–17 subsample.
It is noteworthy that specific FOD area rankings do not closely align with
rankings based on consumption poverty rates (Table 18.1). For instance, in
2007 urban areas have slightly higher levels of consumption poverty (61 per
cent) than Kasai Occidental (56 per cent) and Maniema (59 per cent) (UNDP
2014a). In contrast, in FOD comparisons, urban areas dominate both prov-
inces in nearly every iteration. In the rankings, urban areas are ranked second
compared to the Kasai Occidental and Maniema rankings of fourteenth and
ninth. This difference in outcomes identifies fundamental differences in basic
welfare not apparent in consumption poverty measures.
Though regional spatial FOD rankings and consumption poverty rankings
do not closely correspond, some general trends are quite consistent. Between
2005 and 2012 the disparity between consumption poverty in urban and rural
areas declined from fourteen percentage points to only five percentage points.
In comparison, rural–urban relative trends are consistent in terms of narrow-
ing of net domination scores with rural areas being dominated less often (39
and 23) and urban areas dominating less often (62 and 39) between 2007 and
2013 respectively.
Furthermore, FOD ranking suggest a narrowing in the welfare gap among
regions. As noted, the extent to which Kinshasa dominates other areas signifi-
cantly declined from 86 to 39. This trend is further supported by the increase
in the number of regions with positive net domination scores from four
to nine between 2007 and 2013. Even though fewer regions were dominated
in 2013 compared to 2007, the gap between the bottom regions (particularly
Kasai Occidental) and all others widened, suggesting that the bottom
echelon fell further behind. Again, this pattern is consistent with a
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narrowing in the range of consumption poverty rates at the provincial level
along with the large increases in poverty in Kasai Occidental and Oriental.
18.6 Discussion
This chapter provides an evaluation of multidimensional welfare across
regions in the DRC from 2001 to 2013, a time period corresponding to
turmoil, restoration, reformation, and growth as well as declining rural con-
sumption poverty. Applying FODwelfare analysis to 2001 and 2010MICS and
2007 and 2013 DHS survey data allows the analysis of the welfare of children
aged 0–17 in terms of deprivations in water, sanitation, shelter, health, and
information. In addition, the analysis of children under five incorporates the
nutrition indicator and the analysis of children aged 7–17 years includes
education.
During the period of analysis, GDP grew at an average annual rate in excess
of 5 per cent and since 2010 it accelerated to an average annual growth rate
greater than 7 per cent. Over the same period, GDP per capita increased at an
average annual rate of 3 per cent, rising from US$201 in 2001 to US$288 in
2013 measured in constant 2005 US$ (World Bank 2014). Consumption
poverty fell between 2005 and 2012 from 71 per cent to 63 per cent, a change
driven by rural poverty declining nearly ten percentage points to 65 per cent
while urban poverty hardly budged, remaining at 60 per cent in 2012 (UNDP
2014a).
Despite encouraging growth and consumption poverty trends, FOD tem-
poral comparisons do not indicate broad-based advancement of welfare at the
national, urban, or rural levels over the twelve-year period. This lack of multi-
dimensional welfare advancement is likely due to inconsistent progress in the
water, sanitation, and housing indicators. Nonetheless, all areas achieved sig-
nificant reductions in the percentage of children deprived in bed net use, access
to information, primary school enrolment, and malnutrition. Furthermore,
FOD results do provide encouraging evidence of advancement in some prov-
inces consistent with consumption poverty. Specifically, temporal FOD sug-
gests that provinces with reductions in consumption poverty greater than ten
percentage points (Bandundu, Bas Congo, Equateur, Orientale) also have a
moderate probability of advancing welfare, and provinces with reductions in
consumption poverty greater than 20 per cent (Nord and Sud Kivu) have
significant probabilities of advancingwelfare. FOD results also suggest a decline
in the disparity between rural and urban areas and provinces. Specifically, net
spatial domination scores indicate a narrowing between 2001 and 2013 in the
extent to which Kinshasa and urban areas outperformed other areas, as well as
the extent to which rural areas were outperformed by all other areas.
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Table 18.10. 2001, 2007, 2010, and 2013 area rankings by probability of net domination,
children under five










Kinshasa (KSS) 0.90 1 KSS 0.79 1 KSS 0.86 1 URB 0.32 1 1
Urban (URB) 0.53 2 URB 0.43 2 URB 0.54 2 KSS 0.31 2 1
Équateur (ETR) 0.05 3 BCO 0.03 3 MNM 0.07 3 KTG 0.14 3 3
National (NAT) 0.06 4 SKV 0.01 4 ORT 0.06 4 NAT 0.06 4 0
Maniema (MNM) 0.08 5 NKV 0.05 5 NAT 0.00 5 BCO 0.03 5 2
Katanga (KTG) 0.08 6 NAT 0.06 6 ETR 0.04 6 SKV 0.01 6 4
Bas Congo (BCO) 0.10 7 ETR 0.07 7 SKV 0.06 7 NKV 0.00 7 4
Orientale (ORT) 0.12 8 KTG 0.08 8 BCO 0.06 8 BDD 0.00 8 1
Bandundu (BDD) 0.12 9 MNM 0.10 9 KTG 0.07 9 ETR 0.00 9 6
Sud Kivu (SKV) 0.13 10 KOT 0.11 10 BDD 0.08 10 ORT 0.07 10 2
Nord Kivu (NKV) 0.13 11 BDD 0.13 11 NKV 0.13 11 RUR 0.11 11 3
Kasai Oriental
(KOT)
0.17 12 ORT 0.16 12 KOT 0.16 12 MNM 0.15 12 7
Kasai Occidental
(KOC)
0.18 13 KOC 0.21 13 RUR 0.30 13 KOT 0.17 13 1
Rural (RUR) 0.23 14 RUR 0.27 14 KOC 0.64 14 KOC 0.37 14 1
Note: Rankings within shaded groups are highly sensitive to small perturbations and should be interpreted with caution.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on DHS and MICS data
Table 18.9. 2007, 2010, and 2013 area rankings by probability of net domination, children
0–17
2007 2010 2013
Area Net Dom. Rank Area Net Dom. Rank Area Net Dom. Rank Change
Kinshasa (KSS) 0.86 1 KSS 0.84 1 URB 0.39 1 1
Urban (URB) 0.62 2 URB 0.56 2 KSS 0.39 2 1
Sud Kivu (SKV) 0.27 3 ORT 0.21 3 SKV 0.21 3 0
Bas Congo (BCO) 0.09 4 MNM 0.11 4 KTG 0.20 4 1
Katanga (KTG) 0.02 5 NAT 0.03 5 BCO 0.11 5 1
National (NAT) 0.03 6 SKV 0.02 6 NKV 0.09 6 1
Nord Kivu (NKV) 0.10 7 NKV 0.05 7 NAT 0.08 7 1
Équateur (ETR) 0.15 8 BCO 0.07 8 BDD 0.02 8 4
Maniema (MNM) 0.15 9 KTG 0.09 9 ETR 0.00 9 1
Orientale (ORT) 0.18 10 ETR 0.11 10 ORT 0.17 10 0
Kasai Oriental (KOT) 0.19 11 BDD 0.15 11 MNM 0.22 11 2
Bandundu (BDD) 0.23 12 KOT 0.24 12 RUR 0.23 12 1
Rural (RUR) 0.39 13 RUR 0.36 13 KOT 0.28 13 2
Kasai Occidental
(KOC)
0.40 14 KOC 0.70 14 KOC 0.60 14 0
Note: Rankings within shaded groups are highly sensitive to small perturbations and should be interpreted with caution.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on DHS and MICS data
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Only Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, and Maniema provinces experienced
an increase in consumption poverty between 2005 and 2012, which was accom-
panied by stagnating or declining relative welfare. Specifically, probabilities of
being dominated in spatial FOD comparisons confirm a lack of improvement in
relative welfare in Kasai Oriental andManiema and a significant decline in Kasai
Occidental relative to other areas. In contrast, Nord and Sud Kivu exhibit the
most encouraging signs of improvement with reductions in consumption pov-
erty greater than twenty percentage points. They are the only provinces with
gains in the percentage of children not deprived in every deprivation indicator.
Furthermore, temporal FOD comparisons indicate that the greatest probabilities
of advancement in any area occur in Nord and Sud Kivu.
Even though rural consumption poverty declined and the relative welfare of
rural areas exhibits positive signs of improvement, great strides still must be
made to reduce severe deprivations in rural areas where 60 per cent of the
population resides. The rural population depends heavily on the agricultural
sector, yet the lack of infrastructure, the closure of large farms, low levels of
technology adoption, and the lack of private investment have hampered
productivity in this sector. The government’s prioritization of agricultural
and rural sectors appears to have produced some initial gains, yet efforts
must continue towards achieving the DRCs agricultural potential and further
advancing the welfare of rural populations.
In addition to low agricultural productivity, increasing consumption
poverty and declining relative welfare in Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental
are likely due to the region’s large rural population and dependence on the
informal mining sector, particularly diamond mining. The IMF estimates
that artisanal diamond mining contributed to one fifth (about two millions
carats) of total diamond output in the DRC (2005), yet because most artisanal
mines operate illegally often by parties not present in the local area, the
benefits are not captured in the local economy or in local or national govern-
ment revenues. Local miners earn about US$1 a day, which is less than the
private-sector minimum wage (Global Witness 2004 cited in IMF 2005).
A commitment to carry out current mining reform laws is crucial to lift
these mineral-rich provinces out of a precarious state.
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